

Viktor SUVOROV

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WHY

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SUVOROV?

THE MOST FORBIDDEN

BOOKS

WORLD SECOND

Victor SUVOROV Mark SOLONIN, Andrey Burovsky

WHY ARE WE AFRAID OF VICTOR Suvorov?

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There are books that are destined not only to become bestsellers, but to literally turn over all previous ideas, blow up public consciousness, rewrite the past once and for all in order to CHANGE THE WORLD, nothing less. So it was with Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. So it was with the "Icebreaker" by Viktor Suvorov. And no matter how the Kremlin agitprop raged, no matter how trained historians-"anti-rezunists" cursed its books. they will not succeed in hushing up his revelations, nor in saving the Stalinist mythology of the Second World War, nor in shutting up the numerous followers of Viktor Suvorov, who continue his work and find ever new confirmation of his discoveries. Despite the tacit censorship and persecution of dissidents, the process of rethinking history cannot be stopped. This is proof of what

book.

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Victor Suvorov

USSR PREPARED FOR NOT THAT WAR

Dmitry Khmel'nitsky is talking to Viktor Suvorov

— Why do you think the Red Army, despite many years of preparation for war, was almost instantly defeated at the first clash with the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941?

- Soviet troops were preparing for a completely different war, and this explains everything. It's like if we were preparing for an exam in calculus or physics, and we would suddenly be given an exam in the anatomy of some African zebra. There would be a complete discrepancy between what we were preparing for and what actually happened. All my books are about this.

Here is a famous example. We had the Dnieper flotilla, which blocked the river route from Smolensk to the Black Sea and prevented the enemy from going east. The Dnieper is a great river. Very formidable obstacle, if you blow up bridges and shoot from the other side, not allowing to cross. Stationed there in the 1930s. Dnieper flotilla. This Dnieper flotilla was disbanded just before the war and moved to the mouth of the Danube. Well, what should she do at the mouth of the Danube? In the case of a defensive war, this is sheer stupidity.

And the second part of the Dnieper flotilla was moved to the Pripyat River and dug a canal to the city of Brest in order to connect it with the Bug, Vistula and German rivers. Why was this done?

I have evidence that this is not stupidity and this is not unpreparedness. This is readiness. but for a completely different war.

Let's say, the Germans used our H2P bridges throughout the war.

- What it is?

- The best floating bridge in the world, called H2P. These floating bridges were concentrated in the area of state borders. The Germans attacked, seized the bridges that we had prepared in advance. After that, they easily crossed the Dnieper, Berezina, and so on.

So why did the Germans advance so quickly? Because we weren't ready? No, the rapid advance of the Germans in the direction of Moscow is due to the amazing readiness of the Red Army for war.

Here's another example. The Soviet Union captures Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia. If you don't want to say "captures", say "liberates", you can say whatever you like. There were practically no airfields in these territories, because no one needed them there. And the Germans were all counting on tactical aviation. They did not have strategic aviation; by and large, they did not need it.

They did not need to destroy the Donbass, industrial centers - Leningrad, Moscow, etc. They needed to defeat the army, and then the Donbass, and Leningrad, and Moscow would have gone to them whole, not destroyed. And to defeat an army, you do not need a strategic bomber that bombs stationary targets far in the rear. We need a tactical bomber, with one engine, which falls down from the sky and destroys a command post, an anti-tank battery, a column of tanks. It works on point moving targets. These aircraft have a very short range. Therefore, in order to move after the troops, they need airfields. And if the Soviet Union had not prepared for war, then the following would have happened: the Germans attacked, entered Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, there are no airfields there. They're moving forward

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while air bases remain far behind the front, in the German and conquered Polish territories. Conquered by the Germans. And ahead of them is a huge non-airfield strip.

But when the Germans entered Western Ukraine and Belarus, hundreds of airstrips were found there, on which fuel, bombs, etc. were prepared. Because the Germans went forward so quickly to Kyiv and Smolensk, because someone prepared concrete airfields for them with everything they needed. Our preparations for war worked entirely for Hitler.

There are two ways to defend a country. This is easy to imagine in the model. Suppose there are two hostile villages not far from each other. To protect yourself from a neighbor, you can build a high wall, put machine guns there, guard around the clock and make it clear to the evil neighbor that it's better for him not to even meddle, it won't be good. And you can not build anything, but on the contrary, form a team of hunters, attack your neighbors at a convenient moment, capture their village and thereby reliably prevent an attack. So, the Soviet Union acted according to the second option?

- Yes exactly.

— So, the defeat in the summer of 1941 was the natural end of a long and thorough preparation for war. When did this preparation begin?

— It began in 1917. The October Revolution was immediately regarded as a prologue to the world revolution. The first attempt to unleash the Second World War was made by the Soviet government on November 13, 1918. On November 11 at 11 o'clock the First World War ended, and on November 13 the Soviet government ordered the Red Army to go forward, and it went to Estonia. Lithuania, Latvia, with the intention of reaching Berlin. But at that time the Civil War was already going on, and they did not succeed.

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- And how did this trip end?

- This campaign ended with the establishment of Soviet power in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Therefore, later, when it came to 1940, the Soviet Union usually said that then there was a RESTORATION of Soviet power in the Baltics. But then all sorts of whites rose up there, Yudenich and others, quickly kicked the Bolsheviks out of there, but this attempt in November 1918 to rush to Europe was.

Then there was another attempt, in 1920. "Give me Warsaw, give me Berlin, we have already crashed into the Crimea" - this is the march of the First Cavalry Army. Then Tukhachevsky went to Warsaw. but from his books it is clearly seen that Warsaw is just a station half-station, they went to Europe.

After the failure of the Polish campaign, there were two ways. All the leaders of the Bolsheviks understood very well that we could not coexist with the capitalist world, and in this they were completely right. The reason why the Soviet Union eventually collapsed was that it could not exist side by side with a normal human society. Because the West is an example of a normal human life for our entire subjugated population. Just like North Korea is not able to coexist with South Korea. People look there, to South Korea, and ask: "Why do we live in any other way?" Similarly, East Germany could not coexist with West. Either one or the other will win, said Comrade Lenin.

So, there were two ways. The first path is the path of Trotsky, that is, the permanent revolution. Constantly support any forces that anyone, anywhere, raises against capitalism. A partisan war, for example, like the one that was waged in Poland in the 1920s.

Was there a Soviet underground in Poland then?

— Yes, there was a Soviet partisan war. Vaupshasov, Ryabtsevich, Orlov, the future leaders of the Soviet partisan movement in World War II, were partisan leaders in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus in 23-24-25. There are several other names

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hey, I don't remember now. In the book "Day M". I think I wrote about our partisan leaders.

The second way is the way of Stalin: socialism in one country. We interpret this socialism in a completely wrong way. Anyone who says that Stalin wanted to build socialism in one country has not read Stalin. Stalin wrote that it was possible to achieve the complete victory of socialism in one country. However, he continued, the final victory of socialism can only be on a world scale. And he was right about that too. What is socialism? Liquidation of private property. They did it. The congress of victors in 1934 decided that socialism had been built in the Soviet Union. Collectivization was carried out, everyone was driven into collective farms, everything came under state control. But, as Comrade said. Stalin, final victory is a guarantee against the restoration of capitalism. Because the socialist revolution did not win on a world scale, we did not achieve final victory. Everything collapsed.

So, Stalin's path is socialism in one country, which is being built as the basis for the coming liberation of mankind.

Just yesterday I received an amazing poster "Combat Pencil No. 1", which says: "Fascism is the enemy of humanity. No to fascism! A snake is drawn, with which our Red Army soldier sticks a bayonet in the throat, and around there are four small pictures: "Fascism is the destruction of culture" - some barbarian burns books on fire. "Fascism is hunger" - an unhappy mother with a dying child. "Fascism is a prison" - a prison is drawn. Fascism is war. Drawn warmonger. There is a stamp: "Museum of V.I. Lenin. Leningrad branch. Inventory number. There is no date, but "No. 1" says a lot. That this is the very first poster in the series. The fact that he was prepared before the war is quite obvious to me - in this poster there is nothing about the defense of our Fatherland. There is nothing to say that fascism is an enemy of the Soviet Union, or the Russian people, or the Soviet peoples. Fascism is the enemy of mankind. And we are liberating humanity - we are not defending ourselves, but we are liberating humanity from fascism.

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— I wonder when the word "fascism" began to be applied to National Socialist Germany? It seems to me that this is an invention of Stalin.

- I don't know when it began to be used, but I met this term in Stalin's speeches in 1927.

- It was obvious Comintern propaganda ...

- Yes. The Nazis never called themselves fascists. I did not find such a term in Mein Kampf. The Italians called themselves fascists. Fascina is a Roman name, it means a bunch of rods, that is, if translated into a language we understand, it is a union of like-minded people.

— In Soviet propaganda, the word "fascism" was applied to anything, to everyone who was considered at one time or another an enemy of the USSR.

- That's it. Therefore, in 1927, the Social Democrats began to be called social fascists. Like, do not believe this name, they are not social democrats, but social fascists. It was a fictitious, meaningless label that was hung anywhere.

— The funny thing is that this Stalinist label is still used all over the world. Even in Germany they talk about "fascist Germany" and not about "Nazi". Hence the Soviet Union, which fought with the Nazis, and in general with everyone with whom it wanted, is still listed as "anti-fascists". Although if we assume that "fascism" is a colloquial synonym for totalitarianism (which is correct), then the USSR could not have ended up in the "ranks of anti-fascists". By definition, it couldn't. Antifascism is a struggle for democracy, not the other way around.

- Yes, this is a purely Stalinist sticker that was stuck anywhere. Here is an example. I open a dictionary of foreign words, ed. Lekhina and prof. Petrova, Moscow, 1949, p. 323: "Conservative. The first meaning is Latin, the second

swarm: a member of the reactionary political party of the bourgeoisie, pursuing an imperialist policy of expansion, the forcible suppression of the workers' and revolutionary movement, the elimination of democratic freedoms. At present, the conservative parties are openly going over to the side of fascism." So our Margarita, who is Mrs. Thatcher, that's where, it turns out, she was driving.

"It was an ingenious invention. Soviet propaganda preparations for a future war declared a "war against fascism", which meant all enemies, any, regardless of their political differences. Anyone could be in the "fascists". So, the first attempts to unleash a war on a world scale began in 1918, then the Polish war of 1920, then Stalin deposed and expelled Trotsky, and around the year 28, serious, long-term preparations for war began. So?

- In economic terms, it began in 1927. This is the first five-year plan. That's what she thought about. Although these same "German fascists" were not yet in power. Future "fascists" at that time were undergoing military training in Kazan and other Soviet cities.

- Wasn't such a time period - a five-year plan - specially chosen in order to have time to prepare the country for war just during this time?

- We can assume that it is. I don't have a clear opinion on this. In my opinion, Stalin had two plans: a maximum and a minimum. Apparently, he counted on one or two five-year plans, because looking further ahead is never possible. When we try to do this, the proportion is always violated: the events seem to us either very distant or close, but it is purely psychologically impossible to catch a certain moment. Therefore, perhaps, the first five-year plan was organized by Stalin in this way. in order to start breaking up the neighbors in five years. Break Poland, break Europe. But Sta

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there could be doubts. In this case, the first five-year plan was for him the first powerful backlog. The time of construction of the production base. And the second five-year plan is the further development of this production base and the mass production of weapons.

Actually. no one could guess what would happen. It was impossible to predict the situation in Germany if Hitler came to power (1932-1933). It is quite probable, for example, that there was a civil war. She wasn't excluded, was she? In this case, the USSR breaks through Poland and provides direct assistance to Germany. So long-term forecasts can always be wrong, they simply cannot be made.

— When could the next Soviet attempt after 1920 actually provoke a European war happen?

- The World War came close in 1936-1937. And that's why. In 1936, the Spanish Civil War breaks out. Then the Soviet Union begins to put pressure on France and Great Britain: "Children are dying there, Picasso is painting a picture there, they destroyed the village. damned fascists.." International brigades are rushing to Spain, and Stalin is driving military advisers there. To understand the seriousness of Stalin's intentions, you just need to look at who he sent there. Here is a list of these advisors. Then they were lieutenants, captains, colonels. however, these were the most promising commanders of the Red Army, whom Stalin outlined for promotion. Spain was their last test. Most after returning from Spain rapidly went up. Here are the heights reached by some of the military advisers in a few years.

Malinovsky, Marshal of the USSR, Minister of Defense of the USSR.

Meretskov, Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the USSR.

Kulik, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Minister of the Navy, throughout the war a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. In Spain he was

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as an officer, smashed convoys that went through Mallorca, Minorca.

Voronov, Chief Marshal of Artillery, Commander of the Artillery of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Nedelin, Chief Marshal of Artillery, Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Ogoltsov, Marshal of Aviation, Commander of Long-Range Aviation, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

Kazakov, Marshal of Artillery, Commander of the Rocket Troops of the Artillery of the Ground Forces.

Rychagov, lieutenant general of aviation, head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force.

Mansurov, Colonel General, First Deputy Chief of the GRU.

Eternal, lieutenant general, Stalin's military adjutant.

Proskurov, lieutenant general of aviation, head of the GRU.

Datov, Pavlov, Kolpakchi, Lyashchenko - army generals.

Rodimtsev, Romanenko, Stern, Shumilov, Yushkevich - Colonel General ...

In total, more than four dozen generals, admirals ... Do you feel what a bouquet? So I collected them and was stunned. After returning from Spain, all the military went up steeply. In addition, there were scouts. And the most important person there was Antonov-Ovseenko. Officially, he held the position of Consul General in Barcelona, but this was a front. This is that Antonov Ovseyenko, who took the Winter Palace, then crushed the peasants in the Tambov province, Tukhachevsky was with him then on military business. This consul took all the Spanish gold reserves across the Mediterranean, but on his return he was shot. The chief military adviser was Berzin, head of the Fourth Directorate (later the GRU). He was also shot. I explain it this way: the military did their job and everyone went up. But intelligence officers, politicians, the same Antonov-Ovseenko - they did not fulfill their task. And the task was to unleash the Second World War.

Stalin protected the Spanish children. And we have just passed collectivization, how many millions died ...

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If he had drawn Spain, England and France into the war and it had spread further into Italy and Germany, then all European countries would have been drawn into it. And there, in addition, there were international brigades - both Americans, and Swedes, and others. It could turn out that the United States, and some Canada, and Mexico, and others would also be drawn into the war.

On March 28, 1939, Madrid, the last bastion of the Republic, fell. The war in Spain was, as it were, a kind of prologue to the Second World War. There were 42,000 internationalist volunteers from 54 countries of the world. Someone organized propaganda - let's guys fly to Spain. For some reason, when the Soviet Union fought in Finland, no one assembled international brigades. But here's what's interesting. I dealt with these international brigades. So, when they got to Spain, their documents were taken away. And then a shell would definitely hit the building where these documents were stored, or the truck that transported them burned down. So

In this way, Soviet intelligence obtained real passports for tens of thousands of young men. American, Dutch, Belgian...

This is number one. And here is the second moment. When a person came there and his passport was taken away, he turned into a slave. He has no money, to the north - the sea, to the west - the sea, to the east - the Pyrenees mountains, he could not escape. Escape from the International Brigade was punishable by death. The system was thought out very clearly. I believe that the Soviet Union organized this, although I have no proof. But the fact that they were exploited in full is for sure.

One internationalist in Barcelona did see the light. He saw people being tortured and everything. He returned from there enlightened and then wrote a book. Orwell, "1984"...

Of course, all this was done with Soviet money. Someone paid people who went there... It was an attempt to unleash the Second World War away from the Soviet territories. Why Stalin spared neither tanks nor advisers. But the world war did not happen. Immediately on

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barely ending the Spanish Civil War, in March

1939 Stalin changes foreign policy. Already in May, he removes Litvinov, who, as a Jew, cannot act as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and switches the arrows to Poland, to Germany.

— There is a very interesting book "Russian Volunteers in Spain", published in San Francisco in 1983. Author — A.P. Yaremchuk 2nd. He spoke about the White Guards, who fought on the side of Franco and remained victorious; tyami. There were thirty of them in all.

- I have this book. An article was once published in Krasnaya Zvezda that the damned White Guards, having been defeated in their own country, stood under the banner of the Nazis and fought against their own people, against the Soviet volunteers on the side of the Nazis. However, General Franco did not have collective farms, and if the Spaniard did not like something, he could spit, TAKE AND go to some Argentina. And the Soviet peasant at that time was already sitting on the collective farm. I believe that by fighting in Spain, the Russian volunteers thereby saved the honor of their country.

Spain - it was the most real opportunity to start the Second World War. In 1936, there were no tanks at all in Germany, only something was just beginning to be built. And there was nothing special in Italy yet. At that time, the Soviet advantage would have been even steeper. And if the Second World War broke out in Spain and Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain were involved...

Yes, then no one would care about Poland at all.

- It would look like this: we are going to liberate Europe, and here is some kind of mongrel under our feet. She would have been immoral. We go to save the children, but she won't let us in.

— There is an opinion that Stalin once again prepared for a jump in the summer of 1940, counting on the fact that Germany would become deeply bogged down in France.

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Yes, that would be the ideal situation. Nobody expected the fall of France, not even Hitler expected that everything would happen so quickly.

— Do you think, based on the situation in 1941, can the German attack on the USSR be considered preventive?

— I believe that the attack could not have been fully preventive from either side. When they say that Stalin wanted to prevent a German attack with his own people, then this is nonsense, because he did not believe in a German attack at all. And on the German side, it was more or less preventive, but from a slightly different point of view. Hitler did not see the immediate threat, because Stalin perfectly disguised his actions, and the German intelligence was too weak and the Soviet military preparations did not really see through. However, from a strategic point of view, Hitler clearly understood that if he landed in Britain, Comrade Stalin would beat him up.

Let's put the question in a different way. 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. There is no doubt that Stalin planned to break it. Was Hitler going to break it? Or was he making a pact in earnest, with the intention of keeping it? If he did not intend to, then he was preparing a war on two fronts in advance.

“There is ample evidence that he made the pact in earnest. And he was not so stupid as to prepare a war on two fronts.

- But he turned out to be stupid enough to substitute Stalin ...

— In my opinion, Hitler's main idea at that time was to consolidate Germany. He did not foresee or plan World War II. In my opinion, he just flew in with Great Britain and France. His task was to unite all areas inhabited by Germans. At that time, Hitler

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before it was to break out of the Versailles Treaty, it was necessary to return the German lands, it was necessary to return Danzig, of course, East Prussia was not enough for him, he wanted Germany not to be torn into halves. He first wanted to consolidate Germany. to build good houses, improve the birth rate, raise the standard of living, and then...

— That is, in 1939 he was solving purely tactical tasks, not understanding what he was getting into... — Yes, I think so.

— So, when concluding the pact, he really wanted to divide the spheres of influence, and that's it? No war for living space in the East was supposed?

— Yes, only the division of spheres of influence. And East Prussia unites with Germany...

— If Hitler was not going to deceive Stalin, then the strategic attack on the USSR was a preventive one.

- From the point of view of big politics - yes. Hitler realized in 1940 that Stalin would not stop there. When Stalin entered Romania, Hitler faltered. And then Molotov came to Berlin, talked to Hitler, and he finally understood everything. Yes, from this point of view the war is preventive. Hitler thought that if now, when I am at war with Britain and France on the Continent, they break my arms, then what will happen later when I rip on Britain. But Britain does not go to peace, and it is impossible to conquer it, with its number of colonies.

And then Hitler could not have had a direct interest in Soviet territory. He already had Dutch colonies, and Denmark, and Slovenia, and Czechoslovakia, and part of Poland, so there was enough living space.

Mark Solonin

A SIMPLE REASON FOR THE GREAT CATASTROPHE

In the summer of 1941 something bad happened to the Red Army. In different periods of the history of our country, this “something” received various names: from “temporary failures” to

"catastrophic failure". Accordingly, the search for the causes and explanations of what happened acquired a different severity. It is one thing to look for the causes of "temporary failures." Simple common sense and personal experience of every adult immediately prompts an obvious answer: "Eka is unseen. It happens to everyone". It is quite another thing to try to explain the catastrophic defeat of the largest land army in the world. Therefore, before looking for the causes of the phenomenon, we will try to determine as accurately as possible the scale and actual content of what happened.

1. RELATION OF FORCES

By the start of World War II, the Soviet Union was armed and - in the opinion of many - very dangerous. It is impossible to give exact figures characterizing the strength and armament of the Red Army (as well as the army of any other powerful power of that time). The reason for this is very simple — on the eve of the big war, the USSR, Germany, Poland, France, Italy, etc. were continuously building up their military power. More and more new units and formations were formed, the tank and aircraft fleet was rapidly updated, the staff lists were changed.

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the formations and the structure of formations, the principles and schemes for transferring the army from a state of peace to a state of war were changing. It is impossible to indicate exact figures down to the last comma in such a situation, but - as will become clear from what follows - this does not create big problems for the researcher, since with the numerical superiority that the Red Army possessed, small "measurement errors" are of no fundamental importance.

Hitler's Germany began preparations for war with a big (relative to the Soviet Union) delay. At that time (the first half of the 1930s), when, in the context of the most severe world economic crisis, the big bourgeoisie of the industrially developed countries of the world (USA, England, France, Germany) rushed to sell Stalin military equipment, technology, machine tools and entire - fully loaded water, Hitler was just "clearing" the political space of his power in Germany, and the newborn Wehrmacht was conducting field exercises with cardboard models of tanks. The reckless and suicidal policy of the West allowed Stalin to turn gigantic financial resources (both forcibly seized from the former owners and newly created by the labor of a multimillion-strong army of collective farm and Gulag slaves) into mountains of weapons and military equipment. Already in 1937, the Soviet Air Force was armed with 8139 combat aircraft - about the same number will be in service with Germany (4093), England (1992) and the USA (2473) two years later, combined. By October 1, 1939, the aircraft fleet of the Soviet Air Force had grown one and a half times (up to 12,677 aircraft) and now already exceeded the total number of aviation of all participants in the outbreak of the world war. In terms of the number of tanks (14,544 — and that's not counting the obsolete T-27 and light amphibious T-37/38), the Red Army at the beginning of 1939 was exactly twice as large as the armies of Germany (3419), France (3286) and England (547), together

taken.

Universal conscription in Germany was introduced only on March 16, 1935. By the summer of 1939, the Wehrmacht already had 51 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 motorized), and the Red Army had 100

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rifle divisions (considering the existing 5 rifle brigades as two "estimated divisions"), 18 cavalry divisions and 36 tank brigades. In the future, both powers rapidly increased the number of their armed forces, and the gap between them was continuously decreasing (Germany was "catching up" with its future enemy). On the other hand, by the summer of 1941 the geopolitical situation had changed radically: Wehrmacht divisions were scattered over vast expanses from Northern Norway to North Africa, from Brest on the Atlantic coast of France to Brest-Litovsk on the Western Bug River. As a result, out of about 200 divisions (of all types) that Nazi Germany had at the beginning of the summer

1941, on the western border of the Soviet Union, as part of three army groups ("North", "Center", "South"), by June 22, 91 infantry divisions, 17 tank and 9 motorized divisions were concentrated (in total "91 infantry divisions" we included 4 light infantry, 1 cavalry, 4 mountain rifle divisions and 5 SS combat divisions). In total - 117 divisions.

Subsequently, over several weeks and months, the composition of this grouping gradually increased due to the introduction of reserves into battle: 2 tank divisions (which appeared on the Eastern Front only at the beginning of the battle for Moscow), one motorized, 24 infantry divisions. In addition, on June 29, fighting began in the Arctic (in the direction of Murmansk and Kandalaksha), in which 4 more German divisions took part (more precisely, three divisions and the "SS Nord group", corresponding in size to a rifle brigade). Total - 148 German divisions. On July 10, 1941, the offensive of the Finnish army began in Karelia, and thus the total composition of the enemy grouping increased by 1 German and 16 Finnish infantry divisions - significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in armament and equipment, but not inferior in fighting spirit. . The notorious "190 enemy divisions", invariably present (and supposedly from the first day of the war!) In all the writings of Soviet historians, were obtained by adding Wehrmacht and SS combat units into one heap, 9 German oh

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early divisions, divisions of the reserve of the High Command and troops of the allies of Nazi Germany, including Italians, Hungarians and Slovaks, who in the summer of 1941 did not exist on Soviet territory at all.

By June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had armed forces consisting of 198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 61 tank, 31 motorized divisions. In total - 303 divisions. Besides. the Red Army also included those that had no direct analogues in the invasion forces of the Wehrmacht formation, such as 16 airborne brigades and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades (PTABR). According to the accepted tradition, we did not include in the general list of units and formations of the NKVD troops, the number of which (154 thousand people) corresponded to 10 "settlement divisions". Of course, not all of this colossal land army was on the western frontier. How many divisions were there in the West? Unfortunately, it is impossible to give an exact answer to this simple question. The Red Army was on the move. In May 1941, the largest redeployment of troops in the history of the USSR, Russia and the world began, and in June it continued and significantly increased in scale. Without digressing for a second to a discussion about the reasons that prompted Stalin to start this grandiose operation to transfer troops, we will try to at least tentatively assess the composition of the grouping of the Soviet army in the field.

The last known pre-war document, the certificate "On the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Event of a War in the West," signed by Deputy Chief of the General Staff N. Vatutin on June 13, 1941, provided for the following distribution of forces: 186 divisions in the active fronts, 51 divisions consisting of five (16th, 19th, 22nd, 24th, 28th) main army reserve armies deployed in the strip from the western border to the Bryansk-Rzhev line. Total - 237 divisions for the "war in the West." In addition, the existing 66 divisions were distributed among the internal districts, in particular 31 divisions (a tenth of the entire Armed Forces of the USSR) in the Far East. Further, Vatutin writes: "With such a distribution of forces, it is necessary to

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it is fully planned to transport by rail ... 33 divisions in total ... It will take about 13 days to transport ... combat units can be transported in 10 days. Once again, we recall that the cited document was drawn up

June 13th. Even if the terms named by Vatutin are doubled, it turns out that the complete concentration of the Red Army grouping could have ended by July 10th. In other words, Hitler was very lucky.

Postponing the invasion by only two weeks could have resulted in 117 German divisions launching an offensive against a twice as large enemy force. But even in real history, the numerical superiority was on the Soviet side.

On June 22, the troops of the four border districts (Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa) had 149 divisions (not counting the PTABR, 7 cavalry divisions and 12 airborne brigades were counted as 7 "calculated divisions"). In addition, by June 22, at least 16 divisions of the second strategic echelon were concentrated in the territory of the western districts. Thus, by the beginning of hostilities, the Red Army had 165 divisions in the Western theater of operations, including 40 tank and 20 motorized divisions. Comparing these figures with the enemy grouping (117 divisions, including 17 armored and 9 motorized). one can immediately note not only the overall numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, but also a significantly larger proportion of tank and motorized formations in their number. However, in terms of the number of rifle (infantry) divisions, the Red Army had some superiority over the enemy (105 versus 91). Contrary to the lie about "6 thousand people in a division" repeated a thousand times by a huge army of Soviet historians, the composition of the rifle divisions of the border districts (with a staffing strength of 14,483 people) by the beginning of the war was as follows: 21 divisions of 14 thousand people each, 72 divisions of 12 thousand people and 6 divisions of 11 thousand people.

Subsequently, the size of the grouping of Soviet troops began to increase - and on a much larger scale and at a faster speed than the groupings

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Wehrmacht and its allies. At the end of June, units and formations of the Leningrad Military District entered the battle: 15 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions. By July 10-15, the redeployment of troops of the second strategic echelon (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies) to the theater was basically completed. In mid-July, there were already about 235 divisions in the active army. By the end of July 1941, the 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 43rd, and 49th armies were formed. In total, during the two-month battle of Smolensk, 104 divisions and 33 brigades were put into battle. In total, by December 1, 1941, the Stavka sent 150 divisions and 44 rifle brigades to the western strategic direction, and another 140 divisions and 50 rifle brigades to the Leningrad and Kiev directions. But in addition to rifle (infantry) formations, cavalry, tank, artillery brigades and divisions were also formed ... The reason why the Red Army increased its numbers in volumes completely inaccessible to the enemy is extremely simple. The number of divisions that the Wehrmacht was able to concentrate at the borders of the Soviet Union represented the maximum reached by 80 million Germany two years after the start of general mobilization. There was almost nothing to add to this "maximum". On the other hand, those 235 divisions that the Red Army concentrated on the front by mid-July 1941 represented the minimum that the 200 millionth Soviet Union could form in the framework of covert, secret mobilization even BEFORE the announcement of open general mobilization. On June 23, 1941, open mobilization began, and by July 1, 5.3 million people were drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces (which meant an increase in the total number of military personnel two times compared to the state on June 22). But on July 1, the mobilization, of course, did not end. She was just getting started. As a result, by the end of 1941, a total of 14 million people were mobilized. With such a huge human resource, the command of the Red Army could both make up for the loss of personnel of the units of the army in the field, and form all new ones, but

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new and new connections. On the whole, in the second half of 1941, the total available "resource" of personnel (the initial strength of the active army plus reinforcements and new formations sent to the front) of the parties correlated as 2.7 to 1. Due to the fact that open mobilization in The USSR was declared not before, but after the start of hostilities, in the first days and weeks of the war, the numerical superiority of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht in personnel and the total number of DIVISIONS was relatively small (about 1.3 to 1). Superiority

in the most modern and effective (for that time) branches of the armed forces - tanks and aviation - it was overwhelming from the first days of the war.

The troops of the German Army Group North included 3 tank divisions armed with 602 tanks. The troops of the Soviet Northwestern Front opposing it, from June 22 to July 6, brought into battle four mechanized corps (12, 3, 21 and 1 without one tank division, which fought at that time in the Arctic), which were armed with 2188 tanks. The ratio of the number of 3.6 to 1. In parentheses, we note that prepared by the military-historical service of the General Staff of the Russian Army under the general editorship of Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheev, the statistical collection "Secrecy stamp removed" on page 368 reports that during the "Baltic defensive operation" in the period from June 22 to July 9, S-3 troops, f. lost 2523 tanks. So, the number of tanks indicated by us (hereinafter) in the composition of the mechanized corps of the Red Army is underestimated (probably due to underestimation of the process of arrival of new tanks, which process did not end on June 22, 1941). For the most meticulous readers, we note that the German tankers also received new tanks during the fighting. In particular, in the period up to September 10, 1941, three tank divisions of the Army Group "North" received the following reinforcements: 1st TD - zero, 6th TD - 2 (two) Czech tanks R7-35 (0. 8th TD - 0. In total, the Eastern Front received 10 (ten) R2-1U, 35 (thirty-five) before September 10

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7-7 and 44 (forty-four) Czech 2-35/38(0). This is how "the whole of Europe worked for Hitler" ...

The most powerful German army group "Center" included 9 tank divisions, 1936 tanks. The opposing Western Front in the period from June 22 to July 6 brought into battle six mechanized corps (11, 6, 13, 14, 7 and 5 without the 109th honey) and a separate 57th TD, armed with there were 4365 tanks. The ratio is 2.25 to 1. True, on page 368 of the collection "Secrecy Removed" it is reported that the loss of tanks on the Western Front from June 22 to July 9 amounted to 4799 vehicles.

Army Group South included 5 tank divisions and 728 tanks. The troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts opposing it had ten mechanized corps (22nd, 15th, 4th, 8th, 16th, 9th, 19th, 24th, 2nd, 18th). In the Yu-3 lane. f. the 109th medical unit from the 5th mechanized corps transferred to the Western Front also fought. This huge armored horde consisted of 5826 tanks. The ratio is 8 to 1.

In general, 17 German tank divisions were armed with 3,266 tanks (and if - which would be completely logical - subtract 146 unarmed "commander tanks" and 152 combat training tankettes P7-[with machine guns from the total number, then the Germans not even three thousand tanks are recruited). Already in the first 2 weeks of the war, this "steel avalanche" was opposed by 20 Soviet mechanized corps, which had 12,379 tanks before the start of hostilities. The ratio of the number of tanks is 3.8 to 1. For complete clarity, we clarify that the calculation did not include 11 divisions and 7 batteries of self-propelled "assault guns", which adds another 246 vehicles to the German armored weapons (including armored ammunition transporters) . On the other hand, we did not take into account the two mechanized corps being formed in the Western OVO, the 17th MK and 20th MK, which were armed with 63 and 94 tanks, respectively, did not take into account tank regiments of cavalry divisions, did not take into account one and a half thousand light amphibious tanks - kov as part of reconnaissance units of rifle divisions and corps. The total composition of the tank fleet of the Red Army on June 1, 1941 (not counting 2.4 thousand mouths

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roaring tankettes T-27, not counting 3.6 thousand light amphibious T-37/T-38/T-40) was expressed as 19,540 tanks, unthinkable for any other army in the world. In addition, there were 3,258 cannon armored vehicles in service, in terms of their armament (a 45-mm cannon in a tank turret) exceeding two-thirds of what was called a big word in the Wehrmacht "tank"...

The degree of mechanization of Soviet artillery was also completely unique. According to the staff list of an ordinary (not a motorized rifle!) rifle division of the Red Army, a howitzer artillery regiment was supposed to have two tractors for one howitzer, 90 trucks and 3 cars. In a separate anti-tank division of a rifle division, 18 "forty-five" had 24 vehicles and 21 tractors. Moreover, it was supposed to use the armored caterpillar Komsomolets as a tractor - created on the basis of components and assemblies of the T-38 light tank, armed with a machine gun in a ball mount and generally corresponding in terms of combat capabilities to the German R7-[tankette.

This is the staffing table of April 1941. By the beginning of the war, they did not have time to bring the staffing of rifle divisions to such heights (two tractors per howitzer) (which all Soviet historians tirelessly referred to). What has been done in reality? Already in February 1941, the Red Army had 34 thousand tractors (caterpillar tractors), 214 thousand cars of all types and 11.5 thousand motorcycles. By the beginning of the war, the number of tractors (caterpillar tractors) had grown to 44,900 units. Including 7780 armored "Komsomol". Now let's compare the number of mechanized weapons with the number of artillery systems. By June 22, the entire Red Army had 14,900 anti-tank guns and 17,900 howitzers and guns with a caliber of more than 76 mm. As you can see, by June 22, the number of tractors exceeded the number of guns.

But on June 22, 1941, the equipping of the Red Army with military equipment was by no means completed. This obvious (seemingly) fact was vehemently ignored in Soviet historiography. Nevertheless, in the course of the June 23

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covered mobilization, the Armed Forces received more

31.5 thousand tractors and 234 thousand cars. As a result, the staffing of troops with tractors (tractors) was brought up to 80% of the regular requirement, i.e. up to those very two tractors per howitzer.

Contrary to the general misconception, the Red Army also had a walkie-talkie. And far from alone. At the beginning of January 1941, the Armed Forces of the USSR included:

- 40 front-line radio stations (i.e. 8 for each of the five future fronts);
- army 845 pieces (fifty for one combined arms army);
- regimental (5AK) 5909 pieces (about 4 pieces per regiment).

The Soviet Air Force was also the largest in the world. In terms of the number of aviation squadrons, flight crews and combat-ready aircraft, Soviet aviation also had a significant (and overwhelming) superiority over the Luftwaffe on the southern and northern flanks of the huge front. In the above-mentioned report of Vatutin dated June 13, 1941, it is reported that there are "a total of 218 combat-ready (excluding new, emerging. - M.S.) air regiments." True, already in the next paragraph, where the distribution of these forces by fronts is indicated (it is this term, "front", that was used in the text of June 13), the summation leads to the number of 225 air regiments, i.e. 1125 squadrons. Slightly more than half of these forces were deployed in the Western theater of operations (in relation to the events of the first weeks of the Soviet-German war, the theater of operations should be understood as the sky over Karelia and Murmansk, the Baltic States, Belarus, Right-Bank Ukraine, Moldova and Crimea). The minimum figures available to us make it possible to determine the size of the Soviet Air Force grouping (including aviation of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets) in 136 air regiments (680 squadrons), 7200 flight crews (including about 3.6 thousand fighter pilots). The enemy (1st, 2nd, 4th and some parts of the 5th Luftwaffe air fleet) had 63 groups (air regiment), i.e. 189 squadrons, 2110 airmen

crews (including 910 fighter pilots). The ratio in the number of squadrons is 3.6 to 1. In terms of the number of crews, 3.4 to 1. In terms of the number of fighter pilots, 4 to 1. And behind the back of the group of Soviet aviation deployed in the Western theater of operations, stood almost equal in number (about 120 air regiments) reserve in the internal districts, in Transcaucasia and in the Far East.

The most unfavorable balance of forces for the Soviet Air Force developed in the offensive zone of Army Group Center. The most powerful grouping of the Luftwaffe (2nd Air Fleet) and the weakest grouping of Soviet aviation (Air Force of the Western Front and the 3rd Long-Range Bomber Corps) are concentrated here. But even in this direction, numerical superiority was on the side of Soviet aviation (in terms of the number of squadrons - 1.6 to 1, in terms of the number of crews - 1.4 to 1, in terms of the number of fighter pilots - 1.5 to 1).

On the northern and southern flanks (the Baltic states, Ukraine), the numerical superiority of Soviet aviation over German aviation was enormous. In the offensive zone of the Army Group "South" (4th VF of the Luftwaffe), the Soviet Air Force outnumbered the enemy in fighters by 5.4 times, in bomber crews - by 4.4 times. In the offensive zone of Army Group North (1st and part of the forces of the 5th VF Luftwaffe), the ratio of the number of fighter pilots is 7.2 to 1, the crews of bombers - 4.3 to 1. German aviation were so small - both in comparison with the strength of the Red Army Air Force, and in comparison with the forecasts of Soviet intelligence - that in the report of the headquarters of the North-Western Front No. 3, signed at 12 noon on June 22, 1941, it was stated verbatim the following: "The enemy has not yet put into action significant forces of the Air Force, limiting himself to the action of individual groups and single aircraft."

We did not begin to give figures characterizing the number of combat aircraft of the parties, for two reasons. Firstly, because an aircraft in military aviation is a consumable item. Moreover, it is very quickly expendable: the average "lifetime" of an aircraft in a war is estimated at two to three dozen sorties. After that, he or

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the enemy is shot down, or he himself breaks down in an accident, or he is simply withdrawn from combat strength to replace engines, the real resource of which in combat conditions did not exceed 50 - 100 hours. Secondly, there were much more serviceable aircraft in the Air Force of the western districts than there were pilots (Soviet aviation was rapidly renewing its aircraft fleet, and in many air regiments, especially fighter regiments, two sets of aircraft accumulated). Therefore, an estimate of the balance of forces in terms of the number of aircraft (instead of an estimate in terms of the number of crews and squadrons) would lead us to completely astronomical figures.

A few words should also be said about the aviation of Germany's allies. Two Finnish fighter and one bomber regiment, armed with about 180 combat aircraft, took part in the combat operations in the skies of Karelia. The Romanian Air Force had 8 squadrons of fighters and 11 squadrons of bombers, which were armed with about 200 aircraft by the beginning of the war. Of course, the Finnish and Romanian Air Forces could not have any significant influence on the balance of forces of the parties and the course of hostilities, especially since they had to act precisely on those sectors of the common front where the numerical superiority of Soviet aviation was enormous. However, they should not be completely discounted. First of all, this applies to the Finnish Air Force, whose pilots accumulated over three months of fierce air battles of the "winter war" of 1939-1940. significant combat experience. In general, it can be assumed that the Allied aviation increased the combat potential of the Luftwaffe by 10%.

Let us now descend from heaven to earth and look at this earth (more precisely, at the geographical map of the western regions of the Soviet Union) with a close look. The war unfolds, as everyone knows, not on a smooth chessboard, but on real terrain, with its ravines, potholes, lakes, mountains and swamps. And if no "offensive" or

There are no "defensive" tanks and planes, and there weren't, then the terrain, on the contrary, can help either the defending or the attacking side. This is not designed

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us, and the terms "tank-inaccessible terrain", "tank-dangerous direction" have long and firmly taken their place in military literature. This is all the more true and significant for the armies of the 1940s, in which motorized rifle battalions of tank divisions moved not on caterpillar armored vehicles, but on ordinary, "civilian" trucks and captured buses; and the German tanks, on their narrow tracks, got stuck after the very first rain on the terrain that in Russia is called the "road".

Turning to the map, we will see that the German army group "North" immediately after crossing the border "stumbled" into the full-flowing Neman River, and in its lower (ie, widest) course. Further, having crossed many small rivers and streams, the German divisions, about 250 km from the border, came to the banks of the wide navigable river Zapadnaya Dvina (Daugava), again in its lower reaches. After another 200-250 km, on the way to Leningrad, the German troops had to cross the Velikaya River, to the north of which the road to Leningrad was blocked by the system of Lake Peipsi and Pskovskoye. And this is the best of the options provided by nature. The troops of the Army Groups "Center" and "South" were waiting for much more serious obstacles.

The terrain in the offensive zone of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups (Southern Lithuania and Western Belarus) is completely "anti-tank". From the north, the Bialystok ledge is covered by a strip of impassable swamps in the floodplain of the forest river Biebrza; in the south, the border was drawn along the bank of the navigable river Western Bug (again, in its lower reaches). After forcing the Bug, the Germans were waiting for the swampy banks of the Narev River and a continuous row of forest rivers, tributaries of the Pripyat (Yaselda, Shchara, Tsna, Sluch, Ptich). The few roads among the dense forests and swamps of Western Belarus are a kind of mountain gorges: a stuck (or knocked out) head car of the column cannot be bypassed or bypassed. To the east of Minsk, the offensive zone of the Army Group Center from north to south is crossed by two full-flowing rivers, which Napoleon had the misfortune to meet in his time: the Berezina and the Dnieper.

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Army Group "South" could practically launch an invasion only through a narrow (100-120 km) "corridor" between the cities of Kovel and Brody. From the north, this corridor is bounded by an absolutely impenetrable strip of swamps of Polesye, from the south - by the Carpathian Mountains. It was in this zone that all the German tank and motorized divisions advanced. On this way, they had to force the Western Bug, and then the southern tributaries of the Pripyat (Turya, Stokhod, Styr, Goryn, Sluch) following one after another at almost equal intervals of 50-60 km. South of the Carpathians, in Moldavia and in the steppes of southern Ukraine, the terrain, it would seem, is much more favorable for the advancing troops - there are neither forests nor swamps. But there are three navigable rivers - the Prut, the Dniester, the Southern Bug - in their lower reaches. Finally, the mighty Dnieper inevitably arose on the path of the German and Romanian troops, the forcing of which in its lower reaches is an operation comparable in complexity and riskiness to an amphibious landing. In fact, only to the east of the Dnieper did the German motorized formations of Army Groups Center and South enter the terrain, allowing for a wide and difficult to predict operational maneuver. Yes, only from the border to the Dnieper more than 450 km. This roughly corresponds to the size of the whole of Germany from its western to eastern borders.

The obstacles created by nature itself were supplemented and intensified many times over by man-made obstacles. Along the western border of the Soviet Union, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, a continuous strip of fortified areas of the "Molotov Line" stretched: Telshaisky, Shaulyaisky, Kaunassky, Alytusky, Grodno, Osovetsky, Zambrovsky, Brestsky, Kovelsky, Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russky, Strumilovsky, Przemytsky, Verkhne-Prutsky and

Nizhne-Prutsky. By June 22, 1941, from 332 to 505 bunkers were built in the Western OVO, and about 375 in the Kiev OVO. Twice as many bunkers were still under construction. For example, 128 bunkers were built in the Brest UR, and another 380 were to be handed over by the builders by July 1, 1941.

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95 bunkers were built in Rava-Russky UR and 306 more were under construction. On average, on the main operational directions of the Molotov Line, there were three concrete bunkers dug into the ground per kilometer, the walls of which withstood a direct hit by a heavy field howitzer projectile, and one of them was fully built and equipped.

At a depth of 200-300 km from the border, there were fortified areas of the "Stalin Line": Kingiseppsky, Pskovsky, Ostrovsky, Sebezhsky, Polotsky, Minsky, Slutsky, Mozyrsky, Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Shepetovsky, Izyaslavsky, Starokonstantinovskiy, Ost-Ropolsky, Letichevsky, Kamenetz-Podolsky, Mogilev Yampolsky, Rybnitsky, Tiraspol'sky. The number of bunkers in one URA was different and ranged from 206 to 455. The density was from 2 to 3 bunkers per 1 km of the front. In terms of the number and composition of weapons, the quality of reinforced concrete, and the equipment with special equipment (filtering and ventilation installations, wire and radio communications, electrical equipment, optical devices), any of these bunkers was at least as good as the defensive structures of the notorious "Mannerheim lines". Contrary to the legend that has been circulating for many decades, no one blew up the pillboxes of the "Stalin line" before the war and did not cover them with earth. On the contrary, on May 25, 1941, another government decree was issued on measures to reconstruct the fortified areas on the "old" border. Some pillboxes of the "Stalin line" are still intact to this day. No one planned to transport weapons from them to the "Molotov Line", and it was impossible in principle: bunkers on the "old" border were 9/10 machine-gun, while on the new border, bunkers should have been one and a half times more (5807 versus 3279), and half of them were to be armed with artillery pieces.

Let's sum up the first results. The facts listed above already contain enough information to give simple and accurate answers to questions on which de

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There has been a heated discussion for several years. For example, question number 1. Why did Stalin sleep through the attack? Why didn't he heed the notorious "warnings" of Churchill and Sorge? Why didn't he mobilize? Why "did not move troops to the border"?

And why shouldn't he have slept peacefully on the night of June 21-22? On the night before the exam, he does not sleep and feverishly flips through textbooks, a loser who spent the whole semester doing nothing and not studying. Stalin was not an idler. For many years he worked until late at night (or early in the morning), personally solving thousands of issues related to the creation, equipment, weapons, and training of the largest army in the world. This army has been created. It was larger than any European army. It was armed with so many tanks and planes that all of Stalin's opponents combined did not have. In the west of the country, along the banks of the mighty rivers, two rows of the most powerful fortifications were built, on which - Comrade Stalin knew for sure from the experience of the Finnish war - even a numerically insignificant army could hold back the onslaught of an advancing enemy for weeks. But his army was not "insignificant in numbers." Even in the First Strategic Echelon, it outnumbered that grouping of the Wehrmacht, which was revealed (as we now know - with some exaggeration) by its intelligence. So why did Stalin have to stay awake? Rushing around the office with an extinct pipe? Make some convulsive decisions that break the long and carefully worked out Grand Plan? To declare an open (!!!) mobilization, depriving oneself of the opportunity to appear before the whole world in the role of an innocent victim of a treacherous attack for a hundred years to come?

Question number 2. "But if Directive No. 1 had been sent to the troops a day, an hour, half an hour earlier ... And if Molotov had acted not at 12 o'clock in the afternoon, but at 9 o'clock in the morning ... And if the commander of the Western Front had declared battle - I'm alarmed at the same time as the commander of the Southern Front (that is, 4 hours earlier) ... And then it would be ... "

Nothing would have changed. Neither at the operational, nor - even more so - at the strategic level. Even if we knew nothing about the real course of hostilities, even

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if we didn't know that the biggest defeats of 1941 (Kiev and Vyazemsky pockets) did not take place on the first day, not in the first week, and even far from the first month of the war, even if we forgot that that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the Crimea and near Kharkov in the spring

The year 1942 was no less devastating than the defeats and defeats of the 41st, even without knowing this, we could firmly assert that nothing fateful happened on June 22, 1941. Because it couldn't happen. Not that scale. Not the same spatial scope. It was possible to destroy an army with three hundred divisions, tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft scattered over the vast expanses of the Soviet Union with one first blow only by massively using nuclear missile weapons. But Hitler did not have an atomic bomb. V-2 ballistic missiles and jet bombers existed in the summer of 1941 only in the form of blueprints. Fortunately for all of us, Hitler did not succeed in "postponing" the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union for a long time. As a result, of the 117 divisions of the invading army, three-quarters were infantry. With horse-drawn artillery. Soldiers of the Wehrmacht crossed the border rivers on foot. Over bridges that still needed to be built (or captured and held). The calculated rate of march (march, not attack!) of an infantry division is 20 km per day. Without taking into account the time required to cross the rivers, and without taking into account the resistance of the enemy, who also participates in hostilities. Add to this the maximum firing range of the main German field artillery systems (10-20 km), and we get the value of the maximum possible depth of the "kill zone on June 22". At least 4/5 of all divisions of the Red Army were outside this zone, at a distance of 50-500-5000 kilometers from the border. They learned about the beginning of the war from Molotov's speech on the radio (as hundreds of memoirs tell about this). And even more so, those 14 million reservists who put on soldiers' overcoats after the announcement of general mobilization on June 23, 1941, could not become victims of the "first annihilating blow".

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2. PRICE AND RESULTS

Having finished with the discussion of what was not, we now turn to the history of real events.

The task assigned to the Wehrmacht according to the Barbarossa plan ("the main forces of the Russian ground forces located in Western Russia must be destroyed in bold operations by means of a deep, rapid advance of tank wedges ...") was completed by mid-July 1941. The troops of the Baltic and Western military districts (more than 70 divisions) were defeated, destroyed or captured. The same thing happened with the 60 divisions introduced into the North-Western and Western fronts already in the period from June 22 to July 9. The Germans passed through most of the fortified areas of the "Molotov Line" and "Stalin Line" without even paying attention to the gray concrete boxes of bunkers. Through others they broke through with battles that lasted no more than two or three days (we are talking specifically about breaking through the front of the fortified area, and not about the resistance of some garrisons that held the bunkers of the Grodno, Brest, Osovets URs until June 27-30, 1941). The enemy occupied Lithuania, Latvia, almost all of Belarus, crossed the Bug, Neman, Western Dvina, Berezina and Dnieper. On July 16, the Germans occupied Smolensk. Two-thirds of the distance from the western border to Moscow was covered in less than a month. Troops of the South-Western Front in disorder retreated behind the line

of the old Soviet-Polish border, in mid-July 1941, Wehrmacht tank units occupied Zhytomyr and Berdichev and reached the suburbs of Kyiv.

Almost all the equipment and heavy weapons of the troops of the western districts were lost. By July 6-9, the troops of the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern Fronts had lost 11,700 tanks and 19,000 guns. Aviation losses by the end of July reached 10,000 aircraft, i.e. exceeded the initial number of Soviet Air Force groupings in the Western theater. Particularly heavy, almost irreparable losses were suffered by tank troops. The main striking force of the Red Army is huge

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mechanized corps, armed with the best T-34 and KV tanks in the world, simply melted, disappeared, leaving behind piles of abandoned tanks, armored vehicles, trucks and tankers that blocked all the roads of Lithuania, Belarus and Western Ukraine. Already on July 15, 1941, the remnants of the mechanized corps were officially disbanded.

What Soviet historians modestly called "the failure of the frontier battle" meant in fact the complete defeat of the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army (the number of divisions surpassed any army in Europe, and the number of tanks surpassed all of them put together). By July 7-10, 1941, the Germans occupied (more precisely, passed) an area of 700 thousand square meters. km, which is about three times the territory of Poland occupied by the Wehrmacht in September 1939. True, the German command soon had to learn that the encircled and defeated armies of the four western districts (Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa) represented is only part of the "main forces of the Russian ground forces." And in place of the broken divisions from the depths of the vast country, more and more new formations approached. All this innumerable army was defeated, surrounded and captured in new pockets: near Smolensk and Roslavl, Uman and Kyiv. By the end of September 1941, the Red Army had lost 15,500 tanks, 66,900 guns and mortars, and 3.8 million small arms in the course of seven major strategic operations alone. A month later, the Germans captured Kharkov, Odessa and the Crimea, went to Moscow and Tikhvin.

Now let's look at the situation in the first weeks of the war from the other side. What price did the Wehrmacht pay for its (to put it bluntly, phenomenal) success? "Total losses," writes the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder, "by 6.7.41 are: wounded - 42,755 (1588); killed - 13869 (829); missing - 5010 (81); total - 61634 (2498). Figures in parentheses show casualties among officers, they are not included in the total number of casualties."

If we translate Halder's data into a more familiar form for us (by combining soldiers and officers), then we get the following Wehrmacht loss figures:

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- 19.8 thousand killed and missing;

-44.3 thousand wounded.

Total: 64 thousand soldiers and officers.

Is it a lot? Everything is relative. To begin with, let's compare the losses of the first weeks of the Soviet-German war with the losses of the Wehrmacht in Poland (September 1939) and France (May-June 1940).

War in Poland: 14 thousand dead and missing, 30 thousand wounded, total losses - 44 thousand people.

War in France: 45 thousand dead and missing, 111 thousand wounded, total losses - 156 thousand people.

These figures are taken from the well-known monograph by Tippleskirch. According to updated data presented in the equally textbook work of Müller-Hillebrand, in Poland the Wehrmacht lost 17 thousand people irretrievably, and in France - 49 thousand people.

In principle, the picture is clear, but some explanation is still needed. In terms of the number of divisions, the Polish army was five times inferior to the Soviet troops of the western military districts. The technical equipment of the Polish army in 1939 and the Red Army in 1941 are simply incomparable. Attacked from three sides (from the west, from East Prussia, from the Czech Republic occupied by the Germans), the Polish army was practically left without a rear, and even received a crushing blow from the "Stalinist ax" in the back. "The Polish state, whose rulers have always shown so much arrogance and bragging," shouted Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense, from the rostrum of the Mausoleum on November 7, 1939, "and in the first military clash, it shattered like an old rotten cart .." And yet, losses Wehrmacht in Poland turned out to be slightly less than those that the Germans suffered during the defeat of the troops of the western districts of the Soviet Union. The losses of the Wehrmacht in France (both total and irretrievable) during what Russian historians to this day do not hesitate to call the "triumphal march" were 2.5 times greater than the losses on the Eastern Front by July 6 1941. And this despite the fact that the entire French army was less than the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army in terms of the number of people, divisions, tanks and aircraft,

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and the main events of the war with France took place on the "patch" of Normandy and Flanders, with maximum distances of 300 km along the front and 250 km in depth. This roughly corresponds to the size of Lithuania, which one of the three, the smallest, Army Group North occupied in one week of June 1941.

The results of the war in the air also deserve a brief mention. During the first three weeks of the war on the Western Front (from May 10 to May 31, 1940), the irretrievable losses of the Luftwaffe (aircraft of all types) amounted to 978 aircraft. During the first three weeks of the war on the Eastern Front (from June 22 to July 12, 1941), the irretrievable losses of the Luftwaffe (aircraft of all types) amounted to: according to the so-called "updated data" - 550 aircraft; Luftwaffe - 473 aircraft, i.e. two times less than in the sky of France.

In general, during the entire campaign in the West (from May 10 to June 24), the Luftwaffe lost 1,401 aircraft irretrievably on the Western Front, and another 672 were damaged. For a comparable period of time (from June 22 to August 2, 1941), German aviation losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 968 downed and 606 damaged aircraft.

Thus, the losses of the Luftwaffe on the Western Front were - in any of the considered time intervals - higher than on the Eastern. During that period (May 1940), when French aviation and British fighters based in France (total 700-750 pilots) still had the opportunity for organized resistance, German losses were 2 times more than in the first three weeks of fighting in the East. It remains to be reminded once again that the Air Force of the western districts alone had 3,600 fighter pilots (almost five times more than the allies), and the composition of the Soviet aviation group was constantly increasing.

Everything is relative. Let us now compare the losses of the Wehrmacht with its strength. The same Halder repeatedly determines the size of the grouping of German ground forces in the East at 3.2 million people. Thus, by July 6, 1941, losses amounted to exactly 2% of 06

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cabbage soup. These are certainly not small, but very small losses.

Even those who have not graduated from the military academy should understand that the army, which had to break the "stubborn resistance of the enemy", suffers completely different losses. Let us explain this with three specific examples.

Khalkhin Gol. The size of the grouping of Soviet troops: three rifle divisions, six tank and motorized armored brigades, 57,000 personnel. Russian historians estimate the number of Japanese troops at 75,000 people (i.e., 5 "estimated divisions"). Active hostilities lasted only seven days (from 23 to 30 August 1939). Compared to the war that two huge, multi-million-strong armies entered on June 22, 1941, the conflict at Khalkhin Gol looks like a forgotten minor episode. Nevertheless, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 40% of the total strength of the group (8 thousand killed and missing, 15 thousand wounded). Let us immediately note that the losses of the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol turned out to be only three times less than the losses suffered by the Wehrmacht in battles with 150 Soviet divisions!

Operation "Bagration" (the defeat of German troops in Belarus in the summer of 1944). The size of the grouping of Soviet troops: 156 rifle, 12 cavalry divisions, 2 rifle, 18 tank and mechanized brigades, 2332 thousand personnel. Losses amounted to 33% of the total (179 thousand killed and missing, 587 thousand wounded and sick).

Lvov-Sandomierz operation (liberation of Western Ukraine in the summer of 1944). The losses of the Red Army (65 thousand killed and missing, 224 thousand wounded and sick) amounted to 29% of the total strength of the group.

In general, during the liberation of the Baltic States, Belarus, the western regions of Ukraine, Moldova (in Russian historiography, this is called the Baltic, Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz and Iasi-Chisinau strategic offensive operations) the Red Army

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lost 1400 thousand people (318 thousand killed and missing, 1084 thousand wounded and sick). Let us clarify that here we do not take into account the losses of the Red Army in two more operations to liberate Western Ukraine: Rivne-Lutsk and Proskurovo-Chernivtsi, for which the author does not have data. Comparing these terrible figures with the losses suffered by the Wehrmacht during the occupation of the same territories in June-early July 1941, we find that the total losses of the advancing Red Army turned out to be 22 times greater than the losses of the advancing Red Army in the summer of 1941. on the same terrain of the Wehrmacht.

Finally, we should compare the losses of the Wehrmacht (64 thousand killed and wounded) with the losses of the Red Army. The troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts in the period from June 22 to July 6-9 lost 749 thousand people killed, wounded and missing. This figure does not include the losses of the Northern Front (Leningrad MD) and the Southern Front (Odessa MD), which began active hostilities on June 29 and July 2, respectively. But even without taking into account the losses of these fronts, the ratio of the losses of the advancing (and very successfully, 20-30 km per day advancing) Wehrmacht and the defending Red Army is 1 to 12. This is a "miracle" that does not fit into any what are the canons of military science. According to sound logic - and throughout the practice of wars and armed conflicts - the losses of the attacker should be greater than the losses of the defender. The ratio of losses of 1 to 12 is possible only in the case when the white colonialists, who sailed to Africa with cannons and guns, attack the "enemy" armed with spears and hoes. But in the summer of 1941, the situation on the western borders of the USSR was completely different: the defending side was not inferior to the enemy either in numbers or in armament (the mere fact of the loss of 19 thousand guns suggests that the guns these were), significantly surpassed it in the means of inflicting a powerful counterattack - tanks and aircraft, and even had the opportunity to build its defense on a system of powerful natural barriers and long-term defensive structures.

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No less eloquent are the figures characterizing the ratio of military equipment losses. As noted above, by the end of September 1941, the Red Army had lost 15.5 thousand tanks. The losses of the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht (although not by the end of the month, on September 5-6) amounted to: 285

light R7-P, 471 Czech R7-35/38(0, 639 medium R2-P and 256 "heavy" R7-GU. Total 1651 tanks. This is the total loss figure, including both irretrievably decommissioned vehicles and those tanks that were under repair, but even with this, not entirely correct, comparison, the ratio of the losses of the parties is 1 to 9. The calculation, carried out taking into account only irretrievable losses, almost doubles this proportion.

The ratio of tank losses on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front is also very indicative. The fact is that on the eve of the war, eight mechanized corps of the South-Western Front were armed with 833 of the latest T-34 and KV tanks - more than there were any different ones in the five tank divisions of the 1st tank group of the Wehrmacht (728 tanks). The long-barreled 76-mm gun F-34, mounted on Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, pierced the frontal armor of the most protected German tanks (Ru Sh of the J series, Px yU of the E series) at a distance of 1000-1200 meters. Light tanks with bulletproof armor (of which there were 319 units in the 1st TGr) were pierced by the F-34 cannon projectile through two sides. On the other hand, not a single Wehrmacht tank could hit the T-34 even from 500 m. Strictly speaking, the 1st TGr had 255 R7-Sh tanks armed with a 50-mm cannon, which could tungsten carbide core (armor penetration - up to 65 mm at a distance of 300 m) to hit the T-34, but due to the shortage of tungsten, such ammunition was very rare. Well, against the 48-ton KV monster with 95 mm frontal armor and 75 mm side armor, any German tanks were simply unarmed. Thus, the huge quantitative superiority of the tank forces of the Southwestern Front was complemented by an absolute qualitative superiority. Nevertheless Yu-3. f. by July 6, 4381 tanks had been lost. The losses of the 1st tank group

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By the end of August, 183 tanks were irretrievably lost and 198 were under repair. The ratio of deadweight losses is 1 to 24.

1 to 24. These two numbers give a simple answer to the question of "what would happen if we managed to delay ...". In Soviet historiography, this word denotes the postponement of the date of the start of the Soviet-German war to a later date. What kind of transfer would allegedly allow "to complete the rearmament of the army". Not to mention the fact that only a defeated army can completely and finally "complete rearmament", the very idea of "pulling back" is absurd in principle. Yes, of course, 15 minutes of extra time in a football match can guarantee a win. But on one condition: if the entire opposing team sits on a bench and allows you to score goals into an empty net. And if not? And if the enemy also tries to use each of these 15 minutes to strengthen his defense and storm your gates? In the early 40s. Germany was rapidly catching up with the Soviet Union in terms of the quality and technical sophistication of its military equipment. By the end of the war - no doubt overtaken. I overtook it in the conditions of an economic blockade and among the ruins of cities completely destroyed by the blows of the Anglo-American aviation. And what would have been in service with the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe if Hitler had really been able to delay the start of the war against the USSR? Returning from the subjunctive mood to real history, we see that the re-equipment of the tank divisions of the Kyiv district with the latest tanks did not change anything either in the course of hostilities or in dynamics of equipment losses.

Two generations of Soviet (and now Russian) historians waged an uncompromising struggle against the Soviet tanks of 1941. They were simply mixed with mud (not on the battlefield, of course, but on paper). It was "certainly established" that all the tanks were broken, hopelessly outdated, worn out, with an insignificant balance of 100-150 hours of engine life. Gears were too brittle, track pins were too soft, filters didn't filter, periscopes didn't periscope... In short,

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not only to fight on them - it was impossible to drive 50 km from point A to point B. It's just amazing how these hopeless "thirty-fours" stood in the arsenal of many armies.

world until the mid 1960s. Fortunately, this struggle was bloodless. Unfortunately, it had very concrete, tangible economic consequences. Two generations of Soviet generals were brought up and trained in military academies on the myth that the catastrophe of 1941 happened because of the technical backwardness of the Red Army.

The Soviet generals did not want a repeat of the catastrophe and for half a century put pressure on the party leadership, demanding to finally and irrevocably "re-equip" the Soviet Army in such a way that even friends would be afraid. As a result, the Soviet Union collapsed and disappeared from the political map, armed with, among other things, 30,000 of the best tanks in the world...

A detailed analysis of the performance characteristics of Soviet tanks, aircraft, guns, and artillery tractors, as well as a serious and impartial comparison of them with enemy equipment, are far beyond the scope of this article. Let's not even try to "embrace the immensity". Let's take a better rifle.

On page 367 of the statistical collection "Secret Classification Removed", which we have repeatedly mentioned, it is written that in 1941 the Red Army lost 6,290,000 small arms. The most common "small arms" of 1941 was the three-line Mosin rifle. This weapon was and remains an unsurpassed example of reliability and durability. The "three-ruler" could be drowned in a swamp, buried in sand, dropped into salty sea water - and it kept shooting and shooting. The weight of this true masterpiece of engineering is 3.5 kg without cartridges. This means that any young and healthy man (namely, of such men the Red Army consisted in the summer of 1941) could carry 3-4 rifles from the battlefield without much effort. And even the most wretched collective farm mare, harnessed to a simple peasant cart, could take to the rear a hundred "three-rulers" left over from those killed and wounded in battle.

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tsov. And further. Rifles "just like that" are not handed out. Each has its own individual number, each is issued personally and against signature. Everyone, even the "youngest" first year, was explained that he would go to court for the loss of his personal weapon. How could six MILLION RIFLES and machine guns have gone missing?

Let's not simplify. In war as in war. It is not always possible to collect all the rifles on the battlefield to the last. Not every truck and not every wagon with weapons in a combat situation reaches its destination. Finally, a certain number of rifles and submachine guns could actually be damaged by fire, explosion, or polar cold. Is it possible to roughly estimate the size of such "normal" losses of small arms? Of course you can. After working for a few minutes with a calculator and the same collection "Secrecy Removed", we find out that in 1944-1945. one million soldiers "lost" 36,000 small arms per month. Consequently, in the six months of 1941 "normal" losses should not have exceeded 650,000 to 700,000 units. In fact, 6.3 million were lost. There is an "excessive" loss of more than 5.6 million units of small arms.

Just as "abnormal" were the losses of other types of weapons. Thus, in the six months of 1941, 24,400 field artillery pieces were lost (this figure did not include anti-tank guns and mortars), which amounted to 56% of the total resource. And for 12 months in 1943, 5700 guns were lost (9.7% of the resource). Thus, the "average monthly" losses in 1941 turned out to be 8.5 times greater than in the year 1943. Even more revealing are the proportions of losses of anti-tank defense guns. As of June 22, 1941, there were 14,900 anti-tank guns in the Red Army (in fact, even more, since the compilers of the collection "Secrecy Removed" for some reason did not take into account the 76-mm and 88-mm guns that were on armament of PTABs). In addition to this colossal number (5 guns against one German tank), in six months of 1941, Soviet industry transferred another 2,500 anti-tank guns to the troops.

NIS In total - a total resource of 17,400 units, of which 70% (12,100 guns) were lost. And for the whole of 1943 - for all of its 12 months - 5500 anti-tank guns were lost, which amounted to only 14.6% of the total resource of 1943. As an example for comparison, 1943 was not chosen by chance. This is the year of grandiose tank battles on the Kursk Bulge, this is the year when the Germans began mass production of heavy tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", against which our "forty-five" (namely, they still accounted for 95% of the total resource 1943) were completely helpless. And yet, in 1943, the Red Army was losing 460 guns a month, and in 1941, at a time when two of the three German tanks on the Eastern Front were light vehicles with bulletproof armor, 2,000 a month. . 4.5 times more. But this is also a completely wrong calculation. There was no "uniform" loss of two thousand guns every month. There was a massive loss of most of the entire anti-tank weapons in the first weeks of the war - and bottles with combustible mixture of the KS, which were officially adopted by the Red Army and put into serial production a month after the start of hostilities.

These figures are so incredible that a reasonable question immediately arises: "Are they true?"

As far as accounting for personnel losses is concerned, this question can be answered with a firm "no". The losses of the personnel of the Red Army, given in the statistics collection of G.F. Krivosheev, are clearly underestimated. We illustrate this with the following specific example. On page 162 of this collection, it is reported that the troops of the North-Western Front (the number of which by the beginning of hostilities was determined by the compilers at 440 thousand people) until July 9 lost 87,208 people killed, wounded and missing. 20% of the original number. Can this figure be true? Of course not. All the documents, memoirs, studies at our disposal, with absolute unanimity, are

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act - the front was defeated. Defeated utterly. Here are just a few excerpts from the reports that the command of S-3.f. sent to Moscow:

On June 28, "... the 8th Army, which suffered 40% or more losses, retreats to the northern bank of the Western Dvina.

The 2nd Panzer Division apparently perished. The position of the 5th Panzer Division and the 84th Motorized Division I don't know.

The 11th Army does not exist as a formation.

I don't know the provisions of the 5th, 33rd, 188th, 128th, 23rd and 126th rifle divisions..."

June 29 "... our forces are near Dvinsk: two airborne brigades, of which one actually does not exist due to losses incurred, two consolidated regiments formed from stragglers, the remnants of the 2nd Panzer Division without a single tank and 46 1st motorized division of the 21st mechanized corps - a total of 1000 people ... "

July 2 "... 5th Panzer Division 24.6. in the Vilnius region was surrounded by the enemy and dispersed. The remaining fighters and commanders only began to appear in the Polotsk region on 06/26/41 and on 06/30/41 in the Pskov region. Mat. part of the combat vehicles was completely destroyed or left on enemy territory ...

The 2nd Panzer Division ... was surrounded, and there was no more information about it. Now, just as in the 5th Panzer Division, the remnants are gathering in the area of Pskov and Polotsk.

The 84th motorized division ... was heavily bombarded by enemy aircraft and subsequently surrounded and fought in encirclement until 25.6. There is no information about her, there are individual Red Army soldiers at various points ... "

July 3 "... the condition of the units of the 8th Army is characterized by the following data:

10th Rifle Division: 98th Rifle Regiment is almost completely destroyed; from the 204th Infantry Regiment, 30 people remained without materiel; The 30th artillery regiment has one gun; The 140th howitzer artillery regiment of 36 guns lost 21...

Parts and management of the 90th Infantry Division have not yet been found. Separate fighters of the division are attached to units of the 10th Infantry Division.

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Data on the state of the rest of the army units have not been received...

..The composition of the connections of the 12th mechanized corps on 3.7.41:

23rd Panzer Division - 10 tanks, 150 infantry, no shells;

28th Panzer Division - 22 tanks, a motorized rifle regiment almost at full strength;

202nd motorized division - about 600 people ... "

How is it possible to reconcile such reports with the statement about the loss of "only" (forgive the cynicism) 20% of the original number of personnel? However, in the mentioned statistical collection there is also page 368. On it we read that in the same period, from June 22 to July 9, C-3, f. lost 341 thousand small arms. This already allows us to estimate real losses with a certain degree of reliability...

The constant underestimation of the number of casualties (mainly "missing") led to the fact that in the final table No. 69 on page 146 the total number of missing in 1941 was determined at 2,335,482 people. And this despite the fact that the generally accepted estimate of the number of Soviet prisoners of war in 1941, based on long-declassified and comprehensively studied documents of the Wehrmacht, is 3.8 million people. Without pretending to absolute accuracy, we will try to estimate the total losses of the Red Army in 1941. We will solve this problem, forgetting for a moment that we are talking about millions of killed people. Just like a problem about a pool, into which one pipe is poured, and poured out of another. It is known (all the same statistical collection of Krivosheev, p. 152) that by the end of 1941 the average monthly strength of the active army not only did not increase, but even slightly decreased (2,818,500 against 3,334,400). The only possible explanation for such dynamics is that losses exceeded the number of replenishment (more poured out of the pool than entered).

What human resources did the Red Army receive in the second half of 1941? In total, 14 million people were mobilized. Of course, not all of them got into action.

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active army. The active army is only one of the components of the armed forces. There are also rear and training units, test sites, warehouses and bases, hospitals, rear airfields. For example, in Germany, with a total number of armed forces of the Reich of 7.25 million people. in units and formations of the active army (on all fronts) in June 1941 there were 3.8 million (52%). In the USSR, during the last three years of the war, the share of personnel in the active army was 57-58% of the total number of servicemen. It can be reasonably assumed that the same figures apply to the distribution of human resources in 1941. In this case, out of a total of 14 million people called up for mobilization, at least 8 million people should have entered the active army. And this is the minimum estimate. Let's not forget that in the summer of 1941 the active fronts also included the armies of the Second Strategic Echelon, then the troops of the internal districts previously considered rear, and at the end of the year, units of the Far Eastern Front.

Such simple arithmetic leads us to the fact that the Red Army lost at least 8.5 million people in 1941 ($3,334,400 + 8,000,000 - 2,818,500 = 8.5$ million). And now the most important thing: what are the components of this nightmarish figure?

The most reliable (according to the author) are the data on the number of wounded admitted to hospitals for treatment. In the deep rear, there was more order, and accounting was at least double (both on admission and on discharge). So, all the sanitary losses of the active army (wounded and sick) were determined by the authors of the collection "Secrecy Removed" at 1,314,000 people. Based on the constant for all wars of the twentieth century, the ratio of the wounded and killed as 3 to 1, it can be assumed that 450 thousand people died on the battlefield.

In fact, more precisely, according to the reports of the headquarters of units and formations of the army in the field, the number of those killed and dying from wounds in hospitals amounted to 567 thousand people. Even assuming the worst - one wound

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who did not return to service until the end of 1941 - and add all sanitary losses (1314 thousand) to the number of those killed and dead, it turns out that the counted combat losses of 1941 (i.e. killed and wounded) are no more than 2.0 million people. Another 6.4 million fighters and commanders "disappeared without lead."

6.4 million. As many as there were in the active army on June 22, 1941, and again as many.

Of course, the term "missing" is a euphemism intended to replace other, much less euphonious terms. The "standard scheme" of the defeat and disappearance of a military unit of the Red Army is known. Known from a great variety of documents, memoirs, books.

Point one. A heart-rending cry is heard: "Surrounded!" In the summer of 1941, this unpretentious word worked wonders.

"One single, rare, almost unused in civilian life, fatal word ruled over countless herds of people running, wandering, crawling somewhere without any orders and rules..." (V. Astafiev)

Point two. Loss of a commander. The reasons could be very different: he died, was wounded, went to clarify the situation to a higher headquarters, shot himself, or simply ran away.

Point three. Some of the "experienced" who took command of the decapitated military unit makes a decision: to break through to the east in "small groups". All. This is the end. After a few days (or hours), the former battalion (regiment, division) crumbles into dust and ashes.

Point four. A huge number of lonely "wanderers", having wandered aimlessly, without meaning and without food through the fields and forests, go out to the villages, to the people. And in the village - the Germans. The same Germans, who were supposed to be stopped by the division scattered through the forests and fields. Further options are already very few: a compassionate widow, a prisoner of war camp, service in the "police". That's all.

What word can we call these people? Deserters, traitors to the Motherland, surrendered, captured? Far from pretending to replace the competent authorities and give personal assessments, we will try to at least tentatively assess the scale of the catastrophe.

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phy (the very nature of such a phenomenon as mass desertion excludes the possibility of accurate, by name registration).

The figure of 6.4 million "missing" (that is, prisoners, deserters, not included in the reports of the headquarters of the killed and wounded) that we obtained by purely calculational means correlates with acceptable accuracy with other, quite reliable information. For example, with the above figure of losses of small arms (6.3 million units).

Further. The German military command recorded the capture in 1941 of 3.8 mln of former Red Army servicemen. This figure, as Soviet historians rightly point out, may be somewhat overestimated due to the fact that the Germans included among the prisoners military builders (and in some cases, just men from among the civilian population mobilized to dig trenches and anti-tank ditches). This is true, just as it is true that we are talking about only a few percent of the total number of prisoners. The Germans had no need to "catch" civilian builders and enroll them in the number of prisoners of war of the Red Army. Moreover, by the end of July 1941, the flow of prisoners of war exceeded the Wehrmacht's ability to protect and maintain them. Things got to the point that on July 25, 1941, the order of the Quartermaster General No. 11/4590 was issued, in accordance with which the mass release of prisoners of a number of nationalities (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Balts) began. During the validity of this order, i.e. Until November 13, 1941, 318,770 former Red Army soldiers were sent home (mainly Ukrainians - 277,761 people).

According to the data cited in the same collection "The Classification Removed" (i.e., at least not exaggerated for the purpose of "evil defamation of the Red Army"), the Soviet military command and the NKVD discovered and convicted 376 thousand soldiers for desertion. former servicemen. Another 940 thousand people were "called for the second time." This strange term denotes those soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who, for various reasons, "left behind" their military unit and remained in the territory occupied by the Germans. As Kras comes

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Noah Army, in 1943 - 1944. they were re-armed. At the same time, one should not forget that the initial number of "stragglers" was much larger: someone died from poverty, hunger, shelling, executions and bombings, someone joined the partisans and died in battle, someone enrolled in the "police" and left along with the retreating units of the Wehrmacht.

Probably, we will not be much mistaken in estimating the total number of deserters (if only this term is applied at all to the situation of the massive collapse of the army) at 1.3-1.5 million people. And this figure is rather underestimated than overestimated. On page 140, the total number of all categories of retired personnel of the Red Army - killed, dead, missing, captured, convicted and sent to the Gulag (and not to the penal battalion, which is part of the army), demobilized due to injury and illnesses and "others" does not agree with the total number indicated on page 139 of "those who left the Armed Forces for various reasons" by 2,248,000 people. The compilers of the collection directly explain this inconsistency by "a significant number of undiscovered deserters."

The arithmetic difference ($6.4 - 3.8 - 1.5 = 1.1$) may reflect the inaccuracy of our estimate of the total number of "missing". Well, if that were the case. Unfortunately, there is every reason to assume that this "missing million" consists of the wounded, abandoned in a stampede and not counted in the reports from the front of the dead. At least, many Soviet historians in their writings informed readers without a shadow of embarrassment that "the wounded, who could not be evacuated, were transferred to the care of the local population." Is it worth discussing the question of how the "local population", in whose house there were neither medicines, nor even an extra glass of milk, could take seriously wounded soldiers into their "care"? On November 17, 1941, the head of the Political Directorate of the Western Front, divisional commissar Lestev, in his report "On the political and moral state of the troops" wrote: "Seriously wounded or wounded in the legs, who could not walk and even crawl, at best

leave-

lied in the villages or simply rushed to the battlefield, in the forests and died a slow death from hunger and loss of blood. All this happened in front of people and was one of the reasons that many Red Army soldiers and commanders tried to evade the battle, because they saw the inevitability of death in the wound. According to information provided by G.F. Krivosheev, 200 (two hundred) army hospitals were missing, 17 left the encirclement "with heavy losses."

The fact that in the summer of 1941 it was mass desertion and mass surrender that were the main component of the losses of the Red Army is clearly seen from the (as has already been shown - significantly underestimated) data given by the compilers of the collection "Secrecy Removed". For example, during the 32 days of its existence in July-August 1941, the Central Front irrevocably lost 111,000 soldiers and commanders. Including 9,199 (8%) killed, 45,824 missing and captured, and another 55,985 people fall under the strange column "non-combat irretrievable losses". The Central Front fought for a very short time. The Western Front, constantly changing its commanders and absorbing more and more dozens of divisions, survived until the end of 1941. Its irretrievable losses amounted to 956 thousand people, of which 849 thousand (89%) disappeared without lead, were captured and in "non-combat losses". The same unsightly situation developed on the southern flank of the war. The troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts irretrievably lost 956 thousand people in 1941 (this is not a typo, but an accidental coincidence with the number of losses of 3. f.). Of these, 864,000 (90%) went missing, surrendered, or deserted.

3. SIMPLE ANSWERS

Stalin himself was the first to absolutely understand the meaning of what was happening. Perhaps that is why he understood so quickly and so correctly that his "universities" were underground work in a subversive organization that once destroyed the Russian army right during the world war. Stalin specifically knew how empires collapse and multimillion-strong armies disappear. So there are only seven

It took him days to understand what was the main reason for the unheard-of defeat. The revealed truth turned out to be unreasonably heavy and stunningly unexpected even for this man with a heart of stone and nerves of steel. On the night of June 28-29, Stalin left everything and everyone, went to the "near dacha", where he spent two days in complete prostration - June 29 and 30, not answering phone calls and not meeting with anyone.

We do not need to hold seances and summon the spirits of the dead in order to find out what Stalin thought about and what conclusions he came to. He expressed his decisions in the form of orders that came to the troops either from him personally, or on behalf of the Headquarters, People's Commissar of Defense, the General Staff, commanders of fronts and strategic directions. Let's quote just a few of them:

GKO Decree No. 00381 of July 16, 1941 (signed personally by Stalin):

"...individual commanders and ordinary fighters show instability, alarmism, shameful cowardice, throw down their weapons and, forgetting their duty to the Motherland, grossly violating the Oath, turn into a herd of sheep, in a panic running before an insolent enemy... »

Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the North-Western Direction No. 3 dated July 14, 1941:

"...troops of the North-Western Front, not always giving a proper rebuff to the enemy, often leave their positions without even entering into a decisive battle. Separate alarmists and cowards not only arbitrarily leave the battle front, but also sow panic among honest and staunch fighters. Commanders and political workers in a number of cases not only do not stop the panic, do not organize and do not lead their units into battle, but with their shameful behavior sometimes further increase the disorganization and panic on the front line ... "

Order of the commander of the North-Western Front No. 044 of July 26, 1941:

"... I order

1. Commanders and military commissars of formations and units to oblige all commanders and political workers, under their personal responsibility, to sew on

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overcoats and tunics buttonholes, sleeve insignia and insignia.

2. From now on, all officers of the command staff who allow violations of the uniform, who have removed their insignia, to be considered as cowards and alarmists, dishonoring the high rank of commander of the Red Army, and to bring them to severe responsibility, up to bringing them to trial by military tribunals ".

Headquarters Order No. 270 of August 16, 1941:

"...commanders and political workers, during the battle, tearing off their insignia and deserting to the rear or surrendering to the enemy, should be considered malicious deserters whose families are subject to arrest ... shoot such deserters from command personnel on the spot ... If the head or part of the Red Army, instead of organizing a rebuff to the enemy, prefer to surrender to him as a prisoner - destroy them by all means, both ground and air, and deprive the families of Red Army soldiers who have surrendered of state benefits and assistance ... "

Stavka Directive No. 001919 of September 12, 1941:

"The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are quite a few panicked and directly hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons, start shouting: "We are surrounded" and drag the rest of the soldiers along with them. As a result, the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then, alone, begins to emerge from the forest. Similar phenomena take place on all fronts" (emphasis mine. - M.S.).

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 002202 of September 21, 1941 (the full text is given without abbreviations):

"The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command proposes to urgently convey:

1. Is Kyiv abandoned by our units or not?
2. If Kyiv is abandoned, are the bridges blown up or not?
3. If the bridges are blown up, then who can guarantee that the bridges are really blown up?"

If the question of the morale of the army in which such orders were issued still needs to be

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some comments, then it remains to give the following three figures as such:

163 division (brigade) commanders;

221 division (brigade) chief of staff;

1114 regimental commanders.

This is a list of commanders of the ground forces (excluding aviation commanders who did not return from a sortie) who went missing during all the years of the war. Considering that the state

one rifle division needed one commander, one chief of staff and five commanders of regiments (three rifle, two artillery), we come to the conclusion that an officer corps was missing, in terms of numbers more than sufficient to fully staff the senior command staff all divisions of the five western military districts of the USSR. It is worth noting that even by the beginning of the 90s. the burial places of 44 generals of the Red Army were not known (not counting those who were shot or died in prisons and camps, not counting those who died in enemy captivity). Forty-four generals - among them two dozen commanders of the corps and army level - shared the fate of millions of ordinary soldiers who perished without a trace in the abyss of war. But there is a big difference between a general and a soldier. A soldier often fights alone and sometimes dies without witnesses. But how could a general, a division or corps commander go missing? The commander does not fight alone. The command and headquarters of the division had a strength (according to the state of April 1941) of 75 people. This is not counting the personnel of the political department, the tribunal and the commandant's platoon. There are even more people in the headquarters structures of the corps and the army. To what extent did chaos, panic, and desertion have to reach in order for the commander of a corps or division to "disappear" in an open field, without a sign or a trace? And not all "missing" generals disappeared without a trace. After the war, 23 former generals of the Red Army were shot or hanged for voluntary surrender and cooperation with the invaders (not counting the much larger number of those who received a full-fledged camp term for betrayal). Among the traitors were commanders of the highest rank:

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— Head of the Operations Department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front Trukhin,

- Commander of the 2nd Shock Army Vlasov,
- Chief of Staff of the 19th Army Malyshev,
- Member of the Military Council of the 32nd Army Zhilenkov,
- Commander of the 4th Rifle Corps (Western Front) Yegorov,
- Commander of the 21st Rifle Corps (Western Front) Zakutny.

Yes, ten people from among the executed generals were posthumously rehabilitated in the late 50s. But it should not be forgotten that the rehabilitation of the 50s. carried out according to the same rules as the repressions of the 1930s. By a list, without any objective examination, on the direct instructions of the "directive organs"...

The executed generals are known by name. About privates, as always, only total numbers are known. Thus, in less than four months of the war (from June 22 to October 10, 1941), 10,201 servicemen of the Red Army were shot by the verdicts of military tribunals and the Special Departments of the NKVD. In total, over the years of the war, only military tribunals (excluding the activities of the NKVD) convicted over 994 thousand Soviet military personnel, of which 157,593 people were shot. However, the discussion of the scale of repressions turns into demagoguery if it takes place in isolation from the discussion of the main thing: the completely unparalleled behavior of a huge mass of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, which the Soviet military-political leadership tried to fight with the only known and in a way accessible to him, i.e. cruelest terror.

Already a few months after the start of the war, in the autumn of 1941, the German command was able to begin the systematic formation of the "national" units of the Wehrmacht, staffed by former Soviet citizens (if only the word "citizen" is generally applicable to subjects of the Stalinist empire) . Thus, a total of about 90 so-called "Eastern" battalions were created: 26 "Turkistan", 13 "Azerbaijan

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Russian", 9 "Crimean-Tatar", 7 "Volga-Ural", etc. The following year, 1942, after the breakthrough of German troops to the Don and Kuban, the creation of "volunteer" Cossack formations began. So, in May 1942, in the 17th field army of the Wehrmacht, an order was issued to create one Cossack hundred at each army corps and another two hundred at the army headquarters. Its own Cossack hundred appeared in September 1942, even as part of the 8th Italian Army. By the spring of 1943, more than 20 Cossack regiments with a total strength of about 30 thousand people were fighting in the Wehrmacht. The most widespread and massive form of cooperation between former Red Army servicemen and the occupiers was their enrollment in the regular units of the Wehrmacht as so-called "voluntary assistants" (NIBVISHlee, or abbreviated "Khivi").

Initially, the "Khivi" served as drivers, storekeepers, orderlies, sappers, loaders, thus releasing "full-fledged Aryans" for direct participation in hostilities. Then, as the losses of the Wehrmacht grew, the Russian "volunteers" began to arm. In April 1942, there were 200,000 Heavis in the German army. So, in the 6th army of Paulus surrounded at Stalingrad in November 1942, there were 51,800 "Khivi", and in the 71st, 76th and 297th infantry divisions of this army, "Russians" (as all former Soviets were called) amounted to 40% of the personnel. In the summer of 1942, there were 47,000 "volunteers" in Manstein's 11th Army. In the end, the scale of this mass cooperation with the invaders, unprecedented in the history of Russia, became so great that the Wehrmacht high command created a special post of "Inspector General of the Eastern Forces." In February 1943, under the command of General Kestring, about 750 thousand people served in the ranks of the Wehrmacht, SS and air defense. From October 1943, the Heavis were included in the standard staff of a German infantry division at 2,000 men per division, which was 15% of the total manpower. Such figures are called by foreign historians. The military historians of the Russian General Staff, the compilers of the collection "Secret Classification Lifted" fully agree with them. On page 385 we read: "Number

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By mid-July 1944, the number of military personnel of the so-called "voluntary assistants" of Germany, including police and auxiliary, exceeded 800 thousand people. Only in the SS troops during the war served more than 150 thousand former citizens of the USSR. On page 334 it is reported that in 1942 - 1944. About 500,000 people were released from among the prisoners of war who were in German camps in connection with joining the "volunteer formations". But the prisoners were an important, but by no means the only source of human resources. At the service of the Germans were hundreds of thousands of deserters, and millions of conscripts who evaded mobilization at the beginning of the war...

More than 60 years have passed since those terrible days. And all these years, the official Soviet military history science, ignoring the obvious and indisputable fact of the full-scale collapse of the Red Army, the fact of unprecedented mass desertion, mass surrender and defection to the side of the enemy, successfully searched for and found more and more "reasons for the defeat of the Red Army". in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The history of these attempts itself, the cheating techniques developed over the years, can be the subject of a separate study. Such studies received a new impetus in the early 1990s, after the declassification of a huge amount of documentary information made (more correctly, should have made) impossible further speculations on the topic of "multiple numerical superiority of the enemy" and "hopelessly obsolete Soviet tanks". New time - new songs. And the reader is now new, young and much more demanding. Therefore, the current successors of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet historiography are not looking for simple answers, and write their 700-page works in a very scientific, purely concrete language:

"The first combat group of the 14th Panzer Division (Kampf-Group Stempel) consisted of the 108th motorized infantry regiment (without the 2nd battalion), the headquarters of the 4th artillery

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riysky regiment of the 14th tank division with the 3rd division of the 4th artillery regiment (without the 1st battery), the 1st battery of the 4th artillery regiment, the 1st battery of the 607th mortar division (attached corps, 210-mm mortars), 1st battery of the 60th artillery regiment (attached hull, 100-mm guns), 1st company of the 4th anti-tank battalion of the 14th tank division, 36th tank regiment (without 1st reinforced company) with the 2nd company of the 13th motorized engineer battalion, parts of the motorized communications battalion, 2nd platoon of the 4th engineer company. The second battle group (Falkenstein's Kamifgroup) consisted of the 103rd motorized infantry regiment, the 1st reinforced company of the 36th tank regiment, the 2nd division of the 4th artillery regiment, the 4th anti-tank division without one company and two platoons, 1st platoon of the 4th sapper company. The third battle group (Kampfgruppe Damerau) consisted of ... "

You will still laugh, but the young author of this little masterpiece of pretentious idle talk even received public praise from the lips of Makhmud Akhmetovich himself! Comrade M.A. Gareev, General of the Army, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and others, others, others, recently said: "If there are people like Alexei Isaev, our cause is not hopeless!" Perfectly accurate definition. Mahmud Akhmetovich and his subordinates in high epaulettes and with high ranks ate folk bread for decades, but did not bother to come up with anything that had at least signs of scientificity and plausibility. The modern successor of their work is doing its job much better. Thinner. Tov. Isaev does not "substitute" himself with a direct statement about the "numerical superiority" of the enemy. But an infinitely long (out of pity for the reader, we have quoted only half) list of platoons, companies and batteries of the 14th Panzer Division on a subconscious level forms in the reader, hypnotized with all this flickering of numbers, mortars and guns, the idea of a "huge black cloud" advancing on the positions of the Soviet troops. In fact, on its way from the border Vladimir-Volynsky to Lutsk, the German 14th Panzer Division met (again

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it would be more correct to say - I should have met) four divisions of the Red Army (19th TD, 135th SD, 215th MD, 131st MD) and the 1st anti-tank brigade. This is not counting the 87th Rifle Division and the 41st Infantry Division, located directly at the border, as well as three defense centers of the Vladimir-Volynsky URA (about which A. Isaev briefly dropped: "40 rarely located pillboxes"). "Rarely located" is 40 bunkers per 20 km of the front. On June 26, two more rifle divisions of the Red Army (the 200th Rifle Division and the 193rd Rifle Division) approached Lutsk, which was occupied by the Germans. Miracles do not happen, and if a complete list of all units of a German division takes 2 pages of text, then the same list in relation to 9 Soviet divisions should have taken 18 pages. But for some reason A. Isaev does not bring him up.

Something else is more interesting. Accidentally or consciously, but A. Isaev with his long passage ("the first kampf group consisted of ..., the second kampf group consisted of ..., the third kampf group consisted of ...") almost exactly reproduced the textbook known to everyone to an educated person, a fragment from the novel by L.N. Tolstoy "War and Peace". Yes, yes, the very one where the Austrian general, before the battle of Austerlitz, long and tediously reads out his wonderful disposition: "Pie ergäe Coopie tagust... Pie 2meie Kooppe mar set..." Throughout the entire novel, Lev Nikolaevich contrasts this stupid mechanistic approach to the military genius of Kutuzov, who "knew over many years of military experience that it was not the orders of the commander-in-chief, not the place on which the troops stood, not the number of guns and killed people, but that elusive force called the spirit of the army, that decide the fate of the battle, and he followed this force and guided it as far as it was in his power. Without being distracted by a discussion about how much a real historical character corresponded to the image of Kutuzov, which was created by L.N. Tolstoy, we note the main thing - an almost mystical gift of foresight, manifested by the great writer. In the novel, dedicated to the events of the Patriotic War of 1812, both the main reason for the defeat of 1941 and the main source of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War are named with absolute accuracy.

Alas, today's youth (to which I can no longer rank myself) do not read War and Peace, but "pass through". But he plays computer "shooters" a lot and for a long time.

Believe me, I'm not joking at all and I'm not being rude. Playing "shooters" fatally impedes understanding of the simple cause of the military catastrophe of 1941. And here's why: the funny man on the monitor screen is always absolutely obedient to you. With a slight movement of the computer "mouse" you can direct him to an alley that is teeming with evil monsters - and he will go. No questions. The monsters will devour him, another, the tenth - the next one will go over the "corpses", unquestioningly carrying out your commands. Computer games do not at all imply the possibility that a little man will suddenly get out of a flying-diving missile tank, throw a laser blaster on the ground and swear obscenely. will show you a big muzzle. This doesn't happen in the game. And in real history, this has already happened countless times. The huge army of the Persian king Xerxes, whose warriors were driven into battle with whips (not figuratively, but in the literal sense of the word), could not cope with a small "speck" on the map called "Ancient Greece". The numerically insignificant army of Alexander the Great conquered the vast expanses of the Persian Empire not at all because the horses in the Persian cavalry were "hopelessly outdated" and the scythed chariots "had exhausted almost the entire motor resource". Tiny Israel over and over again smashed numerous Arab armies, and the armed forces of the richest country in the world could not cope with the Vietnamese partisans, who caught helicopters with nets woven from wild growing lianas...

Strictly speaking, neither the Soviet nor the part of Russian historiography that considers itself the successor of its work has ever denied the role of the "human factor". Not on your nelly! On the contrary, the tireless repetition of the "mantra" about the "environment of a nationwide patriotic upsurge" was an integral part of any publication devoted to the events of the Soviet-German war. There was even a new branch of military-historical science: "the heroism of the troops."

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And I'm not kidding again. I have a little book on my shelf, which just shocked me with a stream of the rudest factual "blunders". On the very first page of the text, in the first paragraph, it is reported that Timoshenko replaced Voroshilov as People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR ... you know when? "In December 1940". Further - more, and all in the same spirit. Who is the author? On the cover we read: "Colonel, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, author of 300 printed (it would be better to say non-printed) works on the theory and history of military art and the heroism of the troops." Of course, writing about the "heroism of the troops" is more profitable and charming. And it's much simpler - you don't need to check a single figure, because after all, what difference does it make: the 15th or 51st, tank or rifle division accomplished its feat in October or November of the 14th or 41 th year? In general, the logic of Soviet propaganda cannot but amaze: it (propaganda) was ready to recognize almost any "negative". I could agree that in the course of dispossession there were "separate excesses", and complete collectivization was not always voluntary, that during the mass repressions of 37-38. "violations of socialist legality" were committed, and life in "communal apartments" and barracks was not very satisfying and fun. But let's admit at least a shadow of doubt that the subjects of the Stalinist empire "as one person are ready to give their lives with joy for the great cause of Lenin-Stalin, and in the name of this ideology, fighters, commanders and political workers are always ready to give their lives" (Voroshilov, speech at the 18th Party Congress) - no, no, and again no! It couldn't be, because it could never be!

However, let's not exaggerate the role of propaganda beyond measure and reason. Propaganda is believed when they really want to believe in it. Since we are talking about literature, how can we not recall Pushkin's immortal line: "Ah, it's not difficult to deceive me - I myself am glad to be deceived." The dull and primitive Soviet propaganda was not always believed. No matter how much they talked on the radio and TV about "the decay of the West and the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism", and the people strove for this very "decaying West"

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five - if not forever, then at least on a tour for jeans and a Japanese "two-cassette". No matter how knowledgeable experts and moderately decent politicians warned that the market economy is not a milky river with jelly banks, and that friendship cannot win in the competition, no one heard them and did not believe them. People still believe in the heroic myths of Soviet history to this day because they really want to believe in them. What else can a modern Russian find in the history of the 20th century that could support and justify his great power ambitions? What else can he be proud of? Excuse the expression, the current status of a "great energy power"? Moscow offices built from Finnish and Italian materials on German technology by Turkish builders, in which several thousand "middle managers" wipe imported pants with imported chairs, counting on an imported computer the revenues from the export of Russian oil?

I am often asked: when will we find out the truth about the Great Patriotic War and will we find out about it at all? The answer to this question is very simple. Let's find out. When? Not earlier, but not later than the end of the current, fairly protracted, "Time of Troubles" and Russia will finally take its rightful place in the general ranks of civilized countries.

Only then will we be able to honestly admit that in our recent history there have been not only glorious victories, but also shameful defeats.

Andrey Burovsky

SUVOROV - REVISION DETONATOR

I dare to report - but this free-determined one is thinking! A.I. Kuprin

ATTEMPT ON A MYTH

In 1990, Victor Suvorov's book "Icebreaker" was published. A second boomed after her: "M-Day." Circulation of books instantly went off scale for a million, and from the territory of the then Soviet Union such cries were heard that the volleys of thousands of Stalinists and "patriots" "merged into a drawn-out howl."

17 years have passed, and Suvorov's books are all on the bestseller list, and the debate around the burning problem continues: who attacked whom and when? Hitler against Stalin or Stalin against Hitler?

Probably, for posterity, the bitterness of these disputes and their emotionality will seem strange. More has been written about Suvorov and his books than the volume of his own books. And people don't calm down...

Showdowns of ancestors often seem like nonsense to posterity.

It is difficult to understand like normal people who suddenly began to kill each other because of the most important question: to what extent and how exactly is the divine and human united in the person of Jesus Christ?

But they did kill. There are up to 15 million dead in Syria, Egypt, Asia Minor and Palestine.

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It will probably be just as difficult for posterity to understand why Suvorov-Rezun's book caused such mass hysteria. Why was it so important for people of the late 20th and early 21st centuries to "prove" one of the truths - who attacked whom first?

The emotional charge of the controversy strikes no less than its scale. It would seem, well, what changes for the people of the XXI century from whether there was a Stalinist plan of attack on Europe? From that

did Stalin plan to use Hitler as an "icebreaker of the revolution"? But it is clearly changing, and a lot.

People are fighting both "for" and "against" Suvorov, accuse him of unheard-of filth and put him on a pedestal with almost the same fury with which they performed patriotic deeds two generations earlier: they crushed each other with tanks, slashed with bayonets, finished off with butts. The analogy is not lame at all. For a participant in the Second World War, dousing with gasoline and setting fire to the "enemy" wounded in a hospital or dropping bombs on a residential area of a "foreign" city meant defending "their own" and "their own" familiar, understandable world. Behind the controversy around Suvorov is the same desire to defend something familiar, native, understandable. In war, as in war, and they "wet" Suvorov-Rezun quite for real. Not in the order of discussion, but "to defeat", trying to destroy if not physically, then psychologically, spiritually, and most importantly —

politically.

They also protect him seriously: they take out the wounded from the battlefield. Cover "their".

There is no polemic around the facts of history. There is a war, fortunately, so far only verbal.

It is immediately clear that Suvorov encroached not on historical knowledge.

The point is not at all in the facts and not even in their analysis. Not in the concepts of historians or in the theories of political regimes. Suvorov encroached on something sacred. Something that is not allowed to be touched. Doubt about what causes an emotional reaction in the first place.

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The reaction is the same as if a Muslim in Rome lit a cigarette from a lamp or a Christian in Mecca wiped himself with pages from the Koran.

Suvorov encroached not on historical knowledge, but on historical myth. Not on facts, but on a warm, intimate relationship to historical facts.

Just do not consider historical myths as a purely Soviet phenomenon and some kind of attribute of Russia. The Second World War was the WORLD. And the myths about it are also WORLDWIDE. Books by Viktor Suvorov and Vladimir Rezun caused the same hysterical reaction all over the world.

HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE AS MYTHOLOGY

Often a myth is understood as any "incorrect" statement. An opinion that contradicts the facts and is refuted by the facts. For example, the statement that the Sun revolves around the Earth is declared a myth. But this is not a myth at all.

Ptolemy believed that at the center of the universe is the Earth, around which the Sun revolves. Copernicus believed that the Sun is at the center of the Universe, and the Earth revolves around the Sun. Both are not myths, but scientific models. The model reflects the phenomenon. The model is always poorer than the reflected phenomenon, but it allows us to understand it. Ptolemy's model made it possible to understand the structure of the Universe worse than the Copernican model, but both of them did not carry an emotional charge in themselves.

Myth is both an explanation of the world and an attitude towards the world. It is knowledge and emotion together. Ptolemy and Copernicus did not say anything about whether it is good for the Earth and the Sun to rotate. And in the Book of Genesis, with which the Bible begins, it is said quite definitely: "And God saw that it was good"!

Being engaged in the structure of the Universe, scientists affect little the interests of people. There is enough mythology here, but it is much less than in history. Historical knowledge is mythological in its very essence. Moreover, in the history of

scientific theory without mythology will never become widely known, will not form the basis of the behavior of statesmen, will not be included in textbooks. This happens because the HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS of people is mythological.

Because the eternity and infinity of the Universe have nothing to do with the interests of people and their self-determination. And the history of countries and peoples is directly related to national and cultural self-determination. Especially the history of countries and peoples that exist now. The history of Rome can be written "purely scientifically." The history of Germany and Russia is much more difficult.

The historical consciousness of man is mythological. Anytime and anywhere. With all socio-economic formations. People need not only the description of history and its understanding. They need to experience history together.

"A person cannot bear that he is left to his own forces, that he himself must give meaning to life, and not receive it from some higher power, therefore people need idols and myths," wrote Erich Fromm.

The modern social psychologist Serge Moscovici said even more briefly and harshly: "The masses cannot live under the open sky"².

The myth makes a mercilessly cold life warm and sincere, the cruelty of history is comprehended by the highest values, it includes a lonely person in a historical community. If something is wrong, "in the world and death is red." Especially in the name of higher eternal values.

The myth does not negate the facts at all. ... He "corrects" them in the "necessary" way. The myth does not interfere with the study of particular truths, it relies on them. And because the myth is always very similar to the truth. Only this truth is not an objective truth, but a private and subjective opinion of a group of people, otherwise and customer.

If a scientific study provoked an emotional reaction, it means that it encroached not on science, but on myth.

What myth was disputed by Viktor Suvorov?

MYTH 0 OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The essence of the myth created by Stalinist propaganda during World War II is something like this: Soviet people worked peacefully in the 1930s. The industrial base for a new, happy life in the USSR was being created. The Soviet people did not want to conquer anyone and did not intend to fight with anyone. They were happy with their work, under the guidance of their wise leaders. "Only the Soviet Union has steadily pursued a policy of peace, a policy of organizing a collective rebuff to the aggressors and supporting the peoples who have become victims of the aggressors"³.

Nazi Germany invited the USSR to conclude a non-aggression pact. The Soviet Union was forced to conclude this pact for the purpose of self-defence and in order to prevent the formation of a common front of the imperialist powers against the USSR.

On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany attacked Poland, thus starting World War II. The Western powers betrayed Poland, and only the Soviet Union made a liberation campaign, liberated and annexed Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, and concluded mutual assistance pacts with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany suddenly and treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union. It had a colossal superiority in armaments and in technology, because Hitler had the resources of all of Europe at his disposal. In 1941, the Great Patriotic War began. It was a war to save their homeland. Participation in the Great Patriotic War is a great feat and a colossal merit. If one of the Soviet people fought on the side of Hitler, then he is a disgusting traitor, and his behavior is completely "atypical".

Thanks to his military-technical superiority, Hitler was able to inflict a temporary defeat on the Soviet Union. But the Soviet people are patriots of their socialist motherland. They rallied even more closely around the Communist Party and, under the leadership of their brilliant leader and teacher, the greatest commander

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I.V. Stalin rose to the holy liberation war and gave the enemy a crushing rebuff. The ingenious plan of the great Stalin, "Stalin's ten blows", led Nazi Germany and all its allies to utter defeat.

The "fascists" were guided by the anti-scientific, reactionary doctrine of the inequality of the human races. They wanted to exterminate millions of innocent people on a national basis, and turn others into their slaves. The monstrous, unparalleled in the history of the crimes of the fascists condemned the deeply legitimate and progressive international Nuremberg trials.

The victory of the "German fascist aggressors" would be the greatest misfortune for mankind. It would lead to the destruction of modern civilization, the enslavement and physical extermination of tens of millions of people.

In the USSR, the most advanced social theory of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin, Marxism-Leninism. It has nothing to do with racial theory and the misanthropic teachings of the "fascists". With the help of this theory, Russia made the way from a wooden plow to an industrial civilization and thus showed the way to the whole world.

In the face of the USSR, progressive humanity defeated the "fascists" - obscurantists and scoundrels, stranglers of the best. The value of this victory is absolutely obvious and can never be questioned by anyone. "The Soviet people, by their selfless struggle, saved the civilization of Europe from the fascist pogromists. This is the great merit of the Soviet people before the history of mankind.

WHY IS THIS A MYTH?

The very name of the event is already mythological: the Great Patriotic War. From a grandiose event on a global scale, the Second World War of 1939-1945, a piece is arbitrarily cut out, which is given its own independent significance.

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It turns out: the Great Patriotic War is the most important part of the Second World War. There is no Russian specificity in this. The Americans act in a similar way, proclaiming the military operations in the Pacific between the American and Japanese armies and navies as the most important events of the Second World War.

Soviet historians considered the battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943 to be the main event of World War II. ("the most outstanding victory in the history of great wars"). American - the battle for Midway Atoll in 1942.

In the same way, English historians proclaim El Alamein in North Africa as the main battle of the Second World War.

From these comparisons it is already clear that the falsification of history is by no means the work of Soviet historians alone. The Soviet falsification is grander in scale, but fundamentally the same in meaning.

But in this name - "The Great Patriotic War" there is an emotional, propagandistic charge. After all, the Americans had the conscience not to call the battle in the Pacific Ocean the Great Patriotic War of the American people.

And Soviet propagandists had to separate the events of 1939-1941 from what happened after Hitler's attack. The name does just that.

Fascism was never the ideology of the Third Reich.

The very word "fascism" comes from the Italian "fasho" - that is, a bunch.

The Fascists in Italy and in Spain were conservatives. Their goal was to rally the nation into a fascist-bundle, and through the growth of the corporate principle, curtailing democratic freedoms, to suppress the movement of socialists. After all, the socialists wanted to bring a utopia to life, to build an ideal society on the principles invented by theorists. And the Nazis wanted at all costs not to allow them to do this, to preserve the gains of the civilization of the 19th century.

There were almost no fascists in Germany, and they never were in power. That's why when captured German

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soldiers in Russia were called “fascists”, they were, to put it mildly, surprised.

We are not fascists, we are Nazis! — they answered quite motivated, and the minds of the Soviet people finally went beyond reason.

The party created by Hitler and which came to power in 1933 was called Mayopaÿyoglaÿÿÿÿÿÿÿeÿ Yaeißÿÿÿe Afecegrace! - National Socialist German Workers' Party (MSPAP).

The ideology of this party was very similar to the communist one - the workers and all working people are oppressed by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary to make a socialist revolution, bring the real leaders of the working class to power, establish a state of social and political justice.

Nazis are sometimes referred to as "browns" as opposed to reds. There is a difference, but what is its meaning? The color, which in Russia was designated as black, was seen as brown in Germany. The color of the fertile layer, humus, chernozem, soil. Red and brown are the colors of blood and soil.

In Russia they used to say "black people", and hence - "black hundred"... In Germany it sounded like "brown people". The common people, the mass of the people. And the brown ones went into battle not under some kind, but under a red banner. They marched to liberate the German workers from the power of the Jewish, French and Anglo-American bourgeoisie.

The ideology, psychology and even symbolism of all socialists had much in common. During the Civil War in Russia, for a long time, not only stars, but also swastikas of different colors were red symbols. There are photographs of the aviation squadrons of the Red Army, on the wings of which blue and white swastikas are clearly visible. The stars were also depicted in different colors.

A tough confrontation between the red star and the brown swastika dates back to the late 1920s - early 1930s.

In the USSR, colossal efforts were made to disown kinship. Even their own name — the National Socialists — was replaced in the USSR by

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"fascists". This name is used even in Germany. When I expressed bewilderment in a conversation with my German colleagues, they thought for a long time and finally said:

The Nazis were very cruel. Therefore, they should be called that.

The power of reasoning is enchanting.

The racial theory, that is, the theory of the biological inequality of people, is not at all a peculiarity of Germany and the Germans. In the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the idea of racial inequality was quite widespread throughout the then world. Including, by the way, in the Jewish environment.

It was with a feeling of great perplexity that I read many years ago a book by a certain German Jew, Fritz Kahn, entitled *The Jews as a Race and a Civilized People*. The book was published in Germany in 1921 and is embellished with such pearls, for example: "Moses, Christ and Marx – three representatives of a specific race and racial characteristics"! and that "Trotsky and Lenin adorn our race." I will leave aside the question - who should a person be in order to "decorate" himself with kinship with Trotsky and Lenin. I will draw the reader's attention to the sounded word "race" and to what the Jew uses it - and the Jew, who is quite loyal to the communists of various kinds. For the author, Jews are a race.

F. Kahn is an open and outspoken socialist, but his relative Benjamin Disraeli is a resolute conservative. From the point of view of the Commander of the Order of the Garter, Viscount Hugenden, Earl of Beaconsfield (all these are Disraeli's titles), Jews join the socialists not from a good life, but under the pressure of a Christian society that does not recognize them. And then "... the chosen race gives a hand to the scum and the most contemptible parts of society."

As we can see, the word "race" sounds quite definite. And how definitely! "... the Jewish race connects modern peoples with ancient times... They are clear evidence of the falsity of the modern teaching about the equality of people and about cosmopolitan brotherhood, which, if implemented, would only contribute to the fall of the great races"?

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Who is this? Goebbels?! No, it's all Jew Disraeli. Although, of course, it is interesting, who is Fritz Kahn for Disraeli - "the dregs of society" or "a man of the chosen race"?

The author was no less surprised when reading V.V. Shulgin: he follows the reasoning that Mr. Shulgin would not inflict any insult on the Chinese, speaking of his saffron skin and narrow eyes... But "... it is worth listing in the most academic the description immediately begins to sound like a kind of mockery, mockery, contempt" 10.

V.V. Shulgin has always openly and honestly declared himself an anti-Semite. This Russian nobleman, proud of his origin, suddenly, in some way, is very much in solidarity with two Jews. And not only with a conservative and a monarchist, but also with a socialist. All three are blatant racists.

It remains to be assumed that at the time when these people lived and worked, this point of view was quite common.

By the consistent use of racial theory, national socialism really differed greatly from international socialism. Communist-Internationalist nationality

the oppressed and the oppressors were not given much importance. But the beliefs of both had the same intellectual and spiritual source - the work of the intellectuals of the evil nineteenth century. After all, socialism — both in its nationalist, German, and in its internationalist, Soviet version — is by no means an invention of the common people and not “the belief of the illiterate masses.” Nothing like this. All the theories that formed the basis of all socialist regimes were created in the offices of the most highbrow intellectuals.

In the 1850s, in the most developed countries of Europe, a scientific school was formed, which was called racial-anthropological. The face of the school is determined by the French J.A. Gobineau and J. Lapouge, British F. Galton, K. Pearson, H. Chamberlain. It would be very, very difficult to call them all or each one individually “stupid” or “not intelligent enough”. Perhaps that is why in the USSR the names of the creators of racial theory were hidden and

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Moreover, nothing written by them was translated - even for historical departments or for professional historians.

Among the creators of racial theory are many cult names of socialists. The anarchist P. Proudhon believed that “the Jews are an anti-social, stubborn, diabolical race”; The Jew is the enemy of the human race. This people should be sent to Asia or destroyed.”

Eugene Dühring called for the extermination of the Jews, this “innately and irrevocably corrupted race.”

Russian Narodnaya Volya in 1881-1882 supported the pogroms. K. Marx believed that the Jews are “the most disgusting of

racess.” However, he also considered the Slavs a race and said an incredible amount of nasty things about them.

And Lassalle, the leader of the German workers, also declared that he despised the “Jewish race.”

But this did not save him from the penetrating judgment of Karl Marx: “He comes, judging by the shape of his head, from Negroes who mixed with the Jews during the exodus from Egypt.”

The original racial doctrine or racial theory, Kassen- teige, is the term of the eighteenth-century German philosopher K. Meiners. In the second half of the 19th century, with the rise of science, research began in different directions: “Bassepgiot-shypo” - racial studies, “Kazzeppikpae” - racial science, “Kaÿepreyapke” - racial thinking.

But don't... There's no need to consider the Germans somehow special and vicious. During the First World War, French doctors seriously tried to catch German spies by checking the composition of their urine: the Germans, it turns out, have “too” a lot of ammonia in their urine ... Another sign: the non-German race excretes more excrement than the people of the Gallic race . I tracked who pooped more than others - and feel free to write to the valiant authorities: an obvious German spy.

And here is the British racist: Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927) was born in England, where this surname is rather famous. The family of Chamberlain politicians, dad and two sons, are his distant relatives.

Chamberlain's racial animosity between the Aryans and the Semites became

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the basis of the historical process! Everything that the team is proud of was, of course, made by light-skinned, fair-haired Aryans, tall and with long skulls. Inexpressible from-

rotatable Semites with round heads and curly hair low spoiled the Aryans and parasitized on their achievements.

Gradually, H.S. Chamberlain became so imbued with his own writings that he even moved from his native Britain to Germany: to be closer to the Aryans. Here, on the one hand, disappointment awaited him - not all Germans were in such a hurry to become Aryans, and some simply twisted their fingers at their temples. On the other hand, some people did get into it, including very influential people. H.S. Chamberlain even had a good relationship with Chancellor Wilhelm II and had long conversations with him about turtles and cultures. In his last sunset years, a certain new political figure, who, however, did not have much chance, was already visiting Chamberlain himself - Adolf Hitler. Chamberlain was very fond of Hitler's political program, but strongly disliked his skull and other racial features.

They will object to me: you never know who was chattering ... Namely, in the Third Reich, racial theory became not a theory, but a guide to action!

Fair. But long before the emergence of the National Socialist Third Reich, the liberal United States was a purely racist country.

The racial laws of Nazi Germany largely copied the laws of the United States: since 1896, blacks and whites in the United States had to live separately. To have "the same thing" (at least in theory), but separate!

Race inequality was maintained by practices such as lynching. In 1892, for example, 226 Negroes were killed—they were mostly burned alive, and, according to Mark Twain, white Americans were very worried—what if "the Negro dies too quickly"? eleven

It took the United States, as befits a true beacon of democracy, the Civil War of 1861-1865 to abolish the slavery of the Negroes. During this war, a country of 31 million people lost only

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623 thousand killed. 290 thousand Negroes fought in the allied army, of which 38 thousand died. After this war, Congress passed a number of laws in defense of the rights of Negroes. The 1870 Act made it a crime to deprive Negroes of voting and other civil rights. An 1877 law made it illegal to discriminate against Negroes in hotels, theaters, railroads, and all public places. This was to be supervised by special federal officials. In the south they were called "carpetbaggers", because they came with empty bags, but for some reason they left with full ones ..

In 1877, the Southern Democrats, behind the backs of the Northern Democrats, conspired with the Republican leaders. They promised to support the Republican presidential candidate, but on the condition that the troops of the northern states be withdrawn from the south. The federal troops and all the officials who controlled the implementation of the laws were withdrawn. And it started...

Under the slogan "equal but separate", an open persecution of blacks began. For them, special means of transport, special schools and special benches in parks were introduced. In 1896, Plessy, a Negro shoemaker in New Orleans, decided to find out by experiment whether the US Constitution meant the equality of people ... Having bought a ticket, he got into a carriage intended for whites. He was arrested and tried for breaking the law. The case went to the Supreme Court in Washington. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict. With this act, the US Supreme Court legalized racism and racial discrimination officially.

In 1901, several Negroes from Massachusetts wrote a letter to President McKinley. They accused the government of pandering to white supremacists. Like, the authorities know perfectly well what is happening, and have nothing against it. Negroes mentioned a pogrom that took place in the city of Wilmington, North Carolina, where Negroes were killed like dogs (the expression of the authors

letters), hunted them down like game, and the government did nothing but turn a blind eye. "We hoped in vain for the protection of the law," wrote blacks from Massachusetts.

"In 1921, 59 African Americans were lynched in

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around Tulsa. A common motive for lynching was a concocted accusation, usually without investigation, that an African American wanted to rape a white girl. After the First World War, in which many African Americans participated, some participants in the war took it into their heads to protest. But this further embittered the Ku Klux Klan.

On the same occasion there was a pogrom in Tulsa in 1921. A certain African American, a young man, Richard Rowland, was supposed to go down in an elevator. The girl serving the elevator, seeing the black one, pressed the shutter before he entered the elevator. He hurried and fell under her feet!

The crowd fled to the screams of the girl. It was immediately concluded that the Negro was trying to attack the girl. The crowd did not understand what had happened at all. The onlookers "knew exactly" what the young man was going to do, and they were going to lynch him. The police also did not delve into the details, but it was "everything clear" to the policemen. They arrested Richard Rowland and took him to jail. "The press raised a howl that, they say, it's time to appease the Negroes, that they allegedly became insolent, forgot their place. Journalists presented the girl as a 17-year-old poor orphan who earned pennies for her education. They described her suffering, "torn dress", scratches on her face. Later it was established that none of this happened, that the girl was not a girl at all, but a woman.

suspicious behavior...

In the evening, a crowd of 500 people gathered near the courthouse, which also served as a prison, demanding the extradition of a black youth for reprisal. The African American population was alarmed. 25 blacks with guns arrived at the courthouse!"³. That, in fact, is the whole trigger mechanism of the pogrom that has begun. Who was the first to shoot and who was the first to use the knife is still being investigated. There are very different versions. All these versions are put forward in a very strong dependence on the color of the skin and the beliefs of the researcher. In any case, a fight broke out with the use of clubs and bladed weapons, revolver shots rang out. There were fewer blacks, about 75 people against 2 thousand whites, they retreated inside the black quarter.

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"When the pogrom began, the chief of police sent a telegram to the governor of the state asking him to send the national army of reservists. The train with the soldiers arrived only in the morning, when everything was already over. The soldiers were in no hurry. Yes, and there was no point in interfering!

In short, the Negro part of the city of Tulsa ceased to exist. The number of those killed is given differently - from 36, according to the official version of that time (but the authorities, most likely, tried to downplay the scale of the event), to 175 according to tabloid newspapers (but they could exaggerate). The most probable figure of one of the modern researchers is "about 100". It is known that the Red Cross helped about 1000 people, including women and children. It is known that trucks hired by the authorities took the corpses out of the city, and then these corpses were dumped into the river or into hastily dug mass graves.

Black youth and in general everyone who could have left the city. Those who could not leave or who had nowhere to go spent the winter in tents and were in great need of the bare necessities. The city authorities did their best to hush up the incident, prevented them from providing assistance to the victims, and prevented the Negroes rebuild their homes.

75 years later, in the summer of 1996, the city authorities officially apologized for the pogrom and erected a memorial stele on one of the streets of the former African-American city with the inscription: "1921, Black Wall Street." Several of the victims who survived and survived to our time started talking about financial compensation ... but did not receive a penny.

The pogrom in Tulsa is by no means an isolated occurrence. In St. Louis, a pogrom occurred in 1917, and 125 blacks were killed, in Chicago in 1919 - 36 people, in the city of Elaine (Arkansas) in 1919, 38 blacks were killed.

Racial segregation in the United States officially existed until the 1960s. Parts of the American army that fought during the First and Second World Wars were separate. It seems so wild for any sane European that funny incidents arise.

For example, in the 1960s, all the Warsaw Pact countries screened the Polish film "Stake more than

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life" – about a heroic Polish officer who was introduced into the Wehrmacht and became almost a personal friend of Hitler. A kind of predecessor of Stirlitz.

One of the shots in the last episode of "Stakes more than life" - a black man shining from the tank armor of the "General Sherman", among the same shining whites. A frame that could not be because it could never be - the parts of the American army were separate. Blacks separately, whites separately.

Funny jokes jokes history! The film about the heroic Colonel Kloss was filmed in the 1960s. The world press howled about the anti-Semitism prevailing in Poland, and was divided only in one thing: some considered anti-Semitism to be a ancestral mark of the Soviet system, others - a typical feature of the Poles, regardless of the political system. The howl also went to the USA.

And the Poles at that time were making a historical film, not even suspecting the racial segregation that prevailed in the American army. Forgotten, probably. It probably didn't occur to the Poles that the zealous fighters against Nazism, the saviors of Europe from the horrors of National Socialism and the best friends of all the Jews and Negroes of the world could be vulgar racists. And besides, not racists "in the soul", in private life, but official racists, according to their own laws.

Corrupted by Europe, some American Negroes married European women. These Negroes officially, by law, had no right to appear with their wives on the streets of their native cities. It was not until 1948 that President Truman, as Commander-in-Chief of the American Armed Forces, abolished segregation by special decree and created common white-black units.

What remains? Probably, we should wish the Americans a further heroic struggle for human rights throughout the world.

But if we are talking about racial theory, sorry, the Germans were neither better in theory nor in practice, but they were not worse than other Europeans either. At least, they were no worse than the beacons of progress and democracy, the Americans.

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The extermination of people on a national basis was widely practiced not only in the Third Reich, but also in the USSR and in many other countries participating in the Second World War.

After "perestroika", it became widely known about the genocide of "treacherous" peoples: Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Greeks, Karachays.

On December 27, 1943, the deportation of the entire Kalmyk people and the abolition of the Kalmyk ASSR were announced.

On August 21, 1944, an unpublished Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (No. 619/3) was issued on renaming the village councils of Crimea. October 20, 1944

Decree of the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6): "to rename settlements, rivers and mountains whose names are associated with Tatar, Greek and German origin..."

K. Paustovsky, who is difficult to declare an anti-Soviet element, believed: "this case of renaming testifies to the absence of elementary culture, disregard for the people, for the country ..."!⁵ But who listened to him, Paustovsky?

On February 23, 1944, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council was read out on the eviction of both Chechens and Ingush for treason, for cooperation with the enemy. You are allowed to bring 20 kg of luggage per family. It took 40,200 wagons to deport the Chechens. What consequences this had for the conduct of hostilities and for the supply of the front is clear. But the authorities went to these inconveniences to do what they love.

Chechens and Ingush were deported from other regions of the USSR, and from cities. Only in Moscow 2 Chechens survived.

At the same time, just like in the Crimea, a Decree was issued on the renaming of districts and regional centers. Even Elbrus was renamed Ialbuzi. At the same time, a mass resettlement of Russians, Ukrainians, Ossetians, Avars, and Dargins was carried out in Chechnya.

According to the memoirs of contemporaries, "2000 disobedient people remained in the mountains. They wandered from place to place. Hunt for them

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fled, they were killed, but they did not give up. The mountains have hidden many of them." There is a good story by A. Pristavkin about the fate of these "disobedient" and the fate of Russian settlers!⁶

In 1944, Greeks were evicted from the Black Sea coast to Central Asia, also for "collaboration with the occupiers." How can we separate the vindictiveness, the ideology of collective responsibility, and the primitive desire to "liberate" warm, fertile lands for "ours"?

After the war, large-scale deportations of "bad" peoples were also carried out, which in some way aroused the displeasure of the authorities. The evictions were organized by Beria's deputies, B. Kobulov and I. Serov.

In the late 1940s, several tens of thousands of Armenian repatriates were exiled to Central Asia, those who had come from abroad to live in their historical homeland, among other Armenians.

At the same time, Kurds were expelled from large cities, and in 1947, about 80,000 Muslim Georgians were deported to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Again - it turns out they "cleared" the land for the relatives of Stalin and Beria.

"Not only a Marxist-Leninist, but simply a sane person cannot imagine how peoples, including women, children, old people, communists and Komsomol members, can be made responsible, bring down mass repressions on them and doom them to destruction and suffering for the hostile actions of individuals and groups of people," said N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

If one could still forget, Nikita Sergeevich himself organized the famine in Ukraine in 1931-1932 and was among the most cruel and merciless. Forget it... But can you forget such a thing?

Let's also mention the German genocide. By the beginning of the 20th century, about 1.2 million Germans lived in the Russian Empire, slightly less than 1% of the total population. In addition to the Baltic Germans, there were still large colonies of settlers on the Volga and Altai.

In 1922, they created the Autonomous SSR of the Volga Germans, ASSR PN. And the names of the villages on the Volga sounded like this: Schafhausen, Glarus, Philipsfeld, Ernestinendorf, Gogerberg, Zurich, Basel.

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An unpleasant topic in Soviet post-war times: the famine of 1921 did not pass by the Germans at all. In the village of Grimm, during the famine of 1921, out of 11,000 inhabitants, 5,000 survived.

The Russian Germans were the most common, the most ordinary ethnic group of the Russian superethnos. Those Germans who chose Russia as their homeland.

The Russian Empire could be at war with Germany, but at the same time it was normal to interact with loyal Russian Germans. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd (leaving the "German" names of Yekaterinburg, Revel, Riga and Helsingfors-Helsinki), but when the Union of the Russian People tried to stage a German pogrom in August 1914, the Police Department "did not recommend" organizing something like that. There was no massacre.

Since 1868, with the introduction of universal military service, the Germans began to be called up for military service. Russian Germans fought on the side of the Russian Empire in the First World War. My grandfather's brother, Kurt Schmidt, was gassed at the front and died of transient consumption in 1922, at the age of 28. And my grandfather, Walter Schmidt, from 1914 to 1917 was deported away from the theater of operations, to Karelia - not even an hour, he will run over to the enemy.

The USSR declared its internationalism at every step, stigmatized the Russian Empire as a "prison of peoples", but it turned out to be completely incapable of fighting Germany and being loyal to its own German subjects. In some mystical way, the Germans, who were born in the Altai and the Volga region, were to blame for the fact that Stalin was not able to completely deceive and use Hitler to his advantage.

One of the favorite tales of the Soviet era: that in the USSR there is not and cannot be national inequality, "we" do not offend anyone. So the whole film "Circus" was shot - exclusively on this topic. How they, in a terrible bourgeois society, offend Negroes, and how they love Negroes in the USSR. It is difficult to judge Negroes, but how can the Decree of August 26, 1941, be combined with the idea of the "Circus"? According to this Decree, the Germans were sent to Siberia in 24 hours, to the position special settlers.

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And well, if the special settlers! Innocent people, most often loyal to Russia, were exiled here, to the tundra. They were thrown onto the icy shores, without any means of subsistence - to die. By spring, out of hundreds of people, a few strong men survived. Most of them didn't even have graves — it was impossible to bury them in winter, and in the spring hundreds of corpses began to rot, and the rest of them would not be able to bury them anyway. And these ... "lucky ones", living skeletons that survived until spring, fled from the corpses of relatives and relatives carrying the infection.

They were attached to the procurement office, felling the forest, became workers of various professions. And someone nailed to the Nenets to live, fled from the "civilized" world that turned into hell; these learned to breed deer, to hunt wild animals. From a mixture of Russians and Nenets, a whole people appeared - the Dolgans. From a mixture of Germans and tundra inhabitants, a whole reindeer herding clan arose. German became its language, yet more flexible and complex. Words reflecting hunting, reindeer herding, entered the language from the Nenets, and nothing more.

In 1990, 3,028 Germans lived in Taimyr.

In the army, the Germans were also removed from the front, turned off from combat units and exiled. Some managed to pass off as Jews, for Finns, and they finished the war. I happened to know a man by the name of Vogau, whose military ID was in the name of Vlasyev.

And after the war there was a new Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 26, 1948, signed by N. Shvernik:

"In order to strengthen the settlement regime for Chechens, Karachais, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks, Germans, Crimean Tatars, etc., evicted by the Supreme Body of the USSR, and also due to the fact that during their resettlement no deadlines were set their eviction, to establish that the resettlement to remote regions of the Soviet Union of the above-mentioned persons was carried out forever, without the right to return them to their former places of residence! According to the Decree, 20 years of hard labor were supposed for unauthorized departure from places of special settlement. For help in escaping, for registration at the former place of residence and other crimes of the same kind - 5 years.

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At the same time, historical memory was destroyed: in places where the Germans had lived for centuries, all historical names were changed, archives were burned, and cemeteries were compared to the ground.

The Germans, who had never lived in the USSR, were also subjected to monstrous terror. Many literary texts from the Second World War directly call for the extermination of the Germans. Take, for example, a poem by K. Simonov, which is called: "So kill him, kill him!":

If your brother killed a German, If a neighbor killed a German,

It's him, not you soldier

And you have no excuse!

So kill the German so that he,

And no, he was lying on the ground.

Not in your house to groan, But he stood dead.

So he wanted, his fault - Let his house burn, not yours. And let not your wife

And let him be a widow. Let not yours cry

And his birth mother.

Not yours, but his family Let him wait in vain. So kill one!

So kill him quickly. How many times you see him, so many times and kill!

This is how Konstantin Mikhailovich wrote, explaining from different angles why it is necessary to kill "them".

But what is this! Here is Ilya Ehrenburg: "... One cannot convince a German, but one can and must bury a German. The more Germans each soldier kills, the sooner this damned war will end. ...Kill the German or the German will kill you. There are still many Germans, but all the same, the end is visible to them: we will kill them. The Germans said they were a people without space. Okay, we will give each Fritz two arshins. The damned country, which has brought so much grief to all mankind, which has ruined and saddened our people, will get what it deserves: Germany will become a space without a people!

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From theory to practice: in East Prussia, the Soviet Army and units of the NKVD exterminated several hundred thousand Germans in the Baltic by executions and drowning in barges — all those who did not have time to escape. Cemeteries were plowed up, the historical memory was destroyed, the archives were burned OR WERE EXPORTED.

The Poles behaved in the same way in the western regions of Poland. The German population from Wrocław Breslau and Danzig-Gdańsk was deported in such a way that many died.

Let me emphasize once again that there is no special Russian or Soviet specificity in this nightmare.

Capturing the territory of the USSR, the Finnish troops took "their own", Ingrian Finns, to Finland. For resistance they were shot. There were several executions of the Russian population: on the Karelian Isthmus occupied by the USSR.

The Romanians did the same. Among other "feats" they exterminated Moldovans who did not want to recognize themselves as Romanians.

The Hungarians pursued a policy of official anti-Semitism, and the blood of tens of thousands of people is on the hands of the Horthy government.

In Yugoslavia, the Croats unleashed the genocide of the Serbs and all other Orthodox peoples. The world knows the Auschwitz-Auschwitz and Buchenwald extermination camps. Little is known about the Jasenovac camp, and more than 300 thousand people, mostly Serbs, were killed in it. The total number of Orthodox South Slavs killed by other South Slavs is close to a million.

In 1938, hoping for the intercession of the great powers of the West, the Czechs staged a disgusting German pogrom. The Great Powers in Munich took a position of non-intervention and "appeasement of the aggressor". Thus, they untied the hands of Nazi Germany. The Nazis took over Czechoslovakia and, of course, settled scores with those who offend the "Aryans". But Poland also took advantage of the Munich Agreement. On October 2, 1938, she invaded Czechoslovakia and captured the Těšín region there.

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with a population of 237 thousand people, of which Poles were at most 33%. At the same time, many Czechs were killed or expelled, their property was looted, and their property was transferred to the Poles.

In the United States, with the outbreak of war with Japan, 112,000 ethnic Japanese were deported. Most of them were completely loyal to the US government and people and considered themselves Americans. After the war, those who survived (30% died from unbearable conditions) were released, but no one returned their property.

Let my words not be understood as an attempt to justify Babi Yar or Khatyn. The crimes of some do not justify the crimes of others. I only show that during the Second World War there were no angels in white clothes and black Nazi demons. Everyone committed heinous crimes. Everything. And talk about the "special cruelty" of the German Nazis, to put it mildly, is untenable. This is a black myth designed to justify the crimes of the victors.

The Nuremberg trials of the main "war criminals" still enjoy great respect among the majority of Russians. How! The International Military Tribunal held 403 open court sessions from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946. In Nuremberg, the state and military elite of the Third Reich, its political elite, were tried. 116 witnesses were interrogated, and as many as 300,000 written testimonies were examined. Seven volumes of documents have been published! 1?

.. True, it is somehow not very clear how people can be judged for actions that were not considered as crimes at the time they were committed? And the London Conference of the USSR, USA, Britain and France on July 26-August 8, 1945 created just such an International Tribunal: to punish crimes that were not crimes.

However, the Western powers did not even demand a trial: the execution of future defendants without trial or investigation. The USSR was the most active in insisting on a public and transparent trial.

Viktor Suvorov believes that such a Nuremberg pro

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Only the USSR needed the process: to capture and execute those who knew and could prove the aggressive plans of the Soviet Union and the fact that Germany had declared war on it.

This seems to be true, because no generals guilty of crimes on the Eastern Front were tried or executed. But German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was "exposed" in crimes and executed.

However, Suvorov's judgments are too often similar to the truth.

The trial passed sentences on the basis of witness statements alone or on the basis of the "confessions" of the accused. It was these people, intended for the show trial, who were not tortured. But in the course of preparations for the Nuremberg trials and for 12 subsequent trials of a smaller scale in 1945-1946. many cases have been recorded when Wehrmacht soldiers, especially SS officers, were tortured in order to squeeze out "necessary" "confessions" from them.

US Senator Joseph McCarthy, in a statement on May 20, 1949, drew the attention of the American press to the following instances of torture being used to extract "confessions." Officers of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" were beaten with whips to such an extent that they were covered in blood, after which their genitals were stepped on while they lay on the floor. Those interrogated were hung up and beaten until they signed "confessions".

SS General Oswald Paul was beaten and smeared with filth on his face until he signed what was demanded of him. On the basis of such "confessions" extorted from General Sepp Dietrich and Joachim Peiper, the Leibstandarte division was condemned as a "criminal organization" even though it was a normal front division.

"I have heard and even seen documentary evidence that the prisoners were mistreated, beaten and tortured in ways that only perverts can devise," McCarthy wrote. — The prisoners were subjected to measures such as impromptu sentences and executions, which were canceled at the last minute.

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ment. They were told that food cards would be confiscated from their family members or even handed over to the Soviet zone. All this was carried out with the approval of the prosecutor in order to provide a psychological atmosphere designed to extort "confessions". By indulging in such actions, the United States gives the rest of the world a reason to criticize us and question our motives and our morals."

Such methods also took place at the trials in Frankfurt and Dachau, and a significant number of Germans were convicted only on the basis of their "confessions".

As you can see, not only the Stalinist falcons are characterized by this kind of practice.

The scale of the crimes was such that the Americans created the Army Simpson Commission, which investigated the methods of interrogation on the courts at Dachau. One of the members of this commission, American judge Edward Van Roden, spoke about the methods used to beat the "confessions".

Among the methods described were torture with burning matches, stuffing needles under nails, and solitary confinement on a half-starved basis. They beat the "criminals" so that they knocked out their teeth and broke their jaws.

According to Van Roden, 137 "accused" were struck in the groin with such force that the genitals atrophied. It was standard procedure for the American "investigators". A report on such activities of the "investigators" was published in the newspaper U/azypeyup Rau Mnaeus on January 9, 1949, and also in the English newspaper Zipdau Piciopa1 on January 23, 1949. But this did not prevent them from becoming prosecutors.

The testimonies given by former German officers such as Hess, Hoettl, Wisliceny, Hellriegel and others are completely implausible and often seem like a mockery. The materials of the NKVD contain the testimony of a certain Odessa loader, accused of spying for several foreign states, including Greece... According to the loader, the espionage data he collected was taken away under his black eyepatch by the Greek resident Philip of Macedon.

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Well, German officers told, for example, about the execution of a hundred Jews in the Minsk ghetto, how Himmler was present at the same time and how he immediately vomited on the ground. Everyone knows that Himmler could not have been in Minsk that day. he was at a conference in Zhytom

re. This circumstance is noted in many books, for example, the book by K. Vowinkel "The Wehrmacht at War". Moreover, in April 1959 one of the "witnesses" in

Nuremberg, Bach-Zelewski publicly retracted his Nuremberg testimony in a West German court. According to him, these statements had nothing to do with the facts and that he made them in order to save his life. "Prudent hushing up" descended on this story, and books are still being published that spread the myth about how Himmler nearly fainted at the sight of the people who were shot. In Russia - at least "Seventeen Moments of Spring" by Y. Semenov.

The victors so blatantly falsified the "evidence of guilt" that the American judge Wenersturm (Mepetgsiigt), who was the president of one of the tribunals at the Nuremberg Trials, was horrified by the organization of the process, resigned and flew back to the USA.

The judge left a press statement stating:

— Members of the prosecutor's office, instead of formulating and trying to apply the legal rules of the process, were mainly engaged in the pursuit of personal ambitions and vengeance.

— Ninety percent of the administration of the Nuremberg Tribunal consists of people with prejudiced opinions who, for political or racial reasons, supported the accusing side.

— The real purpose of the Nuremberg trials was to show the Germans the crimes of their Fuhrer, and this purpose was also the pretext under which the Tribunal was created.

No less colorful facts are given in a book about this process, written by the eminent English lawyer Veal and emphatically titled Progress in Barbarism (1953).

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As Field Marshal Montgomery put it, the process made losing the war a crime. According to Harvoord, this trial was the greatest legal farce in history?°.

TARGET? SELF JUSTIFICATION!

But why do we need an obviously illegal and, moreover, falsified trial? In order to choose one defendant for all from many criminals! Lost the war

of course!

Heinous crimes were committed during the Second World War. Among other things, they were committed by the allies against the Germans. To "prove" at any cost that the Germans were scoundrels and criminals was a way for them to justify themselves. The bombing of the English city of Coventry by the "damned Teutons" claimed the lives of 30 thousand people. The bombing of German cities by Allied aircraft claimed the lives of three million people. The pilots carried out the order: not to bomb military facilities, but residential areas.

What would the Anglo-Saxons look like if an impartial court began to ask them uncomfortable questions? For example, about how necessary it was to bomb the residential quarters of Dresden, Cologne, Hamburg, Leipzig, Berlin without even trying to destroy the industrial and military facilities located in them?

The Anglo-Saxons risked appearing before the world not in the guise of noble saviors of mankind, but as dirty killers avenging Coventry according to the stinking laws of the times of the Great Migration and eating human beings. To avoid such horrors, the Anglo-Saxons badly needed the demonization of the Nazis, and, if possible, of the entire German people.

During the First World War, English propaganda accused the Germans of eating (!) Belgian children, and also that they allegedly threw the children into the air and pierced them with bayonets. In addition to this, the British wrote that the Germans had a whole factory in which they extracted glycerin and other substances from the corpses of the dead. After the war

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The head of the British Foreign Office apologized, saying that this was done for the purpose of military propaganda.

But after the Second World War there was no apology; moreover, instead of subsiding over the years, propaganda about Nazi brutality rather intensifies.

After the war, Germany was literally flooded with squads of avengers. Several cases are known when Poles, Czechs and Ukrainians found the killers of their loved ones and dealt with them. The Western press wrote, and now writes about it quite freely, there is no secret here. It happened that the avengers killed the first SS man who came to hand and, in general, any German who fought?!

Why is almost nothing known about this until now?! Why are the perpetrators not exposed and punished?!

Yes, because the criminals have taken the necessary measures. Under the treaty establishing the Federal Republic of Germany, the government of Adenauer undertook not to conduct any investigations and trials on allied war crimes. Not only not to settle scores, but also never to study either the bombings, or the genocide of the Germans, or "acts of retaliation."

Stupid Germans, who do not know how to live, have not yet violated the law imposed on them.

But for self-justification, it is very "useful" to accuse one of the sides of the Second World War in the maximum number of crimes. And continue to blame even a lot after the war - so that no one thinks.

It was not Russia and Germany that fought in World War II. Especially not Russians.
fought with the Germans.

The Third Reich and the USSR were deeply ideological, multinational states. Their inhabitants were united not by origin, but by ideology and citizenship. They have a very indirect relation to historical Germany and historical Russia.

The Third Reich attacked the USSR not at all "treacherously" and not "without declaring war."

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At about 3:30 am on June 22, 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, standing in front of Vyacheslav Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, read out the text of the German declaration on "military countermeasures against the USSR." At Hitler's direction, it was forbidden to mention the words "war" and "attack" in the declaration.

Molotov himself wrote in his memoirs that when Schulenburg read the text of the declaration, his voice trembled and his eyes were full of tears. After listening to the ambassador, the people's commissar was silent for a long time, and then quietly said: "Is this a war? Do you think we deserve it?" Barely restraining himself, the German ambassador added that he did not approve of his government's decision.

At the same time, in Berlin, the Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich, Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop handed Dekanozov a declaration of war. The amazed ambassador quickly recovered his senses and sharply declared: "You will regret having carried out this attack! You will pay dearly for this!" He got up, bowed, and, without offering his hand to Ribbentrop, went to the door. Seeing off the ambassador, the minister whispered: "I was against this attacks."

The tale of a "treacherous attack" was launched by Stalin during his famous speech on July 3, 1941. Then this lie was repeated many times, and they repeat it to this day. Not only in Russia, but all over the world.

How to treat this place in Stalin's speech?!

It is necessary to treat it adequately: as a case of so-called lies. Stalin rarely spoke the truth, and this is just a typical case.

And all the Soviet historians who talked about the "treacherous German attack on Russia" lied on several points at once:

- not treacherous.
- not Germany.
- not to Russia.

Not only Germans served in the army of the Third Reich.

The Wehrmacht was drafted not on a racial or national basis. And on the principle of citizenship. In part

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In fact, an ethnic Jew was recognized as such only in two cases: if he professed Judaism and if he was registered in the Jewish community. In all other cases, he was drafted into the army on a general basis, and there were more than 150 thousand "Jewish soldiers of Hitler".

Among Germany's allies who participated in World War II were Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy and Finland. Spain sent a whole division to the Eastern Front.

In the very first weeks and months after June 22, 1941, from 3.5 to 4.5 million Soviet servicemen were captured by the advancing Nazis.

By 1944, 10% of the available armed forces of the Third Reich, the Wehrmacht, were residents of the Soviet Union.

Representatives of all 120 peoples of the Soviet Union, French, British, Americans, Chinese and Germans from Germany (up to 100 thousand defectors) fought on the side of the USSR.

The allies of the Soviet Union, the greatest colonial powers of the time, France and Britain, mobilized representatives of up to 200 Asian and African peoples.

People of dozens of peoples fought on the side of the United States, including ethnic Indians and blacks.

Attempts to present the Second World War as a war between "Russians and Germans" are completely absurd.

THE IMPOSITION OF A MYTH

The Stalinist myth of the Great Patriotic War was not shared by either the people of the United States or the European peoples. But he agreed with the myths that were created in these countries. The victors in World War II did not need objective truth: there was too much blood on their hands.

There were not many who disagreed. In the West they had the right to speak, but their opinions were not popular and could not change public opinion. And the entire state propaganda machine worked to create a myth.

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In each country, the myth had its own characteristics: the role of "one's own" army and "one's own" contribution to the common victory, suffering and loss of "one's own" people were exaggerated. These parts of the national myths were very similar to the Soviet myth about the Great Patriotic War.

In the USSR, even to object to the myth of the Great Patriotic War meant to pay with your life for your inappropriate talkativeness. In addition, the myth was supported not only by the state. The people basically agreed with this myth, the wrath of many people could fall on the dissenters.

Colossal human losses "tied up with blood" people. How can one not accept ideas that are supported not only by the living, but also by the dead?! Are you encroaching on a myth?! Thus, you desecrate the memory of the soldiers of your country, who died for your life and your happiness. They gave their lives for you, and you spit on their graves. Such an accusation can stop the bravest man.

So Suvorov apologizes to the veterans of the Second World War ... he almost wrote: "The Great Patriotic War."

The same is true abroad.

How many in England are able to realize that the "silver wings" of the pilots of the Second World War are not the wings of heroes and patriots, but the wings of killers? Not many... Including because it is dangerous not to share exactly this position of society. You can be completely outside of this very society.

British society is tolerant, it values eccentrics and originals. Are you into history? Do you have any unusual beliefs and opinions? You are entitled to support. But Darwin and his supporters were harassed by British society: do not dare to destroy the comfortable caressing myth of divine origin!

So it is here: just try to say ... no, not only the WHOLE truth! Telling 5% of the truth about the monstrous bombings, you immediately become a traitor, a corrupt type, an enemy of society.

And Suvorov would not have been allowed into Britain if he spoke about the goals of the Nuremberg trials and how much

innocent blood on the hands of the British Air Force. Viktor Suvorov behaves politically correct: he carefully avoids the issues of Britain's participation in the war.

With Germany it is even easier: the Germans were forced into a myth by the bayonets of the occupying armies. The post-war German governments, not having time to emerge, also hammered into the head of the Germans that it was they who started the Second World War, committed unheard-of crimes, and you yourself are to blame for everything. In the GDR, May 9 was even celebrated as the Day of the Liberation of Germany.

It became profitable for the German to repent and tear his shirt. Using the example of "perestroika", we see that whole crowds of people are running around Russia, who will willingly say any nasty things about their Fatherland, if they would show them at least a broken penny. And in Germany there is enough such scum.

Screeching about terrible Nazis, vile Teutons with their sleeves rolled up, covered in human blood, can make a career. By asking uncomfortable questions, you run the risk of big trouble: from misunderstandings of colleagues to lawsuits and unwillingness to do business with you.

In 1964, German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt in Auschwitz and officially repented of the crimes of the Germans and Germany. He himself belongs to a generation that remembered the war, but did not take part in it - due to childhood. Since the entry into the active life of this generation, Germany has been literally overwhelmed by the waves of real repentant psychosis.

V. Suvorov himself writes very well that for a German to admit that he is right, death is like: he simply falls out of the system. The grandfather or father of this German did not dare to deny that in the Third Reich 6 million Jews were exterminated in gas cars and made soap from them all. These poor fellows could only say that they personally had nothing to do with it, they didn't kill anyone and didn't digest anything from the dead Jews. In the same way, the son or grandson of these Germans cannot deny that Germany started the war. He can only conduct a study of some particulars, without encroaching on fundamental concepts.

MYTH DESTRUCTION AFTER STALIN

Some parts of the official Soviet myth from the very beginning were not accepted by all people. The warring generation itself could have its own opinion about some individual events. But these were all separate private clarifications that did not claim to change the main thing in the myth. Yes, and unable to change it.

Immediately after Stalin's death, the official myth itself began to change. But he only changed details.

Exposing the "cult of personality of Stalin", N.S. Khrushchev spoke about the "mistakes" and "excesses" of the leadership of the USSR and the command of the army, which led to unjustified losses. He called into question the meaningfulness of certain decisions.

The loss figure itself has been revised. Stalin named 7 million dead. Under Khrushchev, the official figure was 20 million dead Soviet people.

During the "perestroika" has changed even more.

They began to write even more frankly about the losses, including the losses of the civilian population. For example, they began to write about the famine in the USSR during the war. Previously, the topic was absolutely taboo.

They began to write about barrage detachments - also an absolutely taboo topic.

They began to write that it was not the "fascists" who killed the Polish officers in Katyn, but the NKVD.

To be frank, it is still not very obvious that the Poles in Katyn were exterminated only by the Soviets. But here it is important that the topic has ceased to be taboo.

But the main theses remained unchanged:

- 1) About a treacherous attack without a declaration of war.
- 2) The participation of the USSR in World War II began in 1941.
- 3) On the military-technical weakness of the USSR.
- 4) On the military-technical advantage of the Wehrmacht.
- 5) About the moral correctness of the USSR in this war.

Whatever parts of the myth and no matter how they change, in place

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the main thing remained: "they" were planning a war, we didn't want a war. All "our" actions before 1941 are explained by forced self-defense. We fought with Finland, seized the Baltic states, Bukovina and part of the Commonwealth because the situation forced us to do so.

On June 22, 1941, "they" attacked "us" without warning. They were very strong, "we" were weaker than "them". At the cost of colossal losses, "we" managed to stop the enemy offensive. At the cost of the feat of the rear, "we" managed to create the required number of weapons and defeat the hated enemy.

No matter what crimes were committed by the Soviet side and no matter what outrageous things were done, "we" were right, and "they" were wrong. "We" have achieved a great victory, and our glory will be shine through the ages.

... And then came Viktor Suvorov.

THE TRUTH OF VIKTOR SUVOROV

Part of Suvorov's concept is indisputable simply because it is supported by documents. It was only in the USSR that they "knew nothing" about the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and about the preparations for an offensive war in the USSR. In the West, documents were also printed, and it was not forbidden to remember. For example, the British were planning a bomb attack on Baku and the oil fields... Hitler managed to attack, the USSR turned from an enemy of Britain and an ally of Hitler into a dear and valuable ally... The raid on Baku did not take place, but it was remembered.

Suvorov relies on these and many other documents.

But even that part of the concept, which is not confirmed by documents, looks very convincing. Too much circumstantial evidence, data, information, testimony. Different data fit into a coherent picture, like assembled puzzles: Stalin considered Hitler an "icebreaker of the revolution". It was he who raised Hitler so that he would bring as much confusion to Europe as possible. Stalin prepared a huge, well-armed army, stronger than any of the armies of Europe. This makes clear the nature of weapons and under

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preparations of the Red Army, even its ideology: "to fight with little bloodshed and on foreign territory".

The attack on Europe was to begin in July 1941. Hence the "oddities": demined bridges in the border zone, vacations of officers on the eve of Hitler's attack, maps of foreign countries in the absence of maps of their own territory. It is clear why no importance was attached to

all the testimonies and defectors, and their own intelligence. Stalin believed that Hitler's preparation for war no longer mattered: he would still be the first to do it.

But Stalin miscalculated: Hitler got ahead of him!

This part of Suvorov's concept can hardly be refuted. That is, it causes a lot of hysterics, but the arguments are somehow not audible.

With this concept itself, Viktor Suvorov deconstructed two myths that are very significant for the national self-determination of both the Germans and the peoples of the USSR, especially Russians.

Suvorov told the Germans that they did not start the war. Stalin prepared the war, and Hitler was only the "icebreaker of the revolution" that Stalin tried to use.

He told the Soviet people that the USSR had no technical backlog. Vice versa! They had just a technical superiority!

The topic of this superiority, the quantity and quality of Soviet weapons is so important for Suvorov that it is difficult to even refer to a specific place.

In general, this side of his research is quite convincing, although it does not do without the creation of new myths. Author's myths of Suvorov.

THE FIRST MYTH OF VICTOR Suvorov

The first myth of Suvorov is that the Germans, slandered by Stalin, turn out to be poorly armed, unprepared for war, and very weak. It's just a pity for the poor things becomes.

Even the supergun "Dora", it turns out, is such a worthless, useless invention. After all, multiton

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ny projectile burrows into the ground and explodes deep in the earth, without causing any harm.

Well, yes ... And if the Dora gun is used against concrete fortifications? Against the enemy, sitting under the protection of thick armor and concrete? For example, the famous 30th battery, which defended Sevastopol, was swept off the face of the earth by the Dora. Apparently, it's still not completely useless? The question is where and how to apply?

It is even said about Soviet tanks "aggressor tank". You involuntarily smile: did the Nazis have purely peaceful tanks? And the French ... And the Anglo-Saxons? One involuntarily recalls an old Soviet anecdote: "An enemy from abroad fired on a peacefully plowing Soviet tractor. The tractor destroyed the enemy with return fire.

It turns out: the Czechs made exclusively peacefully plowing tractors for the Wehrmacht. But the Soviet tanks were aggressors. These are for the offensive!

MYTH ABOUT AUTOMATES

Surprisingly, both the professional military Rezun-Suvorov and Weller, who constantly boasts of his knowledge of weapons, overlooked an elementary, in general, thing. I can explain only one thing: deeply Soviet people, they "bought" the turn of Stalin's military propaganda.

For Suvorov, the presence of submachine guns or machine guns in service is an unequivocal sign of a powerful military industry, high quality and modern weapons.

But the machine gun is by no means a symbol of the mighty military industry. Vice versa. The machine gun is a child of poverty.

The main armament of the infantry in World War II was a rifle, that is, a long-barreled automatic or semi-automatic rifle with rifling in the muzzle. The rifling gives the bullet rotation, the bullet flies far and retains its lethal force for a long time.

The Mosin rifles put into service in the USSR were produced in several modifications, with a barrel length

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la 800, 730, 729 mm. A 5-round magazine provided a rate of fire of up to 10 rounds per minute.

The maximum engagement range is up to 2000 m. The range of aimed fire was estimated at 500 meters, but it no longer depended on the characteristics of the weapon, but on the qualities of a trained soldier. Snipers confidently hit the target at a distance of up to 800 meters²².

“Contrary to popular belief about the almost complete armament of the Wehrmacht with submachine guns, the bulk of its weapons were magazine rifles and carbines of the Mauser system. As of September 1939, the Wehrmacht infantry division had 13,300 rifles and carbines and 3,700 submachine guns”²³.

Maßeg 098 (98) (Mauser 98) is a German rifle created in 1898 by Mauser. This Mauser rifle turned out to be so successful that it served in the German army in a slightly modified form until the end of World War II. It is only in the films of the Dovzhenko Film Studio that the Nazis go into battle in horned helmets, with machine guns at their hips, and with strangled chickens attached to the trouser belt by their martyrically outstretched paws. Watching these films, the elderly Germans literally laugh to tears. Not to mention anything else, in the Wehrmacht they fed well. Catching chickens was a much less typical occupation for Wehrmacht soldiers than for half-starved soldiers of many other states, and for many parts of the Red Army.

The characteristics of the Mauser rifle differ little from the Mosin rifle: five rounds, effective range up to 2000 meters, reliable shooting limit 400-600 meters, barrel length in various modifications from 1100 to 1250 mm.

So it's hard to make a rifle. This requires many parts that are produced with a high degree of precision on a milling machine. It is even more difficult to drill a long barrel and make precise cuts in it. We need qualified workers, we need time and equipment.

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But the submachine gun consists mainly of parts that are prepared by stamping. Such is the submachine gun, made under a pistol cartridge. Such is the machine gun, made under an intermediate cartridge, the average between pistol and rifle.

And the barrel of the submachine gun is short. The German Emny-40 ("Schmeisser") has 251 mm. The Soviet PPSH has 269 mm. Even the famous "Kalashnikov", made under the intermediate cartridge, has a barrel length of 414 mm - much smaller than even a cavalry carbine. Such a barrel is much easier to drill and cut. This requires a lot less skill.

That's just the firing range of a submachine gun is incomparably less than a rifle. And the accuracy of shooting is much less. Wasteful firing in bursts helps, but a large number of shots quickly overheat the barrel, and the accuracy of shooting becomes even lower. At a distance of even 100 meters, a submachine gun is ineffective. He is a cheap and bad weapon, which was not made from a good life.

Stalin put on a good face on a bad game, presenting the transition to automatic weapons as mighty steps of progress and for the far-sighted and wise policy of the Bolshevik Party.

Showing the Nazis who race on motorcycles (across a plowed field) with machine guns at the ready or foppishly firing them from the hip, the Dovzhenko Film Studio wanted to show technically well-prepared and strong enemies. And if you look at it, she "worked for Suvorov": she showed poorly armed, drunk, hungry soldiers chasing chickens in clownish helmets with horns.

It is strange that Suvorov did not notice this.

THE SECOND AND MAIN MYTH OF VICTOR Suvorov

But something else is much more important: Suvorov writes incredibly much about armaments, equipment, military orders, fuel, types of troops, the time for extracting orders from an envelope, cleared bridges and etc.

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But he does not write at all about the social psychology of those who carried out orders and set weapons in motion.

And his explanations of victories and defeats also come down to logistical issues.

Where did the huge amount of weapons procured in the USSR after the start of the war go? Suvorov-Rezun answers with no hesitation: the Nazis destroyed all the prepared equipment and weapons in the first days, almost the first hours of the WAR.

It was everything, it was! Stalin was preparing to take over Europe! But already driven into a corner by the "icebreaker of the revolution", Hitler at the last moment delivered a preemptive strike and destroyed, bombed and set fire to a fantastic amount of weapons, equipment and equipment.

Doesn't look very convincing. Even unusual after Rezun's always convincing conclusions.

It took another person to give a clearer explanation.

MYTHS BY MARK SOLONINA

When you say "A", you have to say "B". Vladimir Rezun was the first to start the deconstruction of the myth - and honor to Rezun-Suvorov. Be glorious, Viktor Suvorov!

But a very big myth was created with too great forces, and for decades it grew into the public consciousness. Suvorov has just begun to disassemble the building of this myth, and nothing more. And others naturally followed Suvorov.

Mark Solonin has already come and has already said a little more about the Second World War than Suvorov, has revealed new "great" secrets.

Mark Solonin spoke about the "human factor". About the elementary truth that any military equipment is powered by people. What little use even from a huge number of the best aircraft, if the pilots on them are with low qualifications.

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FLIGHT HOURS?!?!25

Any weapon, like absolutely any technique, requires qualification for use. The more complex the technique, the higher the qualification. The easiest way is to run

from the hip into the white light, like a pretty penny, from Stalin's favorite submachine gun, the symbol of modern armaments. Already the rifle requires more serious handling and meaningful use. It is even more difficult to set in motion a tank, a machine-gun barrel, an artillery weapon.
que.

Solonin shows through many examples that the soldiers and officers of the Red Army simply did not have the necessary qualifications. In essence, they ruined the technology entrusted to them, or at best used it to an insignificant part of what was possible.

A very interesting topic: for all its declarative "democratism," the Soviet system has never been able to work for a person and use his potential. Stalin and his buzzards, nicknamed "falcons", sincerely believed that colossal armies and a huge amount of weapons and equipment would in itself make them invincible. And, as usual, they lost - precisely because they did not take into account the "human factor".

Until we develop this theme, let us return to Solonin.

Mark Solonin did not in the least deny everything Suvorov said... He relied on Suvorov. In this sense, Solonin, of course, is not a student of Suvorov, but his follower. "If I can see far, it is because I am standing on the shoulders of giants," Charles Darwin once said. From the shoulders of Suvorov, his follower was able to see further than the one who first entered this door.

He just takes the next step.

Mark Solonin showed that the Nazis did not destroy what was accumulated for the capture of Europe. And they did not exterminate the Red Army. Everything is simpler: in 1941, the Red Army simply fled. The border parts consisted of

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tels of the western regions of the USSR, "annexed" to the USSR in 1939. At the first blows they ran... And then they dispersed to their homes. In 1944-1945, there were 3 million "re-conscripts" in the Soviet Army: those whom the Soviet Army, which had again gone westward, called up for the second time.

Now, after Corned beef, everything becomes completely clear!

WHAT DOES NOT HAVE SUVOROV AND corned beef

Not only Suvorov, who talks mainly about the caliber of guns and the driving characteristics of tanks, but Solonin did not utter a seditious phrase ... He came close to her ... In fact, he gave a lot of information ... But he did not dare transcend an important psychological barrier...

I'll have to decide!

The fact is that the Second World War for the Russian people and all the peoples of the USSR was also the Second Civil War. It is worth understanding this - and historical puzzles are already being assembled.

finally.

To begin with, the Civil War only in Soviet textbooks went from 1918 to November 1920. Allegedly, Wrangel was defeated - and everyone, including the Soviet people, under the leadership of their native Bolshevik Party, went to build a happy peaceful life and prepare a classless society. This

not this way.

1) The fighting between the Red Army and the White Army (the Zemstvo army of the state of the Merkulov brothers) in the Far East continued until 1924.

Even formally, the Civil War continued at least until that time, even if not in European Russia.

2) In the USSR, military operations against peasant armies were described as "mutinies" and, at best, as uprisings. To some extent, the events in St. Petersburg and throughout the North-West in 1921 can be considered an uprising. This uprising went down in history as the "Kronstadt

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mutiny" - the communists tried to downplay the scale of the event.

But was the movement of peasants in the Tambov region an uprising? The "Greens" in the Tambov province from the very beginning of the Civil War existed autonomously. They weakly supported the Whites, but they fought with the Reds until the autumn of 1922. They didn't "revolt", they continued the war. And the communists, having dealt with the white armies, intensified the war with the "green" militias of the peasants.

Similarly, the peasants of Siberia have never been subjects of the Soviets. They could neither "change" the Soviet regime, nor "revolt" against it, even with a strong desire.

War with the "greens" 1920 - 1924 was not a chain of uprisings, but a continuation of the Civil War. At this stage of the war, 238 thousand Red Army soldiers died? and about a million armed peasants and civilians, hostages and exterminated.

And the date of the end of hostilities is difficult to name. On Sakhalin, the last "green" partisans were defeated in 1925. In Crimea, the last "green" and Tatar nationalists surrendered in 1926. In Yakutia, the last "green" partisans were defeated only in 1929. Junaid Khan's "Army of Islam" last fought in 1934.

Already these data are enough to understand: both after 1920 and after 1922, the Civil War continued.

3) In 1920, white armies went abroad: hundreds of thousands of armed people who took the oath. They all considered themselves Russians or Russians and were never hostile to Russia. But they were at war with the Soviets and were implacable enemies of Soviet power and the very idea of communism.

No one ever concluded a peace treaty with the leaders of the white camp and did not recognize their capitulation. Formally, the armies of Wrangel, Yudenich, Ataman Semyonov, the Zemsky army of the Merkulov government in Vladivostok, and the fighting squad of General Pepelyaev were at war with the Soviet Republic.

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People from the Russian All-Military Union and the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, white soldiers and officers, penetrated the USSR, committed terrorist attacks, continued the White struggle by other means.

The communists also continued the war on the territory of other states. The war with the White armies was transferred to the territory of other countries, was waged by other means, but did not end at all.

In 1928, under very strange circumstances, Baron Wrangel died. In 1930, General Kutepov was killed while trying to kidnap him by agents of the NKVD. In 1937, the new chairman of the Russian All-Military Union, General Miller, was kidnapped by agents of the NKVD and taken to Moscow. The kidnapping was committed in order to promote the NKVD agent General N.V. Skoblin.

Going to the meeting and sensing danger, Miller left a note to the staff indicating to whom he went with Skoblin. Therefore, the communists failed to capture the ROVS. General Miller was shot in Moscow on September 11, 1939, already after the outbreak of World War II, on the eve of the entry of the Red Army into the territory of the Commonwealth.

With white emigrants who were captured during raids on the territory of Poland, Romania or China, and with those who returned to the Sovdepiya, believing in red propaganda, they acted according to the laws of war.

And after World War II, too. All former Russian subjects caught in the Red Army raid in China in 1945 were exterminated or exiled. In particular, they dealt harshly with all socially active people. who in exile spoke at least about something

political.

The civil war continued after the Second World War. Leaving the Russian land, the White Army took with it the ashes of its soldiers and officers: the Reds desecrated and destroyed the graves. In 1921, the ashes of V.O. Kappel, who died on the ice of Lake Baikal in 1920, was transferred from Chita to China and buried in the Iberian Church in the city of Harbin in Manchuria.

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And in 1955, installed on the grave of V.O. Kappel monument was demolished at the request of the USSR: after the transfer of power from Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Zedong. The communists finished the war in 1955. In 1955 they completed what they could not do in 1921.

Already these data are enough to understand: both after 1920 and after 1922, the Civil War continued.

It was not only a war of Russians against Russians and not a war of the peoples of the Russian Empire with each other or their different parties. From the very beginning, the Civil War was considered the World War of the proletarians against the bourgeoisie. In fact, it was a war of utopia against the historically established real political, social and economic life. Such a war did not recognize any borders between states.

In every state and in every people the communists saw the oppressed proletariat and the exploiters —the bourgeoisie. They believed that sooner or later the Civil War would break out everywhere, in all states. A Zemshar Republic of Soviets is inevitable!

In Section One of the Constitution of the USSR of 1924, "the declaration on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", it was directly written:

"The will of the peoples of the Soviet republics, who recently gathered at the congresses of their Soviets and unanimously decided to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, serves as a reliable guarantee that this Union is a voluntary association of peoples with equal rights, which is behind each republic the right to freely secede from the Union is ensured, that access to the Union is open to all socialist Soviet republics, both existing ones and those that will arise in the future, that the new union state will be a worthy crowning of the foundations of peaceful coexistence laid back in October 1917. cooperation and fraternal cooperation of peoples, that it will serve as a sure bulwark against world capitalism and a new decisive step along the path of uniting the working people of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Republic"27.

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It remains to be amazed at either the blindness or the monstrous hypocrisy of those who deny that the USSR was preparing for war. Of course, I prepared. And not only in the late 1930s. The USSR ALWAYS prepared for war and waged war. It was created as a temporary military camp on the way to the Zemshar Republic of Soviets.

The differences in the positions of Trotsky and Stalin are not so strong. Trotsky was too carried away by his own eloquence and the eloquence of his colleagues. He thought that the World Revolution could and should be spurred on by the propaganda of Marxist ideas.

And Stalin (and certainly not he alone) believed that the aggression of a country already captured by the communists against others was the best way to organize this very World Revolution. That is, a revolution—an armed uprising of the masses—may not happen in this case. And there is a Civil War: a war of armies for a different political system. First the Civil War, and only then, perhaps, the revolution, if the natives appreciate it. And he called Hitler precisely the “icebreaker of the revolution”, and not the “icebreaker of the empire” or the “icebreaker of the USSR”. In an effort to conquer the whole world, Stalin only continued what he started in October 1917. Only differently.

Here Viktor Suvorov convulsively proves the initial aggressiveness of the USSR in the late 1930s... And this makes the historian smile: what is breaking through the open door?! The USSR was created as a springboard for world domination. Suvorov cites only separate, later examples, no more.

EXPERIENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY WARS

Having won, the revolution tries to spread itself to neighboring countries. French revolution? tried to bring what she considered her highest achievement to Italy, Germany, Spain. Bring on the bayonets of the French army. The civil war became at the same time a national war.

In the same way, even before Stalin's coup in 1929, the communists were ready to invade other countries,

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to bring Soviet power into them. The Civil War created experience: Soviet power was brought to Central Asia, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova. Without the bayonets of the Red Army, there would be no Soviet power there. The national war was fought not for territory and resources, but for the right to establish a different political system in the country. The national war easily spilled over into civil war.

But no disease will ever enter a healthy body. No German money, no propaganda of Jewish and European wise men would ever topple the Russian Empire, plunge it into the Civil War, if the Russian Empire were a perfectly healthy organism.

Similarly, no military aggression by Soviet Russia or the USSR could have established Soviet power without the help of the populations of the occupied countries. Poland did not become Soviet, not because it is big and strong, but because even Polish communists and anarchists went against Soviet aggression. No one in Poland wanted to become part of a state centered in Moscow. Estonia is small, but it has also defended its independence. And Ukraine is big, but there were those who helped the Bolsheviks to conquer it. And in little Armenia these lovers

enough.

There would be no Soviet power in Armenia even if all Armenians rose up against the Soviet power in unison. But part of the Armenians were communists, they themselves wanted Soviet power. They helped the Red Army and established Soviet power together with the commissars from Moscow.

Civil wars broke out in European countries without any provocation from the USSR. The “Red Biennium” in Italy, the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1938, the Great Strike of 1926 in Britain, the Civil War of 1926 in Poland, the fascist coups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia were and without the introduction of Soviet troops. Moreover, without the “hand of Moscow”, the Civil War began in China, and

China broke up into 8 warring states. The USSR had nothing to do with the many revolutions and putsches in Latin America.

Between 1914 and 1945 the world changed beyond recognition. The events in Russia were important, but they are only part of the events around the world. Since 1914, the world entered a period of wars and revolutions that lasted 21 years... He emerged from this bloody "stripe" completely different! Like the hero of a fairy tale, diving into boiling milk or into blood. There is not a single country in which the political system has not changed in these 21 years. In some countries it has not changed very much, in others everything has become completely different, but no one has remained the same as it was before 1914.

Against the backdrop of this twenty years, the Second World War is only the final phase of the World Civil War.

Historians argue: did two World Wars thunder in the world, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, or was there only one World War, but with a long, relatively peaceful, break between active phases?

But just as one asks about the number of World Wars, one can ask in another way... And how many Civil Wars were there? Were there many of them in different countries, with different dates, or is it all one grandiose World Civil War of 1914-1945, stretched out in time? In this World Civil War, the Civil War in Russia of 1917-1922 is only one of the episodes. The Second World War is also one of the episodes.

In my opinion, there is only one question: should we consider the entire period of 1914-1945 as the World Civil War or only 1939-1945?

RUSSIA - THE CONTINUATION OF THE CIVIL WAR

Probably the meanest and most deceitful of the theses of the official Soviet propaganda: about the political unity of the Soviet people.

By 1939, there were many people in the USSR who did not at all share the views of the communists, or even were hostile to these ideas. Let's not even say that living abroad

there were up to a million active enemies of the Soviet government and that they willingly worked for the Finnish, German, American, Chinese, Japanese intelligence and armies.

The number of Soviet defectors to Finland, China and Persia, Rumania and Poland is estimated at least in the tens of thousands.

In 1941, the Red Army partially fled - recruits from the western regions of the USSR. Part of the Red Army surrendered in battalions, regiments and almost divisions.

The number of those who surrendered is called different: from 3 - 5 million to 4 - 5 million. The approximate figures prove one thing: no one really counted. It was on their occasion that Stalin said his famous: "There are no prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. There are traitors in the Soviet Union."

Note: Stalin did not act with these people as a monarch, president, head of government. He acted according to the laws of the Civil War. And when he decided that the members of their families were responsible for those who had surrendered, he acted according to the laws of that seemingly long-standing Civil War of 1917-1924.

Both he and his entourage were shaped by the Civil War both as individuals and as politicians.

But their decisions and their political predilections did not have to be shared by all Russians.

It is known that many residents of the Soviet Union served in the Wehrmacht: 310,000 Russians, 53,000 Cossacks, 250,000 Ukrainians, 110,000 people from the peoples of the North Caucasus, 40,000 Volga Tatars, 20,000 Crimean Tatars, and other Turkic peoples. — 180 thousand people. This is at the beginning of 1945, and besides, this number does not include the Estonian, Latvian SS legions, several Lithuanian SS battalions.

If citizens of one country are fighting in warring armies, then what is this if not a civil war?!

The Cossacks in 1941 split into pro-communist and pro-Nazi forces. The Cossack white emigration stood at the head of the Cossack collaborationism, and at the head of the Cossack

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SS Standartenführer, Cossack father Helmut von Pannwitz stood in the unit.

The Crimean Tatars and the peoples of the North Caucasus (Chechens, Karachays, Kalmyks) gave approximately the same number of volunteers to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. If this is not a split of the people and not a civil war, then what is it?

As you can see, during the events of 1941-1945. not only and not so much national forces fought among themselves as political ones. They sat in the trenches opposite each other, fired at each other from cannons and rifles, people of the same peoples converged in hand-to-hand combat. And in the vast majority of cases, it was not about "individual renegades" - this is a later propaganda canard, it is about the split of peoples along political lines.

Whenever the national army entered the capital of a temporarily occupied country (by Nazis or comedians, it doesn't matter), it was always about a certain political force! Which planned to use the acquisition of power to carry out its policies and reforms in accordance with its ideology.

Not only Wehrmacht servicemen, but also those driven away to work, working in special camps, wearing a special "Ost" sign on their clothes – and of these, no more than 15% wanted to return to the USSR. If the reader really wants to, he can consider that 85% of the former Soviet people were scoundrels and traitors in spirit. But even in this case, the Civil War is evident.

The number of "displaced persons" in Germany in 1945 is unknown. According to official Soviet statistics, in 1945, 5,236,130 people "returned to their homeland". The statistics are certainly not complete: too many tried to hide, escape, hide from returning to the USSR. But their fate is already sealed.

AGREEMENT IN YALTA

The post-war system was born as a result of the collusion of several of the most powerful countries on the globe. Each of them would willingly spread its political system

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to the entire globe. After all, the Civil War is a World War. Not only Stalin would have willingly created the Zemsharny USSR. The Anglo-Saxons would gladly make the globe a solid collection of "democratic republics" economically dependent on the US and Britain.

During the World Civil War, the most powerful

the powers cannot overcome each other and therefore agree on what the post-war order of the world will be like. This is happening at the Crimean Conference, in Yalta, February 4-11, 1945. Meeting of W. Churchill, F.D. Roosevelt, I.V. Stalin, with the participation of foreign ministers and chiefs of staff: the three winners in World War II openly divided the booty.

The peoples fought and built, people hoped and believed that they were bringing "this Victory Day" closer. That after Victory Day they will be able to somehow influence the organization of their lives. And everything has already been decided. And, perhaps, the most disgusting, the most mocking thing in this is that the powers that decided for other peoples, divided the world, declared themselves the embodiments of democracy and the lights of progress.

In the Communiqué of the conference, the three powers decided that after the defeat of Germany, each of them would occupy a certain zone, and Greater Berlin would be under joint administration. Germany was to be under the joint administration of the three occupying powers, whose commanders-in-chief would be in Berlin. Future reparations were also divided.

The Germans are still dying on the fronts, they are still rising in insane attacks. German women spit blood, learn to burn tanks with faustpatrons on the streets of their own cities. "Volkssturm" is also going to: old and small, under 16 and over 60 years old. They go to die under the caterpillars of Soviet tanks with a very cheerful folk song:

Yg - "neŷe U \ / aEep", Ug - ae ANep.

What does it mean in Russian:

We are the "new weapon", We are the old monkeys.

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Somewhere else, German communists, employees of the Soviet Army, are running along the front line. They run with mouthpieces in their hands, shouting calls across the trench line to surrender, to beat the Nazis, to go over to the side of the Soviets, to build a democratic Germany. Even the German sniper, gritting his teeth, catches the "traitors" at gunpoint by ear, by voice.

And everything is already counted, divided. It is known how these people will live, in what conditions, how much they will pay and to whom.

In the Declaration on a Liberated Europe, the powers unanimously declared that they would coordinate their actions in solving the political and economic problems of Europe after the war. At the Crimean Conference, it was declared that all the peoples of Europe would be able to "create democratic institutions of their own choice"^{2°}. And if the choice of the people is fascism? What if it's National Socialism?

Oh! We still do not talk about such horrors!!!

The allies agreed that the future state structure of Yugoslavia would be decided by the Provisional United Government, which would include all political forces, from communists to monarchists.

It was also decided that the government of the future Poland would also include Polish political emigrants - its legitimate government, which had fled abroad in 1939. The future border of Poland was determined, and it was decided to give Poland long-term Germanized lands in the north, for example, Gdansk-Danzig, and in the west - Szczecin.

But at the same time, it was decided that Vilna would become Lithuanian Vilnius, and Lvov would become a Ukrainian city. The Germans will be kicked out of their homes, beaten into boxcars with rifle butts, and forever taken away from Danzig, where more than twenty generations were born and raised. But

in the same way, the Poles from Lviv and Vilnius will be faced with a simple choice - to flee their homeland or be exterminated.

It was also decided that no later than 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the USSR would enter into

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war with Japan and get South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japanese settlers still live on these lands, they are still making some plans, counting on something and hoping - but they are already doomed.

Ukrainians, Russians and Byelorussians driven to the east are dispersing across Europe... Most of the millions of "displaced persons" want little - to somehow settle down and relax, not to return to the Soviet Union. But their fate is sealed: at the Yalta Conference, the robbers agreed that everyone who was a citizen of the USSR at the time the war began should return to the Soviet Union. Regardless of your desire. If Vlasov, Cossacks or Kabardians surrender to the allies, they are also subject to extradition.

GREAT BETRAYAL

In the spring of 1945, the Russian Liberation Army of General Vlasov, the ROA, was still pursuing some kind of independent policy. It is still joining the battle for Prague: the Nazis have mined the city, they want to blow it up, just like they blew up Warsaw. The Czechs raised an uprising, calling for help.

Many different fairy tales were written in textbooks on the history of the USSR; one of them is about how on May 8, 1945, the rebellious inhabitants of Prague threw a cry over the radio: "Red Army, help me out." In fact, the radio appeal was in three languages at once - in Russian, French and English. Why in Russian? But because the Czechs knew about the Russian parts of the Wehrmacht. They did not call the Red Army.

In the USSR, they concealed with all their might that Prague had been liberated from the Nazis by the forces of the Vlasov army. But what can you do? The fact remains that Vlasov's division was the first to come to the aid of the Czechs, ahead of both the Soviet troops and the Americans. It was she who actually saved the Czechs from the massacre, and Prague from the inevitable transformation into a stone desert. More than 300 Vlasovites paid for this with their lives, several times more were injured. After 1989, a monument to the soldiers and officers of the Vlasov army was erected in Prague.

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But the fact is another thing - helping the Czechs, the Vlasovites lost several precious days when they could have gone deep into the American zone of occupation. They were squeezed between the battle formations of the 25th Soviet tank corps and the 3rd American tank army. The Americans refused to let Vlasov's 1st division through. Negotiations went on for several days. Personally, Vlasov and people from his entourage were offered several times to change into civilian clothes and run away. He refused.

Many American officers were sympathetic towards the Vlasovites, but - military men - they received an order, and they carried out the order. The commander of the third army, D. Patton, categorically refused to take the Vlasov army into American captivity and advised only to break through to the west in small groups. On May 12, the division was officially disbanded by the last order of Major General S.K. Bunyachenko. A massive unorganized flight of people began; The Americans reported that "White Russians" were fleeing from the Red Army "like animals". The leadership of the army ordered to open fire on the fleeing Russians, ordered "to detain all white Russians and hand them over to the Red Army." On May 12-14, the systematic destruction of the remnants of the division took place, the execution of unarmed people who had no place on earth. Of the 10 thousand saviors of Prague, literally a few survived.

What can I say? Probably so: long live the United States, loyal allies of Stalin! Hooray for American Democracy!

Among the survivors is the battalion commander of the 3rd regiment P.N. Kuchinsky - he gave out the location and identified A.A. Vlasov. For this military feat, worthy of a real Soviet man, he was awarded the rank of captain of the Soviet Army and was given the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

However, it is still unknown how the fate of the Vlasovites would have developed, and if they had surrendered to the Americans. In 1945-1947, the British and Americans handed over to certain death several hundred thousand Russian people who did not want to return to the USSR.

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The details are terrible. Russian people were deceived until the last moment, there were cases when sleeping pills were added to their coffee and SMERSH was given out as sleeping. The English captain Denis swore in the name of the queen that he would arrange a meeting for the Russian Cossacks with Field Marshal Alexander, after which he took them directly to the location of the Soviet units.

The valiant English, natural knights, whose officers were very proud of their gentlemanship, themselves took part in murder and torture. On June 1, 1945, the 8th Argay battalion defeated the Cossack camp with terrible cruelty. Mass suicides were accompanied by the extradition in Lienz of the Cossack camp of Major General T.I. Domashevsky and the 15th Cossack cavalry corps of the three-divisional composition of G. von Pannwitz. Children, old people, women, the wounded were beaten with their feet and rifle butts, they were forcibly thrown into approaching trucks. The English soldiers had a lot of fun when the Cossacks killed their wives and children, leaving the last bullet for themselves. It remains to be regretted that they did not leave the bullet for the British scum.

And in the American zone of occupation on January 19, 1946 in Dachau, 14 people committed suicide, 21 people tried to kill themselves. In Plattling on February 24, 1946, mass suicides also took place. The Americans and the British tried to save the suicides and always betrayed them - sometimes still in bandages.

Major General V.I. Maltsev spent 11 months in the Ashkhabad prison in 1938-1939, where he was subjected to terrible tortures, but did not sign any "confessions". This man followed Vlasov quite consciously and ideologically. In American captivity, he wrote desperate letters to General Eisenhower, seeking to save his officers from extradition. He expressed his full readiness to appear before an international court.

At the moment of extradition, on August 16, 1945, Maltsev cut his throat with a rusty razor. The Americans placed him in a closed Soviet hospital, from there he was transferred to the Butyrka prison. At the trial, Maltsev was irreconcilable.

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The American military press was very amused about the suicides; many articles have been preserved, so it will not be easy for Americans to get away from the facts.

It is curious that already in the 1970s, A. Eden (Lord Avon), who was personally responsible for "carrying out all this policy," repeatedly wrote to Count N.D. Tolstoy, the author of the book "Victims of Yalta", "tried to justify the repatriation, refusing at the same time to answer specific, and key questions"³⁹. Apparently, he believed that everything was correct. In 1995, the Anglo-Saxons and the French celebrated the end of World War II with grandeur. And not a word of repentance. Everything is fine.

No less terrible is the fate of the Yugoslav Chetniks who fought against Tito's communists. The same captain Denis handed over the Slovenian corps of Lev Rupnik along with the sick, wounded,

disabled people. Even disabled people in plaster and the blind were thrown into trucks, then nurses and doctors began to be driven with rifle butts. Among the suicides were children aged 13 and 14, brother and sister. They were incompetent, did not finish the job, and the good English soldiers helped the teenagers, finished them off with bayonets.

One of the eyewitnesses described how he "ran, or rather jumped... an invalid on crutches. Pushing off the ground with his props, the unfortunate man tried to hide in the forest with huge leaps. The English soldiers knelt down and began to beat him with carbines. They laughed. They poured weight ": 1.

The Croatian Chetniks were promised that they would be taken to where King Peter P was waiting for them. Monarchists stormed the trucks with shouts of joy - they were in a hurry to meet their king.

These Chetniks were handed over along with their family members. All 16 thousand people were shot and thrown into the Kochevskaya abyss. Then they lowered explosives, captured faustpatrons into the abyss and blew them up - so that no one would be saved for sure.

Strictly speaking, according to the Yalta agreements, neither Western Ukrainians and Belarusians, nor citizens of the Baltic states, nor white emigration, including

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including neither Shkuro, nor Krasnov, nor Semenov - after all, all of them were not citizens of the USSR for a single day. Moreover, there were not and could not be any documents on the extradition of some citizens of Yugoslavia to others.

But of course, when it came to the "appeasement" of Stalin, all international agreements burned like a blue fire. The Western democracies really needed Stalin to quarrel with him because of some kind of human rights or other nonsense.

As for Krasnov and Shkuro, the Reds had accumulated too many accounts for them and really wanted to drink their blood, including the blood of the writer and public figure Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov. On January 17, 1947, he was hanged in Moscow, before he was 78 years old. months.

According to official data, P.N. Krasnov "was captured by Soviet troops." But this is a lie: Stalin's valiant allies betrayed him and all the other people, up to a million and a half; people who sometimes trustingly expected to be saved by those who boasted so enthusiastically of their "democracy".

I know of only three cases where Western officials opposed these extraditions. Pope Pius XP officially spoke out against the extradition of people "regardless of their will and denial of the right of asylum."

The other is not even a cleric, he is a very bad person, the evil fascist General Franco. The Spanish "Blue Division" fought on the Eastern Front, and Franco was quite reasonably asked:

- And if one of your military would have given Stalin the Russians?

- I would hang it high and short! Franco snapped. "Before that, I would have cut off the eggs!"

And then he spoke for a long time about the deportations in terms that do not allow them to be reproduced on paper.

The prime minister of this small state, A. Frick (the son of a peasant, unlike British gentlemen), did not extradite any of those interned in Liechtenstein. Soviet diplomats threatened him that if Liechtenstein

will not extradite the soldiers and officers of the 1st Russian National Army interned on its territory, the USSR will never establish either diplomatic or economic relations with Liechtenstein. "It's up to you," the prime minister replied, "but I don't want my grandchildren to ever be able to say that their grandfather was a murderer." Apparently, English aristocrats have nothing against this title.

German generals and officers repeatedly spoke out against the extradition policy, but they spoke out in defense of fellow soldiers, and the attitude towards them was understandable: "What?! Is that Bosh pig still barking?!"

But here is a characteristic detail: when in Austria the allies — the British and the Americans — began to issue Cossacks to the Stalinist secret police, the Cossack father and Major General of the Wehrmacht Helmut von Pannwitz himself went after his brother-soldiers and shared their fate — he was executed by the communists in Moscow in 1947 -m. 144 officers of the Wehrmacht voluntarily went into captivity with their Russian brother-soldiers, 690 Cossack officers?2. Eternal glory to the heroes.

The translator R. Ressler voluntarily stayed with Vlasov, although at the time of Andrei Alekseevich's arrest, they tried to separate him from the boss. He returned to Germany in 1955 after serving 10 years in the Gulag.

Surprisingly, it is a fact that life in the Third Reich and service in the ranks of the Wehrmacht formed higher human qualities than life in a democracy and service in the ranks of the armies of liberators.

It makes sense to emphasize once again that neither the Western peoples who boast of "democracy" nor the rulers of these powers have any rights to "white clothes". I would even say that in a number of cases the Western peoples have less rights to white clothes than the Germans, and the rulers of Western countries have less rights to be called decent people than Hitler and Bormann.

What right do English soldiers have to condemn Oradour and Babi Yar, laughingly shooting at a fleeing cripple? Throwing a man in a plaster corset on both legs into trucks? Bayoneting two unfortunate teenage suicides?

Yes, none! It is only interesting, in what commissions on human rights, who were taught to live, after returning to their homeland, these joyfully laughing people, the murderers of the doomed cripple?

As for the leaders of the peoples, then a question arises ... A very terrible ... A very indecent question ... Even you

it's scary to say... Tell me, how do Roosevelt and Churchill fundamentally differ from their ally Stalin? Moreover, how do they fundamentally differ from

Hitler and Ribbentrop? Because they won the war, right? And what else?

THE THIRD MYTH OF SUVOROV, OR THE UNSUCCESSFUL MANIPULATOR

What else betrays Suvorov as a deeply Soviet person: he has great respect for citizen Dzhugashvili...33 In the sense of Joseph Stalin. Suvorov concludes that Hitler failed to "purify" his army and his state. And so he had bad generals and bad politicians. So Stalin made a cleansing - he shot down the "Leninist guard", the surviving revolutionaries, and therefore his state and his army were active, viable. His "cogs" of the state turned out to be stronger than those serving in the Wehrmacht. Reliable. He devoted a whole book to how Stalin cleansed and improved his army from Tukhachevsky and Yakiraz.

True, Suvorov himself is not very consistent: he sometimes writes about the "Stalinist falcons" in such a way that his hair stands on end. I walked around Marshal Zhukov in such a way that it becomes obvious: Zhukov has nothing in common with Moltke, von Brauchitsch and Guderian. Tukhachevsky and Yakir have nothing in common with them - Suvorov convinced, convinced! But Zhukov and Konev have nothing in common with Guderian either. Including the effectiveness of their activities. Any Guderian lieutenant is worth three Zhukovs put together.

Perhaps Suvorov did not want to show this. Perhaps he honestly tried to show that Zhukov and Konev were better in some way... But he did it!

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And most importantly, Suvorov's Stalin somehow does not deserve orgastic awe. Suvorov either honestly experiences this thrill, or tries to imitate it so that everyone can see it. And it turns out

Badly.

With him, Stalin still turns out to be a rare loser. Absolutely all Stalin's undertakings end in failure and do not lead to anything good.

To begin with, Stalin realized the idea of the World Revolution through friendship with Hitler. He almost completely deceived him, but then the "icebreaker of the revolution" deceived Stalin himself: he got out of control and attacked the leader of the first state of workers and peasants.

Having unwittingly become an enemy of Hitler, Stalin again began to divide the world, this time with the rulers of the "decaying bourgeois pseudo-democracies." The method is the same - secret collusion.

In 1941, it was not so easy to disown the former ally and enter into friendship with new ones. "I had to" do a lot of not very respectable actions.

As early as June 1941, the government of the USSR "point-blank did not see" the diplomatic representatives of the countries captured by Hitler, but established diplomatic relations with the puppet government of Vichy. Now all the governments of the countries occupied by Hitler had to be recognized—and not communist puppets, but just those forces that they did not want to recognize: the Polish government in exile in London, the government of General de Gaulle.

In 1943, the strength of the USSR was growing, and again Stalin calmed the allies, held the Tehran conference, began to discuss the future boundaries of the occupation zones in Europe At the same time, he abandoned the gloomy army symbols of the Civil War. He introduces shoulder straps and an international system of military ranks, liquidates the Comintern in the summer of 1943, and in September holds a Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church.

That is, it seems to be obvious that the anti-Hitler coalition exists only as long as Hitler exists. But Stalin is in no hurry to move on to confrontation — Germany is still strong, he wants to receive Lend-Lease supplies, he wants to achieve the opening of the Second Front.

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she ... And she takes a number of steps that make it possible to think that the USSR is ready to liberalize the internal regime after the war.

N.N. Krasnov Jr. left notes in which, among other things, he cites the words of the investigator V.N. Merkulova: "But that you believed the British is really stupid! After all, these are historical traders! They will sell anyone and anything and not blink an eye. Their politics is a prostitute. Their Foreign Office is a brothel in which the prime minister, the main diplomatic "madame," sits. They trade in other people's lives and their own death. We? We don't believe them, Colonel. So we took the reins into our own hands. They don't even know that we locked them in a corner on the chessboard and now made them dance to our tune like the last pawn. Sooner or later there will be a fight between the communist bear and

western bulldog. There will be no mercy for our sugar, honey, reptiles and ingratiating allies! All their kings will fly to hell with all their traditions, lords, heralds, orders of Baths and Garters and white wigs. If an ordinary investigator said so, then what did the "father of peoples" think?

To what extent did those whom he called "our valiant allies" understand Stalin's game? Could it really be that the intellectual Roosevelt, the clever and cynical Churchill could not see through the naive prison-camp cunning of the mustachioed godfather? After all, everything was sewn with white thread!

Did they, the leaders of the Western world, understand what the Caucasian thief, who became the dictator of the Soviet Union, really thought of them? Did Roosevelt and Churchill still have the hope of outplaying Stalin, of deceiving the deceiver? Or did they count on an economic noose? Will Stalin be obedient to the fact that Stalin cannot exist without the import of cars and food? Or was the calculation on nuclear weapons? To be frank, I don't know. I'm not even sure that there was any calculation at all. Perhaps the extraditions in Lienz, all the "Great Betrayal" are explained simply - by the usual colonial attitude towards Russians in general. Well, just think, they handed over several Negroes to another native leader ... Delov!

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But what is most interesting is that twice finding allies, twice starting to share the world with them, in both cases Stalin was deceived in his plans and forecasts. Great statesman? But each time he managed to make incredible efforts and get unjustifiably little for them. Including, it seems, because he did not understand the psychology of his allies at all, did not see what was really a priority for them, what they were ready to fight for in earnest.

As a result, the same thing happened to Stalin that sooner or later happens to any manipulator: no matter how cunningly he spins a web, he still cannot calculate all the actions of another person. If he were honest in his relations with another, it would always be possible to agree... But the manipulator expects to get something that he does not agree on at all; he expects that his partner will give out a predictable and previously taken into account reaction, and it will be a win ... And he loses, because the partner gives out reactions that are not at all predictable (as one would expect).

Even Hitler, much closer and more understandable to Stalin, did something unpredictable and unexpected. And as for "his valiant allies"... Stalin never got even that piece of the world that the allies gave him in Yalta — until the end of his life, he could not completely conquer even Western Ukraine and Lithuania, not to mention Hungary and Poland (of course, he also did not understand the psychology of Polish and Lithuanian patriots).

As for Germany, for power over the world ... is it worth repeating fairy tales for half-witted people who live not in the real world, but in the whims of their own fantasies?

Of course, "many solutions of K.K. (of the Crimean Conference. - A.B) ... did not find their post-war implementation ... due to the fault of the Western powers, which took a course towards inflating the "cold war" against the socialist countries, towards the revival of West German militarism and revenge schism"³⁷.

It turns out that even with the help of a secret division of the world, at the cost of exterminating millions of people, Stalin could not

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to fight not only power over the world... He could not achieve much more modest things... For example, he could not make Germany his satellite.

WORLD CIVIL WAR

World War II was civil not only for the USSR. It was an explosion during which the political system changed in almost all states of Europe and the world.

Before the Great War of 1914-1918, we see one world. With the "Five Great Powers", the absolute leadership of the countries of Europe, with a combination of monarchy and liberal democracy in the domestic politics of the leading powers.

After 1945, a completely different one emerges: with different leaders, different political, economic and social systems, different priorities.

In the fire of the First World War, the old world order collapsed, and the new one did not appear. All countries of the world are faced with a choice.

The Versailles system tied many knots of international tension. After the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War of 1917-1922, the question of the political system arose sharply ... in fact, in all the countries of Europe. The world political system and the direction of development in all the states of Europe remained very uncertain. Period 1918 - 1939 on a global scale - a period of intermediateness, uncertainty, transition.

Italy has been tossing for a long time between socialism, democracy and fascism.

In Spain, fascism became a salvation from the communist and anarchist experiment - during the Civil War of 1935-1938.

France: the crisis of liberal democracy, the growth of the forces of the social democrats, the problem of authoritarianism, the restoration of the monarchy, the growth of communist forces.

Great Britain: agitation in favor of communism and national socialism. The growth of autocracy in power, the growth of the autonomy of the administrative apparatus from democratically elected bodies of representative power.

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Eastern Europe since the end of World War I between communism, fascism, social democracy and national socialism. Each country in Eastern Europe had its own specifics, but the struggle was between these forces. And almost all the countries of Eastern Europe (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece) ultimately opted for fascism or autocracy close to fascism (Poland, Czechoslovakia).

Authoritarian regimes close to fascism were established in the Baltic states.

In Austria, tendencies to join Germany and remain independent were fought, and in politics, social democracy, liberalism, and the growing temptation of National Socialism.

In France, communists, fascists, and liberals argued almost exclusively in the newspapers, but even here tensions escalated.

The nation-state construction of the USSR made it possible to increase the size of the USSR in any way through the system of subordinate "people's republics". The USSR also conducted hostilities almost continuously, in 1923-1939. - in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, Western Ukraine. The Red Army remained the main instrument of territorial expansion.... But the need to wage a secret war in Europe and America turned the Cheka, an instrument of genocide, into one of the strongest intelligence agencies in the world, the NKVD.

The USSR was opposed by the socialist Reich with a red banner, brown shirts and singing hymns, delightfully similar to the Soviet ones.

And all these forces ... Not the Germans, not Stalin, namely that EVERYTHING. Everyone was preparing a new war.

The Second World War completed what was not completed after the First World War. It brought certainty into the world situation. The Versailles division of the world and the activities of the League of Nations did not satisfy, in fact, anyone. The world post-war system lasted from 1945 to 1989 and suited almost all Europeans.

During the Second World War, ABSOLUTELY ALL the countries of Europe, along with the national war (or civil

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liza- tional?) civil wars were also waged—wars between citizens of the same country who had different political persuasions and different ideas about a desirable future. In many countries (France, Poland, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain, Austria, Germany) the civil war was no less cruel than the national war.

Even in quiet Britain and the calm United States, the political system has changed: liberal democracy has been replaced in them by a corporate one, in which there is much less “you can”.

Not a single state that participated in the Second World War retained its former political system.

The “world revolution” that the Bolsheviks raved about did not take place. But the World Civil War took place. It lasted about 2 decades and covered the entire civilized world. As it began in 1914, it continued until 1945.

After the Second World War, not only the face of the world, borders and spheres of influence zones changed. The political map within all participating states has changed. It is still considered very indecent to talk about it, but it is true.

The victors in World War II created many myths. These myths have been studied in textbooks and promoted in novels and films. And to talk about real events and the actual state of affairs has become something unpatriotic and, as it were, hostile towards their own people. And therefore unsafe.

By the 1960s, the first generation had grown up to imagine the Second World War primarily based on these myths.

TO THE HISTORY OF WORLD CIVIL

Suvorov began to demolish the building of these myths. He gave explanations for much of what has been lied about for decades. And the researcher was almost killed by the indignant “patriots

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you,” and his happiness that he was in London: it’s not so easy to get to Suvorov.

Solonin continued and said even more than Suvorov. But the aggression against him was less... Probably, the enraged patriots were exhausted on Suvorov. Yes, and everyone is already used to it.

The myth began to crumble rapidly. Probably, new myths will appear (already have begun to appear) in its place, but it is already possible to reconstruct “how it was”.

But to complete the reconstruction is difficult.

It is not only about propaganda and not only about state violence.

The fact is that the myth itself is warm and cozy.

As long as you live in this myth, you are surrounded by like-minded people. All around - benevolent views, around people who are ready to lend a shoulder. And you yourself realize this community as "correct" and "worthy". A community to be proud of.

To dismantle a myth is to rise above tribal, group ideas. The process is like climbing a mountainside somewhere in the Himalayas.

We must leave the warm valley where "everyone" lives. There is less heat above, below the plants, cold, harsh winds whistle. But from the slope you can already see more than from below... for example, you can see exactly who was preparing the Second World War. Even higher - around a patch of snow, the cold tightens the face, the air is rarefied ... But you can already see very far away! It can be seen that your valley is only one of many, that your compatriots are no better than everyone else.

And you need to move to where you are completely alone, where you can't see your relatives and where none of them has yet risen. There, under the black-green sky, among the icy rocks, moss and piercing cold light, the truth will be revealed to you. What a war! This is a Civil War, and its purpose is to change the economic and political order... all over the world, if possible.

Scary. Unclear. Dangerous. It is not known whether they will want to believe you if you bring this truth down to the bottom of the warm valley to others.

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Any myth is unpleasant to deconstruct. To see that the Earth revolves around the Sun, and that man descended from animal-like ancestors means to abandon the cozy community with his grandfather and father. It is to start thinking differently from the way your recent ancestors thought and the way your relatives think.

".. Mark Solonin accomplished a scientific feat, and what he is doing is a golden brick in the foundation of the history of the war that will someday be written ..." - this is how Viktor Suvorov assessed the work of his colleague.

In my opinion, these words are more correctly attributed to the work of Viktor Suvorov himself. He accomplished a scientific feat and moved the avalanche.

And the history of the war that needs to be written... This is the history of the World Civil War... Or 1914-1945. Is it still 1939 - 1945.

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28I hope the reader will excuse me if I do not call it the Great French Revolution? I'm squeamish.

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Irina Pavlova!

SEARCHING FOR LAW ABOUT THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

You can't trust anyone's word, comrades...

Stalin

In Soviet historiography for many decades there were provisions that the October Revolution became "the great beginning of the world proletarian revolution; it showed all the peoples of the world the path to socialism. However, as the authors of the six-volume "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" convinced readers, the party "saw its mission not in "pushing", not in "exporting the revolution", but in convincing the peoples of the advantages of the socialist system by practical example. "!

In reality, everything was done exactly the opposite. True, in the first months and even years after the October Revolution, the leaders of the Bolshevik Party did not hide not only their faith in the world revolution, but also their actions aimed at "pushing" it. Not one V.I. Lenin lived in the hope that "as soon as

IlyPavlova Irina Vladimirovna — Doctor of Historical Sciences, former leading researcher at the Institute of History of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, currently — an independent historian living in the USA in Boston. Among her works are the books "Stalinism: Formation of the Mechanism of Power" (Novosibirsk, 1993), "The Mechanism of Power and the Construction of Stalinist Socialism" (Novosibirsk, 2001), as well as articles on the most controversial issues of Soviet history published in the journals "Questions of History", "National History", "Kizzap Za ez ip Nisiogu".

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WE will be strong enough to defeat all capitalism, we will immediately grab it by the scruff of the neck." Researcher L.A. Kogan summarized the statements and proposals of other well-known party figures of that time on this subject: L.D. Trotsky in 1919 proposed to form a powerful cavalry corps for a throw to India, since, in his opinion, the path to the West ran through Afghanistan, Bengal and Punjab. N.I. Podvoisky owns the statement that "one must be transformed into another so that it is impossible to say where the war ends and the revolution begins." Proposing to create the General Staff of the Third International, M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote in July 1920: "The war can be ended only with the conquest of the world dictatorship of the proletariat." Other maxims are also known: K.B. Radek: "We have always been for a revolutionary war ... a bayonet is a very essential thing, necessary for the introduction of communism"; F.E. Dzerzhinsky: "We are going to conquer the whole world, despite all the sacrifices that we still have to make"; N.I. Bukharin: "The workers' state, waging war, seeks to expand and strengthen the economic basis on which it arose, that is, socialist relations of production (hence, by the way, the fundamental admissibility of even an offensive revolutionary socialist war is clear)" ; "Civil war is a minus, but it gives the possibility of restructuring on new principles." In 1919, a book by G. Borisov (a pseudonym for the economist and philosopher I.A. Davydov) was published in Petrograd under the title Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in

which a frank confession was made: "No, not the world, but the sword is carried into the world by the dictatorship of the proletariat"?. After the defeat at Warsaw in 1920, Lenin became more cautious about his plans for the future Sovietization of the West. At present, a previously unknown fragment of his speech at the IX Party Conference on September 22, 1920 has been published, where he, in particular, said: "I ask you to write down less: this should not get into print ..."3 In this speech, as already noted in the literature, reflected Lenin's plans for the Bolshevik expansion to the West, including the deployment of the Red Army

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along the German and Czechoslovak borders, as well as his obsession with secrecy."

Speaking about the plans for the Sovietization of Poland, Lenin lifted the veil on how the decision to "use military forces" was made: congress. But among ourselves we said that we should feel with our bayonets whether the social revolution of the proletariat in Poland is ripe? (highlighted by me. - /17.). This was done in secret both from their own party and from the Comintern. "When the Congress of the Comintern was in Moscow in July," Lenin went on, "it was at the time when we were deciding this question in the Central Committee. We could not raise this question at the Congress of the Comintern, because this Congress had to take place openly.

After the defeat near Warsaw, the intentions of the party leadership remained the same. Chairman of Sibrevkom I.N. Smirnov, at the 3rd Siberian Conference of the RCP(b) in February 1921, spoke about his conversation with Lenin, which he had after it turned out that 40 thousand volunteers who had gathered in Siberia for a trip to the Polish front turned out to be unclaimed: "...Tell the villagers that we still have to break capitalist Europe and that these 40,000 must play a decisive role. And the Russian Soviet rifle will appear in Germany.

As for the principles of conspiracy in foreign policy, they were not only fixed, but also brought to their logical conclusion by Stalin. After the first unsuccessful experiments, the hopes for a world revolution did not disappear, and the actions to "push" it did not stop, but were deeply concealed. As a result, the truth about them was literally bricked up. Who could really dare to doubt Stalin's assertion when, in 1936, in response to the question of the American journalist Roy Howard, "Has the Soviet Union abandoned its plans and intentions to make a world revolution?" answered: "We never had such plans and intentions"" (emphasis mine. - I.P.). This response is extremely characteristic of the individual.

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Stalin. For those who did not know that such plans existed, the Stalinist answer meant "did not leave", while those who asked at random received the corresponding answer. There is not even double, but excessive negation, equal to self-exposure and worthy of a common anecdote! At the same time, this response can be viewed as a subtle disorientation of the enemy for internal use and an expression of non-participation in the policy in which the West suspected the Soviet Union - for external use. In fact, it contained a gross mockery of all to whom this answer was intended.

Only with the beginning of radical political changes in the Soviet Union from the end of the 80s. the truth gradually began to come out, but this process turned out to be much more complicated than it seemed then.

The "key" that opens the way to the truth about Stalin's plans to expand the "front of socialism" is the truth about the eve of the war.

Immediately after the war, on Stalin's orders, a special body was created, which was called differently in different documents: "the government commission for the Nuremberg trials",

"government commission for the organization of the Court at Nuremberg", "commission for the management of the Nuremberg Trials". Stalin placed Vyshinsky at the head of this top-secret commission with special functions. The USSR Prosecutor Gorshenin, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR Golyakov, People's Commissar of Justice of the USSR Rychkov and three closest associates of Beria, his deputies Abakumov, Kobulov, Merkulov were appointed members of the commission. The main goal of the commission was to under no circumstances allow a public discussion of any aspects of Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941, primarily the very fact of the existence, and even more so the content of the so-called secret protocols supplementing the non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939) and the Friendship Treaty (September 28, 1939). In order to ensure during the investigation the effectiveness of the instructions of the secret commission, Nuremberg was

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the investigative brigade of special purpose, headed by one of the most ferocious executioners of Beria, Colonel M.T. Likhachev? Stalin was afraid in the public opinion of Europe and America to be in Nuremberg on the same bench with Nazi war criminals. And he had good reason for such fears. Therefore, Stalin did everything to prevent the Nuremberg trials from discussing the role of the USSR in unleashing the Second World War. He succeeded - the position of the winner allowed him to dictate conditions.

On November 26, 1945, the Vyshinsky Commission decided to "approve... a list of issues that are unacceptable for discussion in court"? Separate attempts by the defendants to point out the real role of the USSR in the preparations for the Second World War did not change the general situation. Thus, Ribbentrop stated in his last speech: "When I arrived in Moscow in 1939 to see Marshal Stalin, he discussed with me not the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Briand-Kellogg pact, but made it clear that if he does not get half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania, with the port of Libava, then I can immediately fly back. The conduct of war, apparently, was not considered there in 1939 a crime against peace ... "

This paragraph was not included in the Russian edition of the materials of the Nuremberg Trials. The truth about the eve of the war was ordered to be forgotten. Forget in the truest sense of the word — Stalin forbade writing diaries and memoirs about the war. Violation of the ban could cost lives. As for the direct accomplices of Stalin, oblivion was in their own interests. The clearest evidence of this is the conversation between F. Chuev and Molotov: "The West persistently writes that in 1939 a secret agreement was signed along with the treaty...

None.

- Did not have?

- Did not have. No, it's absurd.

"Now we can probably talk about it.

Of course, there are no secrets here. In my opinion, on purpose

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but spread rumors to somehow, so to speak, wet. No, no, in my opinion, it is still very clean here and there could be nothing resembling such an agreement. I was very close to this, in fact I was engaged in this matter, I can firmly say that this is, of course, an invention."

Of course, Molotov "was very close to this", which is undeniably confirmed by his signature under the secret protocols and the photograph that depicted him next to Stalin and Ribbentrop during the signing of these documents. It is significant that even decades later Molotov was incapable of historical self-assessment, otherwise his deliberate lie

was verbalized without the intriguing words "spread rumors", "wet" and statements that "it's still very clean here", while it was very dirty, prohibitively dirty. All this once again convincingly testifies to the moral characterization of Molotov as a political figure who occupied the position of a "second person" in the country at a crucial moment in its history.

The lack of necessary documents (those that remained were deeply hidden in secret archives), the general worldview of military historians, most of whom lived under Stalin and went through the war, brought up by official propaganda, naturally led to the fact that they saw the war at the suggestion of Stalin .

It would not be an exaggeration to say that even during the period of the Khrushchev "thaw", historians did not even allow the thought of the existence of the secret of the eve of the war, which was hidden by Stalin. There was nothing like that then with A.M. Nekrich, author of the famous book "1941. 22nd of June". He spoke sharply negatively about the "legend of a preventive war", which is "artificially supported by West German neo-Nazis and some reactionary West German publicists and historians"!?

Any criticism of Stalin's actions, which went beyond the then permitted limits, caused an immediate disciplinary reaction. The dialogue that took place during the discussion of the book by A.M. Nekrich in the Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 16, 1966 between the chairman

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who was Major General E.A. Boltin and L.P. Petrovsky, who called Stalin a criminal: "Comrade Petrovsky, in this hall, from this rostrum, expressions must be chosen. Are you a communist?

- Yes.

"I have not heard that somewhere in the directive decisions of our party, binding on both of us, it was said that Stalin is a criminal!"³

After the displacement of N.S. Khrushchev, from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, criticism of Stalin's "personality cult" gradually faded away. Over the next twenty years, the historiography of the Great Patriotic War lost even what it had achieved after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. It is enough to compare at least the 6-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945." (M., 1960-1965) with the 12-volume History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (M., 1973-1982). This was acknowledged by military historians themselves. "It remains only to regret that," wrote N.G. Pavlenko, "that time has been lost, many participants and witnesses have left us, and the most significant problems of the initial period of the war have to be studied, in fact, anew!"⁴.

Mountains of books about the war, accumulated by the beginning of perestroika, were united by the general pro-Stalinist concept of the eve of the war, which consisted of a set of unshakable schemes and stereotypes. Let's open any of these books, for example, "The Great Patriotic War. Questions and Answers" (M., 1985): "The situation ... forced the USSR to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939, although this act was not included in the plans before the breakdown of Moscow negotiations by England and France. Soviet diplomacy.

..On September 17, the Red Army began a liberation campaign in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine.

...On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war broke out through no fault of the USSR...

... On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany treacherously, violating the non-aggression pact, suddenly, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union."

Moreover, even at the beginning of perestroika, new knowledge about the eve of the war made its way with difficulty. The elders of Soviet military historiography F. Kovalev and O. Rzheshevsky considered it their duty in 1989 to warn those who expressed "points of view that did not sufficiently critically reproduce the long-known theses of anti-socialist propaganda, such as stereotypes about the "direct responsibility" of the USSR for starting a war..."!

Perestroika in the historiography on the eve of the war began only with the creation of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on international politics, headed by A.N. Yakovlev. Here are some statements made at the meeting of this commission on March 28, 1989, statements militant and helpless at the same time.

Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU V.M. Falin: "... In the not too distant future, we will come across a whole avalanche of versions that are completely divorced from real facts, imposing — especially on ignorant people, young people — the conclusion that the Soviet Union was an accomplice in the outbreak of the Second World War or, as at least contributed to the fact that it took such a tragic turn, which we know from history and from our own experience.

..Therefore, it is impossible to be detached from what is happening — and something similar is observed in our country — too. Truth is our ally in the current heated debate. But this truth must be complete. Without fakes and overlaps.

Head of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense D.A. Volkogonov: "... All decisions that were made in 1939, including the August and September treaties, were determined by the defensive strategy of the Soviet Union.

History will eventually justify the fact that the pact was signed on August 23, as a forced, albeit extremely dull step in moral terms.

While politically supporting the need to sign the treaty of August 23, we must at the same time condemn the conspiracy, which was contrary to the Leninist principles of renouncing secret agreements.

Director of the Institute of World History of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.O. Chubaryan: "... We have a common concept related to the responsibility for unleashing the Second World War, which is borne by Hitler's fascism. It does not require revision"⁵.

The results of the work of the commission A.N. Yakovlev reported to the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. According to his report, the congress adopted a special resolution "On the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939", which became a new guide in covering the eve of the war by Soviet historians: "... The Congress of People's Deputies The USSR agrees with the opinion of the commission that the non-aggression pact with Germany was concluded in a critical international situation, under the growing danger of fascist aggression in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia, and had one of the goals to avert the threat of impending war from the USSR.

"The Congress considers that the content of this treaty was in line with the norms of international law and the treaty practice of states adopted for such settlements. However, both at the conclusion of the treaty and in the process of its ratification, the fact was hidden that simultaneously with the treaty a "secret additional protocol" was signed, which demarcated the "spheres of interest" of the contracting parties from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from Finland to Bessarabia. .

..The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR condemns the signing of the "secret additional protocol" of 23 August 1939 and other secret agreements with Germany. congress

recognizes the secret protocols as legally untenable and invalid from the moment of their signing..."!".

Commission A.N. Yakovleva did not go beyond the discussion and evaluation of the treaty as an international legal document. The treaty was not placed in a historical context, and no fundamental conclusions about the consequences of this treaty were made at that time. Yakovlev limited himself to the remark that "Stalin and some people from his entourage could already have imperial

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plans alien to the principles of socialism", as well as "illusions, which, apparently, indulged in Stalin after the conclusion of the agreements of 1939. Illusions that did not allow the proper use of the received peaceful respite..."!°.

Moreover, the Yakovlev Commission by that time did not yet know that the originals of the secret protocols were kept in the archives of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Speaking at the congress, Yakovlev said: "There is an official note in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fixing the transfer in April 1946 of the original secret protocols by one of Molotov's assistants to another: Smirnov to Podtserob. So we had the originals, and then they disappeared..."!°.

Meanwhile, the original secret protocols were not only found, but also known to the General Secretary of the Central Committee. However, speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies, M.S. Gorbachev assured that "all attempts to find the original of the secret treaty were unsuccessful." Some time after his speech, as V.I. Boldin, "M.S. Gorbachev asked me casually if I had destroyed the protocol."20 Fortunately, this did not happen, and the publication of the original secret protocols was another serious step towards comprehending the truth. But how difficult was this path!

In the discussions of that time on the issue of the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, opinions were expressed that, having concluded this pact, both states bear the same responsibility for the outbreak of World War II. However, Soviet historiography rejected such opinions automatically, in fact, without argumentation. Here is the point of view of M.I. Semiryaga, author of the book "Secrets of Stalinist Diplomacy": "The statement about the equal responsibility of the USSR and Germany for the outbreak of the Second World War only because they had "the same totalitarian regime" cannot be considered convincing. The main responsibility for this international crime still lies with the ruling elite of Nazi Germany. My

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The Soviet leadership bears a share of responsibility for the fact that, by signing the non-aggression pact with Germany, it created certain conditions that contributed to the unleashing of war by Hitler"?21.

The position of M.I. Semiryagi is more radical than the position of historians represented by A.S. Orlov. Despite the obvious facts, he was still convinced that "the treaty allowed the USSR to stay out of the military fire that had engulfed Europe since September 1, and the secret protocol limited German expansion to the East to the line of the northern border of Lithuania and the rivers Narew, Vistula, San, made it possible to move the western border of the USSR 250-300 km to the west. The treaty created an opportunity in peace to prepare for the inevitable battle with fascism. Further, the Red Army "entered the borders of Poland...", and the troops "had the limited task of protecting the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus"22.

Relative peace among Russian military historians was destroyed by the publication in Russian of books by V. Suvorov (V. Rezun), who called into question something that had never before been questioned by anyone in the USSR. (His book *The Icebreaker* is subtitled *Who Started World War II?*) Through his books, he sought to prove that the main culprit and

The main instigator of World War II is the Soviet Union. Using a metaphorical turn, he named the day of the actual entry of the USSR into the war - August 19, 1939. V. Suvorov managed to figure out that on that day a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee took place, which decided to start secret mobilization. "Many historians," he writes, "think that at first Stalin decided to sign peace with Hitler, and then he decided to prepare a surprise attack on Germany. But the facts revealed and confirmed to me that there were no two different solutions. Signing peace with Germany and finally deciding on the inevitable invasion of Germany is one decision, these are two parts of a single plan. And further: "Therefore, I consider August 19 the boundary of the war, after which, in any case, the Second World

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the war had to take place. And if Hitler had not started it on September 1, 1939, Stalin would have had to look for another opportunity or even another performer who would push Europe and the whole world into war. This is the essence of my little discovery.

V. Suvorov did not focus on one year 1939, but considered all the main events up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941, linking them into a single logical whole: "Secret mobilization was to end with an attack on Germany and Romania on July 6, 1941... Secret mobilization was aimed at preparing aggression. Nothing was done to defend the country. The secret mobilization was so colossal that it was not possible to hide it. Hitler had only one and last chance - to save himself with a preemptive strike. And on June 22, 1941, Hitler - for two weeks - preempted Stalin": 2.

The publication of Suvorov's books divided historians into two unequal groups. The overwhelming majority are historians with experience and names, who in their writings "sanctified" the pro-Stalinist concept of war. Working for many years under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, they could not accept even that half truth about the war, which became the property of official publicity. This is evidenced by the failed attempt to prepare a new, 10-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people." But even those military historians who (for example, A.N. Mertsalov and L.A. Mertsalova) sharply criticize Stalin and Stalinism for the unpreparedness of the Soviet troops for the outbreak of war, for incompetence and arbitrariness, immorality and cruelty²⁵, were not ready to calmly discuss the concept of V. Suvorov.

This can only be explained by the fact that the Suvorov concept not only broke the established historiographical tradition, but also dealt a blow to personal feelings and ideas about the war. Moreover, many military historians, like A.N. Mertsalov, were themselves its participants. This is not just rejection, but also unwillingness to understand. The books of V. Suvorov, in their opinion, do not deserve detailed

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reviews of military historians, because "with the help of "icebreakers" an opportunistic revision of the most important moments of domestic and world history is being carried out", "a shadow is cast on real historical facts that have long been irreproachable from a scientific point of view (! - I.P.) are established by world historiography"-5.

As the influence of V. Suvorov's books on public consciousness spread in Russia, their denial also intensified. From silence, these historians moved on to swearing and implausible accusations. They branded him as "not a historian, not a memoirist, a traitor, an agent of foreign intelligence services." It turns out that his books "are written by different people, rather by groups of people", V. Suvorov's participation "is found only in separate literary devices, jargon, interjections"?7.

Even such a radical historian as YES. Volkogonov, who was placed in a privileged position by the post-communist authorities and had access to many secret documents, did not accept this concept? 8. However, the article in which he expounded his

position on this issue is significant in its own way. Firstly, by the fact that he recognized the fact guessed by V. Suvorov: on August 19, 1939, a meeting of the Politburo really took place. But, as Volkogonov emphasized, "the military question was only this: "On the postponement of the conscription of workers in the construction of the Akmolinsk-Kartala railway to the Red Army (according to Skvortsov's telegram)." And that's it. No mention of the Thunderstorm plan, etc."

Secondly, the article is significant in that it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the mechanism of action of Stalin's power. Volkogonov, who received the right to print the "special folders" of the Politburo of the pre-war and post-war period, did not understand that the absence in the protocol of the Politburo of August 19, 1939 and in the "special folders" of any information about Stalin's secret plans for an attack on Germany, as well as the absence of signatures of Stalin and Zhukov on such, according to Volkogonov, "striking" document as "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and

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its allies" as of May 15, 1941 (and not only on this, but also on other important documents) — this is still not an argument, let alone a decisive one, in a dispute with V. Suvorov.

Unlike his venerable opponents, V. Suvorov understood, although he did not specifically study, the mechanism of power of the Stalinist regime, [see = (6):3 (6) the principle of Stalin's activity in politics - if possible, do not leave documents, leave no traces, surround the truth with "battalions" lies.

Significant testimonies of Soviet military leaders about how decisions on military issues were made have already been cited above. Even if people like the Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major General A.M. Vasilevsky, who was directly involved in the development of operational plans on the eve of the war ("Considerations on the strategic deployment plan ..." were written by him)? it is quite natural to assume that the subordinates knew even less about the strategic plans of Stalin, moreover, they were sometimes perplexed about the "illogical" actions of their leadership. Historian V.D. Danilov cited in his article a very characteristic testimony of K.K. Rokossovsky, who was released from prison on the eve of the war and was appointed commander of the 9th mechanized corps in the Kiev Special Military District: "Followed by orders from the headquarters of the district to the troops to send artillery to the firing ranges located in the border zone, and other ridiculous in that situation, the instructions caused complete bewilderment. Judging by the concentration of our aviation on advanced airfields and the location of warehouses of central subordination in the front line, it was like preparing a jump forward, and the disposition of troops and the activities carried out in the troops did not correspond to it ... In any case, if there was any plan, it clearly did not correspond to the situation that had taken shape at the beginning of the war.

Thus, to assert that the Soviet Union was not preparing for a war against Germany in 1941, only on the basis of the absence of an official "decision to start

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war on the part of the Soviet political leadership and government, according to which the USSR would be the first to start preparing for war, the first to mobilize, concentrate and deploy troops on the most advantageous frontiers," as Yu.A. Gorkov, at least prematurely. Moreover, in the same article, he reports a very remarkable fact that in the pre-war period, the operational plan "was developed in a single copy, was reported for approval only personally to Stalin and Molotov" ?!.

In Soviet times, historians not only did not have access to secret materials of party and state bodies, but were also brought up on strict adherence to the principles of party membership and a class approach. This implied following the interpretation of events, which was laid down in the sources themselves. As a result, the works of historians reproduced the ideology and

document logic. The main difficulty in overcoming the Soviet historiographic legacy was to learn how to reveal the true meaning of events that in their own way reflected the remaining documents of the Soviet era - secret and unclassified. We must pay tribute to V. Suvorov, who showed himself in the book "Icebreaker" as a historian-intelligence officer who managed to reveal the main secret of Soviet military policy and history. He did this, relying mainly on published Soviet sources, which he compared, rethought, cleared of ideological masking and marking.

It is noteworthy that the conclusion about the preparation in 1939-1941. active entry of the USSR into the world conflict came and other historians. First of all, the names of J. Zamoyski (Poland) and I. Hoffman (Germany) should be mentioned. The article by J. Zamoyski "The Black Hole", September 1939 - June 1941 (On the Policy of the USSR in the Initial Period of the Conflict)" was published in 1994, but prepared much earlier, for an international conference of historians in April 1990 in Moscow?2. Convinced that the actions of the Soviet Union in that period "do not fit into any logical whole", not knowing

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In addition to many documents published in Russia in subsequent years, the author came to the conclusion that the decisions listed below testify to the preparation of the USSR for an offensive.

These are: 1. The appointment of G.K. Zhukov to the post of Chief of the General Staff as the winner at Khalkhin Gol, who showed himself excellently (although not without criticism) during the January staff game. 2. Growing replenishment of units in the western districts, but not yet in the order of mobilization. 3. A huge program of military production and rearmament of the Red Army, the results of which were implemented only in 1942 (taking into account the achievements of German aviation). 4. The movement of five armies (16th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 25th) from the depths of the country to the west, but not to the border zones, which is important from an operational point of view. 5. Creation in Ukraine of a strong operational fist of 60 divisions with a tendency to further strengthen it. 6. Reorganization of the four rifle divisions of the Kiev district into mountain divisions (Ukraine is mainly flat, and in front of it is a mountainous direction at the junction of Czechoslovakia, Austria with access to the central, vital regions of Germany - a direction known from the First World War). An airborne corps, a tool of non-defensive use, was also formed in the Kiev district. 7. Disarmament of fortified areas on the old border. 8. The extensive construction of airfields near the western border and the mass delivery of air bombs there, which could mean their preparation for an offensive. 9. The movement of military depots to the west by Stalin's personal decision, which later turned out to be a major mistake, but which is quite understandable and correct in the offensive version of the planned operations. 10. Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941 (in the text of the article on January 5, 1941 - I. / 1.) that the war with Germany is inevitable and we must be ready for it in 1942. and that not only a defensive but also a warning strike is possible. 11. May 6, Stalin becomes head of government, which could mean a lot, including a sharp turn towards concessions to Germany, but above all

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It was clear that the USSR was entering a period of major and dangerous decisions—decisions calculated for success.

J. Zamoyski also made an important remark about "silent sources", which do not contain any information about Stalin's strategic plans. In particular, attention is focused on the transparency and significance of the ellipses in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov - "Hitler ... was in a hurry, and not without reason ...". As a result, Zamoysky was convinced that "Stalin, back in the period of Munich, undertook a huge, dangerous, "long-range" game, calculated on the fact that the USSR, i.e. he will say the decisive word in this conflict..."33.

The historian I. Hoffman, who worked for many years at the Institute of Military History in Freiburg, moved in the same direction in his research, and came to the conclusion that

"Stalin concluded a pact on August 23, 1939, in order to unleash a war in Europe, in which he himself took part as an aggressor from September 17, 1939 ... The military and political preparations of the Red Army for an attack on Germany culminated in the spring of 1941 .»³⁴.

Hoffman's article, published in the journal *Otechestvennaya Istoriya*, contains additional evidence of the aggressive intentions of the USSR. First, he cites two very important facts: "We have concluded an agreement with Germany," Narkomindel reported | July 1940 to the ambassador in Japan - was dictated by the desire to unleash a war in Europe. And in a telegram to the Soviet ambassadors in Japan and China on June 14, 1940, it said: "We would agree to any agreement to ensure a clash between Japan and the United States."

Secondly, in the interrogations of Soviet officers of war kept in the German archives, he found confirmation of the fact that the actions of the Red Army on the border with Germany before June 22, 1941 were indeed shrouded in mystery, the meaning of which was understood far away. Not all.

Thirdly, there is additional material evidence of the existence of offensive plans from the Soviet side, captured by the Germans. Thus, the former head of the Department of Eastern European History, Mainz

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of the German University, Professor Dr. Gotthold Rode, at one time a translator and *Sonderführer* at the headquarters of the German 3rd Infantry Division, found on June 23, 1941 in the building of the headquarters of the Soviet 3rd Army in Grodno, as he noted in his diary, "a pile of maps of East Prussia, excellently printed on a scale of 1:50000 ... All of East Prussia at a glance. Why, he wondered, did the Red Army need hundreds of maps? Further, in the building of the headquarters of the Soviet 5th Army in Lutsk, on July 4, 1941, documents were found, among which was the "Plan for the political support of military operations during the offensive." In addition, the Germans were aware of leaflets addressed to German soldiers, found, in particular, by the troops of the 16th German Army on the first day of the war, June 22, 1941, near the town of Sakiai in Lithuania. Thus, according to I. Hoffman, although "Hitler did not have a clear idea of what was really being prepared on the Soviet side ... by his attack on June 22, 1941, he anticipated Stalin's attack"³⁵.

It must be said that in the West, too, the point of view about the "preventive" attack of Germany on the USSR in 1941 is rejected without discussion by the overwhelming majority of historians. The *Pe Gay* weekly (June 7, 1991) directly called the supporters of this version "belated victims of Nazi propaganda"³⁶. One gets the impression that Western historians, especially German ones, are most afraid of accusations of sympathies for fascism, of neo-Nazi aspirations. These fears are so great that they outweigh the desire for truth, which should guide the historian in his work. That is why they are so aggressive in their criticism of the historians of the so-called revisionist school, to which Suvorov and Hoffman are primarily attributed. Recently, another name has been added to this series - the German historian W. Mather published the book "The Broken Word. Hitler, Stalin and the Second World War" (in another translation "Treachery..."), which was subjected to crushing criticism from another German historian, G.A. Jacobsen up to the statement that "Maser has shown himself in this book

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like a historian." The arguments in his criticism are the same categorical statements as those of our opponents of this concept; "There are no indications, documents that would indicate that Stalin had political intentions to attack Germany on a certain day", and in general "there is no evidence that Stalin was going to attack Germany in 1941". In addition, according to G.A. Jacobsen, "The Red Army was just about to modernize its tank troops and aviation"⁷⁷,

Unfortunately, in this matter, not only Russian but also Western historians are guided primarily by ideological motives. Thus, the Israeli historian G. Gorodetsky, the author of books published in 1995 and 1999. in Russian — “The Myth of the Icebreaker” and “Fatal Self-Deception: Stalin and Germany’s Attack on the Soviet Union”, proclaiming as its goal “the transfer of the discussion from the road of ideology to the rails of science”, sees in the concept of V. Suvorov only a “grand hoax”, which is beneficial “for those who wanted to weaken the warming of the political climate, and in Germany to rehabilitate the Nazi regime”³⁸. This statement most frankly reveals the ideologization of the works of G. Gorodetsky himself. It would be more honest to admit that many Western historians are not yet ready for a serious scientific discussion on these issues in the way that, for example, the American historian R.Ch. Raak in a review of I. Hoffman's book “Stalin's all-destroying war 1941-1945”³⁹.

Attempts to justify Stalin's actions in 1939-1941. helpless, naive, and most importantly, go against the logic. Perhaps Stalin would not have wished for himself a better defender than, for example, J. Fleischhauer. Citing the fact of Stalin's more than half a meter (58 cm) signature on the map attached to the Soviet-German treaty of friendship and by the signing of the secret protocol to the pact of 23 August, but rather a kind of detente in connection with the fact that the non-aggression pact has borne fruit. Although it wouldn't be

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triumph, then there would be no psychological relaxation. Moreover, according to I. Fleischhauer, “the map fixes not the division of Poland in half, but rather the Soviet renunciation of most of Eastern Poland as compensation for Lithuania. Stalin then clearly preferred military security to territorial expansion in the West. Subsequently, I. Fleischhauer and G. Gorodetsky even tried to prove that the noun “offensive” in Russian means ... “defense”!

It is noteworthy that the publications that appeared in Russia in those years on this topic - documentary materials or articles by historians who were guided by the desire to establish the truth - generally confirmed the concept of the Icebreaker. The Military History Journal (1991, No. 12; 1992, No. 1, 2) carried out a partial publication of the variants of plans for the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces, which were developed before the war by the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (plan 1940 - basis for the preparation of the plan of September 18, 1940, the plan of March 11, 1941, and in part the plan of May 15, 1941). Anticipating this publication entitled “Did the USSR prepare a preventive strike?”, the editors of the magazine formulated their point of view: “In general, they (materials. - I.P.) confirm that the Soviet Union, doing, according to Molotov me.—I.1.), the choice in favor of an “offensive policy” did not set itself aggressive goals, did not provoke Germany into a “preventive war”. However, historians B.N. Petrov” and especially V.N. Kiselev, from whom the editors even preferred to dissociate themselves with a note (“We do not consider the author's point of view indisputable”), came to different conclusions. According to Kiselev, “both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were preparing for the offensive. We did not plan a strategic defense, and this is generally recognized. Only covering troops were supposed to defend themselves in order to ensure the deployment of the main forces for the offensive. Judging by the timing of the concentration of reserves of the border military districts, the armies of the reserve of the High Command and the deployment of front-line command posts,

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the offensive of the Soviet troops to defeat the aggressor preparing the invasion could begin no earlier than July 1941. ...”.

Colonel General Yu.A. Gorkov was one of the first in Russia to publish “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies” as of May 15, 1941, which dealt another blow to the previous

Veteran historiography of the war, which categorically denied the fact that the General Staff of the Red Army could work out a plan of attack on Germany. But Gorkov himself does not agree with the conclusion that the Red Army is preparing for an offensive. Moreover, in strengthening the South-Western direction, he sees not a strategic plan, but a miscalculation. In his opinion, "the concept of the operational plan for the war did not reflect an offensive, but rather an umbrella doctrine. According to the meaning of the umbrella doctrine, the covering troops should be tasked with covering the deployment of their troops with a strong defense, identifying the composition of the advancing enemy troops, determining the direction of the main and other strikes in order to clarify the tasks for the main forces of their troops.

Meanwhile, it was an unbiased study of the available documents on the eve of the war that led to the appearance of articles by V.D. Danilova and M.I. Meltyukhov⁴⁶. The main conclusion that Danilov came to was the recognition: "We were preparing to start the war with a crushing offensive, but we missed many issues of organizing a reliable defense of the country. It is these "mistakes" and "miscalculations" that explain the major failures of our troops at the beginning of the war.

As for Meltyukhov's article, the decision to publish it was made at a special meeting of the editorial board of the journal "Otechestvennaya istoriya", which also showed a sharp rejection of the concept of preparing the USSR for an attack on Germany on the part of historians Yu.A. According to Lyakov, V.P. Dmitrenko, V.I. Bovykina, V.A. Fedorova and others⁴⁷. Polyakov, despite an avalanche of obvious facts, refused to recognize the actions of the USSR to annex the Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Bessarabia as aggression and accused Meltyukhov of

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ness. Dmitrenko was convinced that "it is simply indecent to discuss Suvorov's book in a scientific journal."

Nevertheless, the article was accepted for publication. Deputy editor-in-chief M.A. Rakhmatullin rightly assessed it as one of the first attempts to objectively assess the books of V. Suvorov. Meltyukhov not only substantiated the fact that the USSR was preparing an attack on Germany, but also pointed out that the plan for the war with Germany was approved on October 14, 1940 and its further clarification in the documents dated March 11 and May 15, 1941 d., in fact, did not change anything. "The most important thing," he stressed, "in Germany and in the USSR, these plans did not remain on paper, but began to be implemented. Comparative analysis of the preparation of the parties for the war is another direction for further research on the eve of the war. But even on the basis of the materials known today, it can be argued that this process proceeded in parallel and from the beginning of 1941 entered the final stage both in Germany and in the USSR, which, by the way, once again confirms the inevitability of the outbreak of war precisely in 1941. g., whoever was its initiator" "®.

As for the date of a possible Soviet offensive, according to Meltyukhov, "no offensive actions of the Red Army against Germany before July 15, 1941 were impossible." Danilov, on the contrary, believes that the latest readiness date was July 2, 1941⁵⁹. Somewhat later, he named another date — "approximately after July 10, 1941">!.

Then Meltyukhov touched on the version of Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR. He cited the definition of preventive action given by the German historian A. Hilgruber. Preventive warfare is "military action taken to pre-empt the actions of an enemy who is ready to attack or has already begun one, by his own offensive." This requires, first of all, to know about the intentions of the enemy. According to Meltyukhov, neither Germany nor the USSR counted on the enemy's offensive, which means that the thesis of preventive actions is inapplicable in this case. Moreover, he believes that "the version of a preventive war in general

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has nothing to do with historical science, but is a purely propaganda thesis to justify one's own actions">2,

The issue of preventive actions, in my opinion, is more complicated than Meltyukhov interprets it, and is not just propaganda. Hitler really did not have a clear idea of what was being prepared on the Soviet side—let us refer to the authoritative opinion of I. Hoffman. He had no idea of the scope of this preparation and did not know the date of the alleged attack. The Germans knew practically nothing about the systematic creation of tank formations in the USSR for the purpose of conducting offensive operations, so at the beginning of the war it was a complete surprise for them to encounter numerous tank divisions, which they suddenly entered. But Hitler had a certain understanding of the offensive military doctrine of the USSR and of Stalin's political intentions. From G. Hilger, adviser to the German embassy in Moscow, he knew about Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, in which he directly spoke about the war with Germany in the near future.

From a legal point of view, the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, of course, is aggression. Hitler's actions could be qualified as preventive if he, having defeated the enemy army on the border, would not rush further into the interior of the country, capturing more and more territories of the USSR. Since that time, military actions on the part of Germany are unambiguously aggression, and on the part of the USSR - a war of liberation, a war of the Patriotic War. However, Hitler's attack on the USSR was objectively preventive, because it prevented a much more massive offensive by the Red Army.

At the same time, it was recognized that the official Soviet historians, trying to substantiate the thesis about the military-technical superiority of the Wehrmacht at the time of the attack on the USSR, falsified the available facts. They cited, for example, the number of all German tanks and aircraft available on the Eastern Front, and from the USSR only

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the number of new designs. This is not even a falsification, but a direct forgery. As a result, the belief in the absolute superiority of the Wehrmacht troops was firmly established not only in Soviet historiography, but also in everyday consciousness. Now even the former editor-in-chief of the "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people" V.A. Zolotarev admitted that by the beginning of the war, "only in terms of tanks and aircraft, we surpassed the armed forces of Germany, Japan, Italy, Romania and Finland, taken together, almost twice."

At the same time, official historiography confirmed that the negotiations with England and France in 1939 reached an impasse not only through the fault of these two countries, but also through the fault of the USSR: without the consent of the Polish government to let the troops of the Red Army through the territory of Poland, a military convention with these states was excluded ... although the only way to prevent a war was to conclude a military and political alliance with England and France as soon as possible. Russian literature noted that "there is still no comprehensive documentary picture that would reflect with exhaustive reliability the position of the Soviet leadership in relation to the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with London and Paris, would highlight the underlying, rather than external, reasons for the breakdown these negotiations and the reorientation of Moscow towards an agreement with Berlin".

And in the December issue of the Novy Mir magazine for 1994, a publication appeared of Stalin's speech, which he delivered on the day of the Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939. T.S. Bushuyeva, who found the text of this speech in the secret trophy funds of the former Special Archive of the USSR, assessed it as "undoubtedly a historical document that so frankly exposed the aggressiveness of the USSR's policy." In her opinion, it was this speech "that formed the basis of the position of the Soviet side when it signed secret protocols with Nazi Germany on the division of Europe">".

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A recording of Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on August 19, 1939 was published earlier in the West. Almost immediately, this speech was reported by the French agency Gavaz, whose publication Stalin called "a lie" in an interview with the Pravda newspaper on November 30, 1939. Some Western historians also knew about Stalin's speech. The West German historian E. Jeckel even published a recording of Stalin's speech he found in one of the journals of the FRG in 1958. The reaction of Soviet military historians to this publication can be found in the second volume of the History of the Second World War: "The falsification is very rude. Suffice it to say that Stalin is credited with such turns of speech and addresses that he never used. Apart from that, on this Saturday, August 19, 1939, there was no meeting of the Politburo at all." Even such a pro-Stalinist Western historian as I. Fleischhauerbo considers this speech a falsification.

In 1995, Russia solemnly celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany and the end of World War II. This anniversary year has become the year of a huge number of publications on the topic, demonstrating not only the level of freedom that Russian historians have achieved, but also the difficulty with which the truth about the eve of the war breaks out!.

Soviet history is replete with secret crimes of power, but of all its secrets, the preparations for a military offensive against Europe in 1941 were especially dark and guarded. This truth has so far been accepted by a small part of Russian historians.

As an example of the clash of directly opposite points of view, the published unplanned discussion "Did Stalin prepare an offensive war against Hitler?" (M.: AIRO - XX, 1995). Along with the articles by A.V. Afanasiev, S. Grigorieva, MG. Nikolaev, S.P. Isaikin, A.N. and L.A. Mertsalovs, the collection presents an alternative view of the events on the eve of the war - B.N. Petrova, V.N. Kiseleva, V.D. Danilova, M.I. Meltyukhov, V.A. Nevezhina. At the same time, faced with a number of obvious facts, the supporters of the pro-Stalinist concept were forced, by

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at least to admit that "the problem of the relationship between military doctrine and technical policy in the USSR has always been a white spot for society...", that "compared to the West, we have published a negligible number of books devoted to this topic" .

The most radical conclusions were contained in the article by M. Nikitin, who, not by chance, disappeared under a pseudonym (albeit a very transparent one). Based on the ideological documents of May-June 1941, the author came to the conclusion that "the main goal of the USSR was to expand the "front of socialism" to the maximum possible territory, ideally to the whole of Europe. According to Moscow, the situation was conducive to the implementation of this task. The occupation by Germany of most of the continent, a protracted, futile war, the growth of discontent among the population of the occupied countries, the dispersion of Wehrmacht forces on different fronts, the close Japanese-American conflict — all this gave the Soviet leadership a unique chance to defeat Germany with a sudden blow and "liberate" Europe from "decaying capitalism". All the activities of the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941 were devoted to this goal.

Thus, the author believes, the intentions of the Soviet leadership in May-June 1941, established on the basis of historical documents, differ significantly from those presented to us by Russian historiography. Consequently, the whole already not very coherent concept of the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War is incorrect, since it does not correspond to known facts and documents. Therefore, already now the main task of domestic science is to create a new concept of the history of the Soviet period in general and the events of 1939-1941.

in particular*.

However, the subsequent development of the historiographic situation showed how far Russian historical science is from recognizing this conclusion. In 1995, conferences were held in Russia, including those specially dedicated to the eve of the war. At an international conference in Moscow,

organized by the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences in cooperation with the Cummings Institute for explored

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to Russia and Eastern Europe at Tel Aviv University, "the overwhelming majority—practically all—of the speakers refuted the version of Suvorov and other authors, calling into question their very method of approach to the analysis of events"by, Participants of the scientific seminar in Novosibirsk, organized by the local society "Memorial", on the contrary, spoke in favor of cleansing history from ideological camouflage. One of the seminar participants, V.L. Doroshenko made an analysis of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, which convincingly proved that the text of this speech, "with all possible distortions, goes back to Stalin and should be accepted as one of the fundamental documents on the history of World War II. wars»®.

Of the foreign authors in the anniversary year, Russian historical journals gave preference to those who spoke with a pro-Stalinist concept,

In the context under consideration, two introductory articles deserve special attention: director of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.O. Chubaryan and Director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.N. Sakharov, who, according to the tradition dating back to Soviet times, determined the possible limits of the historical search, but objectively outlined the difficulties that still need to be overcome on the way to the truth. The main conclusion of Chubaryan's article boiled down to the fact that "in those anxious months, Stalin was afraid even to think about the German attack and the beginning of the war"⁵⁷. However, the new factual material about the eve of the war, already introduced into scientific circulation, could not but determine the contradictory nature of the article. On the one hand, noting the absence of a discussion of the most important issues of foreign and domestic policy in the Politburo protocols, the author agrees that "many issues were not discussed at the Politburo: decisions on them, apparently, were made at meetings in a narrow format. or Stalin alone", and on the other hand, directly referring to the "Considerations and plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941, reiterates that

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"There is no evidence that this document was discussed anywhere, just as there is no definite data on Stalin's reaction to it." In addition, one of the main provisions of Soviet historiography is repeated, which has been refuted more than once in recent times. In his opinion, "the USSR did not have the forces and capabilities to start a war with Germany"⁶⁸. However, in the same issue of the journal, G.A. Kumanev admitted that "by the beginning of the war, the defense industry of the USSR as a whole for the first time began to surpass in quantity, and in certain areas of military production and in quality, the indicators of fascist Germany" ⁵.

Article by A.N. Sakharov "War and Soviet Diplomacy: 1939-1945" to a greater extent met the requirements of the time and took into account the results of historiography achieved in recent years. Sakharov officially recognized the still existing desire to "create and strengthen state-ideological myths, anathematize those who are trying to penetrate or at least approximately find out the true meaning of the events that took place in the late 30s and the first half of the 40s, to preserve over them a veil of state secrets, which is completely unacceptable from the point of view of a historian." Further, Sakharov acknowledged the fact of Stalin's speech at the meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, quoting an excerpt from it and referring (though dully!) to the December 1994 issue of the Novy Mir magazine. The most important fact was also the confirmation A.N. Sakharov, in contrast to A.O. Chubaryan, the thesis that "according to all objective data, by the middle of 1941, the preponderance of forces in almost all respects was on the side of the Soviet Union".

However, Sakharov's general objectivist approach to assessing Soviet diplomacy in 1939–1941 raises serious objections: "It was pragmatic, globalist diplomacy based on the principles of continuity with the policy of old Russia and accompanied, moreover, by certain revolutionary -ideological calculations of the Bolshevik leadership. Defend and justify it, as Soviet historiography did for many years, or condemn and denounce it, as

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We hope that V. Suvorov undertakes this in his books, it is absolutely senseless. Morality has nothing to do with it. In politics, there are only results - victories or defeats. Such was the Soviet policy and diplomacy of those years"?2.

It is impossible to avoid a moral assessment of the actions of the Stalinist authorities, and these attempts always have a real basis, and, as a rule, such an objectivist approach leads to the justification of the actions of the authorities. For Sakharov, it was determined, firstly, by the fact that Soviet diplomacy in 1939-1941. was considered by him in isolation from the inherently provocative Stalinist diplomacy of the previous period, and secondly, he, like many other modern authors, did not escape the influence of the "charm" of the Stalinist great power. Only taking into account these circumstances, one can perceive the author's final conclusion without internal protest: "... the Soviet leadership acted quite in the spirit of the time, decisively, on a large scale, and proactively. And the main miscalculation of Stalin and his guilt before the Fatherland was at this stage and in those conditions not that the country had not properly prepared for defense (it did not prepare for it), but that the Soviet leadership - and the political , and the military failed to accurately determine the moment when the desire to delay the war until bringing its offensive forces to full readiness was no longer possible, and it did not take emergency measures to mobilize the country and the army in a state of maximum combat readiness. A preemptive strike would have saved millions of lives for our Fatherland and, perhaps, would have led much earlier to the same political results that the country, ruined, hungry, cold, having lost the color of the nation, came in 1945, hoisting the banner of Victory over Reichstag.

And the fact that such a blow was not delivered, that the offensive doctrine, carefully developed at the General Staff of the Red Army and began to be vigorously implemented in May-June 1941, was not implemented, is perhaps one of Stalin's main miscalculations.

A certain result of the historiography of the topic was published in 1996 by the Russian State Humanitarian

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University under the editorship of Yu.N. Afanasyev's book "Another War: 1939-1945", which brought together modern authors known for their new approaches to studying not only the eve, but the entire period of the Great Patriotic War. This book mainly republishes articles by V. D. Danilov, M. I. Meltyukhov,

V.A. Nevezhina, Yu.A. Gorkova, A.A. Pechenkin and others.

However, in the same year, against the background of the growing wave of apologetic literature about Stalin, a departure from what had been achieved in covering the eve of the war became noticeable. The illustration for the publication by Yu.A. Gorkov and Yu.N. Semin "The end of the global lie. (The operational plans of the western border military districts in 1941 testify: the USSR was not preparing for an attack on Germany)"4. This is a poster from the time of the war called "The broom of the Red Army will sweep the evil spirits to the ground!". Among this "evil spirits" is V. Suvorov's book "Icebreaker".

Signs of digression are actually a negative review by A.F. Vasiliev on the book "Another War: 1939-1945", published in 1997 in the journal "Problems of History" (No. 7), and new publications by G. Gorodetsky. In response to the reprint of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, no

In the German weekly "Pie\\Me" (July 12, 1996), Gorodetsky once again called this speech a falsification. In complete contradiction to the historical facts known today, he continues to insist that in the days preceding the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, Stalin "more than ever adhered to his traditional defensive policy", that he "did not put forward any territorial claims, but wanted only mutual German-Soviet guarantees of the inviolability of the Baltic countries"⁵.

The book by V.Ya. Sipols "Diplomatic Secrets. Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 1939 - 1941" (M., 1997) and a review of it by A.S. Orlov, in which the high assessment of the fact that "the book is permeated by controversy with opportunistic interpretations of the history of 1939-1941, which, in the wake of unbridled criticism of the

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the torii of the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s prevailed in post-Soviet historiography. The logic of the objections of both Sinols and the reviewer supporting him is also indicative. It turns out that the idea of secret protocols and the division of "spheres of influence" first appeared not in the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, but in the course of secret Anglo-German negotiations and in the British proposals of the USSR on guarantees for the Baltic countries'.

In the same year, a book by V.A. Nevezhin "Syndrome of offensive war. Soviet propaganda on the eve of the "holy battles", 1939-1941", which is a systematic result of his previous research. Based on a large amount of factual material, Nevezhin came to the conclusion that "Stalin did not separate the national interests of the country from the ultimate strategic goal — the destruction of the "capitalist encirclement." At the end of the 1930s, the Bolshevik leadership no longer considered the "world revolution" in itself as the main instrument for achieving this goal. The mission of crushing the hostile "bourgeois world" was to be taken over, according to Stalin's plan, by the Red Army.

Of particular interest is the special chapter of the book "Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941". This is not only Stalin's speech to the graduates of the military academies, but also his remarks and toasts at the banquet arranged for this occasion. The original authentic text of Stalin's speech is unknown. At the disposal of the researchers there is only a record, and not only of speech, but also of Stalin's statements, made by an employee of the People's Commissariat of Defense K. Semenov and identified in the RGASPI. At present, the most complete publication has been prepared by A.A. Pechenkin". So the accusation made in 1994 by historians A.N. and L.A. Mertsalovs against the German historian I. Hoffman in that he operated on "the alleged intentions of Stalin, his speech on May 5, 1941, the content of which, unfortunately, is unknown to science", is devoid of any grounds." Nevezhin himself, completing the chapter on Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, concludes that "for the closest Stalinist entourage, everything that was said then

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"Leader" at a solemn meeting and at a reception (banquet) was not a "hoax" or "disinformation", but a direct guide to action."

However, the significance of Nevezhin's study is reduced by the inconsistency and inconsistency of the author's conclusions. It would not be worth paying special attention to this circumstance, if it were not proof of the marked retreat in historiography. One gets the impression. that Nevezhin is afraid that he will be put on a par with V. Suvorov, to whom he treats with an obvious prejudice, incomprehensible because it was Le Dokol ". Without noting the positive aspects of this BOOK, Nevezhin immediately proceeds to criticize it in the worst historiographical traditions: "... Russian historians noticed that V. Suvorov (V.B. Rezun) weakly uses the documentary base, abuses conjectures ,

tendentiously cites memoirs, which in itself require careful source analysis, distort facts, and arbitrarily interpret events. Western scientists also made great claims against the author of the book "Icebreaker". So, B. Bonvech attributed it to a quite definite genre of literature, in which one can see the desire to remove the blame from Germany for the attack on the USSR." In this context, those Western researchers who agreed in their conclusions with V. Suvorov, G. Gilessen, V. Mather, E. Topich, I. Hoffman, also got it.

With already familiar prejudice, Nevezhin also refers to The Other War: 1939-1945. In his opinion, Yu.N. Afanasiev unreasonably tried to put Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 "on a par with Stalin's speeches allegedly delivered at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on August 19, 1939 and at the main Military Council on May 14, 1941." . The source on the basis of which the publication of Stalin's speech to the Politburo on August 19, 1939, was made, Nevezhin further adds, "requires critical analysis." By making this addition,

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he considered it unnecessary to mention, firstly, that V. Suvorov drew attention to Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, and secondly, that a recording of the text of this speech was found in the Special Archive (now the Center for the Storage of Historical -documentary collections) T.S. Bushuyeva and published by her in the journal Novy Mir in 1994 (No. 12), thirdly, that the analysis of this speech had already been made by V. L. Doroshenko and published in the materials of a scientific seminar dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, held in Novosibirsk on April 16

1995, and then republished in The Other War: 1939-1945. There is no indication of all this not only in the main text of the book, but also in the attached "List of used sources and literature".

As for the verbal phrase "supposedly spoken" used by Nevezhin, the same can be said about Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941. The original text of the speech in both cases was not found. In addition, the whole construction of Nevezhin falls apart if we take as a basis another recording of Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, which was told by N.G. Lyashchenko. Decades later, he was able to read a transcript of the text of Stalin's speech sent from the Institute of Military History. According to Nevezhin, there was not a word about the war in the note received. As an eyewitness, N.G. Lyashchenko concluded that "someone did a pretty good job of it." All this was quite in the spirit of Stalin. It is no coincidence that he forbade the inclusion of the recording of his speech on May 5, 1941, made by K. Semenov, in the 14th volume of his works, which was supposed to be published.

Such a position of Nevezhin could not but cause the inconsistency and vagueness of the conclusions of his book. In the chapter devoted to Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, he joins the conclusion that "Stalin's calls for the need to restructure Soviet propaganda, sounded at a banquet in the Kremlin on the occasion of the graduation of the military academies of the Red Army, did not yet mean that the USSR was preparing to attack Germany in the summer of 1941" (emphasis mine. - /17.)%3.

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The book ends with an afterword by professor of the Ruhr University (Germany) B. Bonwetsch, in which he "explains" Nevezhin's position to the reader. It turns out that the emphasis on the "offensive" does not make the "attack" necessary. The author of the book, according to Bonwetsch, "sometimes is prone to some dramatization, but on the whole he is positively characterized by that. that he, on the basis of obvious changes in Soviet military propaganda after Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, does not conclude that the Soviet Union definitely intended to attack Germany..."⁸⁴. Bonwetsch, despite the study of Nevezhin and other authors, is still convinced that "Stalin scrupulously, and not only on the basis of defense considerations, took into account state interests, taking into account the possibility of war with Germany. It is impossible to establish by what time he attributed the beginning of the war, but many data point to 1942»®.

The section written by M.I. Meltyukhov, in the book "Soviet society: emergence, development, historical finale. T. 1. From the armed uprising in Petrograd to the second superpower of the world" (Moscow: RGGU, 1997). The section has an eloquent title - "Cries for defense - this is a veil", which is a phrase of Stalin, said by him on October 1, 1938 at a meeting of propagandists from Moscow and Leningrad, then recorded by the Secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Zhdanov in his notebook. Characteristically, Zhdanov singled out this phrase as a key one, revealing Stalin's true ideas about the foreign policy mission of the Soviet state. But, on the other hand, analyzing the articles of the authors, which are collected in the book "Another War: 1939-1945" and actually represent a discussion on the topic "Did Stalin Prepare an Offensive War?", Meltyukhov incorrectly reduced it to the following conclusion: "... the authors dispute not so much the probability (or necessity) of a pre-emptive offensive by the USSR as the possibility of its implementation precisely in 1941 (emphasis mine. - 1.77). In any case, a comparison of the mentioned articles published in

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one book and reflecting at first glance opposing points of view, it is useful. This helps to better understand the causes and nature of the catastrophe that occurred in 1941 and which was ultimately organically connected with the nature of the Stalinist regime"??.

The emphasis on the question of the possibility of carrying out an offensive by the USSR in 1941 is nothing more than an attempt to divert the discussion from clarifying the real actions of Stalin in preparation for war. The same trend was clearly manifested at the meeting of the Association of World War II Historians in December 1997, at which a special report by M.I. Meltyukhov. On the same flank were the speaker and the historian V.A. Nevezhin, and on the other - the elders of our military historical science V.A. Anfilov, M.A. Gareev, Yu.A. Gorkov,

A.S. Orlov, O.A. Rzheshesky and others, for whom "history is a political science", and the historian, in their opinion, "should always remember the interests of his state and take care of the sanity of generations entering into life". The discussion that took place demonstrated that the historians of the democratic trend failed to push back or to any noticeably squeeze out the historians of the pro-communist trend. The latter, having retained their positions in the institutional system of post-Soviet science, have moved on to revenge, which has no scientific significance in its own right. However, it has a serious impact on the process of further degradation of historical science in Russia and will affect the training of a new generation of historians. The processes that are taking place in post-Soviet historical science are connected with the general political processes in the country. Democracy has not succeeded even in history, and indeed it could not succeed in the present correlation of forces. If the pro-communist revenge had received at least a rebuff from world historical science, a paradoxical situation had developed here too: Western historians not only formally contact pro-communist historians, but also support them conceptually. Russian historians of democratic

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In this direction, you will have to show not only patience, but also courage.

The publication in 1998 by the International Foundation "Democracy" of the collection of documents "1941" (in 2 books) does not put an end to the historiography of this topic, as L.A. Bezymensky, an interview with whom under the significant title "The Truth about June 22" appeared on June 18, 1998 in the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda". The collection contains documents that, until very recently, were not available in such archives as the Archive of the President, the Archive of Foreign Policy, the Archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, etc. For all its indisputable importance - these documents by themselves cannot provide direct answers to the questions posed. This was exactly what was in the interests of Stalin, who personally controlled the acquisition of his archive, which today forms the basis of the Archive of the President. That is why "documentation that contains

lives in the personal archives of Stalin and Molotov, is an exceptionally important, but not exhaustive source" (emphasis mine. — I.P.)?'. Quite indicative is the fundamental fact that came to light during the preparation of the collection that, "in contrast to the meager information about a possible political rapprochement, the materials on the resumption of economic ties between the USSR and Germany are very extensive..."². It was no coincidence that Stalin left in his archives mainly materials on economic cooperation with Germany, as if he knew the psychology of historians educated in the country he created. And indeed, the conclusion followed: "Our assumption about the proactive role of the economic factor still requires additional research, but even now it should be taken into account when assessing the argument about the "forced" nature of the 1939 agreements"³.

Documents on the pre-war policy of the Stalinist regime, which have survived to this day, are precisely the example of sources that make us "get rid of the illusion that the sources are "windows" through which one can look at the historical life of people

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other epochs in its "primordial" authenticity, one has only to wipe these windows well"?*. Only then will it be possible to extract a grain of truth from this array of sources left to us, when they are compared with others, analyzed, built into the general context of events. Only under this condition will these sources "tell" us what Stalin wanted to hide. Therefore, the conclusion of the compilers of the collection of documents "1941" that "the published documents completely refute the speculation about the supposedly preventive (to repel the impending Soviet aggression) attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union" seems premature. Moreover, the situation in the pre-war period cannot be interpreted so unambiguously in the categories: "preventive" — "non-preventive (perfidious)" attack.

Whatever the digressions in coverage of the eve of the war, the truth about him has already come out. It made clearer not only the foreign, but also the internal policy of the Stalinist government, aimed at realizing the main goal. This goal is clearly formulated in the article by Z.S. Belousova and D.G. Nadzhafov, which can be regarded as a milestone in the process of modern Russian historians' departure from the lies of Soviet historiography: "The proletarian call for a "last and decisive battle" with capitalism has become the guiding principle of the policy of the communist rulers of the Soviet state, was the basis of their global strategies. Thus, the idea of destroying the "old world" became the end in itself of the newborn socialist system, the meaning and justification of its existence, infecting the millions of masses of the vast Eurasian country with aspiration for the "new world" ... The belief that the dialectics of historical development will lead to the triumph of communism (and in the first post-October years, such a course of world events seemed to the creators of the Russian revolution a near future), rested on the dogmas of class irreconcilability and the inevitability of wars under capitalism, supposedly leading the proletariat to the social revolution. Elevated to the rank of official policy, betting on the victory of world comm

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nism determined the global framework of Soviet activity to create conditions for the widespread establishment of a new social order"⁵.

However, the need for a historical assessment of this "bet on the victory of world communism" marked a new divergence between historians on the eve of the war, which can be considered significant. On the one hand, this is a democratic position, its essence is stated by D.G. Najafov. "Most likely," he writes, "the Soviet leaders really believed in their revolutionary mission, putting an equal sign between the interests of the socialist Soviet Union and the "fundamental" (in Marxist terminology) interests of the peoples of other countries, intending at the right time to act in the role of the liberator of these peoples from the yoke of capitalism. In practice, the so-called proletarian internationalism of the USSR was reduced to a frank

nationalism (in its Soviet, national-bolshevik version), while the basic component of the Second World War from the very beginning was the defense of freedom and democracy against the onslaught of the forces of totalitarianism"??.

On the other hand, this is a great-power, anti-Western position, manifested in the book by M.I. Meltyukhov "Stalin's Missed Chance". This position deserves special attention, because its supporter turned out to be the author, who achieved very significant results in the study of existing and in the search for new materials on this topic. Meltyukhov managed to summarize almost all the facts that have become known in recent years and create a comprehensive study, after which a return to the old version of the Soviet Union's unpreparedness for war is no longer possible. The book convincingly proves that by the summer of 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world, armed with a number of unique systems of military equipment, and this army was preparing for the offensive. In 1940 - 1941. The General Staff of the Red Army developed at least four variants of the operational plan, the content of which testifies to the preparation of only offensive operations by the Soviet troops... This idea is especially clearly expressed in the document dated May 15, 1941. In total

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For the war with Germany, out of 303 divisions available in the Red Army, 247 were allocated, which after mobilization would have numbered over 6 million people, 62 thousand guns and mortars, 14.2 thousand tanks and 9.9 thousand aircraft. Germany and its allies, according to the data given in the book, did not have forces capable of inflicting a guaranteed defeat on the Red Army. The superiority of the latter in the number of divisions was 2.3 times, in personnel 2.1 times, in guns and mortars 2.4 times, in tanks 8.7 times, and in aircraft 4.4 times?%.

After Meltyukhov's book, it is impossible to talk more about the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, not only on the eve of the war, but also in the previous years. The book examines in detail the actions of the USSR in Poland in September 1939, its "fight for the Scandinavian bridgehead", "the build-up of the Soviet military presence in the Baltics", the struggle for the Balkans, the policy aimed at weakening the positions of England and France in Europe.

At the same time, the discussion about the eve of the war cannot be considered completed. Firstly, as Meltyukhov rightly notes, many documents on the state of the Red Army, plans for combat operations against Finland, Romania, Turkey, most of the documents on the operational training of troops, in particular, district plans, cover plans for the entire interwar period, etc. But first of all, there are no documents that allow "to fully reconstruct the process of making key decisions by the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941." The available sources do not yet allow not only to answer the question about the reasons for the refusal of June 12 as the initial date of the attack on Germany, but also to substantiate the thesis that "the Red Army should have completed preparations for the offensive no earlier than July 15 1941"°.

Secondly, Meltyukhov's general approach to considering the policy of the USSR in 1939-1941 raises serious objections. Claiming to objectively recreate historical reality, to consider Soviet foreign policy "without any propaganda blinkers, but from the point of view of real interests, goals and opportunities

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of the Soviet Union", speaking out against the moralizing traditions in Russian historical literature and declaring that his research is not about justifying or accusing the Soviet leadership, Meltyukhov turns out to be the spokesman for the great-power and anti-Western position that is typical today for many representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, including historians. This position determined his research approach - he is completely on the side of Stalin, moreover, he regrets the missed chance "to defeat the most powerful European

Western threat to our country". If Stalin had succeeded in realizing the planned plan, then, according to Meltyukhov, "the Red Army could be in Berlin no later than

1942, which would have made it possible to place a much larger territory in Europe under Moscow's control than happened in 1945. The defeat of Germany and the Sovietization of Europe allowed Moscow to use the EU's scientific and technical potential, opened the way to a "just social reorganization" of European colonies in Asia and Africa..."¹⁰⁰.

No one would dispute the right of M.I. Meltyukhov to talk about the possible prospects for the Sovietization of Europe more than half a century ago, just as the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party V.V. Zhirinovskiy and his follower, State Duma deputy A.V. Mitrofanov about the position of modern Russia in relation to the West, if not for one important circumstance. This approach is in complete contradiction with the author's claim for an objective study of the problem. This contradiction can be shown by the example of his consideration of the most important issue of the role of the USSR in unleashing the Second World War. Meltyukhov actually lubricates the initiative role of the USSR in the preparation of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, incorrectly sets out the position of the USSR on the eve of Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, bypasses the question of evaluating Stalin's speech on August 19, frankly hushing up those that appeared on this topic publications. Thanks to agreement 23

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August, Meltyukhov believes, "For the first time in its history, the USSR received recognition of its interests in Eastern Europe from the side of a great European power," therefore, "the Soviet-German non-aggression pact can be regarded as a significant success of Soviet diplomacy, which was able to outplay British diplomacy and achieve its main goal of staying out of the European war, while gaining a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, more room for maneuver between the warring factions in their own interests, and at the same time shift the blame for the disruption of the Anglo-French -Soviet negotiations on London and Paris. It was not in the interests of the Soviet leadership to prevent the war in Europe between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany, since only the war gave him a real chance to significantly increase his influence on the continent... The non-aggression pact, he concludes, ensured not only interests of the Soviet Union, but also the rear of Germany, facilitating her war in Europe"¹⁰¹. In fact, the key role of the USSR at the beginning of World War II lies in the words I have highlighted. However, this role is camouflaged by Meltyukhov's geopolitical reasoning.

Thus, despite the obvious success in the search for the truth about the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the creation of its objective history requires clarification of many more fundamental points. Following the concept of a post-communist great power that defends Stalin's aggressive aspirations not only leads to a distortion of coverage of the key turns of his policy, but also fails to answer such an important question as to why the Red Army, despite its multiple superiority, suffered such a crushing defeat in 1941. Arguments about the fatal miscalculation of the Soviet leadership and the unpreparedness of the troops to create a continuous front of defense are not enough here. Questions of this kind do not fit into this concept at all, because these are no longer questions about Stalin's geopolitical plans, but about the attitude of millions of Red Army soldiers towards the regime he created.

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The truth about the eve of the war will have to win its proper place not only in historiography, but also in the public consciousness. The Russian society is not yet ready to accept such truth about the war, as evidenced by its negative reaction to V. Sinelnikov's documentary film "The Last Myth" about Viktor Suvorov and his book "Icebreaker". And yet, there is still hope that May 9 in Russia will someday become not only the Day of the long-awaited peace that came after a bloody war, the Day of Remembrance of the 27 million who died in this war, but also a reminder of our blindness, of how relations between power and society should not be built.

Notes

1 History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 6 volumes. T. 4. Book. 1. M., 1970. S. 217, 218.

2 Kogan L.A. War communism: utopia and reality // Vopr. stories. 1998. No. 2. S. 128.

3 "I ask you to write less: this should not get into print." Speeches by V.I. Lenin at the [X Conference of the RCP(b) September 22, 1920 // Historical archive. 1992. No. 1. S. 12, 13.

4 Raak R. Ch. A source from the highest circles of the Comintern about Stalin's plans related to the Second World War // Domestic History. 1996. No. 3. S. 45.

5 Historical archive. 1992. No. 1. S. 16.

6 GANO, f. P - 1, op. 3, d. 11, l. 51.

7 Stalin I.V. Op. T. 14 / Comp. and general ed. R. Kosolapova. M.,

1997. P. 106. B. Solonevich cites this episode in more detail: "Recently, he (Stalin. - IL.) gave an interview to the American journalist Howard (so in the text. - I.P.), and when he unexpectedly asked Stalin about his intention to start a world revolution, the latter made a "sincerely naive" face.

- What kind of world revolution?

The American was even embarrassed by such impudence.

- Excuse me, Mr. Stalin. Why, the whole world thinks that your task is to establish world communism through revolution in all countries.

Where did such a strange opinion come from? There is a clear misunderstanding here. Our Soviet Union thinks only of arranging its own life and never thinks of interfering in the affairs of other countries. All the fables that we are striving for some kind of world revolution are nothing but the fantasy of our enemies ... " // Solonevich B. Red Bon Conspiracy

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desk. Marshal Tukhachevsky: A documented novel. Buenos Aires, 1958, p. 125.

8 Vaksberg A. Pages of one life (Strokes to the political portrait of Vyshinsky) // Znamya. 1990. No. 6. S. 131.

9 Ibid. This list was made up of: 1. Issues related to the socio-political system of the USSR. 2. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union: a) the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 and issues related to it (trade agreement, demarcation of borders, negotiations, etc.); 6) Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow and negotiations in November 1940 with Molotov in Berlin; c) the Balkan question; d) Soviet-Polish relations. 3. Soviet Baltic republics". — Najafov D.G. The Soviet-German pact of 1939: rethinking approaches to its assessment // Vopr. stories. 1999. No. 1. S. 159.

10 Semiryaga M.I. Secrets of Stalinist diplomacy. 1939 - 1941. M., 1992. S. 48 - 49.

P One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov: From the diary of F. Chuev. M., 1991. S. 20.

12 Nekrich A.M. 1941. June 22. M., 1965. S. 8 - 9. In 1995, the book of A.M. Nekricha has been reissued. His modern point of view on this issue is as follows: "I have no doubt that Stalin planned the participation of the USSR in a large-scale European war, but at the same time he was afraid of colliding with an alliance of leading capitalist powers and, above all,

he was afraid of a change in the front by England and her collusion with Germany against the USSR... Stalin was afraid of being politically isolated... This, it seems to me, contains the vulnerable points of the assumption that Stalin expected to inflict an unexpected, preventive strike on Hitler in the summer of 1941 d. [...] the Soviet military-industrial plans were mainly focused on their implementation in 1942. Perhaps this time would be, in Stalin's opinion, the most suitable time to throw the pound weights of Soviet military power into the scales. - Nekrich A. 1941. June 22: Ed. 2nd, add. and reworked. M., 1995. S. 216 - 217.

13 Archive of Dr. ist. sciences, prof. A.S. Moscow. The transcript of the meeting of the Party Control Committee (CPC) under the Central Committee of the CPSU was published under the title "A.M. Nekrich: From the history of the persecution of the Soviet intelligentsia. Publication of documents about the book. A. Nekrich "1941. June 22" and the circumstances related to its discussion. Foreword L.P. Petrovsky // Centaur. 1994. No. 4 - 5. By the decision of the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.P. Petrovsky was severely reprimanded and put on the register "for irresponsible, politically erroneous speech during the discussion of the book by A.M. Without shouting for violating party discipline." — Centaur. 1994. No. 5. P. 96. As for E.A. Boltin, then by a resolution of the Politburo of May 5, 1940, he was appointed editor of the Red Star - RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1021, p. 177. From that time on, he was an active conductor of Stalin's policy and knew a lot about the impending attack on Germany. V.A. Nevezhin cited a number of statements from the speech

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E.A. Boltin at a meeting with writers on June 25, 1940. In particular, he said: "We must be ready, if necessary, to be the first to strike ... It is absolutely clear that the nature of the Red Army's combat operations will be active." E.A. Boltin also formulated the main principles of the Soviet military ideology, which had to be put into practice. First, the Red Army is an instrument of war. Secondly, the war of the USSR against any capitalist state will have a fair character, regardless of who starts it. — Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome. Soviet propaganda on the eve of the "holy battles", 1939-1941. M., 1997. S. 134.

M Pavlenko N. At the first stage of the war // Pages of the history of the CPSU. Data. Problems. Lessons. M., 1988. S. 470.

15 Kovalev F., Rzhesheshevsky O. This is how the war began // History gives a lesson. M., 1989. S. 268.

16 News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 7. S. 28, 29, 31, 32.

17 the day before. 1931 - 1939. How the world was plunged into war. Brief history in documents, memoirs and comments. M., 1991. S. 268 - 269.

18 Ibid. S. 268.

19 Ibid. pp. 227, 267.

20 Boldin V.I. The collapse of the pedestal. Strokes to the portrait of M.S. Gorbachev. M., 1995. S. 262. Only in October 1992 were the originals of the secret additional protocols finally "found" and published in Russia, first in newspapers, and then in other publications. See: New and recent history. 1993. No. 1. P. 83 - 95. As for the first publication in the USSR of the text of the secret additional protocol to the treaty of August 23, 1939, it was carried out by the journal Voprosy Istorii in 1989 (No. 6). — Aleksandrov V.A. The conspiracy of Stalin and Hitler in 1939 is a mine that exploded half a century later // Vopr. stories. 1999. No. 8. S. 76.

21 Semiryaga M.I. Secrets of Stalin's diplomacy... S. 59.

22 Orlov A. S. Comments on the book: Winston Churchill. The Second World War. Book. 1. T. 1 - 2 / Abbreviated. translation from English M., 1991. S. 179, 204.

23 Suvorov V. Icebreaker. M., 1992. He is the same. Den M. M., 1994. S. 130, 131.

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Yuri Tsurgamov

HOW TO READ POST-SOVIET HISTORIANS?

DOTS ABOVE "1"

With the statement that the history of the Second World War is slandered, many will agree. Moreover, they will agree that the history of the participation of the USSR in it has been slandered. But at the same time, each agreeing will have in mind his own: one - that they lied before perestroika, the other - that they are lying now. Therefore, I will immediately reveal my cards: I belong to the category of people about which Prokhanov said: "... they strive to spit the red icons of Victory with the poisonous saliva of nihilism"!

GREAT START

In the early 1990s, scientific works on the history of the Second World War were characterized by sharp criticism of the historiography of the Soviet period and the desire to dissociate themselves from it: "... Adherents of totalitarianism are still trying to impose historical myths in order to eradicate scientific knowledge. Such an example is the notorious ten-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. 1941 - 1945", work on which was launched in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of August 13, 1987 ... A ten-volume official opus is a

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deliberate sabotage by ideologues from the CPSU against the people who see clearly from lies. This is an attempt by familiar means to revive the idea of the strength and inviolability of the "socialist" system... The public expects from historians a fundamentally new work created on the basis of a deep reassessment of the past, and not a corrected model of what has already been written"². This trend was stable for several years, but then the situation began to change.

KATYN - A TEST FOR SANITY

Among the previously unexplored problems, one of the first to attract the attention of modern Russian historians was the fate of Polish prisoners of war in the USSR.

Collection of articles "Katyn Drama" with the participation of domestic researchers, author of the foreword by prof. A.O. Chubaryan called the first scientific publication in our country dedicated to the Katyn case. The publications are based on archival documents. "... The cases of Polish officers and policemen who were in the Kozelsky, Starobelsky and Ostashkovsky camps in December 1939 - March 1940, - concludes N. Lebedeva, - were being prepared for consideration by the Special Meeting of the NKVD in April - May 1940. More than 15 thousand Polish prisoners of war - officers and policemen - were taken out of Kozelsky, Starobelsky and Ostashkovsky

camps and transferred to the NKVD of the Smolensk, Kharkov and Kalinin regions. This was their last route, the final points of which were Katyn, Mednoe and the 6th quarter of the forested park zone of Kharkov.

The conclusion about the "Soviet trace" was also made by V.K. Abarinov, author of the monograph "Katyn labyrinth">. From a legal point of view, Abarinov assesses the events in Katyn as a war crime. In doing so, he refers to Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which speaks of violations of the laws and customs of war, in particular the killing of prisoners of war. The author also points out that the Soviet Union was a party to the Convention on the non-applicability of the statute of limitations to war crimes and crimes against

humanity

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dated November 26, 1968. In December 1983, the USSR voted for resolution 38/99 of the UN General Assembly, according to which it is the obligation of all members of the international community to bring to justice those responsible for these crimes.

In principle, the question of who exactly shot the Poles in Katyn has already lost its historical relevance, the subject of research today can only be the details of the event. After in April 1990 the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev admitted the guilt of the NKVD in the Katyn case, this issue has lost its political relevance. Today, the question of responsibility for what has been done has turned into a sanity test, which not everyone in our country passes.

There are three counterarguments. The first is the denial to the last, contrary to obvious circumstances, of the fact that the Polish prisoners of war were shot by the Soviet special services, shifting responsibility to the Wehrmacht, the SS, and the Gestapo. The arguments, as a rule, are dressed in a characteristic linguistic form: "It's not us, it's the Germans." Indeed, the instinct of self-preservation alone should make everyone come out in defense of everyone whom a person unites with himself into a single "we". The problem rests on the fact that there are still people for whom Stalin and the NKVD are "we".

(Foreign socio-political thought sometimes itself pushes for such use of pronouns. In the West, and in Eastern Europe, they often do not breed, but synonymize the concepts of "Russians" and "Bolsheviks." For example, Vojtech Mastny gave his book the title: "Russia's Path to the Cold War." Although during the Cold War there was no state called "Russia" on the political map of the world.)

The second "counterargument": yes, the executions were carried out by Chekists, but "are our Polish friends not in a position to assess what happened from a clear class position? After all, we are talking about the commanding cadres of the old Polish army, which was in the service of the bourgeoisie. So why are the Polish comrades beginning to lose their class sense and fall into nationalistic ambitions?

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The third "counterargument": the leadership of the NKVD misinterpreted the order to liquidate the camps, Stalin did not have in mind the execution of the Poles, it was the subordinates who overdid it.

Yet the most popular is the first "counter-argument". An example is the book "Anti-Russian meanness" by Yury Mukhin, editor-in-chief of the Duel newspaper. In it, as in several other works, the author tries to cross out the conclusions of modern historical science about the initial period of World War II and return to the canons of Soviet historiography, flavoring them with the pathos of national Bolshevism.

"Anti-Russian meanness" - a book about Katyn. It is not even necessary to pick it up in order to understand what the author wants to convince his readers of. The cover depicts a German soldier shooting a man in a Polish uniform in the back of the head. (The picture quality is very

low, but characteristic German helmet and Polish "confederate" are guessed.) Within the framework of the article, it is not possible to give a complete analysis of Mukhin's theses. We will only say that the first document that he cites (and already in the introduction to the book) is "the testimony of the peasant Kiselev" to the NKVD officers. In them, Kiselev claims that under the Germans he was forced to say that the Poles were killed by the Chekists, since the Germans used methods of physical pressure on him. Apparently, it should be understood that the representatives of the Soviet authorities did not use such methods, and therefore the person was truly frank with them.

The level of Mukhin's controversy is characterized by statements of this kind: "After the war, for Polish gentry freaks hanging around abroad and ready for anything for small handouts, the Katyn case became the only justification for why they did not fight against the Germans in World War II and why they crap Poland and after the war... The coming to power of the brainless Gorbachev and his team in the USSR left the Soviet Union without control. This spotted cretin sawed off the branch on which he was sitting, and falling from the top into the garbage, he pretends that this is exactly what he wanted because of his commitment to "universal values" and his

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new "thinking" b. Mukhin evaluates his scientific opponents as follows: "... the archives were admitted mainly to extremely vile, but sometimes simply stupid" scientists "..."

Mukhin likes to bring the events of 1940 (or, as he believes, 1941) to the present: "How many people in Russia understand that ... an almost 40-year-old military ally of the USSR has now become a potential enemy of Russia? .." Does he understand he himself that Poland was never an ally of the USSR, that it was its satellite? Does he understand that in 1944 it was not the "liberation" of Poland that took place, but the change of the occupation regime from Hitler to Stalin? The Red Army was inactive instead of coming to the aid of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944. This uprising against the Nazis was led by the Home Army ("the freaks of the gentry" who "did not fight against the Germans in World War II"). The Home Army is a force that sought to restore the rule of law that existed in Poland in the pre-war years. Of course, it was beneficial for Stalin that the Nazis drowned this uprising in blood, which is why the Red Army was inactive. After all, Stalin's main goal was to impose on Poland, as well as on other European states that he could reach, the same barbaric system that existed in the USSR. It succeeded, and during the forty years mentioned by Mukhin, the USSR kept Poland on a leash. In 1982, Jaruzelski was even forced to introduce martial law himself in order to prevent the development of events according to the Hungarian scenario of 1956 or the Czechoslovak scenario of 1968. Even without Katyn, this is enough to recognize the hatred of the Poles for Bolshevism as well-founded. So far only towards Bolshevism as a system, but what about Russians as a nation?

Mukhin's general conclusion: "The Katyn case was used by the "fifth column" of the USSR and Russia in the same way as it was used by the Nazis with their Polish lackeys starting from 1943, i.e. to cause hatred among Europeans for the USSR and Russia ... "

The tragedy of Mukhin and his associates lies in the fact that for them the USSR is a Russian state.

— And what else? - the question will follow.

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— Bolshevik, communist, Soviet (in this case, we will consider these terms as synonyms). And that means anti-Russian in the narrow sense and anti-human in the broad sense. How does a nation state differ from a totalitarian one? The fact that the national government in its activities proceeds from the fact that to improve the lives of citizens. In this field, national governments can make mistakes, they can turn out to be insufficiently competent, but the vector of their policy is set, nevertheless, precisely in the named direction. The totalitarian government, in principle, does not set itself the task of

improving the lives of citizens. Its task is to strengthen the regime inside the country and expand the geography of its influence. And everything that is in the country, including citizens, is only raw material for the implementation of the main task. Moreover, its implementation is an endless process. Of course, totalitarian rulers also do something for the citizens, but just as the slave owner does something for the slaves, and the farmer does something for the domestic animals.

Why tragedy? Because Mukhin really loves Russia. But in an effort to express his feelings, he tries to defend the USSR, a state that was the main enemy for the peoples living on its territory. Any accusation directed against the USSR is perceived by Mukhin and his like-minded people as "anti-Russian meanness", that is, a priori biased. And how true this accusation is in itself is not important for them: they accuse "ours", which means they have to defend themselves. In reality, Russia is the first victim of Bolshevism, which subsequently began to act on behalf of its victim, incurring the hatred of neighboring peoples for its crimes. To renounce Lenin and Stalin as the destroyers of Russia is the main task of national policy. To speak of them as national leaders is indeed anti-Russian meanness, in this case without quotation marks.

The really bad thing is that Mukhin is unscrupulous in his means. In order to ensure support for his version of the Russian inhabitants, he plays on a very

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unpretentious feelings: "How many people understand that as soon as the point desired by the Poles and domestic scoundrels is put in this matter, the current citizens of Russia will pay the current citizens of hostile Poland monetary "compensation"?..". Mukhin refers to the lawsuit of the citizens of Poland against the citizens of Russia more than once. Researchers whose goal is to reconstruct an adequate picture of the past do not resort to such arguments.

Mukhin not only jumps from 1940 to 1991, but also jumps back to 1937: "The Katyn affair perfectly explains why emergency troikas were needed on the eve of World War II and why the "fifth column" was so mercilessly destroyed.

The scale of his super-task is really impressive: not only to blame the architects of perestroika for all sorts of sins, but also to justify the Stalinist repressions.

But Mukhin offended Alexander Filippovich Katusev in vain ("... in the autumn of 1990, the chief military prosecutor of the USSR Katusev assembled an "investigative team" from the notorious scoundrels of the GVP to legally falsify this case"). A more zealous fighter against the "fifth column" than Katusev, perhaps, cannot be found. In 1990, together with V. Oppokov, he wrote the article "Judas. (Vlasovites in the service of fascism)". The name speaks for itself and brings us to another topic, no less burning.

IN WHOSE SERVICE WERE THE VLASOVIANS?

In the 1990s, several serious books were published about the anti-Stalinist protest of Soviet citizens in 1941-1945. They are usually written by young historians and published by private publishers. But here is a book written by Mikhail Ivanovich Semiryaga, a leading figure in the Soviet historical science, a veteran (which is important), published by the ROSSPEN publishing house - "The Russian Political Encyclopedia". In this monograph, entitled "Collaborationism. Nature, typology and manifestation

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during the Second World War", we read: "The vast majority of citizens of the states of the former Soviet Union strongly condemn the inhuman Stalinist regime. But when it comes to the political assessment of those who waged an active struggle against him, a seemingly paradoxical situation arises: people are ready to sympathize with those prisoners of the Stalinist regime who

were imprisoned in numerous Gulag camps and, in fact, could not actively fight against it. But these same people are psychologically still not ready to understand and accept those opponents of Stalin who fought against the same regime with weapons in their hands... Life is always richer, more complex, more multifaceted than any, even the most established schemes and stereotypes. Therefore, it seems that in the course of time the attitude towards collaborators — excluding, of course, genuine war criminals, punishers for whom there is no and cannot be forgiveness — will most certainly change. The new generations of our compatriots will obviously be able to more widely and impartially assess the nature and motives of the behavior of many collaborators, to see and understand the tragedy of their destinies”?

Such a view, presented in fact at the official level, was a great event for domestic science. But then there was a rollback. Boris Filippov in the article "Resistance to the Soviet Regime (1920-1941)"! begins “for health”: “The thesis was imposed on the mass consciousness about the absence of resistance, about the passive behavior of the civilian population bled white by the world war, revolution and war, the active part of which either died or emigrated.” He cites numerous facts of resistance to Bolshevism in the 1920s-1930s and classifies them. But he ends “for peace”: “...before the beginning of the Patriotic War, resistance to the Stalinist regime did not stop.” And what, after the start of the "Patriotic War" it stopped? It was after June 22 that it really unfolded.

S. Chuev, author of the book "Damned Soldiers"!!, recognizes both the presence of resistance and its scope. But, asking the question why this became possible, he gives the answer:

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first of all, it is the readiness of German commanders to recruit local residents and prisoners of war, although such an initiative was sometimes hampered by the Nazi encirclement”!?.

Such readiness of the German commanders did not manifest itself immediately. The initiative for cooperation with the Germans came precisely from the local population and from prisoners of war. The idea of the political formation of the movement also came from the locals, specifically from the residents of Smolensk in the autumn of 1941. The question of what comes first - the anti-Stalinist protest of the citizens of the USSR, which passed from a latent phase to an open phase under war conditions, or the desire of the Germans to replenish their thinning regiments with someone - is fundamentally important. Nor can one agree with the fact that the initiative "sometimes was hampered by the Hitlerite encirclement." It met with the most active opposition from the Nazi party elite, primarily from Hitler himself, since it contradicted the ideological guidelines developed even before the war.

“... In our country, serving the Germans,” continues Chuev, “still was perceived, including in the public mind, as a betrayal, and even if a former Soviet or party official became a burgomaster, and a former policeman became a policeman , then such an act was regarded as especially cynical and unforgivable ... ”!3

There was no unified attitude towards cooperation between fellow citizens and the Germans, since the cooperation itself was massive. In addition, many looked at it from a pragmatic standpoint. The criminal police (militia in the USSR) must exist in any country under any regime. And she must be local, speak the same language with the population, have experience in specific cities and towns, and know the specifics of the criminal world. The Bolsheviks retreated, so there is no need to catch crooks? Do not need to service the life support system? Plow, sow, harvest? That's what Stalin wanted: either with me, or not at all. Hence the orders to destroy the infrastructure during the retreat of the Red Army. (This is how Hitler will act from the end of 1944

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yes, scorched earth tactics.) Dictators want life to end with them, but should a nation share this view?

Chuev's book is a compilation, he relies on a lot of documentary data introduced into scientific circulation by other authors, but his conclusions and assessments are diametrically opposed. The gratitude that he expresses to K. Alexandrov, S. Drobyazko, G. Kokunko and others, therefore, looks rather strange.

B. Kovalev's book "Nazi Occupation and Collaborationism in Russia, 1941-1944"!* was written on the basis of a dissertation, which can already be seen from the introduction: the enumeration of the object, subject, goal, objectives of research, classification of sources, analysis of historical - riography problems. This already obliges us to pay special attention to this work.

"Instilling their "new order" in the occupied territories, the Nazis sought to erase the very word "Russia" from the map of the so-called "New Europe".

Russia was not on the world map in 1941; it had already been erased by the Bolsheviks.

The author evaluates the works of his predecessors: "Since the mid-1990s, articles and books have appeared in Russia telling about various forms of Russian collaborationism in apologetic tones. These include, first of all, articles by K. Alexandrov in the magazines "Posev" and "New Watch". Since 1997 in Moscow under the editorship of A.V. Okorokov published "Materials on the History of the Russian Liberation Movement (1941-1945)"... The Vlasov movement is called the "Russian Liberation Movement" (it is in this spelling, all words with a capital letter. - B.K.) The Soviet resistance is written in pejorative tones...»!6

Kovalev's preferences are obvious: "Of the most fundamental works of a general nature on the events of the Second World War, one should note the six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941 - 1945". Its authors introduced

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Enormous material, reflecting all the main aspects of the history of the war, including the events in the territory of our country occupied by the Nazis, has been put into scientific circulation"!7. The 12-volume "History of the Second World War...", published in 1973-1982, received no less flattering feedback. "Separate chapters of this work were devoted to the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines!" . Let us compare this statement with the assessment given to Soviet multi-volume books in 1992 (quoted at the beginning of this article). Rollback again.

The trend is depressing. "... So far, there is no comprehensive study on this problem," continues Kovalev. — Lack of work in

This area has now been used by those who are directly or indirectly trying to rehabilitate persons who collaborated with the Germans during the Great Patriotic War. Actively using the mass media, they promote the idea of the independence of the collaborationist movement. One of the most important tasks now facing Russian historians is the objective study of this problem, the exposure of such statements!

The author concludes: "The country had one enemy — foreign invaders..."20 Well, if so, is it not necessary to fight against Stalin? (According to the data presented in 1991 to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by the prosecution and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the total number of victims of Stalinist repressions was 50,114,267 people.) This means that those who did this were "in the service of fascism," and not moreover? Leading the reader to this conclusion, the author returns to the most straightforward Soviet interpretations, discarding a whole layer of studies and conclusions made in the 1990s.

PASSION FOR "ICEBREAKER" CONTINUES

In 2002, the publishing house "Veche" in Moscow published a book by Alexander Pomogaibo "Pseudo-historian Suvorov and the mysteries of the Second World War." This is yet another attempt to refute the concept of Stalin preparing for an attack on Europe in 1941. Previous attempts
different

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helplessness. The main argument of the critics was ideological: "With the book Icebreaker, Suvorov offended the feelings of veterans of the Great Patriotic War." Nobody analyzed the text of the book, including the main critic, Gabriel Gorodetsky. His monograph "The Myth of the Icebreaker" should have had a different title - "Some Information on Soviet-German Relations at the Turn of the 1930s-1940s". It contains a lot of new and interesting things, but there is no refutation of Suvorov's concept in it.

Pomogaybo first who set himself the task of refuting Suvorov point by point, but, again, to no avail. The first thing that attracts attention is the author's attempt to reproduce the style of his opponent. Suvorov's language is lively, aphoristic, almost colloquial. This is the strength and weakness of his books about the war. The strength is that the author has gained a mass readership, the weakness is that he gave his detractors a reason to classify The Icebreaker as journalism, although in essence it is a scientific study. Suvorov loves to make jokes, but he does it with talent, while Pomogaibo is mediocre: "I can really see: the bearded Marx conjures over retorts, cultivates pure Marxism. But pure does not work. Everything comes out dirty, with sediment. "Oh, something is missing," Marx mournfully whispers. "Suvorov Rezun would add one hundred and fifty grams of world revolution here to me ..." A nightmare scene. Brrr."

Such arrogance is found on almost every page. Indeed "brrrr". Reading is difficult and not pleasant.

The second is the pettiness of nit-picking. Suvorov writes: "And the shells of the Tiger (weight 56 tons) and Tigr-B (weight 67 tons) could not penetrate the IS-2 from such a distance ..." Pomogaibo retorts: "It cannot be so that the tank has shells of 67 tons! Yes, Suvorov's phrase is not very well constructed, but nevertheless it is quite clear that tons refer to tanks, and not to shells.

There is a letter on the forum: "Mr. Help! Let's be honest... You wrote a bad book. Superficial in the presentation of facts, in the construction of counterarguments to the theory of Vladimir Bogdanovich and simply unprofessional

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cash. I have been writing a similar work since June 2001 (more than 3 MB of Word text have already been written, more than 1.2 million printed characters with spaces), so as a colleague I see advantages and disadvantages. When I wrote each of the chapters, I dug into various sources, both ours and foreign, and searched for the essence of the matter. I even made my way into the RGVA (Russian State Military Archive — Yu.Ts.) and read documents in Finnish. Well, how can you jump from topic to topic in one chapter without finishing the thought and without building a clear proof with the conclusion "listened-decided" at the end? The way you do it, books are not written. A chaotic presentation of facts, the absence of one's own integral theory about the development of events... V. Suvorov will erase your book into powder...»

Let's see, of course, what the author of the letter himself will present in the end, but the attempt to "expose" Suvorov, undertaken by Pomogaibo, should be recognized as unsuccessful.

In addition, these attempts have already tired readers. Anti-Su thieves' books are no longer in demand. This is eloquently evidenced by the fact that one of the works was smuggled into the reader. "Icebreaker-2". The cover design is the same as for the entire Suvorov series, the name of the author is "Viktor Surovov". The order of the letters has been changed, but a cursory glance doesn't pick it up right away. As a marketing technique - an abomination, in terms of content - an even greater abomination. This is not even personal criticism, but just a set of dirty conjectures.

NO CHANGES ON THE WESTERN FRONT

A. Orlov in the book "Behind the Scenes of the Second Front"?! asks the question: "What allowed Hitler for almost five years (September 1939 - June 1944) to successfully avoid a war on two fronts? Why was the second front opened only in the fifth year of the war? year and about the fact that England and France declared war on Hitler on September 3

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1939 - two days after he attacked Poland. But for him, these are insignificant episodes: "...The concept of the "second front" implied the military operations of the armed forces of the USA and England in Western Europe (and in 1944. - Yu.Ts.), yes, in Western Europe, because only the crushing simultaneous onslaught on Germany from the east and west, from the territories directly leading the armies of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition to the borders of Germany itself and to the capital of the Third Reich, allowed the allies to take the citadel of the fascist bloc into a powerful vice. Only such conditions ensured victory over the Nazi Reich and throughout World War II"?3.

Firstly, the territory leading directly to the borders of the Reich was not only France, but also Italy. Secondly, the presence of several fronts, regardless of where they were located, forced the Germans to disperse their forces, did not allow them to gather into a single fist in the eastern direction. As for Japan, its alternative to Pearl Harbor was the Soviet Far East, but the Japanese blow fell on the United States. Otherwise, not Hitler, but Stalin would have fought on two fronts.

All this is quite obvious, but Orlov's overarching task is to once again confirm the Soviet thesis that the USSR took upon itself not only the largest part of the task of defeating Hitler, but that the participation of the allies was extremely small, and they shied away from decisive action to the last.

But in general, which front is the second, and which is the first? At the time Britain and France declared war on Hitler, the USSR and Germany were bound by a non-aggression pact. After 25 days, they signed a treaty of friendship, that is, they became allies. The USSR supplied Germany with strategic raw materials — the Messerschmitts that ironed the British Isles ran on fuel made from Baku oil. The two dictators agreed on spheres of influence in Europe, proceeded to partition and, of course, squabbled.

Here we come to another super-task of Orlov - to convince the reader that the USSR supposedly had no aggressive intentions:

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ideas of the Comintern, but the national interests of the Soviet state. The leading role was acquired by geopolitics, not ideology. It could be said that "Slavyanka" parted ways with "Varshavyanka". The Soviet Union needed peace."24

The pun about the songs is spectacular, but the declaration as a whole is not supported by any facts. From what does it follow that Stalin abandoned the world revolution, from the slogan "Socialism in a single country"? So there is no contradiction here - first in one country, then everywhere. As for the "national interests of the Soviet state", this is generally an incorrect statement of the question, the USSR simply did not have such, this state did not set itself the task of serving the interests of the nation.

The tone of Robert Ivanov's book "Stals and Allies: 1941-1945"25 is set by the epigraph - a quote from Stalin: "I know that after my death they will put a lot of rubbish on my grave, but the wind

history will dispel it!" The book is openly revanchist — the author sets the task of canceling out the conclusions made by the historical science of the 1990s. He justifies this aspiration as follows: "On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the West, the falsification of history and the results of the war sharply intensified. Unfortunately, individual Russian historians are also actively participating in this campaign"⁶. "Many historians, writers, and publicists now specialize in endless slandering of everything that happened in the history of our country after 1917"⁷.

Ivanov strives to appear objective, repeatedly repeating that Stalin made "serious mistakes." However, the author is so "objective" that he is ready to equate the devil with a baby: "Stalin, on the one hand, Roosevelt and Churchill, on the other, represented different systems, opposite in their socio-economic and socio-political content.. Each of them had its pluses and minuses... The Emperor of Russia Alexander I was by no means an exemplary democrat, nor did he shine with any other virtues. Nevertheless, his name is inscribed in history as the liberator of Europe from the yoke of Napoleon. This is an attempt to draw an analogy with the "liberator of the Euro

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py" by Stalin, who was also not a "model democrat".

The author is interested in the moral side of the issue: "... From the very beginning of World War II, the states that fought against the bloc of fascist countries waged a just, liberation war for their existence. This liberating character of the Second World War was further intensified after the entry of the Soviet Union into it. The liberation character of the war really intensified after June 22, 1941, as the number of people in the world fighting against tyranny, both external and internal (the latter, however, Ivanov does not mean), increased. But June 22, 1941 is not the date the USSR entered World War II; by that time, it had been fighting for almost two years. Given this, the author's statement is false. The USSR entered World War II on September 17, 1939, stabbing Poland in the back. And there is nothing liberating in this - the regiment of aggressors has arrived. With this in mind, Ivanov's assertion is also false.

Some of the author's statements are generally bewildering: "The popular character of the Second World War required the search for new ways of cooperation between the broadest masses of the Soviet Union and the public of allied and friendly countries"³⁰. First, if we are talking about new ways, then what are the old ways of cooperation? The number of citizens of the USSR who had contacts with foreigners in the pre-war years was limited to an extremely narrow circle of responsible workers, and they were the first candidates for "landing". Secondly, if we proceed from the expediency of preserving the socio-political structure of the USSR, and Ivanov proceeds precisely from this, then it was required, as in the pre-war years, not to allow the citizens of the USSR to come into contact with the "other world", so that they would not get smart -reason and did not show the foreign community evidence of the Soviet order. Stalin understood this very well, hence his attitude towards those who during the war years came into contact with the allies, for example, through work in the Lend-Lease field, not to mention prisoners of war and Ostarbeiters. The contact of the latter with

allies only aggravated

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their fate: those liberated from the German camps by the Red Army are candidates for the "chervonets", and those liberated by the Anglo-Americans - for the "quarter". Ivanov mentions several anti-fascist committees created in the USSR, whose members actually traveled to the allied countries, but these are not "broad masses of the people". In addition, the exception confirms the rule: most of the participants in these tours were then planted and shot, and Mikhoels had a fatal accident.

Ivanov complains: "... in the vast historical and journalistic literature devoted to the history of the Second World War, there is still a big blank spot - showing the role of wide

popular masses in the defeat of fascist Germany, its allies and satellites”³!. Taking into account the fact that Soviet literature on the war was aimed at this in the first place, and all the same - a "blank spot", perhaps the rumors about this role should be recognized as exaggerated? A regular army, yes, a partisan movement managed and strictly controlled by Moscow, yes, but “the broad masses of the people”?..

Like other red revanchists, Robert Ivanov likes to bring the topic to the present: “... there is a direct connection between the topic “Stalin and the Allies: 1941-1945” and the most acute problems of modern Russia, its domestic and foreign political situation.” The author's personal political preferences are most clearly revealed by his phrase: “Stalin remained one of the Big Three when it was time to sum up the results of the war. And it was a great blessing for our country”².

PRESSURE AND DON'T LET GO

Textbook by Igor Dolutsky “History of the USSR. XX century” is deprived of the stamp "recommended". In an interview with Novoe Vremya magazine (December 21, 2003), the author said that the publisher was able to redraw their notes from the official copy of the textbook. Officials are annoyed by the mention of the victims of repression: “In 1941-1942, 150 thousand people were shot for cowardice and alarmism, this is equal to

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16 divisions. They are also horrified by language such as “half a century of occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union”. They are indignant about the following paragraph: “The Bobruisk group of Germans tried 15 times to break out of the encirclement. In full growth during the day, the Germans rushed to break through. From seven hundred meters our artillery and machine guns opened fire on them. And they continued to walk, stepping over the corpses.” One indignant reviewer, - testifies Dolutsky, - asked: is this how history should be taught?!

History as a science generally does not set educational tasks for itself, just as physics or chemistry does not set them for itself. It would be simply absurd to talk about their educational significance, but for some reason it is customary to talk about the educational significance of history. The only task of historical science is to reconstruct the events of the past as accurately as possible. This task can only be accomplished if the scale of a historical phenomenon and the degree of attention paid to it by researchers are adequate to each other. Any bias—increased attention to selected subjects, estrangement from other subjects—immediately creates the effect of a crooked mirror. And what is upbringing, especially patriotic upbringing? This is the desire to convey to the educated a system of views and judgments. And if historical science is placed at the service of this, then this will inevitably mean a biased selection of facts - we write and talk about what does honor to the fatherland, and what does not do - we do not write and do not talk about it. Moreover, we are not talking about what does honor to the enemy of the fatherland. And immediately science degenerates into propaganda, the researcher and teacher turn into a political officer.

The episode with the Bobruisk grouping of Germans, continues Dolutsky, is an almost verbatim retelling of the memoirs of Marshal Rokossovsky. “For 40 years there were no complaints against Rokossovsky that he incorrectly covered our history. But we have such a publishing technology that it does not give footnotes. Indeed, source studies and historiography are practically absent in the educational literature. No one is taught the methodology of checking sources for validity.

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fidelity, do not teach to analyze facts, compare concepts and draw independent conclusions. Instead, they are taught to take on faith and memorize certain clichéd judgments.

“Now the rollback from the previous liberal interpretations and the offensive of the sovereign ideology has begun,” writes Dolutsky. - During the years of perestroika, in the era of Yeltsin,

the communist core, but the state remains... Just don't confuse the state and the people, the state and the country. They do not match, they are not synonyms. I tried to portray... how the state actually behaved, the rulers behaved and how the people resisted them... You can love your homeland, but hate the state... The Bolsheviks committed a crime in 1917, a continuing crime, and it cannot contain any bright moments that I am advised to find. The only bright moment is the resistance of the people to this onslaught."

A stereotype is being formed: the Great Patriotic War is (after Pushkin) "our everything". A "public organization" — the Council of Veterans — was created under the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. The goal is obvious - to carry out the introduction of Soviet patriotism. For the most part, veterans are the most conservative part of society.

Dolutsky: "There is a Constitution that guarantees the absence of an official ideology. If our ideology is not nationalistic, not chauvinistic, MY textbook has the right to exist... There is an attempt to change ideology, and this is state policy, and every academic year it takes a step forward... The Ministry is only an executor of the state order, which comes from standing at the very top of the people, and it is, of course, beneficial for them that everyone has one opinion.

The fate of Dolutsky's textbook is not the only precedent. A few years ago, the persecution of A.A. Kreder, *The Recent History of Foreign Countries*. The neck was also removed, the author suffered two heart attacks and died. Officials were not satisfied with about the same as in Dolutsky's book. Kreder was mercilessly hounded because he did not show the feat in the proper, in their opinion, volume. Soviet

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people. Although he has a different topic - world history. Here is a review by Y. Mukhin, posted on the website of the *Zavtra* newspaper: "After reading this textbook, I came to the conclusion that this book is an example of anti-Slavic Zionist racism, on the cover of which there is only an inscription: "For the 9th grade native schools in the colony of Russia (Vissia)."

Dolutsky is criticized, in particular, for undermining "the collectivist primordial values of the Russian people and instilling individualistic values that are not characteristic of our people." To determine what is characteristic and what is not characteristic of the people as a whole is a pernicious desire in itself. Moreover, history has proven that progress is based on individual creativity in conditions of intellectual freedom (although many people really feel more comfortable in the herd). If we talk about the war, it is hard not to agree with the authors of the article posted by May 9, 2005 on the website of the Russian Information Agency: "... All the arithmetic impurity in the history of the war is a consequence of the unscrupulous attitude of the Soviet authorities towards the population a country whose greatness was based on the fact that the value of the life of an individual was not only negligible, but was completely absent, sacrificed to the collective "rallying of the masses" 33.

So, the trends are sad: the intellectual breakthrough, which began at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, is opposed by a growing wave of lies. This is especially noticeable when it comes to the history of the Second World War. Do you have a move? "I believe," says the author of the "unrecommended" textbook, "in the possibility of resistance of each individual in his area to the onslaught of the state."

Notes

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Thomas Titura!

VICTOR SUVOROV AS "ICEBREAKER"

TO ONE HISTORICAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of this article is to give Russian readers an overview of the discussions about Viktor Suvorov's books outside of Russia, as well as to present the literature on the subject available in the West.

"Joseph Stalin planned an attack on Germany in 1941" is the main tenet of Viktor Suvorov's books (his real name is Vladimir Rezun, a GRU officer who fled to England). Such a statement has explosive power even today, primarily in the countries of former military opponents - Russia and Germany. At the same time, debates on the topic of the prehistory of the Second World War, especially those related to the Barbarossa plan, are more relevant today than ever. In Germany, they resumed in the form of a "battle of historians", in Russia - with the release of Suvorov's book "The Icebreaker", as well as in connection with the partial and temporary opening of archives.

How to classify works from today's point of view! Suvorov? What new things will be revealed to us by declassified documents that were inaccessible to Suvorov?

In recent years, numerous documents from the party, state, military and KGB archives have become known, which convincingly confirm those

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theses of Suvorov. The most important, without a doubt, belong to the military plans of the General Staff of the Red Army.

1940 - 1941 In the future, within the framework of this study, we will touch upon party and army propaganda materials. Separately, the role of the Soviet Navy will be covered, a topic that Suvorov has not touched on so far.

Ideology inevitably plays an important role in assessing the role of Stalin and the pre-war Soviet Union. At the very beginning of the Stalinist dictatorship, the Soviet Union was forced to avoid military conflicts with the capitalist states. Stalin needed a breather to strengthen the role of the party and create an industrial base for the massive production of weapons. When the five-year plans were introduced, first of all, it was envisaged to create a heavy industry and an armaments industry, and by the most ruthless methods. The labor force released in agriculture as a result of bloody collectivization was literally absorbed by numerous new industries in the field of energy and heavy industry. The leadership of the Red Army jealously watched and controlled the ever-increasing industrial power of the state.

The demands of the Red Army on industry were already excessive in 1929: an army of three million men, two thousand aircraft (an additional fifteen hundred reserve aircraft), 9,350 artillery pieces (an additional 3,400 of a smaller caliber), one and a half thousand tanks (additional reserve at the initial stage of the war - up to three thousand pieces). The "extraction" of foreign models of tanks and aircraft began, and not only by official means, but also with the help of industrial espionage.

It will be seen from what follows that these armament figures, however incredible they may seem for 1929, pale in comparison with the planning and reality of the forties.
years.

To begin with, Stalin created an atmosphere of threat from the capitalist states in order to crack down on

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real and imaginary "enemies" within the country. At the end of the 30s. "enemies of the people", "spies" and "saboteurs" were persecuted throughout the Soviet Union to cover up economic failures and to further consolidate Stalin's power. At that time, there was such a point of view: the USSR should be armed to such an extent as to be able to repel the attack of all conceivable enemy coalitions simultaneously. Such a goal demanded from the industry that the lion's share of it was the arms industry, which led the country to decline and economic collapse.

However, by the mid-1930s Stalin felt himself strong enough to reorient industry and the party towards another goal, an offensive one, in the event of an attack on the USSR, instead of purely defensive tasks. Efforts to create an armaments industry began to bear fruit. Military plants and factories grew and multiplied all over the country, a large proportion of which were built with the technical assistance of the capitalist countries. The rapid development of Soviet industry would have been impossible without Western machines and technologies. Germany, the United States, and even Mussolini's Italy were among the preferred technology suppliers.

Even seemingly "peaceful" industries, such as tractor factories, were created for the purpose of producing weapons. "Based on tractors or automobiles, tractor and automobile factories will create tanks as a "military version" of peaceful vehicles. Therefore, the high-quality mechanization of the army will depend only on the capacity of these factories," Yegorov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, said as early as June 14, 1932*.

Indeed, automobile and tractor factories in Kharkov, Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk and Leningrad, built with the participation of Ford, served as the basis for tank production before the Second World War. Already before the war, 50% of the capacity of these factories was used for military purposes. At the end of the 30s. the number of battle tanks in the Soviet Union exceeded the total number of tanks in Germany, France, England and the United States combined!

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Stalin did not forget about the air force either. The corresponding industry was created systematically. Airplanes and aircraft engines were bought in the West, on the basis of which the USSR built its own. For Stalin, the "procurement" of modern machines was not associated with any ideological problems. They planned to buy them both from the Italian Duce and from the unloved England. Meanwhile, a license was acquired in America for the manufacture of the well-known OS-3 aircraft, in the Soviet version, the Li-2 model.

Soviet pilots often flew abroad before the war. So, for example, three TB-3 bombers visited Rome in 1934. At the same time, the Soviet military delegation was received by the Duce himself. The Soviet military were offered excursions to factories producing aircraft. In turn, Italian military pilots visited the USSR, in particular, in Odessa.

German aircraft had a good reputation, and the Soviet Union captured some examples during the Spanish Civil War (Messerschmitt Bf-109B and Heinkel HE-111).

Therefore, it is not always necessary to talk about the insufficient technical level of Soviet aircraft. Even if numerous authors explain the success of the German troops at the very beginning of the war precisely by their technical superiority over the Soviet Union, Soviet specialists come to different results. Here is what the Soviet test pilot Suprun said about the captured Messerschmitt BE-109V aircraft:

fighters that are in service with the Red Army Air Forces. The assessment of the Heinkel HE-111 aircraft by test pilot Kabanov sounds very similar: "1. Plane Neschke | HE-111 is inferior to domestic cars in speed. 2. The take-off speed, flight range and maximum altitude of this machine are much lower than the requirements for a twin-engine bomber»®.

After the pact between Stalin and Hitler

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joint work with the German air force became official. Stalin gave the order to draw up a list of modern machines and engines that Germany could supply him and that interested him. So, the USSR bought, for example, a NeshKe! HE-100, on which in 1938 a world speed record was achieved in Germany. This machine, according to its aerodynamic data, was probably the most modern German model before the war. But it was not adopted by the German aviation, but sold to the Soviet Union. The aviation industry of the USSR undoubtedly learned a lot from this

cars.

In 1939, the Soviet delegation, which included such well-known designers as Alexander Yakovlev and Nikolai Polikarpov, were shown in Germany almost all types of aircraft and the factories where they were produced. Soviet test pilots could even try out the latest machines in the air.

Soviet designers and technicians used aircraft supplied by Germany to improve their skills. In 1940 alone, more than 3,500 Soviet technicians were trained on German machines. Sobolev summarizes the results of this training and trial flights on German aircraft as follows: "From this it becomes clear that the new generation of Soviet combat aircraft not only does not lag behind the German ones in its main parameters, but surpasses similar machines, for example, in speed ". The Soviets had another problem - to set up mass production of new types of aircraft in time.

It is worth paying attention once again to the fact that from the assessment of German aircraft in the Soviet Union immediately before the start of the war it is absolutely impossible to draw a conclusion about the lower level of Soviet aircraft. Thus, the Soviet leadership, headed by Stalin, could by no means be terrified of German military equipment. On the contrary, the top military and party leaders considered themselves quite capable of winning an offensive war against Germany. In the words of Professor Maudsley: "Contrary to the opinion of many of today's

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historians, I would argue it this way: Stalin and the high military command believed that they could deal with Hitler precisely from a position of their own strength, not weakness! Moreover, the German tanks shown to the Soviet experts made a very bad impression on them. Soviet experts simply could not believe that Germany really did not have the best tanks. Knowing about the capabilities AND POWER of the latest Soviet types of T-34 and KV-1 tanks, they could not perceive German tanks as a serious enemy.

The appearance on the front of the Soviet battle tanks KV-1, named after Marshal Voroshilov, acted as a shock to the German troops. There is an episode from the memoirs of the Austrian General Erhard Raus, which describes the appearance of a single KV-1 tank after the start of the Barbarossa plan: the KV-1 blocked the supply route for the German 6th Panzer Division and blocked it for almost two days . Attacks by German tanks, anti-tank guns of 50 mm caliber and even attacks by a dive bomber were unsuccessful. Usually very effective anti-aircraft guns 88 mm worked only at a very close distance, and even then not immediately"!!.

USSR ReCrew Sh | ReKrech TU | T-34/76

And booking, in mm

95 pag Kalib Tsa (8.2) extinguishing weapons, in mm Power 230

engine, l/s

In terms of their technical capabilities, Soviet tanks were not only either equal to the German ones, or better than THEM,

but also greatly outnumbered them. While the Wehrmacht was armed with only 3350 tanks

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of all types (next to the captured 35-38-ton Skoda tanks there were numerous, completely outdated Rapterg P and Rapterg Sh models), Stalin's arsenal looked something like this¹²:

Leningrad Military District: 1977 tanks;

Northwestern Front (Baltic Military District): 1646 tanks;

Western Front (Special Western Military District): 3345 tanks;

Southwestern Front (Special Kiev Military District): 5894 tanks;

Odessa Military District: 1119 tanks.

Using these few figures as an example, it becomes clear how hopeless an attack on Russia must have been for the Germans. Especially when you consider that figures for the internal military districts (Moscow, Caucasus, etc.) have not yet been given here.

Now let's turn to a topic that, even in the specialized literature, has been touched upon very little: the gigantic Stalinist program to create a fleet.

Tsarist Russia never played a big role as a maritime power. The vast continental empire focused on arming the ground forces. In any case, Russia did not have to protect the sea routes along which trade would develop. In the USSR, sea trade routes also did not play an important role. Therefore, the creation of a large fleet, even for defensive purposes, was not necessary. Nevertheless, Stalin developed grandiose plans for the creation of an ocean-going fleet. If Stalin's plans had come true, the Soviet Union would have had a navy that would have surpassed the naval forces of both traditional maritime powers - England and the United States, combined!¹³

In 1936, the Soviets began to probe the US for a battleship. The man assigned to negotiate was Sam Karp, the brother of Vyacheslav Molotov's wife. Sam Karp was born in Russia but lived in America.

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Stalin even interceded with the American ambassador Steinhardt to get permission to buy the battleship from the US government. Prior to this, Steinhardt, during his tenure as ambassador to Moscow, had never been able to meet with Stalin. In the end, after long settlements, President Roosevelt agreed to the development and delivery of the battleship to the USSR. This work was undertaken in August 1937 by the American firm Sirs & Cox. In addition to one battleship, the Soviet Union had to receive more parts and weapons for the second one to assemble in their shipyards.

The plans of C1b\$ & Cox were, in fact, gigantic. Both ships had to displace at least 66,000 tons (option A) or even 74,000 tons (option B). For comparison, the German battleship Bismarck had a displacement of 42,000 tons.

The Soviet Union also counted on technical assistance from Italy. For example, the engine of the Kirov-class cruiser was made according to a model bought in Italy. The engines of other ships of the same class had to be built under an Italian license. In addition, blueprints for the Kappapao Mochescisso cruiser were purchased in Italy.

The Italian destroyers Ragio and Vaepo served as a model for the Soviet destroyers of the Wrathful class (project 7). As early as 1929, plans were drawn up at the Italian shipyard Capiet Kpima de Adpanso for a Soviet submarine of the Dekabrist class.

Stalin approved the huge program for the creation of the navy, presented to him by Voroshilov on September 7, 1937. This program provided for the construction of at least eight battleships (four - type B / project 25 and four - type A / project 64), 10 heavy cruisers (project 22), 22 cruisers (project 68), two aircraft carriers (project 71), 20 leading destroyers, 144 destroyers, various minelayers, anti-mine sweeps, 85 large, 175 medium and 116 small submarines.

Construction programs for 10 destroyers, eight battlecruisers, 14 cruisers and two aircraft carriers were approved on July 27, 1940.

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These are just two examples from the vast Soviet naval building program, clearly demonstrating its grandiose scope. What was the meaning of this program for the continental Soviet Union?

Such a program could not have been defensive in nature, since it was too large and too ambitious to protect the coasts. If it were about following the defensive doctrine, it would be necessary to design and build a completely different fleet.

The role of the Soviet navy was predetermined by the offensive doctrine. The description of the role of the fleet in the "Provisional Naval Regulations of 1937" ("Temporary Regulations for the Naval Service of 1937") begins with offensive tasks: "Offensive battles on the high seas and in airspace above the sea, in addition, near the enemy coast sea and near enemy naval bases in order to achieve the operational goals of the war at sea ... "Naval commanders had to carry out offensive operations in order to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy!

Molotov, Stalin's closest confidant, said on February 14, 1938: "The mighty Soviet state needs a sea and ocean fleet that corresponds to its interests and is worthy of its great goals!"⁶.

Stalin's plans for the construction of the fleet exceeded the capabilities of Soviet shipyards. Therefore, the terms of launching ships into the water were often delayed. Ultimately, this entire gigantic weapons program could not be completed in time, before the start of Operation Barbarossa.

This short digression into the realm of naval armaments should serve as another touch in the study of Stalin's intentions before the Second World War.

Another very controversial point in substantiating the expansionist plans of the Soviet Union is Stalin's speeches at a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939 and before graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941.

The authenticity of the speech on August 19, 1939 is questioned by many historians. In this speech, Stalin prepares the top leadership of the party to conclude a pact with the German Empire. Unusually frank, this

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speech cannot in any way correspond to the concepts of historians who have remained true to the Soviet lines.

Stalin openly admits that he intends to use the pact with Hitler in order to drag the German Empire into an exhausting war with the Western countries. In this case, the Soviet Union will be able to determine the moment of its entry into the war, that is, to set the time for the attack itself. Weakened opponents will then fall into Stalin's hands like "ripe fruit". Traditional historical science, of course, cannot use such a frank statement by Stalin about his own plans. The historical version, according to which Adolf Hitler was the only aggressor, if Stalin's speech is recognized as genuine, collapses.

However, was Stalin's speech really as extraordinary as it is commonly believed, or are other similar documents from Stalin's inner circle simply not available to us? In fact, we can cite many other proofs of Stalin's aggressive intentions.

One of the most important witnesses can be considered the leader of the Communist International, Bulgarian Georgy Dimitrov, whose diaries were found in one of the archives in Sofia.

The entry dated September 7, 1939¹⁷ deserves special attention:

"The war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.). For the redivision of the world, for domination over the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. It would not be bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler himself, without understanding or do this, shakes and undermines the capitalist system. ...maneuver, push one side against the other to get better torn apart. The Non-Aggression Pact helps Germany to some extent. The next step is to push the other side. ... What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland

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did we extend the socialist system to new territories and populations?"

These diary entries of Dimitrov fully correspond to the text of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, which got to the West! Witnesses to Stalin's statements were, in addition to Dimitrov, Molotov and Zhdanov.

Let us now turn to Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's overseer of ideology and art, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo. Could such statements by Stalin, as given in Dimitrov's diary, be unexpected for Zhdanov? In no case! 8.

A few years ago Zhdanov's secret speech in 1938 before the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Prague became known¹⁸. Zhdanov said that although it is the duty of every communist to fight the fascist aggressor, the communists must at the same time try "with all their might to use the economic and political crisis generated by the war in order to mobilize the masses and hasten the decline of capitalism in Czechoslovakia." In their struggle against Hitler, and later against capitalism, the communists would be supported by the Red Army, which would become "an important political factor in this conflict."

Another document throws light on Stalin's political games. The document, which fell into the hands of the American consul in Prague, tells about the trip of Czech communists to Moscow in 1939. The Soviet motives for the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin pact were explained to the delegation as follows:

"If the USSR had concluded a pact with the Western countries, Germany would never have been able to start a war, the result of which would be the world revolution that we have been preparing for so long ... Encircled Germany would never have started a war ... We cannot allow Germany to lose - rallied the war, because if it falls under the control of the West and Poland is recreated, we will be cut off from the rest of Europe. This war should last as long as we want... Remain calm,

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because there has never been a time so favorable to our interests as it is now.

Another quote from Comrade Zhdanov, this time from a speech in Leningrad that was not intended for publication: "The policy of the socialist government is to use the contradictions between the imperialists, in this case military contradictions, for strengthening the positions of socialism wherever there is an opportunity for this"?1.

And here is Zhdanov's statement in November 1940: "Our neutrality is an unusual neutrality. We acquire territories without fighting (laughter in the audience). To maintain this neutrality, strength is essential... We must be **STRONG ENOUGH** to defend the positions of socialism by both diplomatic and military means." Further, Zhdanov calls on his listeners "not to lose a single day, not to lose a single hour to improve military technology, military organization, while modern offensive experience with all its methods and means of attack must be taken into account"22.

And these are just a few of the quotes that betray the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union under Stalin.

The credibility of Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies on the evening of May 5, 1941 was also in doubt for a long time?3. Subsequently, the contents of this speech became known, including the three toasts that Stalin made at the subsequent banquet? Stalin declared that the German Wehrmacht should no longer be regarded as invincible. He praised the Red Army, which already consisted of 300 divisions, a third of which were mechanized. He ended his speech with these words: "The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army."

After Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, propaganda became even more outspoken and aggressive, primarily within the Red Army." For example, the draft directive "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" contained, among other things, the following wording: "All forms of propaganda, agitation and

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supply to a single goal: the political, moral and combat training of personnel for the conduct of a just, offensive and all-destroying war ... "

And finally, from the report "The Current International Situation and Foreign Policy of the USSR" (May 1941): "The German army has not yet encountered an equivalent enemy, equal to it both in the number of troops and in technical equipment and combat training. Meanwhile, such a clash is not far off. And further: "The experience of military operations has shown that the defensive strategy did not give any success and ended in defeat. Therefore, the same offensive strategy, backed up by powerful technology, must be applied against Germany. To the first quote by G.F. Alexandrov, head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, made the following significant note: "Such a formulation must by no means be allowed. That would mean showing the cards to the enemy." Note to the second quote: "War with Germany[[]]."

I think there is no need to cite further quotations in order to draw an unambiguous conclusion about Stalin's policy in 1941.

In conclusion, let us touch upon the offensive strategy of the Red Army and its military preparations⁶ against Germany in the summer of 1941.

Even Viktor Suvorov defined the military preparations of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 as offensive. Airfields were located close to the borders in order to be able to launch a surprise attack on Germany. At the beginning of the war, this played a fatal role for Stalin's air force. Hundreds of aircraft were destroyed by German aircraft directly on the ground or while trying to take off.

This is how the well-known American historian E.F. Tsimke assesses the situation: "After an irreparable mistake was made and the main forces of the Red Aviation were deployed near the border in anticipation of offensive actions, it was almost completely destroyed on the ground and in the air even before after dark on June 22, 1941, and did not fully recover until the very end of the war"⁷.

The same thing happened with the concentrated

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Lvov and Bialystok ledges by the tank forces of the Soviet Union. The shock tank wedges concentrated there were bypassed by the Wehrmacht, surrounded and destroyed.

For defense against a German attack, these military preparations were completely unsuitable. Thanks to them, these tank units were presented to the Germans for destruction as if on a plate. But the Red Army was preparing not for an attack, but for a sudden deep strike against German troops in German-occupied Poland. This is recognized even by A. Kokoshin (First Deputy Defense Minister and former security adviser to President Yeltsin) and Major General V. Lavrinov, authors of the preface to the book on Soviet military strategy⁸.

Evan Maudsley also comes to a similar conclusion? was the offensive doctrine of the Red Army. "The offensive Soviet doctrine meant not only that the forces of the Red Army were brought far ahead. It also meant that they were concentrated in the wrong region of the border"³⁰.

The Soviet military plan of May 15, 1941 called for an attack on southern Poland from the Ukraine in order to cut Germany off from the Ploiesti oil region. Therefore, the strongest Soviet tank units were concentrated in Ukraine⁹!.

The war plan of May 15, 1941 can be regarded as the most sensational document of the pre-war period. The fifteen-page document, entitled "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies," contains proposals for a pre-emptive strike against Germany.

The corresponding wording reads: "In order to prevent this, I consider it necessary in no case to give the initiative of action to the German command, to forestall the enemy in deployment and to attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the stage of deployment and will not have time to organize front and interaction of military branches.

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This plan was proposed to Stalin by the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Timoshenko, and the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov. The document was written by the hand of General Vasilevsky, head of the planning department of the Soviet General Staff.

Although this plan was not signed by Stalin, the measures proposed in it were implemented right up to the very beginning of the war. Stalin usually did not sign such documents

personally, on previous military plans (for example, November 1940 and March 1941) it is also not signatures.

These plans were by no means mere games of the General Staff, as some experts readily assert. So, for example, on the military plan of March 1941, one can find a note by Lieutenant General Nikolai Vatutin: "The offensive will begin on 12.6." As you know, Vatutin was not just some kind of lieutenant general, but the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

Also absurd is the opinion that the offensive plans were developed without Stalin's knowledge or against his will. The General Staff would have decided in 1940-1941. to set in motion such a far-reaching plan without Stalin's knowledge or without his orders? Naturally, in the Soviet Union of 1941 this was impossible. Whoever insists on this pretends that there have never been bloody purges that have just ended among the officers of the Red Army. Stalin would have thrown the recalcitrant generals into the cellars of the Lubyanka without a second's hesitation.

Is the position in relation to V. Suvorov's theses of two well-known authors in the West, Colonel David E. Glantz, interesting? (publisher of the journal *Yoshta! oYo Zau1s Magu* 5915) and Gabriel Gorodetsky³³ (Tel Aviv University).

Although hardly anyone has published more materials on the subject of the Barbarossa Plan than David Glantz, there is practically nothing in his books concerning the Soviet military plans of 1940-1941. If he mentions it, it is at best in one or two short paragraphs. He also stubbornly avoids citing key documents on the Soviet military.

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ing, while at other times it publishes every little thing imaginable.

Gabriel Gorodetsky also seems to be behaving. Gorodetsky not only does not recognize the authenticity of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, but also considers the Soviet offensive plans for 1940-1941 to be completely harmless. He claims that these plans are, at best, internal documents of the General Staff, which are available in any General Staff of the world. Even the occupation and annexation by Stalin of Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are presented by Gorodetsky as a purely protective measure! Stalin's role in the division of Poland does not particularly upset him either. The expansion of the borders of Germany by Hitler always looks like an attack, the expansion of the borders of the USSR by the Red Army, according to Gorodetsky, pursued only defensive goals.

One can only hope that in the future new documents from the former Soviet archives will become available, which will enable the next generations of historians to come to more

balanced conclusions.

Notes

1 The following books by Viktor Suvorov were published in German: "Per Eýýbgeszher. NSheg ip Zalız Ka" (1989), "Oer Tas M" (1995), "S(ýýýý ýýýýýýýýýýý ýýýýýýýý. NSheg ýrýýski Fe MeigeuoGyop" (2000) and "MagzsvaTs SshyiKou. .bepsueo yBeg I. ýýýýýý".

2 Examples of such publications include: “1941” (in 2 volumes, M., 1998), ed. A. Yakovleva; A. Kolpakidi, D. Prokhorov. GRU Empire (in 2 volumes, Moscow, 2001); State security agencies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War (in 2 volumes, M., 1995).

3 bop Rama V. Nattég apa KShe. T'e Miyaphayoy o' She Zome Otop, 1926-1933.

4 Back translation from German. RGVA (Russian State Military Archive), 33988/3/301. Cit. Quoted from: Sate[sop Heppat. P1aps South ZChal]\$ Mag Masse. Tokyasäeuÿkÿi apÿ M!

Illagu-Esopopis Riappipo, 1925 - 1941. MasktiShar Rgess Ila., 2000. \$. 163.

5 St.: biyoy Atiopo S.: Mahopa! jyyjy. Magu Ala yu je Zome Otop., Tye jyyjygaŷap j.jyyjy jŷ Bo, 1973. 5. 101 Y.

6 7. Sayai Siagke Sh. "lao-Zoulet Miyagu Sooregaop ip jŷ 19305" ip: Popa! J. buqueg g. un ŷopaŷap A. Stat. "Sitapo South Waye. Tye Attŷ Tgade sha jŷoBaŷ Regzresyuye, 1815 - 1940». Praecer Publispo, 2003, \$. 181.

7 RGVA (Russian State Military Archive). F. 24.708.

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Op. 9. D. 142. S. 26. Cited. according to 5oroiem Otitis " Yuehsŷe Srshep ip 4er ŷokhuŷeyŷŷep Gai aggi", E. \$. MŷSheg opa Zori, 2000, \$. 101.

8 RGVA (Russian State Military Archive). F. 24.708. Op. 9. D. 142. S. 26. Cited. according to Eiaya ZoBoe \: "Oeshszhe Zrigep ip deg khohuŷeyŷshep Ga Nat", E.\$. MiNeg opa Zori, 2000, 8. 102.

9 oŷŷoŷem Ripig: "Ressshŷŷŷe Srigep ip eg ŷokhuŷeyŷŷep GI jyyjy", E.\$. Mlyer ip4 Soŷŷp, 2000, \$. 118.

10 Mamayayaey Euap: "Tŷipaer jn je jyyj: "Tŷe Mahŷ-Soyieŷ Eygae 1941 - 1945", NoidegA gpo!a, 2005, \$. 34.

P Memiope Meuep N. (Ngzo.): "Rapteŷ Oregiops. Tŷe jyyjyŷŷŷ His Meto oŷ fekega! Vass, 1941 - 1945", "Ra Saro Prezz, 2003, \$. 26 - 34.

12 The data are taken from the following obscure publications: Syowoo' Sgaie: "Te Or4er oJ Vaye oŷ je Soyie Arme4 Eorges. Tŷe \$1eeripo Veag. Date 1: 22 June 1941. Pax op. An ekhigaspop oŷ je Oŷbsŷŷ! Soy1iee Or4er o Wayne. Eog Che epige Artea Eogsez oE Me Oshop oŷ Soyieŷ Socia1jŷŷ Veri 1c\$ uŷgŷpo je Otea{ Paigiois Mag", T'e Maeloeg Copeciop, 2001.

13 This information is based on the following publications: Ly'en BosmegLeog Atoshow. "Sitapwe Paranaŷ un Zlaa!n\$ ana NHer's Maua| Rgovgat» vop ip Kobegi no. Gohe JG.L.ashie Boe1e/Bapap MapieMagk/ Maoshyp, Ui. No way. Seŷessiea Raregs Here is {ŷe Eleuepŷŷ Maha! Nisiogu Sutrosŷop, Maua| jnŷŷŷshe Prezz, 2001, bay 2818 izep Koŷueŷ/Mŷkŷai 5. Mopakou: "Elapp'\$ Oseap-ooŷpo, jŷeeŷ. Souie Maua! Eiaesu api ZmriAte Prosgattes 1935 - 1953", Egapk Caŷs Publŷŷŷerŷ, 2001; erlep MSG.aeŷŷŷp: "Kissŷap & Souŷei Vaeŷŷŷŷŷ", Maha! sznaie Prezs, 2003; Mlap G. Naipeg. "81ŷŷŷŷ ŷ1®- Nee Prootat", Maua! Magician SoPese Keuieu, Srgŷpo 2004, \Vo|. GUP, no. 2; V. G. Gautap/<ŷerŷep MsGŷizlt: "Tŷe NuBpa Mŷrŷŷŷŷ. Tŷe ataŷsatayop oŷ Vi jŷips jŷpa jyyjyŷŷŷŷ, Maua! psivie Proezz, 1991.

No. See 5ŷeeŷŷŷea Bteyer. "Sexascische un Schasmkgeleg 1921 - 1997. Piegpayer Schascissichie", Vegmar4 & Staeg Uenaz, 2002.

15 LLusep Woimeimm paradise 5. Mopakou: "Syaip's Ocean-soshe Eee. Soy1iee Maua| Sigayesu apa Zirbiyashe Prosomattes 1935 - 1953, Etapk Caŷŷ Pivyŷŷŷŷerŷ, 2001, \$. 105.

16 Yokoep Koime/Miyai 5. Mopakou: "Zapp'z Oseap-ooipo Reei. Souie Maua| Sigayesu apa Zirbiyashe Prosomattes 1935 - 1953, Etapk Cass RaBusNecs, 2001, 8. 77.

17 Seoget Ritiogog "Tavebiisuzheg 1933-1943", Aiai Mepao, 2000, back 274.

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19 Joog Imkes: "Cresuhosiouayua Bebmeepp Siaÿp apa NSher. Te Puryutasu oYo Eihaga Vepeÿ ÿn e 19305. ", OkhYuga Opuegÿÿÿu Prgeÿs, 1996 (Raretfask), Zee 1981.

20 [oog Gikez: "Stejosiouayua Bebmeepp ZaPp aha Nshég. Te Puryutasu oYo Eihaga Vepes ip Fe 1930\$, OkhYuga Oshuegziu Prezz, 1996 (Raregfask), Zeye 258.

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21 AeKzapag M. Mektsy: "Rapaÿs, Parÿpegÿ, Pgedayugz. Segment-Soviet VeaNop\$ 1922 - 1941, Sopitia Owetgizu Prez\$, 1997, Zeye 230.

2 Back translation from German. For this and other similar quotations, see: ITaiitig Meuegit: "Soyieÿ U/ar Prosap4da, Not Apÿ-ÿtregaÿÿÿt io Apÿ-ÿÿÿÿÿt: EV apÿ ÿopÿtaiÿsbops" ip 80ÿ1ÿo ÿops/Apagea Kotapo (Ngzo.): "Vis ÿÿÿ sh ÿe Ase ÿÿ Mags 1914 - 1945, Eopdagiope Slapolasoto Eeliye! 1 MPapo, 2000, See 251 - 264.

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26 On the military plans of the Soviet Union and the strategy of the Red Army, see: Euap MamA\$eu (Oshuetziu oÿ Slazoog): "Crossipo ÿe KiYsop. Souieÿ Rÿaps South Oÿepsÿue Mag 1940 - 1941", Tÿe Imegpayopa! Nÿÿÿogu Vuÿem XXY, 4: ResetBeg 2003; No; Mazepyeyteg. "Etiÿsÿeÿÿipÿÿkatri 1941. Sokhÿeyÿsÿe Kneoskuogbegeyipön — Ayipagzey — /iÿattepÿÿo?", Ospÿpo, Wepao, 2001. Dr. Magenheimer teaches at the Austrian Defense Academy and at the University of Salzburg.

27 Bai R. 2etke: "T'e Vea Attu, 1918 - 1941: Egot Uaposhaga o Moga Keuoshyop jo Atepsa? ÿ Apu", Etapk Caÿÿ RiBiz o, 2004, Zetse 277.

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30 Euap Mathaayeu: "Thypaeg un kue Easi: Te Ma1-Soyie 8itisoÿe 1941-1945", Noaher Arpo]a, 2005, See 39.

31 See the classic work by the Munich historian Walter Post, Operation Barbarossa. German and Soviet military plans 1940/41. Zhayeg Rosyo "Oshchetebtep VagBbagossa. Revisiÿsÿe opa ÿomÿeyÿsÿe Kpeosridpe 1940/41", Ue]ac E.5. Micher & Son, 1995. This book can still be recommended today as the best study on this topic in German.

32 See, for example: "ÿÿÿ ÿÿÿÿÿ! Repoa oE Mag op ÿe Easiegp Etopi. 22 Lshe - ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ 1941", Etapk Caÿÿ Riyÿÿÿpo, 1993 (second edition - 2001); "Tÿe Zato So1oscis. Te Kea Agtu op ke Eue oYo Mota Mag", Oshuetziu Prgess oYo Kapsas, 1998; "The Way South of Heppogaa 1941-1944", Kapsas Oshuetziu Prezz, 2002; "Soÿoscis Webog. Te Wei Agtu ai Mag, 1941 - 1943", Capsas Oshuegziu Prgess, 2005.

33 "Obtapa Yuellsÿop. Sciaip ana ÿe Segman ipuasiop oE Viscia", Yÿÿÿ Otyergy Pgeÿÿ, 2000.

Richard C. Raaki

THE ROLE OF STALIN IN UNLEASHING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

"Viktor Suvorov" is the pseudonym of a former Soviet military intelligence officer who has lived in England for many years. In the 1980s he published a study of Stalin's war plans, which, if Suvorov's version is credible, should have shaken the firmament of the historical establishment. In 1990, a British publisher finally released an English translation of his book *Icebreaker*. Suvorov offers in it a new understanding of Stalin's purpose in the war, substantiated in detail by quotations from Soviet military memoirs and other important documents. An American publishing house in the same year published Suvorov's book in New York. The subtitle of the London edition was "Who Started World War II?" Naturally, this was to attract the attention of readers. But, despite the constant interest, especially in those anniversary years, in the history of the war of 1939-1945, the London and New York editions did not receive reviews either in general periodicals or in professional historical journals in the USA! Of course, Hamish Hamilton and the New York Viking Press are interested in the success of their publications - and therefore sent out copies for review. Why the strange silence?

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A book with a similar title, *How the War Came*, by London-based professor D. Watt, was published in England and the United States in 1989. It received reviews—mostly positive—in at least fifteen journals (considering only the reviews from Pives o Artegisap Book Veyuem and maex ou Book Veyuey)². Professor Watt presented the generally accepted version of the outbreak of war, overwhelmingly based on Western and German material and ignoring the many new sources that emerged from behind the former Iron Curtain in those early days of glasnost.

In fact, the two books are similar only in titles. Watt's book is broader, its approach to the subject covered is much more traditional. And Suvorov's book has only one focus - Stalin's war plans, ignored by most historians, and it uses completely different sources, mainly military history.

Suvorov builds his argument on historical ground that has been left unattended: the plan for a Soviet attack in a westerly direction. According to Suvorov, Stalin deployed his troops to carry out precisely this plan, but was taken by surprise by the German attack that preempted him. There is not the slightest hint of this Soviet war plan in Watt's text.

Suvorov also offered a fresh look at Stalin's earlier designs when he signed a "non-aggression pact" with Hitler in 1939, setting the stage for a German and Soviet attack on Poland. This pact, taking into account the existing British guarantees to Poland, made a pan-European war inevitable and within a month brought the Wehrmacht to the Soviet border. Without this common frontier, which Stalin deliberately helped create in 1939, there could not have been a direct German attack on the USSR in 1941.

As said earlier, Watt is not alone in not looking ahead to better see what happened in the past. Countless authors, just like him, completely and incomprehensibly ignored the words of Git

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ler about this, although it was Hitler who was the main participant in the events.

Hitler said many times that he had to attack the Soviets before they attacked him? Was he right? Did Stalin have plans to use the war, especially the war of 1939, on

in favor of the USSR and Bolshevism, whose interests were, from Stalin's point of view, identical? The widely disseminated Marxist-Leninist theory, which declared wars between the "imperialist" powers a necessary path to their inevitable death in proletarian and colonial revolutions, should have sharpened the attention of both contemporaries and historians on the connection between this war and the probable Stalin's interest in making use of it.

These clear connections, as well as the prophecies of Hitler and Lenin, have been almost completely ignored by historians who have not asked the obvious question: what exactly did Stalin expect from a second "imperialist" war? They clearly preferred to believe Stalin that his intentions in signing the pact were purely defensive, just like his plans on the eve of Hitler's surprise attack in 1941.

In fact, for the most part, "informed" Western public opinion fully accepted then the dubious assurances of the USSR that it had allegedly lost interest in the central principles of international adventurism driven by Marxism-Leninism."

Will the above-described attention be drawn to the reader, who now has good reason to be suspicious of all sorts of fantasies generated by the media? And is there any reason to be suspicious of a book published by well-known publishers containing a completely new historical concept, but left without reviews? Even in Britain, only one prominent journal has published a review of Suvorov's book - positively, by the way. John Zametica, a reviewer for The Observer, suggested that Suvorov's book would be attacked by "many academic historians, whose previous work would prove to be

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meaning, if Suvorov is in the nature. It would be natural to see among such critics many academic authors who studied the events of 1938-1941, beginning with Hitler's capture of Austria and the Sudetenland and ending with Germany's attack on the USSR. But Suvorov was treated differently: he was not reviewed, which would notify the general public about him, but ignored, allowed to quietly disappear from the field of academic public opinion. It was practically isolated, leaving out the attention of the intelligentsia of the western coast of the Atlantic Ocean, which receives information from interregional newspapers and leading social and political magazines." Did Suvorov become a victim of an intellectual "purge" in our area?

What kind of historical concept could be destroyed by Suvorov's version, if his arguments are valid?

The modern reader interested in World War II is likely to be familiar with the following commonly accepted concept (set out here in a simplified way for the sake of brevity). It is based on a system of opinions widespread in the West, which for many years provided at least a favorable explanation for Stalin's behavior in the war and post-war years. The common story goes like this.

Stalin's distrust of the Western democracies, Great Britain and France, grew sharply after they practically stopped supporting the Czech President Benes, to whom Hitler presented his demands on the eve of the Munich crisis in September 1938. The Soviet Union was then bound by bilateral defensive pacts with Czechoslovakia and France. Both of these agreements were part of the collective security system that the European powers were slowly building up against Nazi Germany. But when the British and French reached an agreement with Hitler in Munich and allowed him to annex the German-populated areas of Czechoslovakia to Germany, Stalin lost faith in these democracies. He believed that their desire to appease Hitler by satisfying his demands on Czechoslovakia, and also that they did not consult the Soviet Union on this issue, indicated a willingness

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Hitler to seize everything he wants in the east of Europe. After that, Hitler would be ready to attack the Soviet Union.

Hitler loudly declared his hostility to what he called "Judeo-Bolshevism" and his determination to obtain "living space" for the German people in the East. Given Hitler's such inclinations, it would be difficult to assume that this vague expansionist goal does not include at least most of the western Slavic lands of the Soviet Union.

According to this version, Stalin, foreseeing a war with Germany, intensified the fight against what seemed to him the intrigues of the West. He allowed Hitler to move east and occupy half of Poland in exchange for Hitler's agreement to allow him, Stalin, to move the Soviet border west, occupying the other half of Poland. In this way, Stalin was able to create from eastern Poland and other Eastern European states and territories he received as a result of this deal, an earthen rampart, a buffer between the USSR and the Germans, covering eight million square miles of original Soviet territory. As a result, Hitler found himself in a state of confrontation with the Western powers. Thus Stalin won both the space and time he desperately needed to build his own defenses, for he knew that Hitler was adamant in his decision to move against him in the near future. Therefore, Stalin's pact with the Nazis and his agreement to supply Germany with many of the raw materials that she then needed for the war in Western Europe against England and France were defensive measures, part of a plan to delay the conflict in order to acquire vital space and time. .

As follows from this version, which declares Stalin's defensive goals, Stalin's version of Bolshevism was not aggressive, despite the wars he waged against Poland and Finland after the pact, and despite the subsequent brutal seizure of the small Baltic countries. One often reads that by that time the bloody Bolshevik expansionism had already begun to wane.

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whose initial creators during the days of the revolution were Lenin and Trotsky, and one of the unsuccessful manifestations of which was the catastrophic (for the Bolsheviks) invasion of Poland in 1920. Although Stalin himself was one of the political leaders of the Red Army and one of the main culprits of that invasion, believers in this version nevertheless prove, contrary to the evidence, that Stalin later refused such expensive foreign adventures according to the recipes of his deceased teacher. Lenin. Stalin, as follows from this version, was mainly concerned about internal security, feared for the future of the Soviet Union. Many historiographers thought so, and very many over the past fifty years have sympathetically perceived the foreign policy of the Soviet leader. They believe that Stalin had little choice but to make a pact with Hitler and play his own part in destroying what was left of independent Central and Eastern Europe.

Further, according to this version, Stalin fatally miscalculated, because soon after the unexpected and quick defeat of France, the entire European continent was in the hands of Hitler. Having no serious enemies in the west of the continent, the Fuhrer began to concentrate his armies against the Soviet Union. The Soviet dictator, whose plans to gain time and build his country in safety were interrupted by German victories throughout Europe, did not foresee this turn of events. And although after the pact with the Germans he hastily rearmed, strengthened his defensive positions in the west and gained two years in preparation for war, his armies nevertheless did not hold back the initial German attack in June 1941. The Red Air Force was practically destroyed at its airfields along the entire front of the German offensive. All this happened despite the fact that Stalin received countless warnings about the impending attack. From the very beginning of the German invasion, the Russians

almost everywhere they retreated in panic. Their losses were enormous: millions of soldiers were killed or captured by the Germans and their allies, who soon captured

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tili the main cities and industrial centers of the west of the USSR. An incredible political disaster was followed by an incredible military one.

The above version (which often glosses over the extent of the catastrophe to which Stalin, "the greatest genius of mankind," as he was, to his own pleasure, called it) condemned his country) contains more than isolated errors. However, no matter how incredible it may seem, it is she who can be heard most often. Those who don't believe can read historical writings on the subject, or look into university textbooks OR The New Yorker, one of the many popular magazines that regularly bombard readers with amateur historiography on various aspects of the war against Hitler, such as rule, while confirming, although not always directly, the Stalinist version of the Soviet defensive plans.

Even during the war, this version convinced many of the policy makers in London and Washington who were looking for historical evidence to predict what the Soviets would do after the war. It was clearly taken at face value by our wartime leaders, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. It formed, as a generally accepted historical truth, the basis of many critical decisions and post-war planning during WWII—decisions made in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. At these crucial conferences, the West decided how to deal with the Stalinist Soviet Union, its ally in the war, based on its own hopes for Stalin's behavior in the years to come after the war. And often the decisions of the West, due to ignorance and misunderstanding of what really happened, helped Stalin. This version was presented to the Western population for a long time as a justification for mistrust in the Soviet Union after the beginning of the Cold War, when the Soviet armies were conveniently located in the center of Europe, and Stalin's borders and spheres of influence were seriously expanded in Asia. Just a few years ago, the former communist

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Did der Mikhail Gorbachev still tell this tale to reinforce his current justification of Stalin?.

Behind this version, various versions of which have never deviated far from the above, one hears the voice of Stalinist propaganda and the desire of the Western public, gullible journalists and politicians, as well as numerous historians, to believe the defenders of Stalin and take propaganda at face value. Today it surprises, but it should have surprised from the very beginning. After all, Stalin's contemporaries in the West never had serious reasons to expect anything good from an unexpectedly found military ally - a former military ally of Hitler! There were no serious reasons for their successors either. In fact, they had even less reason to see anything good in him at all—although many chose to do so for many years. Today we must admit that the long-term popularity of the above tale is the brilliant product of the best propaganda campaign ever made. But the current access to many archives of the former Eastern Bloc, previously closed to independent researchers, means that this version can no longer remain beyond criticism.

If the historical tale that has been propagated for so long is wrong, what story will replace it? According to Suvorov, Stalin did not want peace at all, neither during the Sudeten crisis in 1938, nor in 1939, nor in 1941. His stance was neither defensive nor reactive. He did not take time to prepare the defense, but prepared the attack, waiting for the right moment for his own campaign to the west. He saw in Hitler an "icebreaker" who was breaking the way for the Bolsheviks to

the West, a demonic nihilist that will tear to shreds the fragile fabric of post-Versailles Europe, everywhere destroying governments, economic and social order, setting people against people, state against state, group against group.

Thus, it was assumed that the "icebreaker" Hitler would open wide the gates of the continent for the invasion of the Marxist geggir/es siprlissheigu ("terrible simplifiers" (Fran. - Ed.) and help to realize them

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the dreams of ending the imperialist wars with the universal triumph of proletarian revolutions, during which the masses, despairing of the hardships and hardships of the war with Hitler, will finally rise up against the capitalist warmongers.

Suvorov proves that the Stalinist invasion of the West with the help of the Red Army was scheduled for the beginning of the summer of 1941. If his evidence were widely discussed, then readers, faced with a well-developed system of quotations from Soviet military historical sources, could begin to revise the entire previous history of the beginning of the war. And if Suvorov's evidence were subjected to verification, then the above pseudo-historical version could be refuted in the end. After all, if Stalin really intended to attack the West at a moment of his own choosing, then the reason he made the pact with Hitler in 1939 was not defensive, but part of an elaborate plan to end the European war of attrition politically, socially. and the economic destruction of the European powers.

Suvorov wrote military history and did not go deep into the study of documents available at that time in order to find out the political reasons for Stalin's war plan. But in reality this plan of war had to have, and had, a political foundation.

It is obvious that the authors of the policy of aggressive war were Stalin and his closest associates in the Kremlin. The path they followed was charted by Lenin, and it fell to their lot to put into practice the above-described scheme of war and the subsequent all-European revolution. We find reports of this in reliable sources from the Comintern. In addition to the fact that Stalin was a member of his presidium, the head of the Comintern, Georgy Dimitrov, was a frequent visitor to the Kremlin and was in regular contact with Stalin and with those representatives of his inner circle who personally transmitted the leader's decisions to political control bodies, and in in the case of Dimitrov, international political control. Long before Hitler attacked the USSR in June 1941

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Stalin and his inner circle planned the outcome of the European war exactly as Suvorov described it almost fifty years later: the destruction of the warring powers from within as a result of mass discontent (which the Red Army can encourage by force) arising from the war and its inevitable burdens. . He prepared the Red Army to go into action as soon as the expected civil conflict—repeating the internal unrest and revolutions in the warring countries in 1917 and 1918—erupted in Western Europe behind the fronts of the warring armies of both the Allies and Germany.

Suvorov only sketched out a sketch of this risky plan. But now we have received information about him from three independent sources, each of which confirms the words of others, each tells what he himself heard from the lips of the Kremlin leaders and from other high-ranking Soviet figures.

The information from the most detailed of these sources is simply ancient, by the standards of modern historiography. The most recent evidence (from the Comintern itself) supporting this plan came to light quite recently, thanks to the opening of access to the party archives of the former Eastern Bloc. Description of this terrifying plan of march on

West was made the leader of the Communist Party of Germany in exile in Moscow, a loyal Stalinist, close to the executive committee of the Comintern. The message of this leader, copied in February 1941 by another source who knew Stalin, outlined the possible and then assumed by the Kremlin consequences of a war raging in the West, in which the Soviet Union was not then directly involved.

Then, in February 1941, Walter Ulbricht, the German communist leader (later the builder of the infamous Berlin Wall), told his comrades in exile what he had just learned: possible scenarios planned by the Kremlin for ending the then ongoing war in Western Europe. . One of them was the insane undertaking of the world revolution, described above, supported by the Red Army. Obviously, this outcome was the most

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favorable in the eyes of the Kremlin, since it was the only one of all those proposed that brought the Soviet Union the closest to achieving the foreign policy goals of the Bolsheviks.

We do not know how long this plan was developed by Stalin and his Kremlin gang². It suggested that the Bolshevik agitators exploited the crisis of civil society within the warring powers. The Kremlin was counting on the Red Army, following the model of 1917-1922, to come to the aid of the warring proletariat (or perhaps the imaginary warring proletariat) and workers' and soldiers' revolutionary councils in the West. Revolutionary governments will be established throughout Europe. Lenin's plans for an international revolution as a consequence of the First World War will thus be carried out in the course of the Second World War.

In addition to the lack of a convincing documentary source for this political design, there is another possible flaw in Suvorov's evidence. This dramatic scenario, given the preconditions implied by the plan for the Red Army's march to the west, does not at all coincide with the wartime conditions that existed during the period when Stalin, according to Suvorov, planned to attack Hitler: July 6, 1941 d. The fact is that at that time Hitler, who had not yet attacked the Soviet Union (which he actually did on June 22), should have been at the zenith of his military power. It was occupied, but only on a few minor battlefields due to the ongoing war against Britain. Based on this, one can doubt the validity of a number of important arguments of Suvorov, especially in the sequence of military actions he proposed. But today the general plan for the Red military invasion of the West is well known on the basis of historical evidence. So there is no reason to doubt him, without a preliminary refutation of these testimonies. In any case, the two historical concepts, one establishing the Kremlin's political intent and the other its military implementation, must be considered separately. Su

the existence of the plan itself can today be regarded as a

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known thanks to the statements of its authors and their closest collaborators, although in the works of Suvorov it is not sufficiently substantiated³.

Today, the main military-historical aspect of Suvorov's arguments is confirmed by data that were not available to him at the time of writing *The Icebreaker*. And these data, obtained from the Soviet military archives and from other hitherto closed archives of the Eastern Bloc, deserve very close attention. It makes sense to cite the opinion of another Soviet military historian, V.I. Semidetko. Starting his research "Results of the Battle in Belorussia" about the behavior of the Soviet army in the early summer of 1941, he hardly imagined that he would come to the following: conclusions.

Semidetko, most likely, did not know anything about Suvorov's work at that time. But, publishing in the Soviet Military Historical Journal the results of his searches in the recently opened Soviet military archives, he came to the conclusion that the reason why the German army so easily

passed through the positions of the Red Army on the central front in Belorussia in June 1941 (where both armies, attacking and defending, had approximately equal strength), was that the position of the Red Army was attacking. "This discovery, is, of course, the main component of Suvorov's concept, formulated a few years earlier, explaining that very defeat. Suvorov then said that the Red Army was deployed to attack to the west and therefore was located outside the defensive positions abandoned from for the offensive doctrine of the Kremlin. Therefore, the Red Army was very vulnerable during the offensive of the Germans, who, forestalling Stalin, attacked first.

Other materials came into my hands, confirming the conclusions reached by Suvorov and Semidetko independently of each other (this independence is important in itself). One material is of Soviet diplomatic origin, completely independent of the military sources cited by Russian authors. The second, completely different source contains the same amazing information! It comes from the Czech archives, closed until recently to independent researchers.

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Before the German attack, Moscow received warnings of German military preparations on the western Soviet border (many of them of British and American origin, and one from the German German invasion. Today we can only guess what his goals were.

The Kremlin sent an emissary, a leading Soviet journalist (the source does not name him), to the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky. Maisky, acting no doubt on instructions from Moscow, had long pretended to be independent, flirted with many political groups and individuals throughout democratic London, passed on to the British various, probably soothing, messages from Stalin. We know that on June 15 Maisky had a very lengthy meeting with a very senior British Foreign Office official. There they persistently urged him to send urgent warnings to Moscow about the impending German attack. (The reader will remember how successful the British intercepts of German communications were then.) The evidence that the British diplomat presented this time clearly shook Maisky's belief in his own superior's claims for the first time! (The ambassador, who might have been recalled home to Moscow, certainly did not often question the words hailed as "the greatest genius of mankind.") After that, the British passed on to their allies as political intelligence a Stalinist message denying the possibility of a German attacks. Three days later, a message from Moscow was recorded by at least one of them, Karel Erban, an analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak National Committee (in exile), and handed over to the Czech leadership in London.

Erban reported that the Soviets were not afraid of the Germans, explaining the German concentration of forces on the Soviet borders as simply a test of the vigilance and readiness of a potential enemy. However, said the Moscow emissary, if necessary, they are ready to go to many political

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and economic concessions to buy off Hitler even with temporary effect. There was talk openly about allowing German military aid to be given to neutral Turkey (and hence hinting at what Berlin had long wanted: Turkey's entry, voluntary or forced, into the German camp). Such a move, quite possibly expected after Hitler's recent successful campaigns in the Balkans, will not arouse Moscow's objections. This meant Stalin's abandonment (at least temporarily) of traditional Russian interests in southeastern Europe, especially in Bulgaria and in the straits, interests that Stalin, with the help of Molotov, had recently sought to realize at the Soviet-German negotiations. in Berlin in November 1940, to the obvious disgust of Hitler.

Stalin probably imagined that this kind of German advance to the southwest would distract Hitler's attention from the Soviet borders for some time (and stretch the Wehrmacht forces far to the southwest, creating a vulnerable Balkan flank), which already partly happened during his Yugoslav, Greek and Cretan campaigns. (The rapid Soviet advance southward into Romania, which Suvorov considers necessary for Stalin's plan for the coming attack on Germany, would not only cut off Hitler's oil supply, but trap the German armies in the south and east, preventing them from returning to home front to meet the forthcoming main Soviet attack in a westerly direction, through the former Poland.)

The emissary reported that Stalin's plan to divert the forces of a potential Nazi enemy and delay, at the expense of Bulgaria, his advance directly to the east was also aimed at weakening both sides in the war, making sure that it lasted as long as possible. It is clear that if Hitler had accepted this bribe from Stalin, the British would have been further involved in the war in the Balkans and in the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet concessions in Turkey to lure the Germans to the southeast would have required Hitler to delay the attack until autumn. This is ozna

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There would be a delay, for climatic reasons, until next spring. This would give the Red Army a chance to start first - if indeed, as Suvorov believes, Stalin meant to attack! in 1941 (or even in

1942, according to another historian). One who reported from the Kremlin reported that there was so little fear of the Germans in Moscow that the Red Army had already occupied the offensive, not the defensive positions.

There is a lot of amazing information in this report, definitely unknown to the vast majority of researchers of the history of the Second World War and confirmed by other sources. This confirmation adds to the credibility of the source itself, which is thus a completely credible account of the amazing - and vulnerable - disposition of the Red Army in the week before the German attack on June 22, 1941.

Such data on the behavior of Soviet troops on the eve of Hitler's attack should certainly arouse new interest in Suvorov's controversial conclusions. Therefore, I consider it important to touch on Suvorov's work in more detail and I hope to explain why the majority of English-speaking readers interested in this war know nothing about his point of view.

In fact, Suvorov's conclusions were disputed in the English press by only one author, Professor of Tel Aviv University Gabriel Gorodetsky. The exchange of arguments between Suvorov and Gorodetsky took place for the first time as early as 1986 in the Journal of the British Royal Institute of Services [KOZP, a military periodical. Suvorov's concept was published outside Russian émigré circles only shortly before this exchange of views.

Having decided to publish Suvorov's article, the editors of the KOZT journal may have decided that its controversy requires a quick refutation. Editors sometimes use this technique to absolve themselves of responsibility for a particularly unusual publication, in this case potentially pro-German in a certain sense. After all, Hitler himself, as was said earlier, justified his attack

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The other thing about the Soviet Union was that it had to strike to the east before the Soviets struck to the west. And what could be less politically correct, then and now, than to agree even in anything with the Nazi Fuhrer, whom no one (among adults and mentally healthy) will regret.

Another explanation is also possible: Gorodetsky read Suvorov's article and offered his arguments to the editors as a refutation. By the way, Suvorov's arguments were disputed more than once on various grounds (for example, by the author of these lines, who wanted to know how the Kremlin's plan to strike to the west, following the expected internal collapse in the warring countries, could be appointed, according to Suvorov, on July 6, 1941, when Hitler was militarily strongest and his empire relatively obedient)²⁹. But the historian Gorodetsky did not then try to refute Suvorov's arguments, even his strange timing of the Soviet attack, using his own sources as opposed to Suvorov's military historical sources. Instead, he quoted diplomatic notes of Soviet origin, which, of course, were carefully selected and edited - and extremely unreliable. And he did not use any of his arguments to refute Suvorov's judgments about the Kremlin's political plan behind the military plans. So, Gorodetsky never really challenged Suvorov's claim that Stalin had, above all else, a political plan for marching west. He simply ignored the political aspect. It follows that, although some of Gorodetsky's diplomatic arguments are informative and interesting, he did not cross intellectual swords with Suvorov on any of his most important arguments. Gorodetsky, in his later writings on the same topic, did not show the slightest awareness of the existence of published documents indicating that there was a detailed political plan for the intervention of the Soviets in the situation in the West²¹.

In contrast to the almost complete silence of the English-speaking reviewers, which may have played a role in the belated

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the appearance of an English translation of Suvorov's book (five years after his article in the KOSI magazine), a German translation of *The Icebreaker*, published in 1989, the earliest book version of his research (with a slightly different subtitle, "Hitler in Stalin's Plans" [Nsheer ip ZaPp\$ Ka1Kki22]), received very serious reviews. Among the reviewers were two very knowledgeable scholars of the period, Alexander Fischer, professor at the University of Bonn (recently deceased, former member of an important parliamentary commission for the re-study of the German past), and Günter Gillessen, long-term historical editor of Germany's most prestigious newspaper, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. Professor Fisher, author of many books and collections of documents on diplomacy of the period, including Soviet diplomacy, found Suvorov's book bold—but not convincing. However, he tactfully refrained from making a final verdict, correctly observing that a real decision requires an examination of what the Soviet archives might reveal. The editor Gillessen described the book as too polemical and, echoing Fischer, not convincing enough, as based solely on circumstantial evidence³.

The reader who is familiar with the tragic modern history of Germany and understands what a huge responsibility is imposed by the need for a historical and legal explanation of events that burden the past of several generations of the German people will understand how careful German authors must be when evaluating historical works, that could somehow positively shed light on the actions of the former German Führer.

The essence of what might be called a tacit agreement between serious German writers is the assertion that attempts to reduce German responsibility for the war should not be taken lightly. It is necessary to avoid at all costs the method of reducing historical responsibility, which could lead to a too literal perception of Suvorov's arguments and reasoning close to them. The recent long, at times merciless, discussion in the German press about sources

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Hitler's criminal behavior (including attempts to find these sources outside of Germany), the so-called "battle of

there may be historical discussions in German society, tormented by guilt, reaching almost to spiritual self-destruction. From this point of view, one can consider the critical restraint of both German reviewers regarding the validity of Suvorov's arguments (which undoubtedly deserve considerable skepticism). Thus, in Germany, extreme caution, dictated by the terrible events of the German past, produced the same censoring effect that in English-speaking countries produced a clear lack of interest in revising this part of the past?⁵.

The very fact that the first translation of Suvorov's study appeared in Germany is important not only for historiography. The publication of Suvorov's work in German as a book indicates that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact plays a central role in the ongoing, albeit limited, German public discussions on the history of the Second World War. The publication of the book made it possible to rediscover a topic that was almost never discussed and seemed to be completely resolved thanks to the many years of domination (and in Germany too) of a single interpretation of the events of the beginning of the Second World War?⁵.

How could Hitler start the war he so desperately wanted in 1939 if the Soviet Union actively supported the countries on its western flank with military aid or at least military supplies and food, which blocked the German aggression? this one, directed to the east, to the Soviet Union? Even Hitler would most likely not have taken such a risk, having strong opponents from the West. But if this eternally risky adventurer had gone on a campaign anyway, it would have been a completely different war, different allies, different terms, and not those that we know.

Recently, a new book by Suvorov has appeared with new, carefully developed evidence for his arguments, and international discussion continues on topics related to

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going to his work. The evidence for his version is getting stronger. Therefore, these topics are being discussed more and more widely, although, oddly enough, so far outside the front pages of historical forums in English-speaking countries. The current discussion in Europe was stimulated by the appearance of Suvorov's first book in Poland and Russia?⁷. One could imagine the popularity of the Polish edition in post-communist, newly liberated Poland. After all, the Second World War is a central event in the recent history of Poland. The Poles were the first and ultimately the most unfortunate victims of the Soviet-Nazi alliance from 1939 to 1941. Half of their pre-war territory was taken over by Stalin, countless Polish citizens ended up in Stalin's and Hitler's camps (most of the many millions of Jews killed in German extermination camps were Polish citizens), from 1944 to 1989 they were prisoners of the tyrannical regime invented by Stalin and his friends for them - and intended for everyone and everyone whom the Red Army was able to drive into their camp. That the Poles have discovered a great deal of historical interest in their longest—for centuries—traditional tormentor, Russia, will not surprise anyone familiar with the history of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Russian edition of Suvorov's 1992 book *The Icebreaker* is especially important for discussing the fate of his ideas, as it clearly helped to bring the discussion of Stalin's supposed war plan to the center of the historical debate about Stalin and Stalinism in Russia today.

The Russian edition of Suvorov appeared only in 1992, and after that three articles on the same topic appeared in post-Soviet historical journals. The leading journal *Otechestvennaya Istoriya* published a Russian translation of an article by the German military historian Joachim Hoffmann "Preparation by the Soviet Union for an Offensive War in 1941"². Around the same time, a second article appeared in *Modern and Contemporary History*, "Did Stalin Prepare a Preemptive Strike Against Hitler in 1941?"²⁹. Its author, Colonel General Yu.A. Gorkov, considered the plan

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under the title "Considerations on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies", found some time before in the former Soviet archives. This plan, prepared in May 1941 by Army General (later Marshal) G.K. Zhukov, was published in brief form in the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, greedy for sensation.

Hoffmann's article is a study, completely independent of Suvorov's, proving that Stalin was going to attack the West in 1941. It appeared for the first time in 1991 in a collection of articles in German called "Two Ways to Moscow" [7ma Mere Mashu MozKai. Mot Ni0er-S{ÿÿÿ Raki tat «Oshcheshebtep Vafago\$za»jÿ1. Professor Gorodetsky was included in the same collection, sitting next to Hoffman in print, with the intention of refuting Suvorov (and reinforcing the impression that some editors fear lest historians who suspect Stalin of aggressive intentions might would remain alone and uncontested). Strange as it may seem, essentially the same article of his, with some additions, had been published two years earlier in the German historical journal *WezePaut\$Weye Gag HeyoessMe*. There Gorodetsky once again spoke about Suvorov and, just as passionately as in his previous attacks on him, undertook to crush Suvorov's assumption that Stalin had an offensive plan (this time calling it "the latest, most extreme and the most inaccurate description of those events")³². But again, the attack was directed at a Russian emigrant, and not at the closest neighbor in the Hoffman collection, whose article remained unmentioned.

Hoffman's work supports many of Suvorov's discoveries. But Gorodetsky clearly did not see it, except for a much earlier (1983) and less finished version. Gorodetsky again comes to his anti-Suvorov conclusions without considering any military historical sources of Hoffmann (in the last article, mainly German reports on interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war) and also without criticizing military historical sources,

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tirovannye Suvorov. Moreover, Gorodetsky wrote, apparently unaware of the long-published materials of the Kremlin's war plans³³. These plans (which, as noted above, Suvorov also omitted) have been widely available in English since 1954. Instead, Gorodetsky rejected the very idea that such thinking—not defensive—existed in the Kremlin, identifying it with the ideas that were created (by anti-Stalinists, presumably) "at the height of the Cold War."³⁴ And in an area where new historical sources and surprises appeared almost daily, he cited in support of his latest refutation of Suvorov only material published at least two years before the German publication of *Two Ways to Moscow*. And, relying on such a fragile base, Gorodetsky nevertheless declared "absurd" the assertion that Stalin planned an offensive in a westerly direction. Leaving a few recent reports calling into question the assumption that Stalin's political intentions from 1939 to 1941 were benevolent and Veteran historians V.I. Dashichev and M.I. Semiryaga, Gorodetsky came to the conclusion (wrong, as the reader already knows) that "there are absolutely no witnesses [testifying] about Stalin's intentions"³⁵.

Gorodetsky linked interest in Suvorov in Germany with an attempt to exonerate Germany. He stated that the book's popularity in Germany (as opposed to its practical obscurity in England, France and, he might add, the US) stemmed from covert neo-Nazi support for it. In fact, if Professor Gorodetsky followed the solid German bibliography in this area of research, he would know that German historical interest in the war on the Eastern Front (and in Eastern Europe in general, judging by German academic writings on Slavic themes (unlike, say, French) for many years was larger than anywhere else in Europe, if not for some other reason, then for understandable geographical reasons. So, the position of Gorodetsky as a historian is very

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strange. The researcher might be expected to be more devoted to the idea of an open exchange of opinions, rather than keeping them quiet. This fate, which befell the English-language publications of Suvorov, Gorodetsky indirectly welcomes⁵.

Colonel General Gorkov's article is interesting in that he denies that the plan for the Soviet attack on the West in May 1941 (which he himself publishes) was something more than just a counterattack plan, in view of the well-known German preparations for an attack on Soviet Union. While emphasizing the defensive nature of the Soviet war plan, Gorkov denies that the Soviets had an additional plan to seize territory after the planned thrust to the west, a thrust whose success would have taken them inside Germany, as far as Breslau and Danzig.

It is impossible to imagine that this additional Soviet plan did not exist. How could both sides have left the Red Army in its positions inside Germany after such initial military achievements - if Zhukovsky's plan had succeeded? Would the Red Army be left to simply occupy most of East Germany and what had previously been Nazi-occupied central or even western Poland? Should the Red Army, after a successful advance to the west, steadfastly hold on to the new line of defense,

a war of attrition against the Germans—a war backed by the Kremlin's enormous manpower and raw materials—until the German home front

will not collapse and the Red Army will not move west again, this time almost unhindered?

But even in the unlikely event that Stalin had in mind peace rather than international revolution, the Soviets would certainly need a military-political plan for a final, negotiated retreat from the front in central-eastern Europe to the Soviet borders, after after Hitler is defeated and peace reigns. The Red Army could not simply march several hundred miles into well-armed Nazi Germany, as suggested by Zhukov's plan, and

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then return to their original positions. What for? Somewhere, at some level, there must have been other plans with some political result of a successful invasion, provided for by the plan reported by Gorkov.

However, Gorkov shows no understanding that the military plan he is discussing could have anything to do with the Kremlin's plans for the time that follows the supposed success of the Western campaign. He also appears ignorant of Stalin's penchant for political adventurism, a penchant discussed even in Soviet historical publications (and elsewhere) by Gorkov's Russian colleagues Dashichev and Semiryaga (and a few others).

Gorkov's 1993 article is important nonetheless because, like the Russian edition of Hoffman's translation of the article, it placed the issue of Stalin's war plans right at the center of Russia's lively discussions of a key period in the Soviet past. Gorkov's work concerns both Suvorov and a number of journalistic articles in the Russian press about Stalin's military plans, and a "round table" on this topic, held in May 1992 in Moscow at the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation³ .

The third article, published in No. 1 of *Otechestvennaya Istoriya*, 1994, also focuses on Suvorov. The purpose of the author is obvious: to present mainly the opinions of numerous German critics of Hoffmann and Suvorov (ignoring, like almost all other such authors, post-Soviet historians who prove Stalin's aggressive intentions). But the author, A.I. Boroznyak nevertheless notes that some of the critics, such as Professor Fischer, argue that the issue cannot be resolved until the Soviet archives, many of which are still closed to independent researchers today for obvious political reasons, are carefully researched. Recently, the same "National History" published several articles

Russian historians who were allowed into archives open to independent researchers, while

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The Central Presidential Archive is not available. The essence of the findings of three of them is that the Soviet military doctrine encouraged "imperialist" wars and that Stalin radically changed the direction of Soviet propaganda in the winter of 1941 (when Walter Ulbricht broke news to German party comrades about possible support by the Red Army of the revolution in the West): from condemning all "imperialist" wars to supporting offensive wars?.

Discussion of Stalin's role in unleashing the war is now going on both in the West and in the East, although some historians are determined to interrupt this discussion, calling it "absurd" to challenge the traditional vision of Stalin's plans as peace-loving. A discussion of Suvorov's and other researchers' arguments about Stalin's aggressive plans should, in the coming years, help bring this topic back into the mainstream of world scientific debate. Their place there is especially given the tendency of some post-Soviet historians, as well as Stalin's defenders in the West, to preemptively dismiss his responsibility for the misfortunes of World War II.

The time has come for conscientious historical discussions based on open access to the archives and leading to an honest understanding of the Soviet past and the Soviet policy that led the USSR to disaster both domestically and internationally. This is especially important given the tendency of the current Russian government to use military solutions to crises and shamelessly use threats, both with weaker neighbors and even with the United States.

Translation from English by Misha Shauli.

Notes

1 A brief review of Suvorov's book was written, together with a review of D. Watt's book (see in the text and in footnote 2) and other books of the same time, in *Mu Wat Kemem o' Booz*, October 12, 1989, 11 - 16 by Retired Professor Gordon Craig of Stanford University. But Craig was writing for the American reader about the German edition—the English edition had not yet been published. Craig, who worked for many years in the field of German history, but did little to advise

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Stalinist or Eastern European themes, both military and otherwise, of the Stalinist period, considered Suvorov's arguments insufficient. Craig expressed the opinion that if Stalin was really going to attack in a westerly direction in 1941, as Suvorov believes, then Western military attachés and diplomats in Moscow would have been told about it. He did not find "any record of this in the documents of foreign embassies or in the reports of their military attachés." Even if we assume that Craig rummaged through documents and reports in many relevant archives, he must have had Western documents and reports in mind, since in 1989 many archives of the former Eastern Bloc were not yet open to Western and other independent researchers. Moreover, a researcher who has worked with Western diplomatic documents from Moscow should know that in Stalin's paranoid secretive state, foreign diplomats and military observers could not move freely around the Soviet Union, and especially its newly occupied western border regions, to make your observations. Many Western diplomats have mentioned these distressing circumstances in their reports. Therefore, this argument against Suvorov is hardly effective.

2 New York, 1989.

3 See Aa Seoge Vesch, Soebey\$ (translated from German, New York), entry in Goebbels' diary of June 16, 1941. In February 1945, Hitler repeated that Stalin was going to attack in the western

direction. See 4/an ViPosk, Hsheur ana byte (translated from English, Berlin, 1991), 55. 924-26, 939, 941.

4 Many authors appear to have seized the commercial opportunity presented by the fiftieth anniversary of the war in 1989 to write books about 1939. When the whirlwind of disclosures broke out in early 1988 in the USSR, and shortly thereafter in the rest of the Eastern Bloc, they apparently did not know what was happening there, or were bound by treaties or other obligations that forced them to complete the work. to the anniversary of the end of the war (i.e., almost by 1989). New materials, vital for understanding the history of the origin of the war, were left out of consideration.

For the leaders of Western diplomacy leading a campaign of faith in Stalin's defensive intentions, see A.S. Kaask, bait Atue io she Mezi, 1938-1945.

5 Obseguer, May 5, 1990, 30. The book was ignored by the main academic and special (engaged in Slavonic studies) journals. In the US, there were reviews in only two relatively obscure military journals. In both cases, the reviewers rejected Suvorov's arguments: one very emphatically (Tie Loigi ou more! Miyagu 5shaies, 4[1991]:195-97); the second review was brief, in Ai Rogs Mawagta 7[1991]:55. The reviewer /5M5 wrote that the German military documents did not support Suvorov's conclusions that the Soviets were unprepared, and that Stalin rejected Zhukovsky's plan for a pre-emptive strike. See footnote 26 for a discussion of the work of the German

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military historian Joachim Hoffmann, whose arguments partially support Suvorov on the basis of the same German sources. See also the discussion of Zhukovsky's plan in the text. In Britain, the book was not reviewed in the two most important academic journals specializing in Slavonic studies.

6 Igor Lukes successfully refuted in several articles the notion that Stalin wanted to provide the Czechoslovaks with serious military assistance in 1938. See articles by Lukes "Did Stalin Want War in 1938? A New Look at Soviet Behavior During the May and September Crises", Piriotasu apă 5ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, 2 (1991): 2 — 53; and "Vepeseh, Staÿp opa Fe Kotipzhegp 1938/1939. Mot Mipshepeg ABKottep hit Niyeg-8(ÿÿp Raki», Yeneriteyeye ÿig Geiseÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, Le. 1993, Ney 3, 325 - 353.

7 Gorbachev in Pravda, November 3, 1987. What follows is a small but representative selection of works by both popular and academic authors who support the view of Stalin on the defensive. Not all authors agree with each other on all the details of the above version. But the essence, i.e. that Stalin's intentions in 1939 were defensive is present everywhere, explicitly or hinted at. See J/sizgoi 5. Crysci, "T'e Safepie Zyugt" ip T'e Sesopa Moga Mag, I (Bosyon, 1948), 391-94; Atpo4 J. ana Vegopisa TopBee, e4z., "Te Eue oE Mat, 1939" Aigs 10 (Gondon, 1958): 23, 25, 504; A. JR. Tauiog, Tÿe Orioijs oÿ ÿe Sesopa Mota Mag (Me\ Yorgk, 1968),

163 - 64, 241, 261, 263, 267, 278; R.S. Paradise, No Mag Sachet. Tÿe ÿttefÿÿÿÿÿÿ Orioijs oÿ ÿÿ Zesop4 Moga Mag (G.opdop, 1989), 112 - 113, 117 - 119, 369 - 370, 372 - 373; Paeg Sausogyessi, Siu lipi apa Loip Ruysiaga, Toya Mag. Tÿe ÿÿÿÿÿÿ ÿpa ÿÿÿÿÿ ÿÿ ÿÿ ÿÿÿÿÿÿ \oya Mag (Sesopa ÿ4. Nagtsuogÿÿ, 1989), 71, 96 - 100, 106; Negapp @tapi, ÿÿgorÿÿ \es ip ep Kiee. Nsheg ap fe Mace 1939 (Mipÿsÿ, 1990), 251. Contrasting with the above authors, Yateÿ E. Masÿetu (Zap, NSheg apa Eÿshgore. Tÿe ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ ÿÿ Mota Mag P, 1933 — 1939, vo1. P (Tseuea pa, 1970)) paid due attention to Soviet sources that existed at the time he wrote, but nonetheless optimistically concluded (long before the recent discovery of sources and archives of the former Eastern Bloc) that "it is relatively easy to formulate a clear picture of Soviet foreign policy in 1938 and 1939. More recently, the presence of defensive intentions

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19 YUog Siuogou, "Ho ŷŷŷŷ ŷŷappŷpo ŷŷ ANASK Mot ŷn Lshe 1941, ŷŷr og Sŷŷŷŷ?" BOI Toigpa|, (Tape 1985): 50 - 55; Sogoaevka, IYa., Lshe 1986, 69-72; and again, 5uogou, "Uez, Sŷŷŷŷ Uaz ŷŷappŷpo ŷŷ Ayask Niyeg ip Lshe 1941", 1ŷŷ., 73-74.

20 At a conference in the Italian resort of Bellagio to commemorate the anniversary of the German attack, at least four historians touched directly on the subject, but only two spoke of Stalin's plan for an attack on the west —and both rejected the idea. The German Gerd Überschar (Cega OeBegschar) spoke of "Herr's Resistiop io Ayask ŷe Souieŷ Chiyup ŷp Vesepŷ Segtap Nŷŷŷogpoogaru" (published in Sole Otop 18 [1991]: 297-316). He cited Suvorov's articles in the journal KO8I, the book by Suvorov and Hoffman (for the latter, see footnote 18) and criticized the arguments of both. Alexander Dallin's report (Alexander Yuashn) was entitled "Stalin and the German Invasion" (published in the same issue of Soviet Otop 18, 19-37). Dallin observed that "the notion of a possible Soviet attack on Germany in 1941 (or 1942) is absurd ... a completely untenable hypothesis" (ibid., 20). He cites Suvorov's articles, but not Hoffman's book or article. Dallin called Gorodetsky's article in Wegner's collection (see footnote 21) "a masterful refutation" (ibid.). He did not say anything about arguments and evidence in favor of his assertion. Karl Drexler (Kai Yuteszher), a historian from the former East Germany, in his report Segtapu apa From Ai Pez apa ŷe Mag acaipsi ŷŷŷŷŷŷŷ Otop, 1940-1942" (ibid., 39-58) did not address this problem, obviously important to the subject of his work. So did the British scientist Jonathan Gaslam (see footnote 7).

21 Sane Sogodezku, "Sialŷn un hn scherz Anopy aiYo Che Soujespop", ip \eneoper, 347-366.

22 Bayoan, 1989.

23 Eŷŷŷŷŷŷr ŷn Paz ŷŷŷŷogŷŷŷŷ-roŷŷŷŷŷe Visŷe, 1989, 117; Schezzen ip "Roiissŷe Vŷszheg", EA, 27 Arpi 1989.

24 See the discussion in C'apes \$. Maleg, Tŷe Optasete4 Raŷŷ (Satbgiyoye, Maz\$, 1988).

25 There is no research material in the book Empsi ThorizsV, \$(ŷŷŷŷŷ Mag: A Vaissa! Mech Teogu op ŷŷ Opoipŷ oŷ She Zesop Moga Mag (translated from German, London, 1984), which contains early versions of theses similar to those of Suvorov, there is no research material, based on military documentation or on other sources that can convince the author of these lines that it presents something more than a hypothesis.

26 The apparent self-censorship of German historians writing on this subject, and harming historical research, is described by Günther Gillessen in a review of Joachim Hoffmann's book Stalin's War of Annihilation (see footnote 12) as "linked to political interests and manifested in the voluntary denial of professional knowledge".

27 Godfatas? (Warsaw, 1991) and Icebreaker (Moscow, 1992).

28 Issue 4/1993, 19-31, published a translation from the German of this article from Wegner, 367-388.

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29 Issue 3/1993, 29-45. An excerpt from a 1970 book by two German authors who wrote at a time when important materials were not yet known, and who rejected the version that Hitler was forced to start a preventive war. It seemed to me that the editors of the magazine really wanted to publish anything they wanted to refute this VIEW.

30 "Sehyko\us Apotŷ rap", Reg Priese, 24/1991, 148

31 See footnote 15. The collection was recently published in English.

32 Wegner's Miscellany, footnote 1. In the same Wegner Miscellany, Gorodetsky also attacks Hoffmann's article from 1983 ("Reg Boge Artee Ys KneosBesti 1941", in Horst Boog et al., Pa; , GU [Sijjoagÿ, 1983], 56-75) as "having no substantial evidence."

33 See footnote 11.

34 An article by Gorodetsky under a heading similar to that which appeared in Wegner's collection, "Sciane na nsheerz apo au fe Sokheiniop. Yeshe A iÿeÿpapÿegÿeÿghipo tÿÿ deg Gesepÿe wat aeÿÿÿsÿep RgaeuetanuzsShas", ip WetsePargveye g Heyseÿsÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ, Yo. 37 (1989): 645 - 72. Attribution of guilt to Gorodetsky on the basis of chronological commonality - in Wegner's collection, footnote 13.

35 and I. Razysey, "Oer Rakÿ deg Beÿÿep Vapanÿÿep", and "Sÿÿÿp Va dep Kies semo", in Ayÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ Megki/ City ip Y'ey 21 and 28 April 1989; and M.I. Semiryaga, "September 17, 1939," Soviet Slavonic Studies, 5 (1990): 14, and "The Soviet Union and the Pre-War Political Crisis," Questions of History 9 (1990): 54-61. Two well-known American scholars, Robert Conquest (Kobe Condsei) and Robert Tucker (Kobe S. TisKer), also skeptical of Stalin's supposed defensive plans, were, like Hoffman, sharply attacked in a magazine article (p. 646, footnote 3, p. 658, footnote 40). Gorodetsky claims that the notion that Stalin had expansionist plans and that he was going to take over Central and Eastern Europe is long outdated (Wegner Miscellany, p. 363, footnote 13). In 1977, Tucker expressed the opinion that Stalin's territorial plans for international Bolshevism date back to Lenin. See "Te Etegoepse oÿ \$ÿÿn'ÿ Eogreyn Roysu", unbass Keuyeu, 36 [1977]: 588-589.

36 In an article published in a journal (footnote 34, pp. 645-648), Gorodetsky clearly rejoices in Suvorov's obscurity in English-speaking countries (p. 646); Gorodetsky outrageously links Suvorov's popularity with the "revisionist" part of the participants in the "battle of the historians" in Germany (ibid., 645-646). It seems quite obvious that historians should extract the facts, write them down, and critically examine the arguments based on them, without attributing "politically incorrect" motives to those with whom they intellectually disagree.

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37 Gorkov, p. 29.

38 "June 22, 1941: a view from the other side," in issue 1/1994, 148-156. The author Boroznyak, who openly admires the fact that the Germans (at least some) so want to justify Stalin (and the Russians), clearly does not understand that some German critics of Hitler's idea of a preventive war are making the same fatal mistake as American "revisionist" historians writing about the Cold War: they are trying to unravel Stalin's plans by studying only their own archives. But this is obviously a vicious method, although its inevitably detrimental results have not prevented their publishers from selling many books.

39 See issue 1/1995, L.N. Nezhinsky and I.A. Chelyshev, "On the Doctrinal Foundations of Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War", 3-27, and in issue 2/1995, V.A. Nevezhin, "Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 and an apology for an offensive war", 54-69, and M.I. Meltyukhov, "Ideological documents of May-June 1941 on the events of the Second World War", 70-85.

Jahangir Najafov:

KACG. GORODETSKII REJECTS V. Suvorov, OR A REMAKE OF "FALSIFFERS OF HISTORY" (1948)

1. "VITAL OBJECTIVE"

The book of the Israeli historian G. Gorodetsky "The Myth of the Icebreaker!" attracted my attention in connection with the work on the subject of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. Representing, according to the author, the "crown" of his fifteen years of efforts to study international relations in 1939-1941 (p. 4)². With a promise to say a non-trivial word in the historiography of the Second World War. And what is remarkable: the events described are considered from the angle of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, but the actual basis of the book is British archival materials and literature. With a noticeable shortage of sources of the Soviet and post-Soviet times, even official editions of documents.

The coverage of the issues that form the theme of the Soviet-German pact - the subject of my research interest - is narrowed down in The Myth of the Icebreaker to the limit, as was practiced in Soviet historiography. We have to recall the facts and documents omitted by its author.

| Najafov Jahangir Hussein-Ogly — Leading Research Fellow-Consultant of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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Oddities of the Icebreaker Myth? are due to its purpose to substantiate a special historical vision of the Second World War. Rejecting the idea of the book "Icebreaker" by V. Suvorov — that the Stalinist Soviet Union expected to use the anti-Western aggressive potential of Germany to undermine European capitalism", G. Gorodetsky hastily, without due attention to the causal relationships of events, passes to the peculiarly interpreted circumstances of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Behind the individual "actual events" with which he operates, global phenomena are not visible, the historical process as such disappears.

G. Gorodetsky tries to achieve his goal in two ways:

First, by ignoring the prerequisites and underlying causes of the general conflict on the grounds that this leads "far away from the actual events that led to the war in the East" (p. 13). The search for historical truth within the framework of the diplomatic aspect of the topic is opposed to painstaking work to identify the "theoretical foundations and ideological roots" of the world war (ibid.), of which the Eastern Front was an integral part. The kind of work that V. Suvorov decided to do. In general, the entire exposition is based on the antithesis of the world and Soviet-German wars. As a result, the official Soviet concept is actually reanimated, which reduces the essence of the world war primarily to a military confrontation between socialism and capitalism.

Secondly, the assertion that during the critical period of the unleashing of the world war, the only concern of the Stalinist leadership was "to defend the Russian revolution" (p. 47). I.V. Stalin is credited with the dubious honor of being the conductor of a foreign policy that "was dictated by national interests, and not by principles or moral factors, like the policies of his Western partners" (p. 57. *My italics.*). The preference given to the foreign policy of the Stalinist Soviet Union is reinforced by doubts that the Western slogan

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"destruction of Nazism" reflected the true goals of England in the war (p. 86). Recalls the characterization of this slogan as "criminal stupidity", voiced by V.M. Molotov during the years of Soviet-German cooperation". Although later the Soviet Union acceded to the F. Roosevelt-W. Churchill Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, with its demand for "the final destruction of Nazi tyranny"^b. The question also arises: was it possible to effectively defend the national interests of the Soviet Union, discarding both principles and morality?

In the author's scheme, Comrade Stalin is assigned the role of an extra at the stage of both preparation and unleashing of a general armed conflict. Consideration of the system of world coordinates of the Stalinist leadership is replaced by a bold assertion that "from the very beginning, Soviet foreign policy was characterized by a gradual but consistent transition from open hostility towards capitalist countries to peaceful coexistence with them, based on mutual personal benefit" (p. 33. *My italics.*). In this case, it is not clear why the Soviet leaders, more than twenty years after the October Revolution, continued to consider themselves in a "hostile capitalist environment" and why the outside world did not notice this transformation, still seeing the USSR as a threat to itself. It is also unclear how to regard such Leninist-Stalinist definitions, which served to characterize the place and role of the Soviet state in the system of international relations, as the incompatibility of the long-term coexistence of the "two systems" and the regularity of the permanent aggravation of the "ideological struggle" between them. It was as if there was no total confrontation between Soviet socialism and Western democracy that had been growing for decades, which reached its climax in the Cold War and led to the collapse of the Soviet communist empire and the collapse of the USSR itself."

It is not surprising that G. Gorodetsky is not limited to the proclaimed goal - the refutation (as it seems to him) of the "Icebreaker" by V. Suvorov. Israeli historian

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parries—and this he emphasizes every now and then—key provisions in the works of "most historians," and even more often, of all "other historians" (pp. 3, 12, 45, 50-51, 94, 98, etc.). Therefore, in interpreting the political and diplomatic events on the eve of the World War, V. Suvorov most often finds himself together with "other historians", while G. Gorodetsky is against it.

The author of the "Myth of the Icebreaker" is disliked by the works of Russian historians, who in recent years have paid great attention to the problem of the origin of the Second World War and its initial stage. However, he believes, this has only led to the fact that "the former" blank spots "are now filled with a set of lies, tendentious collections of facts that the public tends to accept as true" (p. 3). Therefore, G. Gorodetsky considered it "his vital task" to give such a description of the critical events of 1939-1941, so that the Russian reader would get "the opportunity to navigate in all the variety of facts of the past, to see them exactly as they were." ... "(p. 4. *My italics.*). All this, mind you, is about the period of Gorbachev's perestroika and the first years of the existence of democratic Russia, when domestic scholars got the opportunity to rethink the heritage of historiography, forced for decades to serve the needs of a totalitarian system.

He reinforces his vision of the fateful changes that have taken place in our country — for an Israeli historian this is a "time of troubles" — he recommends not to abandon the "Soviet period", not to oppose the historical experience of the Soviet Union with the archaic of pre-revolutionary Russia (p. 18). He also calls on our historians not to disturb the memory of those who died in the war with Nazi Germany, to close for the time being (it is not specified until when) the topic of Soviet foreign policy of the period under consideration (p. 3). As we see, G. Gorodetsky does not deny himself this occupation. Such an understanding of the purpose of his book does not fit well with the proclaimed readiness to be guided by the principle of objectivity, and not by political or ideological interests.

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Thus, the "Myth of the Icebreaker" was conceived and implemented with the Russian reader in mind. The participants in the action are, on the one hand, our public, which tends to accept "a set of lies" and "tendentiously selected facts" as truth, and, on the other hand, a historian-educator, a guru in his field.

At the same time, the abundance of inconsistencies and inconsistencies in the text of the book leaves a lasting impression of the English *yyyyyyyy yyyyy*?: the formation of ideas based not on objective analysis, but in accordance with one's own preferences. Before us, at best, is a version of Anglo-Soviet relations, that is, a fragment of international relations in 1939-1941, outside the diversity of the historical process.

Be that as it may, “The myth of the Icebreaker did not produce the effect that its author had hoped for. More than once I have heard and read opinions that the book of an Israeli historian is in no way a refutation of V. Suvorov’s Icebreaker. To refute his work, says one of his fellow historians, it is necessary to prove the inconsistency of hundreds and hundreds of facts he cites. According to some evidence, on one of his visits to Moscow, G. Gorodetsky expressed dissatisfaction with the way his book was being distributed - not as widely as the work of V. Suvorov. Apparently, therefore, he continued his criticism, reissuing under a different title, in fact, the same opus, which did not add credibility to his position. Moreover, the oddities of the first book migrated to the second*.

Finally, the most amazing. Imagine, *The Myth of the Icebreaker* frankly defends the provisions of the 1948 pamphlet *Falsifiers of History*, a memorable propaganda product of the escalating Cold War. Provisions on the purely defensive pre-war foreign policy of the Soviet Union, on its invariable commitment to collective security, on the Western policy of provocative inciting Germany against the Soviet Union, on the double game of the Western powers in Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, on the international isolation of the USSR on the eve of the world war that forced

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him to go to a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany and so on. Before us is the printed legacy of an official publication that for many years imposed Stalin's foreign policy guidelines on Soviet historians. This is how G. Gorodetsky realizes his call not to abandon the "Soviet period".

But did he manage to expose the author of *The Icebreaker* and at the same time refute the works of "other historians"? To reinforce the theses of Soviet historiography controlled by the authorities on the role of the USSR on the eve of and with the outbreak of World War II? What is the outcome of the challenge to virtually the entire community of historians to revise the critical version of the pre-war foreign policy of the Stalinist Soviet Union, established in world historiography, critical for its role in unleashing the world war? And isn't this the reason for the original techniques and style used in *The Myth of the Icebreaker*?

2. "IGNORED" V. Suvorov

G. Gorodetsky, who calls himself a professional historian, allows himself perplexing accusations against V. Suvorov and his book.

Based on his own ideas about the criteria of scientificity, he characterizes V. Suvorov as the author of "absurd", "ignorant writings"; not a serious historian, but an "amateur" and "intelligence officer", showing "promiscuity in means"; the author, whose "free handling" with sources "became his trademark", who does not burden himself with evidence, resorting to "clumsy arguments", "absurd" and "absolutely ridiculous" statements; "defector", "defector", "traitor", "small fry" in the GRU, a morally unscrupulous person, etc. (p. 4, 9, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 34, 48, 71, etc.).

V. Suvorov, who uses exclusively open materials, is accused of writing in the “thriving genre of conspiratorial psychology” (p. 15). In out

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according to G. Gorodetsky, this is due to Russia's transition from totalitarianism to democracy, when "the conspiracy theory, being exceptionally attractive to the inhabitants, promotes myths, deliberately and persistently hides the truth, simplifying difficult situations" (ibid.). According to this classification, the Soviet-German pact fell into the category of "fundamental myths" (ibid.). However, it seems that the accusation of "conspiratorial psychology" is just a pretext to avoid considering such an issue as the international strategy of the Stalinist Soviet Union, programmed by its socio-political system.

V. Suvorov's book is credited with having a negative impact on nationalistic feelings, in particular, indulging Polish nationalism and even rehabilitating Nazism (pp. 8–9). Moreover, its goals, it turns out, were "above all" to "undermine the process of détente" (p. 9), "ignite the 'war psychosis' and warn public opinion in the West against resuming détente" (p. 15). Does this mean that V. Suvorov managed to "undermine" international détente, and then switch to preventing its "resumption"?!

Despite the promise in the introduction not to "cross swords with Suvorov" anymore, but "only to give an alternative interpretation of events" (p. 28), G. Gorodetsky enriched his research tools by constantly, up to the conclusion, mentioning his name: discrediting the given name is intended to serve as the final, exhaustive argument in the system of his proofs.

The burden of derogatory assessments of the personality of V. Suvorov and his book weighs heavily on the Israeli historian. Otherwise, one cannot understand why he resorts to methods that are not accepted in the scientific community. You can read about two examples of this kind at once on the same page of the "Controversy" section that opens his book.

G. Gorodetsky writes: "The statement that Nazi Germany 'has more reason to be considered neutral in 1939-1940' is absurd" (p. 10). We open the 48th page of the Icebreaker indicated by him

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V. Suvorov, which provides an argument - among others - against the official thesis of Soviet neutrality in these years. When through threats and violence—a joint attack with Germany on Poland, a "winter war" with Finland, ultimatums to the Baltic states and Romania—the Soviet Union annexed a number of states and territories along its western borders.

In this so-called pre-war period, we read from V. Suvorov, the Red Army suffered more losses in battles than the German army in battles in Western Europe. Which was the basis for him to conclude: "Judging by the losses, Germany had more reason to be considered neutral in 1939-1940." The critic V. Suvorov omitted the words I have italicized.

Whether intentionally or not, it doesn't matter, G. Gorodetsky avoids raising the question of whether the Soviet Union, given its partnership with Nazi Germany in 1939-1941 and its military actions against neighboring countries, can be considered a neutral country. For V. Suvorov, as well as for "other historians", these are significant events inscribed in the annals of the world war. For the Israeli historian advocating for giving priority to "actual events", there is no such question.

Second example: "It is also unfounded to claim that the head of the Soviet military intelligence, General Golikov, was not punished by Stalin for belittling the data on the build-up of the German armed forces on June 21, since he reported the truth to Stalin. Hitler really did not prepare for a war against the Soviet Union." Not so again. V. Suvorov has no mention of 21 June on page 312 (G. Gorodetsky refers to it). It refers to an earlier period when Soviet intelligence tried to judge preparations for war against the Soviet Union by whether the German army was preparing for a military campaign in the conditions of the Russian winter:

whether the Germans stock up on winter equipment and whether they conduct appropriate military-technical training.

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In the light of this accusation against V. Suvorov, it is amusing to read in the "Myth of the Icebreaker" the author's commentary on Hitler's order in July 1940 on preparing an attack on the USSR. Referring to the fact that this order was oral, he concludes: "The attack on Russia should not therefore be considered a pre-decided issue because it took place" (p. 98). The reader is clearly forced to think that the whole thing was in the emerging (it is not clear how) circumstances: the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union could not have taken place, and even the configuration of the participants in the world war could have looked different. For this, wordings such as: "a confused international situation" (p. 22), London and Moscow are "potential enemies" (ch. 4), the "mystery" of Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union (p. 94), there are no "concrete documents - evidence of connection" between the ideology and politics of Hitler and Stalin (p. 94), historians "underestimate the complexity of the strategic and political situation" (p. 98), etc.

In search of evidence, G. Gorodetsky questions the usefulness of V. Suvorov's book on the grounds that it uses exclusively open sources accessible to all (pp. 14, 17, 28, 116). But one should pay tribute to the one who managed to process such an array of historical material that envious critics of The Icebreaker express doubts about the ability of one person to do such a wonderful job. Unless, they say, he succeeded with the help of people from the British intelligence services. V. Suvorov's book clearly proves that no archival materials, for all their value, can cancel the historical events that have already taken place, as well as their refraction in the official documents of their time. Meanwhile, the text of the "Myth of the Icebreaker" just lacks such documents in order, in the language of its author, to see the events he describes "exactly as they were" and "not to judge them from the standpoint of today" (with 4, 12).

G. Gorodetsky opposes the book of V. Suvorov with his narrative as based on many sources, emphasizing the importance of archival documents. One

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In one of the anti-Suvorov articles, he writes that he "carefully" studied the materials of the most important Russian archives: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff, the Intelligence Directorate and the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. In the summer of 2005, while in the Department for Supporting the Activities of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (in order to find out about the answer to his request), when mentioning the name of G. Gorodetsky, it was stated that he had never worked in their archive.

Another very, very strange statement by an Israeli historian. In his interpretation, V. Suvorov "depicted the Soviet Union not as a victim, but as the culprit of the war", arguing that "in June 1941, Stalin was ready for a surprise attack on Nazi Germany, and Hitler only got ahead of him" (p. 7). There is a clear substitution of one question - about responsibility for the Second World War by another - about the circumstances of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. It is amazing how the critics of V. Suvorov do not see point-blank the main meaning of his book, replacing the question about the concept of the book, reflected in the expansion of the title of the book - "Who unleashed the Second World War?", Secondary, derived from the first question - whether Stalin was preparing an attack on Hitler in June 1941. The same with the sequel to Icebreaker, M-Day, subtitled When World War II Started. The essence of both books is to prove that Stalin, like Hitler, is also responsible for starting a world war. Here one can only argue about the degree of guilt of each of the dictators. Stalin had an auxiliary role compared to Hitler. The role is inflammatory, provocative, which, as we will see later, Stalin himself took credit for.

Undoubtedly, the outbreak of the World War in September 1939 and the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 are interrelated events: if there had been no world war, there would have been no Hitler attack. But I repeat: the main idea of "Icebreaker" (as well as its continuation "M Day") is that one's share of responsibility for

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the Stalinist Soviet Union is also carrying the world war. To me personally, the dispute with V. Suvorov of his critics seems unproductive, since it boils down to the timing of the start of the war between the USSR and Germany - in 1941 or a little later. And no one disputes that an attack, ahead of the enemy, is the best means of defense.

It seems that it makes no sense to list all the oddities of the Icebreaker Myth. They are due to the very purpose of its author, otherwise unattainable. Let us further note only those historical plots when what could be considered a banal mistake (with whom this does not happen) is used by the author as an argument to justify his case.

3. "RUSSIA UNDER SIEGE"

Stalin's theses of the pamphlet "Falsifiers of History" found a clear continuation in the interpretation of G. Gorodetsky's pre-war course of Soviet foreign policy. The content of the section of his book "Russia under siege" (pp. 45-47), where it is presented most prominently, closely echoes the third chapter of the pamphlet "Isolation of the Soviet Union. Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact"².

The materials of Stalin's archival fund that became available to researchers confirmed that he was at the same time the customer, co-author and editor of The Falsifiers of History. His hand made inserts, the most significant of which is the justification of the conclusion of the pact with Hitler by the hostility of the countries of the democratic West!³.

As is known, this pamphlet was prepared in opposition to the Western publication of archival documents of the German Foreign Ministry under the title "Nazi-Soviet Relations in 1939-1941", in order to refute the conclusion that the pact on non-aggression between Germany and the USSR had an anti-Western orientation." The veracity of the pamphlet can be judged by the fact that it does not contain even a hint of a secret supplementary agreement signed simultaneously with the pact.

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a protocol revealing the background of the Soviet-German agreement. (G. Gorodetsky, in his own way, bypasses this moment, unacceptable for his historical construction, but more on that later.) Not without reason, after Stalin's death, few Soviet historians dared to refer to the "Falsifiers of History". G. Gorodetsky, on the contrary, took advantage of Stalin's developments, forgetting about the promise to say something fresh about the policy of the "Kremlin mountaineer".

Hence the provisions of the "Myth of the Icebreaker" about the strictly defensive nature of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, when even calls for a revolutionary war "had an exclusively defensive sound" (pp. 15, 25, 95), about following the national interests of the Stalinist leadership country (p. 19), about the threat posed to the Soviet Union by all capitalist states without exception (p. 46-47), about the fact that, having concluded a pact with Hitler, "Stalin made a choice in favor of the lesser of two evils" (p. 61), etc. itn. All this is covered up with an absolutely unsubstantiated message that the restoration of the whole truth about the Second World War, including the disclosure of the far from unambiguous role of Stalin's pre-war foreign policy, allegedly leads to the whitewashing of German Nazism and its aggression.

How, then, are proven (and are proven) as old as the world of the provisions of the "Falsifiers of History"? Or, to put it another way, why does G. Gorodetsky, unlike "other historians," believe that "Soviet policy was in no way determined by expansionist considerations?

zhenii" (p. 46)? Why does he deny Stalin's Soviet Union the right to an active, offensive anti-capitalist strategy?

In the mentioned section "Russia under siege" we read: "A clear and consistent policy, with minor tactical deviations, was based on the awareness of the potential danger posed by the entire capitalist world, be it fascist Germany or Western democracies. Striving for a balance in relations with the powers that is so alien to Marxist theory, which rejects the idea of supporting one capitalist power

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On the other hand, Stalin sought to defend the Russian revolution. At first by cooperating with Weimar Germany, and with the advent of Hitler to power, through collective security" (pp. 46-47. My italics.).

Indeed, Stalin cannot be denied the certainty of his pre-war foreign policy, which was truly "clear and consistent", but the pursuit of an expansionist imperial class course. Yes, both "aggressive powers" and "so-called democratic states" were equally alien to him (using the definitions from the "Short Course in the History of the CPSU (b)", repeated in Stalin's report at the party congress in March 1939). That is why the Marxist theory mentioned by the author, which saw the cause of world wars in "inter-imperialist contradictions", excluded a long-term orientation towards any of the hostile groups that had been formed since the mid-1930s - the fascist militaristic Axis states and the states of the democratic West. In the alternate participation of the Soviet Union in the course of the World War in both capitalist coalitions, G. Gorodetsky, apparently, sees a manifestation of "a desire for balance in relations with the powers". But the Soviet leaders saw in this "balancing" the manifestation of "the wise Stalinist foreign policy", thanks to which, in their words, it was possible, both in the pre-war and during the war years, to "correctly use the contradictions within the camp of imperialism"¹⁵.

The distinction made by the author of The Icebreaker Myth between world capitalism and revolutionary Russia does not prevent him, contrary to logic, from denying the existence of class motives in the policy of the Stalinist leadership. Distancing himself from "other historians", he considers it superfluous, as already mentioned, to search for the deep, including class, causes of the Soviet-German conflict. But what is the task of the historian, if not to comprehensively explore the range of issues of the chosen topic? Of course, its context, which covers both the "theoretical foundations" and the "ideological roots" of the policy of states that have decided to

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war with each other. And is it possible to judge Soviet foreign policy in a qualified manner, abstracting from the quite definite doctrinaire foundations of this policy, conditioned by communist ideology, and even more so ignoring the totalitarian essence of the Soviet system? Is it even possible to imagine a work in which the methodology of studying the past is free from one or another general framework of such a study that reveals the idea of the work? The author of The Myth of the Icebreaker confirms with his predilections - no, such works do not exist.

The essence, so to speak, of the concept of G. Gorodetsky is that on the eve of the world war, the hostile capitalist encirclement turned from words into deeds, putting the Soviet Union not only in a position of "international isolation" (as with Comrade Stalin), and - in the position of the country, subjected to "siege" by numerous external enemies. Both Nazi Germany and Western democracies.

But was the situation in the USSR as hopeless, hopeless, as G. Gorodetsky wants to present, developing the version of "Falsifiers of History"? And if, as he advises, "try to understand the mood of the people of that period and not judge them from the positions of today"?

Comrade Stalin saw the situation from the Kremlin by no means as bleak. In September 1938, he announced that "the second imperialist war has in fact already begun", and in March 1939 he confirmed: "a new imperialist war has become a fact", but it "has not yet become general, world"!6. Needless to say, the reader will not find these Stalinist definitions, which are so important for understanding the motives of the pre-war Soviet policy, in *The Myth of the Icebreaker*. Otherwise, one would have to agree that the situation of the "second imperialist war" ruled out the isolation, and even more so the "siege" of the Soviet Union, giving Stalin the long-awaited chance to break into world politics with a bang.

Nevertheless, G. Gorodetsky, contradicting himself, admits that such a fundamental change in the international

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nom position of the Soviet Union took place. But in his presentation it happened by chance - indirectly, contrary to Stalin's intentions. It happened because of the short-sightedness (not to say stupidity) of the British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain, who at the end of March 1939 provided security guarantees to Poland, which became Hitler's next target after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The British guarantees, he writes, "caused an unforeseen dramatic upheaval in international relations ... with its immediate and tragic consequences" (p. 51. *My italics.*). Not the capture of Czechoslovakia in direct violation of the Munich Agreement, but the British guarantees to Poland became the "first salvo of the Second World War", changing the entire international situation "with one blow" (*ibid.*).

Here is the course of his amazing conclusions.

With its guarantees to Poland, "England is actually

challenged Germany, thereby completely abandoning the key role in the balance of power in Europe" (p. 51-52). This forced the Nazis to "strive for the neutralization of the Soviet Union," which England itself needed to support (p. 52). "Thus, without any secret plans, the Soviet Union became the basis for the balance of power in Europe" (*ibid.*). That is, it was not the failure of the Western policy of appeasement and the approach of a general armed conflict on the European continent that forced both warring capitalist coalitions to turn their gaze towards Moscow, but the miserable attempts of N. Chamberlain. This is how the head of the British government outpaced the Fuhrer of Nazi Germany, who took aim at Poland, in whipping up international tension!

In the course of these arguments, follow (in order to completely confuse the reader?) ritual attacks on V. Suvorov (although it was promised not to return to his person) for condemning the pact between Stalin and Hitler on the eve of their joint attack on Poland. Forgetting once again about his call to see events "exactly as they were", G. Gorodetsky rejects criticism of the Soviet-German pact, being careful, however, to challenge

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V. Suvorov's analysis of facts and documents. He blames everything on the Cold War, which, he says, stimulated the resurgence of the "myths" of the 1920s, which were "based on a simplistic understanding of the events leading up to the pact" (p. 52). The point was, therefore, not in the strategy of the warring states, but in the events that took place, according to Gorodetsky, contrary to the policy of the European leaders. Who really shows a "simplified understanding of events" is for the reader to judge.

It turns out that the real reason for both the Soviet-German pact and the outbreak of war in Europe in general lies in England's anti-German demarche. It should not have given guarantees to Poland to refuse the role of an arbitrator in the affairs of the continent, since this brought Hitler Germany and

Stalinist Soviet Union. Yes, a non-trivial approach to history, except for the saying
"the Englishwoman is shitting"...

But what if the reader asks whether the situation was as G. Gorodetsky draws it, drawing the reader's attention to the sinister role of English guarantees, and turns to already known materials?

A. Toynbee, a contemporary of the events described and, perhaps, the most famous British historian of the 20th century, agrees that then, in the first spring month of 1939, Europe entered the peak of its slide into a general war. In the preface to the corresponding volume of the multi-volume Review of International Affairs in 1939-1946, of which he was editor-in-chief, A. Toynbee wrote that, from many points of view, the Second World War actually began with the occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15 by the Nazis. Germany and only formally since its attack on Poland on 1 September. March 1939 was a turning point for international relations, but not because of British guarantees, but because of the Nazi violence against Czechoslovakia!

And what do the long-published official Soviet documents (which G. Gorodetsky neglected) say about how the Kremlin assessed the situation on the European continent after the provision of British guarantees?

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Poland in response to Nazi aggression? Did Comrade Stalin and his comrades feel the "tragic consequences" of the guarantees? Based on these documents, it is easy to establish that the "actual events" did not develop as described in the "Icebreaker Myth".

According to the Stalinist leadership, "the most serious events that radically worsened the situation in Europe" were connected with the actions of Nazi Germany and its de facto ally, fascist Italy. As such events that threatened many countries, it considered the termination by Hitler, who used as a pretext the provision of British guarantees to Poland, the Anglo-German naval agreement of June 18, 1935 and the declaration of friendship and non-aggression between Germany and Poland of January 26, 1934, and also the announcement of the forthcoming conclusion of a military-political alliance between Germany and Italy. Finally, it was said in the quoted Soviet document (dated May 11, 1939), on this basis "negotiations arose between England and France, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other, on the organization of an effective peace front against aggression!"^o .

So when did the "tragic consequences" of the British guarantees to Poland come into play – after they were given or decades later, when The Myth of the Icebreaker was being written? Or one of the "tragic consequences" of guarantees to Poland in the political and diplomatic rise of Stalin? And this is the fruit of "an endless search for new information and materials" (p. 4)?

But is it by chance, as G. Gorodetsky claims, that Comrade Stalin found himself in the role of a third force in the imminent pan-European conflict? What then was the meaning of the special line constantly proclaimed by the Stalinist leadership in international affairs - the line outside and above the coalition policy, which it considered completely self-sufficient? Isn't it about taking advantage of the "second imperialist war" and its expected social consequences in one's own way - in the interests of the imperial class? Western allies - "imperialists", recalled V.M. Molotov, Stalin's right hand

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foreign affairs, counted on the weakening of the Soviet Union in the world war. But: "Here they miscalculated. Here they were not Marxists, but we were. When half of Europe moved away from them, they woke up. Here Churchill found himself, of course, in a very stupid position!

However, the author of *The Myth of the Icebreaker* insists that he was successful “especially in his consistent analysis of the Stalinist policies of those years”²⁰.

But I would not say that his book pays due attention to the words and deeds of the Stalinist leadership. Own

The author's essential criterion - "to try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not to judge them from the positions of today" - does not apply where most of all

appropriate. To put it mildly, the documents of the Communist Party and the materials of its central organs—the *Pravda* newspaper and the *Bolshevik* magazine—are underestimated. Meanwhile, it is the analysis of party materials that allows us to conclude that Stalin and his entourage considered class motives as the sub-foundation of their international policy. It is not clear how one can judge the views and activities of the top Soviet leadership without such materials.

From Stalin's documents, I would draw the reader's attention (Israeli historians are unlikely to be interested in this) to the "Short Course in the History of the CPSU (6)", which was published in September 1938. Comrade Stalin was proud of this book as his work, in which the movement of history depends solely on the irreconcilable struggle of ideas. Party cadres, the Kremlin believed, “could freely navigate the domestic and international situation” only if they were politically and ideologically trained?!

In the last chapter of the "Short Course", its international section, published in *Pravda* in September 1938 - even before Munich, the independent, separate line of the USSR in international affairs was proclaimed as opposed to the two warring capitalist groups that had practically taken shape. . And one of them, the countries of the democratic West, was promised (with reference to

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sad consequences for the Russian bourgeoisie of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917) “historical retribution”²². The provisions of the section, it was said at the highest official level, gave a “Marxist explanation” to the changes in the world, which means that they alone can “judge the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and all recent international events”²³. These provisions were developed in Stalin's speech at a closed meeting in the Central Committee (see below) and later included in his report at the party congress. The international sections of the history of the party and the Stalinist report at the party congress are phenomena of the same order, making it possible to judge the trend of Soviet foreign policy.

Something else is also significant. G. Gorodetsky, defending the right of the Stalinist leadership to protect the “Russian revolution” from external enemies, simply repeats the version of the “Falsifiers of History” about the identity of the situation of the revolutionary year of 1917 and the eve of World War II. The aforementioned Stalinist correction in the text of the pamphlet explains the decision to conclude a pact with Nazi Germany as follows: 20 years after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude a pact with the Germans in view of the same hostile policy of England and France. But is the approach that compares the foreign policy actions of the Bolshevik leaders separated by two decades justified? The answer is contained in the works of “other historians” rejected by G. Gorodetsky, who came to the conclusion, on the one hand, that Stalin overestimated the likelihood of the formation of an anti-Soviet front of the capitalist countries, and, on the other hand, that he underestimated the danger of fascism. Indeed, the global threat of fascism that arose in the 1930s was viewed by Stalin and his entourage not from general democratic, but from class positions and interests. In fascism, they saw primarily “a sign of the weakness of capitalism” (Stalin), considered fascism a manifestation of the so-called general crisis

capitalism and, thus, even closer to the death of the world system of capitalism.

It is worth noting that on the issue of the directionality of the USSR's policy before the World War, the positions of the majority of domestic authors practically coincide. D.M. The projector, who has studied the history of the world war extensively and fruitfully, explains Stalin's decision to make an "unprincipled and pernicious" agreement with Hitler by his strategy to take advantage of the weakening of enemies in an inter-imperialist war²⁵. In turn, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.N. Sakharov (who heads the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) quite definitely characterizes the line of Stalin's pre-war diplomacy as "clear" as "clear". The line is to "work for a clash of their potential rivals in Europe, and in the long term to enter the war in order not only to consolidate the already achieved geopolitical advantages, but also to carry out revolutionary expansion"⁶.

These are the opinions of "other historians" who follow the principle "try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not judge them from the standpoint of today." The adequacy of their judgments to historical realities is confirmed by the testimonies of contemporaries. In his memoirs, the writer K.M. Simonov shared his thoughts, born of the Soviet-German pact: before the inevitable battle with fascism, "there will be a long war between Germany, France and England, and somewhere later, in the final, we will face fascism. The pact gave such a course to our thinking"⁷.

Archival material says the same. Yes, such global anti-capitalist plans were not only hatched in the Kremlin, but were also accepted as a guide to action.

A week before Stalin's report at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) on March 10, 1939, A.A. Zhdanov²⁶, whose criticism of the policy of the West, which received publicity at the congress, was brought to its logical end. One of the figures closest to Stalin was frank: "There is a party conference here, there is nothing to be ashamed of."

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The world situation, the speaker said, is developing in such a way that fascist aggression "is directed chiefly against England and France." Although England "would very much like to balance the situation in such a way that Hitler unleashed a war with the Soviet Union. But Hitler understands in his own way and believes that he must unleash a war where it is weaker. And since he sees that it is weaker in the West, he rushes there, along with Mussolini. Party listeners applauded and laughed.

"Comrades," continued A.A. Zhdanov, under the guise of peacefulness, under the guise of collective security, England is pitting one power against another, is not averse to inciting And to organize a war with us, using in this respect the actions, tactics, old traditions of bourgeois politicians - to rake in the heat with the wrong hands, to wait positions when the enemies are weakened, and take away." But this policy is designed for naive people. As for the Soviet Union, "in our country even the pioneers can unravel this matter, this matter is very rude."

Since everything is so obvious to the Stalinist leadership, which is "hard to deceive", then the Soviet foreign policy has already been completely determined: "... We will accumulate our strength for the time when we will deal with Hitler and Mussolini, and at the same time , of course, and with Chamberlain. Was met applause.

The Israeli historian (as well as other critics of the Icebreaker) ignores the facts and documents that characterize Stalin's deep intention to take advantage of Nazi Germany's aggression against England and France in order to weaken them. Moreover, this idea, correctly grasped by V. Suvorov - to use Germany, whether revolutionary or Nazi, as a battering ram against capitalism in Europe - is nothing new. Let us recall that the strategy of the Comintern, directed by the Kremlin, was based on initiating a proletarian revolution in Germany and thus making a decisive breach in the system of capitalism?⁹.

With Hitler coming to power in Germany, the goal of spreading socialism (in its Soviet model) to Europe

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has not undergone significant changes. Germany, now Nazi Germany, remained the main tool for achieving this goal, which promised new opportunities. For the Nazi movement, Stalin believed, was a natural reaction to the injustices of Versailles. Such a Germany, therefore, can be manipulated. Otherwise it is difficult to regard euphoria. that engulfed Comrade Stalin after the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact: "Well, who will deceive whom? We will deceive Hitler!"³⁰.

Taking advantage of the situation of the "second imperialist war", the Kremlin activated its long-standing expansionist plans. It is interesting how G. Gorodetsky would comment on the revelations of a member of the presidium and secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern D.Z. Manuilsky, who was called "the hand of Stalin" in this international communist organization. Already in the summer of 1939, even before the start of the World War, the fate of Poland, in his opinion, was sealed. Speaking in a closed audience, he predicted: "If instead of the USSR there were old tsarist Russia, we could say that in the event of a conflict, in essence, a new division of Poland would take place." But even from Soviet Russia, Poland does not expect anything better: "it is afraid that if it ties its fate with us, then socialism will come out of it on its territory (laughter)"?!

V.M. Molotov Soviet seizures in Eastern Europe in pursuance of the Soviet-German agreement on a secret protocol?².

It must be assumed that G. Gorodetsky is aware of the assessments of Soviet foreign policy recorded in the documents of his time. But he prefers not to dwell on them, does not rely on them to analyze the described events. There is — once again — a virtual rejection of the principle declared by him to see the events of the past "exactly as they were" and "not to judge THEM FROM THE POSITION OF THE TODAY".

In other words, if we proceed from the interest of the Soviet Union in its numerous

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capitalist enemies "better torn apart" (Stalin—see below), then following the undermining of the positions of the class-alien largest states of Europe, one should, of course, take advantage of this for one's own purposes. Only for G. Gorodetsky these goals are purely defensive, while for V. Suvorov and "other historians" they are expansionist, class-imperial. The differences between them are in the reconstruction of the course of events in accordance with different ideas about the criteria of objectivity.

So who follows the logic of the research search - V. Suvorov and "other historians" or G. Gorodetsky, if everyone proceeds from the premise that the leaders of the Soviet Union considered themselves surrounded by enemies? Who analyzes the pre-war Stalinist foreign policy with its strategy to take advantage of the "imperialist contradictions" in the camp of the enemies of socialism in order to push them against each other, break through the "hostile capitalist encirclement" and gain other advantages? Or someone who, not caring about the proper interpretation of "actual events", wants to be known as the discoverer of more than dubious historical truth in the spirit and style of Stalin's "Falsifiers of History"?

4. "ASSESSMENT" OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

As already emphasized, G. Gorodetsky avoids a more or less intelligible presentation of the events on the eve of the world war, so as not to take into account the totality of the circumstances of the transition, using Stalin's definitions, from the "second imperialist war" to the "war of general

cabbage soup, world". And, according to the logic of things, to ask what kind of refraction this Stalinist idea of the development of international relations found in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. That is, to try to identify what was the role of Comrade Stalin in unleashing the Second World War, which became the starting point for all subsequent fateful changes both in Europe and beyond. But the author of *The Myth of the Icebreaker*, fascinated by his strange

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By the way, there is little interest in the problem of the relationship between Stalin's foreign policy and the beginning of the world war. What does his more than modest attention to such a significant event for the world peace and for the Soviet Union itself, as Stalin's report at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (6) on March 10, 1939, indicate?

Meanwhile, Stalin's report at the party congress is his only public speech in all the months preceding the world war. Naturally, historians give this speech the attention it deserves. G. Gorodetsky devotes only one paragraph to the Stalinist report:

"Most historians consider Stalin's assessment of Soviet foreign policy at the 18th party congress on March 10, 1939, to be a watershed. At the same time, they often refer to Stalin's famous warning to the Western democracies that he is not going to "pull chestnuts out of the fire for them." Under the influence of subsequent events, historians see this as Stalin's decision to move closer to Nazi Germany. However (?), even a superficial acquaintance with the full text of Stalin's speech is enough to make it clear that his anti-Nazi orientation is very strong. If Suvorov had read this speech, he would have noticed that Stalin abandoned Lenin's idea of a revolutionary war and warned that war was a threat to everyone. In addition (?), Hitler's rejection of the Munich agreements, expressed in the annexation of the rest of Czechoslovakia a week later, raised hopes for the revival of the idea of collective security. Hitler's actions were condemned - at least publicly - by Chamberlain, and the opponents of appeasement strengthened their positions. It was against this background that the Soviet government came up with a proposal to conclude a military agreement with Britain and France" (pp. 50-51. *My italics*).

In his own way - not like "most historians" - interpreting Stalin's speech, G. Gorodetsky directly connects it with a set of wonderful conclusions. According to him

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In my opinion, historians underestimate the "anti-Nazi orientation" of the speech, and their conclusion that Stalin's speech opened the way to rapprochement with Germany was influenced by events not related to the international consequences of the speech. And allegedly, the report announced the rejection of the class strategy in international relations, which paved the way for the resumption of attempts to achieve collective security with the participation of Western countries. Anyone who has read the report will say that nothing of the kind can be found in its text.

In passing, we note once again: the "ignorance" of V. Suvorov, in this case in the interpretation of Stalin's report, is shared by "the majority of historians." and even all historians, except for G. Gorodetsky himself. However, let's try to deal with the justification by the author of *The Icebreaker Myth* of his disagreement with the conclusion of "the majority of historians" that Stalin's speech at the party congress was a "watershed" for the pre-war Soviet foreign policy.

Let us take the question of the alleged "anti-Nazi orientation" of the report. This is how things can be presented only if one does not take into account the pro-German accents of the speech, which attracted the attention of "other historians".

With Stalin's statement that Germany is a country "seriously affected as a result of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles"³* (confirmation of the widespread opinion about

that Stalin viewed the Nazi movement as primarily revanchist). With his statement that the Western countries failed to "raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany (in connection with the propaganda hype in the foreign press around the Carpathian Ukraine. - D.N.), poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason." With another statement that "the Germans were given areas of Czechoslovakia (meaning the Czech Sudetenland. - D.N.) as a price for the obligation to start a war with the Soviet Union, and the Germans now refuse to pay the bill; sending them (Western countries — D.N.) somewhere far away"36.

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Stalin completed his analysis of the international situation with a list of principles of his foreign policy. The main ones are: "We stand for peace and strengthening business ties with all countries ... since they will not try to violate the interests of our country ... they will not try to violate directly or indirectly the interests of the integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Soviet state." This is addressed to Nazi Germany, from which the only threat to the Soviet borders could come. They were supplemented by the words that served as the basis for characterizing Stalin's speech abroad as a "speech about roasted chestnuts": "Be careful and not let our country be drawn into conflicts by war provocateurs who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands"37. And this is for Western countries.

It seems that G. Gorodetsky deliberately refused to analyze the text of Stalin's report with its provisions, which make it possible to objectively judge the international strategy of the Soviet leadership. Had he stopped, say, at the Stalinist position that there were no "apparent grounds" for an armed conflict with Germany, one would have had to ask questions that needed answers.

For example, what were the grounds for such a statement, that is, to delve into the past of Soviet-German relations and into Stalin's ideas about Nazism. Ask yourself what connection existed between this statement and his own, Stalin's, criticism of the policy of the Western countries. Also try to compare the statement about the absence of grounds for the Soviet-German armed conflict, made on the eve of the occupation of Czechoslovakia from the rostrum of the party congress, with the official protest expressed through the diplomatic line on March 18 by M.M. Litvinov38 (who, by the way, was not given the floor to speak at the party congress), and ask himself: which of these "actual events" was of greater significance? In a word, follow your call to try to "understand the moods of the people of that period and not judge them from the standpoint of today."

Let's see how Stalin's speech was assessed by contemporaries - foreign diplomats in Moscow, reported

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none of which their governments, one must think, are more important for understanding the policies of the then world leaders than the way this speech is presented to the historian today.

Foreign diplomats accredited in the Soviet capital, Stalin's speech at the party congress was unequivocally perceived as pro-German and anti-Western. German Ambassador F. Schulenburg, in a report to Berlin, drew attention to the fact that "Stalin's irony and criticism in a much sharper form was directed against Britain, i.e. against the reactionary forces in power than against the so-called aggressive countries, Germany in particular. Chargé d'affaires a.i. in the USSR A. Kerk compared Stalin's statement about the West's desire to provoke a Soviet-German conflict "for no apparent reason" with the task he formulated "to prevent our country from being drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war ". And he concluded: "judging by Stalin's words, it has been publicly proclaimed that if Germany does not directly threaten the Soviet borders, then she can count on Soviet neutrality in the event of a war against the Western powers." WITH

British Ambassador W. Side agreed with this. The ambassador concluded his lengthy report to London with a recommendation to those "naive people" in England who believe that the Soviet Union is just waiting for an invitation to join the Western democracies to reflect on Stalin's task of "being careful and not let themselves be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands.

Soviet statements were in the same anti-Western and pro-German line. At a late dinner in the Kremlin in a narrow format, which ended the signing of the Soviet-German pact on August 23, 1939, V.M. Molotov, according to the German recording of the talks, "raised a glass to Stalin, noting that it was Stalin, with his speech in March of this year, which was correctly understood in Germany, that completely changed the political relations between the two countries." A week later, speaking at an extraordinary session

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The Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a proposal to ratify the pact, Molotov repeated: "Now it is clear that in Germany, in general, these statements of Comrade Stalin were correctly understood and practical conclusions were drawn from this"³. According to him, "Even before the Soviet government considered it desirable to take a further step in improving political relations with Germany..."

One can read about the reaction in Berlin to Stalin's speech in the dying memoirs of German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop, who "acquainted" Hitler with the speech "and urged" authority "for the required steps." But at first Hitler took a wait-and-see attitude and hesitated." Although, as is now known from documentary publications, when explaining to the German military leadership his decision to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, Hitler said that back in the autumn of 1938, not being sure of the unconditional support of his plans by Italy and Japan, he decided "to be along with Stalin" "⁶. There is something to think about, isn't it? On, let's say, what gave Hitler grounds to count on agreements with Stalin.

Now regarding the fact that at the party congress Stalin proclaimed a renunciation of the revolutionary struggle and, in general, of an attack on the positions of world capitalism. Although the "second imperialist war", which threatened to develop into a "general, world war", created certain opportunities for breaking through the "hostile capitalist encirclement". At that time, but according to the memoirs of N.S. Khrushchev, Stalin was preparing party workers for the "great war" of the USSR with its enemies, which was "inexorably advancing"⁷. To whom this testimony of a representative of the party elite is not enough, one must turn to the testimony of Comrade Stalin himself.

In Stalin's "Short course of the history of the CPSU (b)", which did not interest G. Gorodetsky in any way, it is precisely the military side of the matter that is emphasized: since the "second imperialist war" posed a danger "above all" to the USSR, the answer was "further amplification of

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the effectiveness of our borders and the combat readiness of the Red Army and the Red Fleet.

Further more. In this book (published in September 1938), in the section "Theory and Tactics of the Bolshevik Party on Questions of War, Peace and Revolution," it was said that during the First World War, "the Bolsheviks were not against any war. They recognized the legitimacy of just wars, referring to such wars not only as "the protection of the people from external attacks and attempts to enslave them", but also "the liberation of the people from the slavery of capitalism", as well as "the liberation of the colonies and dependent countries from the oppression of the imperialists". But haven't these provisions lost their relevance in the new conditions of the "second imperialist war"? Not at all, as can be judged from many "actual events".

Let's take a report at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (6) DZ. Manuisky, who, along with Stalin's report, became a guideline for foreign countries to draw conclusions about the course of the Soviet foreign policy.

politicians. Speaking on behalf of the delegation of the CPSU (6) in the Comintern, he declared that "the instructions of the "Short Course" on just and unjust wars are a clear Marxist-Leninist line in connection with the imperialist war." But party documents practically remained outside the research interest of G. Gorodetsky.

The Israeli historian did not pay attention to the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) of November 14, 1938, adopted on the occasion of the publication of a textbook on the history of the party. It resolutely rejected "the distortions of Marxist-Leninist views on the question of the nature of wars in the modern era, the misunderstanding of the difference between just and unjust wars, the wrong view of the Bolsheviks as a kind of "pacifists"?1.

This provision of the Decree of the Central Committee, the draft of which was "corrected" by Stalin Comrade Stalin ridiculed the notion of the Bolsheviks as people who "sigh for peace and then for

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They only take up arms when they are attacked. This is not true." What is true? And that "there are cases when the Bolsheviks themselves will attack, if the war is just, if the situation is suitable, if the conditions are favorable, they themselves will begin to attack." Further

even more concretely, even more clearly: "They (the Bolsheviks. - D.N.) are not at all against an offensive, not against any war. The fact that we are screaming for defense is a veil, a veil. All gosu

gifts are disguised: "you live with wolves, you have to howl like a wolf." The party audience responded with laughter. And at the end of the passage: "It would be foolish to twist your insides and put them on the table. Would you say, fools"?3.

For G. Gorodetsky, such revelations of Stalin are from the category of evidence that can be neglected. "Other historians" do not consider themselves entitled to follow the method of silence.

How were the instructions of the Soviet leader about overcoming the wrong view of the Bolsheviks "as a kind of pacifists", about agitation and propaganda preparation for a "just war" carried out?

Let us dwell on the article "The International Situation of the Second Imperialist War", which appeared in the February 1939 issue of the Bolshevik magazine. It was written by the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V.P. Potemkin (under the pseudonym V. Galyanov), as one might assume, on the instructions of Stalin."

The author of the article proceeded from the main Stalinist premise - "a second imperialist war is going on." On the most careful reading, it is impossible to detect even purely verbal statements about the need to stop the war, to prevent its growth. On the contrary, the article welcomed the conflict development of events, because, it said, "humanity is heading for great battles that will unleash a world revolution." The propaganda of peace and collective security gave way to the Marxist enlightenment of people "with a philistine outlook", hoping that "everything will work out, everything will work out." Contrasted with such reasoning

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The position of the "conscious part of mankind" was stated in the words that "for the disciples of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, the second imperialist war is the most important phenomenon in the life of people">". And the article ended on the same lofty anti-capitalist note. Being "between two millstones": the Soviet Union, "menacingly rising to its full gigantic height", and "an indestructible wall of revolutionary democracy that has risen

help him—the last remnants of the capitalist
systems."

V.P. Potemkin was inspired by the belief that the Soviet Union is "the world's strongest military power," and therefore without it "not a single common foreign policy issue can be resolved, not a single serious undertaking in the field of international life is conceivable." Isn't it an exaggeration that the Soviet Union was the strongest military power? No, not an exaggeration. V. Suvorov in "Icebreaker" gives enough evidence on this score.

It is curious that confidence in the military capabilities of the Soviet Union was reinforced by faith in the revolutionary potential of the international proletariat. Here is what D.M. wrote about this. Projector: "The idea of the inevitability of a revolution in the capitalist countries in the event of aggression against the Soviet Union entered deeply into the consciousness of Stalin and his entourage. They were reflected to some extent in politics, and in military theory, and in military doctrine, and even in plans for a future war"⁶⁰.

The materials of the former party archive (now RGASPI) say: yes, such were the "moods of the people of that time" in the Soviet Union.

In the report of DZ. Manuilsky on international topics (with the heading "instructive"), with which he spoke in mid-July 1939, painted a rosy picture of the growing world anti-fascist movement, which was also spreading to the aggressor countries. Here are some passages from his speech:

"I affirm that some time ago a portrait appeared in a Viennese barracks, hung

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dates, Comrade Stalin (stormy applause. Shouts of "Hurrah." Everyone stands up)

"I affirm ... that there are units in the German army that are under the influence of the communists. And in Czechoslovakia, the workers sang the Internationale together with the German soldiers. Commentary of the speaker: "I will say frankly - the position of the Fuhrer, whose soldiers sing the Internationale, is unenviable ... the German people are waiting for the defeat of German fascism"[®].

Such views - on the one hand, we are "the most powerful military power", on the other - the anti-fascist movement has spread throughout the world in such a way that it leads to the disintegration of the armies of hostile states, were widely used. And it is not surprising, since they were not only divided in the Kremlin, but came from there, from the Stalinist leadership.

On the military-patriotic wave that swept the country³, with the book "First Strike. The Tale of the Future War" was made by N. Shpanov (a writer who later became notorious for his novel "Arsonists"). Initially, the book was rejected by Glavlit (censorship) as artistically "helpless". The trouble was not in the mediocrity of this story, the writer K. Simonov recalled, but in the fact that it was published "in a circulation of half a million and supported with a firm hand from above"⁶. Is it necessary to say whose "firm hand" it was?

The story depicted the beginning of a victorious war for the USSR against Germany. Terrible for the enemy is the "first strike" - a retaliatory strike, already by the end of the first hour of the war, by hundreds of the latest high-speed Soviet bombers on German rear military-industrial facilities there. Anti-fascist workers help the Soviet air armada by giving light signals. When the Soviet armies enter the territory of the enemy "in agitated, rearing Europe", the anti-fascist masses set in motion. The "exciting scenes" of acts of proletarian fraternization are described. In the Bolshevik magazine, the writer Vs. Vishnevsky concluded his review of the story in the following way: "It speaks in a fascinating (!) way about what a just war of the Soviet people against the aggressors will be like—

on, deadly for the enemies of socialism"66. Why not a forerunner of the Icebreaker version of Stalin's preparations for an offensive war against the capitalists of the whole world?!

It is indicative that Stalin's report at the party congress, which was anti-capitalist in spirit and letter, culminating in the proclaimed readiness to "retaliate with a double blow against the blow of the warmongers who are trying to violate the inviolability of the Soviet borders"67, inspired the delegates to bellicose speeches6. However, G. Gorodetsky ignored not only Stalin's report at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (6), but also other materials of the congress, which amounted to a voluminous volume of verbatim records. Otherwise, he (let's assume with doubts, given the purpose of the "Myth of the Icebreaker") would not have been so sure of his discovery that Comrade Stalin had no geopolitical plans.

To make sure that Stalin intended to take advantage of the mutual weakening of the capitalist enemies, it was enough to read the first, international section of his report at the congress. The blessing is a little reading, pages 9 to 15 of the verbatim report. In this case, he may have doubted that Stalin had no "plans" (not secret, but quite transparent) to take advantage of the "second imperialist war" for his own purposes. This refers to the section of the report where Stalin explains the "systematic concessions" to the aggressors on the part of the Western countries, which, "taken together, are indisputably stronger than the fascist states both economically and militarily." One explanation is their feeling of "fear of revolution" in the event of another world imperialist war, which, according to the experience of the First World War, "may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or more countries."

However, Stalin saw the main reason for the refusal of the Western countries from the policy of collective security in the fact that they, with their policy of non-intervention and neutrality, provoke a world war in order to then "dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war," summing up, "Both cheap and nice! » At the same time, he emphasized

on the desire of the "war provocateurs" in the West to pit the USSR and Germany against each other "for no apparent reason". Under the conditions of the "new imperialist war", that is, the armed conflict within the "hostile capitalist encirclement", it was precisely the Stalinist Soviet Union that had the opportunity to take advantage of the "golden rule" of diplomacy - to remain on the sidelines for the time being, until its numerous enemies are sorted out among themselves, weakening each other. To be "both cheap and cute!"

So who is right in assessing Stalin's report at the party congress:

V. Suvorov and "other historians", who consider this speech as a turning point in Soviet foreign policy, or G. Gorodetsky denying this, and not bothering to prove it?

5. "ONLY CONTRACT 0 NEUTRALITY"

No less questions are raised by G. Gorodetsky's interpretation of the historical significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and its consequences.

We read on page 45 of the "Myth of the Icebreaker":

"Late on the night of August 23, 1939, in the Kremlin, Soviet Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov signed a non-aggression pact with German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop. Although it was only a treaty of neutrality, it is generally regarded by historians as the most obvious, immediate cause of World War II. This event led to hostilities and therefore deserves careful consideration. To what extent does it share

Soviet Union with Nazi Germany blame for the outbreak of war? Some historians go further in their arguments. They prioritize the top secret protocols signed a month later that divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. It is the secret protocols, they argue, and not the non-aggression pact, that reflect the true aims of Soviet foreign policy. The treaty laid the foundations for

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alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union". There is also an on-duty reference to V. Suvorov, who, they say, "goes even further in his arguments", linking the conclusion of the pact with Stalin's long-standing intentions, having unleashed a world war, to create "favorable conditions" for achieving foreign policy goals.

The mention of the name of V. Suvorov (as in previous cases) in itself, G. Gorodetsky believes, calls into question the interpretation of "other historians" of the reasons for the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact and its consequences, as if freeing them from the obligation to prove anything in particular. Still, let us dwell on the conclusions of the author, which I have highlighted in italics.

What does "although it was only a treaty of neutrality" mean, but historians "generally" consider the treaty "the most obvious, direct cause of the Second World War"? "As a rule" means, again, the majority of historians. Consequently, G. Gorodetsky (again and again) does not share the point of view not only of the "ignorant" V. Suvorov, but also of "other historians".

Of course, the Soviet-German pact was by no means "just a treaty of neutrality", as it is stubbornly called in the "Myth of the Icebreaker". Here the author either corrects or develops The Falsifiers of History, where the pact is called as it was, a non-aggression pact. And not only formally - by name. There is no mention of neutrality in the text of the agreement itself. The main thing in it was the obligation of the parties under no circumstances to oppose each other if one of them "becomes the object of hostilities on the part of a third power" (Articles D and II). Neutrality agreements usually included a clause releasing one of the parties from obligations if the other side itself committed an act of unprovoked aggression. However, there was no such clause in the Soviet-German pact. A classic case of preparation for aggression, about which M.M. Litvinov, who turned out to be objectionable to Stalin with the acceleration of his course towards rapprochement with Hitler: "This means that the states that have secured

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rear or flank by such a non-aggression pact, reserve for themselves the possibility of attacking third states with impunity."

The immediate entry into force of the pact, even before ratification, indicated that everything was ready to attack the already intended victim. A few days later, on September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland, and on September 17, as agreed at the conclusion of the pact, the Red Army invaded Poland from the east. The joint communiqué on the tasks of the Soviet and German troops in Poland stated that their actions corresponded to the "spirit and letter of the non-aggression pact." About non-aggression, not about neutrality.

More evidence is needed why historians "as a rule" consider the Soviet-German pact in the way it was, as the most immediate cause of the emergence (not preparation - it began long before the conclusion of the pact) of World War II. war?!

I will draw the reader's attention to the negotiations in the Kremlin that led to the signing of the pact. There is a German recording of the negotiations, from which it is clear that the participants in the negotiations - I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, I. Ribbentrop did not speak about the preservation of world peace, but assessed the balance of forces of the participants in the imminent armed conflict: Germany and its opponents

— England and France. The people who plotted the deal were unanimous about the purpose of the pact. At the same time, Stalin did not hide his preference for Germany.”

When analyzing the historical and international significance of the pact, one should start from the definition of V.M. Molotov pact as "a turning point in the history of Europe, and not only Europe." Definitions of an unambiguous, indicating the far-reaching intentions of the parties to the pact that entered into relations, according to "other historians", a strategic partnership. But in order not to undermine his historical construction, G. Gorodetsky has to again dissociate himself from "other historians". Therefore, the words of V.M. Molotov (as well as a number of eloquent facts of Soviet-German cooperation, including the joint partition of Poland), he writes, "should not be mistaken for

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clean coin" (p. 74). Why shouldn't it? Didn't the Stalinist leadership, whose general opinion is reflected in Molotov's definition, know what they were doing? The explanation of the Israeli historian is remarkably simple: "these episodes (as if small, insignificant events. — D.N.) reflect the difficulties that the Russians faced after the conclusion of the pact" (ibid.). "Other historians", on the contrary, on the basis of the same facts, came to the conclusion that the Soviet-German pact, as before the 18th Congress of the CPSU (6), launched a series of events that visibly accelerated the dramatic denouement of world contradictions.

If the assessment of V.M. Molotov, the significance of the Soviet-German pact is devoid of content, what about his statement about the mutual geopolitical benefits that the parties received due to military-political cooperation? With his statement that the conclusion of the pact "eliminated the possibility of friction in Soviet-German relations during the carrying out of Soviet measures along our western border and, at the same time, provided Germany with calm confidence in the East"?⁷⁵ This is about territorial expansion the Soviet Union at the expense of its small Eastern European neighbors and the victories of the German army in Western Europe.

In the document "On the current tasks of propaganda" prepared in May 1941 in the Central Committee of the VKGy (6), as one of the two reasons for German success in the war against France and England - after the factor of military superiority of Germany - it was to the war, she tried to establish "friendly relations with the USSR." Defeated France, on the contrary, showed, like England, "a frivolous attitude to the question of the role and relative weight of the Soviet Union"?

Are there not many official statements that "should not be taken at face value"? Is it the beginning of the "Stalinist onslaught on Europe", the capitulation of France (according to the English historian Reynolds, which influenced the situation throughout the world)", the elimination of the independence of many small European states - these "actions

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did the events of 1939-1940 not lead to dramatic geopolitical shifts on the continent?

G. Gorodetsky convinces the reader not to trust not only what the head of the Soviet government V.M. Molotov, but also to Comrade Stalin. He writes: "It would be a mistake to take at face value Stalin's own explanation that when he signed the pact, he knew that he would have to fight Germany, and he was only looking for a respite" (p. 61. My italics.). And a few lines above it says the exact opposite—that the pact "reflected Russia's relative weakness and a fine understanding that sooner or later Russia would have to face Germany on the battlefield" (ibid. My italics.).

G. Gorodetsky's refusal to recognize the significance of the generalizing self-assessments of Soviet policy by the Stalinist leadership, declaring them unworthy of being taken at face value (the matter is not limited to these two examples - see below), forces one to touch upon

his other research methods of the same kind. Thus, Stalin's words that "the actions of the Red Army are also the cause of the world revolution" are declared by him to be "an unsuccessful statement" (p. 78). There are even more examples when an Israeli historian rejects important provisions on the grounds that, they say, this is just a verbal tribute to ideology.

The strange conclusions of G. Gorodetsky put the reader of his book in front of a dilemma. What to believe: the author's current ideas about the events of that time, or the way world leaders perceived these events, in accordance with which they built their policies? The reader would have been spared from such a choice had the author of *The Icebreaker Myth* followed his call "to try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not judge them from the standpoint of today." Indeed, how else to approach historical events?!

What follows is no less odd. Standing up for the pre-war Stalinist foreign policy, G. Gorodetsky writes that it is in vain for historians "to give priority to those signed a month later, completely secret

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protocols," using them to reveal the true aims of Soviet policy (see italics in the above quote from *The Myth of the Icebreaker*). Why in vain? That is why, he argues, the secret protocols were signed a month later, and not immediately, not together with the pact. Consequently, the secret protocols did not have the significance given to them by "other historians". It comes to the point that on the following pages he argues with himself, proving the existence of a connection between the pact and the secret protocols (pp. 45-46). In light of what has already been said about the methods used by the Israeli historian to reinforce the oddities of the *Icebreaker Myth*, it is difficult to suspect him of inattention when reading documentary publications with the text of the pact. He could not help but know that along with the pact, on the night of August 23-24, 1939, the secret attached to it was signed.

ny additional protocol - the first and main of the total number of six secret protocols adopted by the parties in 1939-1941. taken over the course of

several: years, not in one month. Both documents, the pact and the secret protocol, according to which the parties "discussed in a strictly confidential manner the issue of delimiting the spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe", follow one after another in the corresponding diplomatic publications, on adjacent pages." Agree, all this is more than strange.

Finally, does G. Gorodetsky really not know that it was not the pact itself, but the secret protocol supplementing it on the division of Eastern Europe that became the main subject of negotiations in the Kremlin? We read the note to the secret protocol published in the 22nd volume of the Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. The reservation about the absence of a record of the negotiations in the Kremlin (in fact, there is a German record of the negotiations mentioned above; I think there is also a Soviet record of the negotiations, only hidden far away) is accompanied by a note by the compilers of the volume that Stalin considered it necessary to start the meeting with J. Ribbentrop on August 23 precisely on the issue of delimiting "spheres of interest". In his last speech at Nuremberg

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In the process, I. Ribbentrop said that when he arrived in Moscow to conclude a pact, Stalin "made it clear that if he did not get half of Poland and the Baltic countries, even without Lithuania with the port of Libava, then I could immediately fly back"?! . Which was recorded in the secret protocol.

By the way, this most important volume (in two books) of the well-known series "Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR", dedicated to 1939, was not reflected in the "Myth of the Icebreaker". Meanwhile, in the documents of the volume, a counter movement of the parties to the pact is traced, the impetus to which was given by the demand of V.M. Molotov to bring "an appropriate political base" under the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. What did he immediately begin to achieve, replacing

MM. Litvinov in the USSR NKID?2. These are the methods used by the Israeli historian to get rid of deepening into international relations on the eve of the war and to avoid posing the question of Stalin's role in unleashing the world war.

In addition, by stating that the secret protocol was signed not simultaneously with the non-aggression pact, but a month later, G. Gorodetsky bypasses the old problem of Soviet foreign policy - how to keep the secret of the secret protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23 1939. For half a century Soviet leaders, from Comrade Stalin to M.S. Gorbachev, hid the secret of the secret protocol from our public. It lasted so long because the disclosure of the contents of the protocol removed the question of who, at what particular moment and for what purpose unleashed a world war. This also explains the "touching unity" in keeping the secret of the secret protocol, which was carried through the entire world war by the Nazi leaders and the Stalinist leadership. True, it is interesting, what turned out to be more significant than the battle of mortal enemies - Stalin and Hitler, since none of them dared to publish the secret protocol, blaming the other side for everything?

The fact that G. Gorodetsky follows the Soviet tradition of keeping the secret protocol secret (using

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a device that none of the followers of the "Falsifiers of History" had thought of before him – they say that the pact and the secret protocol were signed at different times), could not but affect his interpretation of the historical significance of the pact (and again: in striking difference from "other historians"). It is also striking that, while justifying the foreign policy of the Stalinist leadership, he completely ignores the problem of the relationship between politics and morality in relation to international relations in 1939-1941. In his narrowly diplomatic narrative, all powers and their leaders are equalized as subjects of international relations. "Other historians" take a completely different approach.

Since the moral side of "actual events" is of little interest to the author of "The Myth of the Icebreaker," he sees nothing wrong with the fact that the Stalinist leadership in the last pre-war months of negotiations simultaneously with the countries of the democratic West, and with Nazi Germany. For G. Gorodetsky, who develops his thesis about a hostile environment that "closed more and more around the Soviet Union," this is "realist politics" (pp. 46, 57). In other words, there was nothing left but to pursue "such a policy that would best suit the security of the Soviet Union" (p. 60).

Thus was born Stalin's decision to make a pact with the Nazi leader Hitler.

The final conclusion of the author of The Icebreaker Myth boils down to the fact that both in 1939 and in 1941 Stalin's actions are explained by "the hopelessness of political alternatives for the Soviet Union" (p. 344). Recognizing, however, that from the spring of 1939, with the British guarantees to Poland, the Soviet Union "had an opportunity to choose", that is, it gained freedom of maneuver, which is "the crown of success of any foreign policy" (p. 52 - 53). But why does G. Gorodetsky talk about the absence of alternatives for the USSR? Only because he was never able to understand the motives of the Stalinist leadership, that it was guided in foreign policy solely by class-imperial goals. In those who created

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under extremely favorable international conditions for the USSR.

It is hard to believe that a historian with fifteen years of experience in studying the international events of the time is unaware that both Western countries, democratic England and France, and Nazi Germany attached decisive importance to which side the Soviet Union would take in the approaching general conflict. Therefore, along with the officially announced

Soviet-Western negotiations were secret bilateral Soviet-German "conversations" (V.M. Molotov) and "conversations" (J. Ribbentrop).

In the political and diplomatic circles of Europe, there was a belief that a large-scale conflict on the continent would begin only after the Soviet Union, the last unbiased great European power that could tip the scales in one direction or another, made its choice. But not before.

Let us resort to the testimony of a direct participant in the pre-war diplomatic negotiations on the Soviet side with representatives of both the West and Germany. To the testimony of V.P. Potemkin, in 1937-1940, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Later editor-in-chief of the third volume of *The History of Diplomacy* (first edition), entirely devoted to the diplomatic training of the Second World War and published three years before the appearance of *The Falsifiers of History*. In the chapter on the prewar 1939, and its co-author was V.P. Potemkin, highlighted the paragraph "Rivalry between the Anglo-French bloc and German fascist diplomacy due to an agreement with the USSR". It turns out that the Soviet Union was not only not under "siege", but was in a winning position when there was rivalry, a competitive struggle to win it over to its side. For – this is how the paragraph begins: "For both camps, the question of which side the Soviet Union would take in the upcoming clash became of exceptional importance." A high-ranking eyewitness testifies: the Stalinist Soviet Union was the master of the situation,

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the forest was behind him. And it was made - in favor of Nazi Germany.

And what do the published Soviet and foreign diplomatic documents say? Which version do they confirm: the early one in the *History of Diplomacy* or the later one in *The Falsifiers of History*, which G. Gorodetsky is trying to revive and develop with his book?

I have already had to prove that the Soviet leaders in post-Munich Europe did not at all consider themselves in "international isolation", much less in a "siege". On the contrary, Stalin and his entourage believed that the time had come when they could follow the example of Tsarist Russia, which often determined the outcome of the conflict in intra-European conflicts.

G. Gorodetsky, distracting himself from the motives of the Stalinist leadership, argues that the choice of whether to support the Western countries or their enemy in the person of Germany, the Soviet Union was deprived of the intractability of the Western powers at the tripartite negotiations in Moscow and the fear of war with Germany as a result of its invasion of Poland (pp. 57 - 59). On these pages, referring to the secret intelligence data of May 7 and June 19, which fell on the table to Stalin and allegedly determined his policy "for the next two years", the Israeli historian again imposes on the reader the absolutely unsubstantiated conclusion that "Stalin had no alternative to signing the pact" (p. 61). As in *"Falsifiers of History"*, where the signing of the pact is presented as "the best way out of all possible ways."

But what about the official Soviet statements, according to which things look completely different? For G. Gorodetsky, this is not a problem. Or, as already noted, he simply dismisses such statements, suggesting not to take them at face value. Or, as in this case, he again ignored the statements of the Stalinist leadership, which was still confident that the aggression of Nazi Germany was primarily directed not against the Soviet Union, but against France and England. One of such statements by V.M. Molotov did at the end of May, commenting on the conclusion of May 22

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Mano-Italian military-political treaty. According to him, now the aggressors no longer need to hide behind the screen of the struggle against the Comintern to divert attention. Now "it is definitely said that this treaty is directed precisely against the main European democracies."

Even according to the intelligence information of June 19 (p. 59), about which G. Gorodetsky speaks so highly ("outstanding document", "brilliant intelligence information"), the German plans for the Soviet Union did not go beyond his temporary neutralization by the "second Rapallo".

Comrade Stalin took full advantage of the opportunity to maneuver in the unique situation that opened up for him. The Soviet leader, who allegedly had no other choice but to make a "choice in favor of the lesser of two evils"—that is, to conclude a pact with Hitler (p. 61), took advantage of the opportunity presented to him to advance his class imperial plans.

After the start of the war between Germany and England and France, which acted in accordance with their obligations on the side of Poland, Stalin explained with the utmost frankness the motives for which he had concluded a non-aggression pact with Hitler. He did this on September 7, receiving the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, G. Dimitrov, who applied for political guidelines for the Comintern. In the presence of V.M. Molotov and A.A. Zhdanov, the closest members of the Politburo to Stalin at that time.

Stalin's instructions became known from G. Dimitrov's diary, which G. Gorodetsky also used. But he acted selectively with this document, omitting the most essential part, which reveals the intention laid down by Comrade Stalin in the pact with Hitler. Of course, after everything that was said about the research methodology of the Israeli historian, which is not surprising in the fact that in an analytical way - all methods are good, just to support his version of events, he also managed with the diary of G. Dimitrov, who wrote down Stalin's statements.

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G. Gorodetsky twice refers to the diaries of the leader of the Comintern (pp. 76-77).

For the first time, citing Stalin's words about the fate that was prepared for Poland: "The destruction of this state in the current conditions would mean one less bourgeois state! What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist] system to new territories and populations"88. G. Gorodetsky's comment: "As usual, he [Stalin] frankly defended the interests and priorities of the Soviet Union, slightly covering them with an ideological veil ... However, such statements should not be taken at face value." Like, "the interests of the USSR, and not Lenin's dogmas about the "imperialist war" prevailed (p. 77. My italics.). Well, yes, after all, the Stalinist Soviet Union has long abandoned the offensive against the positions of world capitalism ...

For the second time, the Israeli historian used Stalin's statements about the tripartite negotiations in Moscow. He cites (not completely) another passage from Stalin's instructions to the Comintern that "we preferred an agreement with the so-called democratic countries and therefore negotiated. But the British and French wanted to have us as farmhands and, moreover, pay nothing for it! We, of course, would not have gone to work as farm laborers and received even less without getting anything." Quoted without comments. But there is something to comment on.

It would seem that G. Gorodetsky should have been interested in what Stalin was trying to achieve in the negotiations with England and France, what kind of "payment" he demanded in exchange for "laboring". And he demanded from them what he received from Hitler - control over the western border neighbors between the Baltic and Black Seas. But England and France did not agree to this in any way, which Stalin could not ignore. One might wonder why, even while fighting as part of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Western allies did not recognize the right of the Soviet Union to the three Baltic states. They did not do this even after the end of the war. One more thing could be asked

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The question is whether Stalin, putting forward such territorial demands at the tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, did not want to convey to Hitler his conditions for reaching an agreement with him. After all, the course of the Moscow talks was no secret to the Germans.

And omitted by G. Gorodetsky, as already mentioned, is the most important of Stalin's "frank conversation" (p. 76) with G. Dimitrov. For reasons of scientific conscientiousness, let us restore that part of Stalin's statements in which an assessment of the Soviet-German pact is given in the context of the world war.

Describing the outbreak of the war as a fight "between two groups of capitalist countries," Stalin continued: "We are not averse to them having a good fight and weakening each other. It would not be bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler, without realizing it and not wanting to, is shaking and undermining the capitalist system... We can maneuver, pushing one side against the other in order to better tear ourselves apart. The non-aggression pact helps Germany to some extent. The next moment is to push the other side"??.

As a reader of *The Icebreaker Myth*, I can't help feeling embarrassed for the Israeli historian. Having cited, at the very least, two quotations from Stalin's instructions to G. Dimitrov, he hid from the reader the most fundamental part of them. That the Soviet-German pact helps Hitler, who, without realizing it, is undermining capitalism in Europe by war with Western countries; that the belligerents should continue to be encouraged so that they "better torn apart." I am embarrassed that I do not find an answer befitting a professional historian to the question why he did not dare to quote Stalin's key phrases about the purpose of the Soviet-German pact. Why did he so frankly renounce his promise to write, while maintaining objectivity, which, in his opinion, the "ignorant" V. Suvorov and "other historians" lack. What to do with his own call of "fasting

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try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not judge them from the standpoint of today." The revelations of Stalin, the central figure of the whole story, deserved to be fully transmitted and expertly analyzed.

We have to admit: G. Gorodetsky omitted the most important part of Stalin's testimonies because these revelations alone prove the concept of V. Suvorov's "Icebreaker". This is not only a rejection of the principle of objectivity, but a tacit recognition of the inconsistency of his "non-trivial" version of the Soviet foreign policy of 1939-1941 years.

Once the Israeli historian embarked on the path of concealing the most important Stalinist documents ("A Short Course in the History of the CPSU (6)", a report at the 18th Congress, the most revealing part of the instructions to the Comintern), he continued it with respect to other historical evidence. Thus, in the "Myth of the Icebreaker" there was no place for diplomatic reports to Moscow from European capitals, which spoke of the panic that gripped Western countries before the inevitable social consequences of the world war. Does its author really imagine that the figures of that time acted according to prescriptions that he writes out to them retroactively?!

Speaking about the goals of Soviet foreign policy in connection with the World War, G. Gorodetsky completely abstracts from its geopolitical consequences - the expansion of Soviet control over Eastern and Central Europe up to Berlin. The successive "pushing" of the parties, supposedly equally hostile to the USSR, resulted in Soviet participation - on a contractual basis - in both belligerent coalitions. First, in August-September 1939, by signing two agreements with Nazi Germany and entering into officially recognized "friendly relations" with it; then, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, they acceded to the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, which announced the unification of the efforts of their countries in the war against "Nazi tyranny". It's from

number of major events of the initial stage of World War II. They cannot be bypassed or misinterpreted.

At the end of the war, Stalin again equalized the two coalitions, as he had done before the war, describing the Second World War as a clash of "two capitalist coalitions clinging to each other" in order to "achieve world domination." And at the party congress of 1952, the historical significance of the world war (that is, its main result) was considered from the angle of the formation of a "peace and democracy camp opposed to the camp of imperialism"??2. What more evidence is required that in its foreign policy the Stalinist leadership proceeded from the postulate of the need to take advantage of "inter-imperialist contradictions" in the interests of the "cause of socialism"?! More precisely, for the class-imperial purposes of the Stalinist Soviet Union.

Stalin's speech on March 10 with its pro-German accents; Litvinov, Stalin's instructions by K.E. Voroshilov of August 7, frankly aimed at disrupting negotiations with the military missions of England and France that have not yet begun, the decision of the Politburo of August 11 on the readiness to enter into official negotiations on issues already agreed with the German side (which formed the content of the secret protocol)?* — this is an incomplete list of documented facts of the spring-summer of 1939, which speak of the purposeful course of the Stalinist leadership towards reaching agreements with Nazi Germany.

Perhaps this series should be supplemented with another archival document on how Stalin's inner circle imagined the outcome of the parallel officially announced tripartite (USSR, England and France) and secret bilateral (USSR and Germany) negotiations.

This document is a transcript of the report by D.Z. Manuilsky in an audience consisting of representatives of the party and scientific elite. They spoke confidentially about the prospects for the Moscow tripartite talks: "We

we clearly understand that now we are being looked after as much as a rich Moscow bride was in her time (laughter), but we know the value of our beauty (applause) and if we make a marriage, then by calculation (laughter, applause). Marriage for love will not enter with us (so in the text. - DN.), but for the calculation - you are welcome. And at the end of the speech, in response to questions: "I am not a great optimist, I will not say, like the English press, that the agreement between the USSR and England and France is already in my pocket. There may be a fig in your pocket. Apparently, having come to his senses, he continued: "This is a serious question, I won't say that." Nevertheless: "And I say, I am not an optimist, I do not think that the agreement is already in my pocket, I just, as a Soviet person, have a large share of skepticism." There was no place for documents of this kind in the Myth of the Icebreaker.

6. WITHOUT DRY RESIDUE

Why did V. Suvorov's "Icebreaker" find its numerous readers, but G. Gorodetsky's "The Myth of the Icebreaker" did not? Therefore, it seems that not only the historical truth proclaimed by each of these authors is important, but also the path to this truth, which the reader travels together with the researcher. The path of evidence based on facts, documents, arguments. Whoever has it more convincingly has grateful readers.

The historical retrospective reflected in the words and deeds of Comrade Stalin convinces us that the outcome (yes, the outcome!) of his pre-war foreign policy - the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact - was predetermined by the calculation of undermining the forces of the capitalist countries in the NEW World War. The pact was a practical application of the Marxist-Leninist idea of using "inter-imperialist contradictions" in the interests of class and empire.

Stalinist Soviet Union. Hence the Soviet rushing from cooperation with Germany (1939-1941) to joining the anti-Hitler coalition together with England, the USA and France (1941-1945). None of the main participants in the world war did such deep

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side military-political zigzags, like the Soviet Union; all the other participants in the war—a coalition war on both sides—decided in advance on the choice of potential allies.

On the whole, "The Myth of the Icebreaker" by G. Gorodetsky is nothing but a remake of Stalin's "Falsifiers of History", the provisions of which have long been abandoned by historians who respect themselves and readers. By opposing himself to other historians, and not only to V. Suvorov, the author deprived himself of the opportunity to try to reveal the historical significance of the Second World War. Not to mention the fact that the general context of the 20th century, the global confrontation between democracy and totalitarianism, remained out of his attention.

Notes

¹Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker": On the eve of the war Translation from English. M., 1995. 350 p.

Hereinafter references to G. Gorodetsky's book are given directly in the text of the article.

The oddities of the "Icebreaker Myth" have already been the subject of public analysis: see, for example: Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's choice of 1941: defense or ... "the slogan of an offensive war"? (Regarding the book by G. Gorodetsky "The Myth of the Icebreaker"). // National history. 1996. No. 3. S. 55 - 73.

⁴Suvorov V. Icebreaker. Who started World War II? M., 1992; M day. When did World War II start? Continuation of the book "Icebreaker". M., 1994.

⁵On the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Report of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939 // Pravda. November 1, 1939 The fact that this assessment belongs to Stalin became known from his editing of the text of the article "Peace or War?", which was published in the newspaper Izvestia on October 9, 1939 in support of "peace proposals » Hitler, put forward by him in a speech in the Reichstag on October 6, 1939 // Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). F. 558. Op. I. D. 1123. L. 35.

Declaration of the Government of the USSR at the Inter-Allied Conference in London. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. Documents and materials. T. 1. M., 1944. S. 144 - 148.

⁷See more details: Najafov D.G. On the historical and geopolitical legacy of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. // Is it true

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Victor Suvorov. Restoring the history of World War II - 2. M., 2007. S. 33 - 80.

⁸Sm. Gorodetsky G. Fatal self-deception. Stalin and the German attack on the Soviet Union. M., 2001.

⁹Falsifiers of history. (Historical reference.) M., 1948.

¹⁰The solid work of the English co-authors A. Reed and D. Fisher "Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 1939 - 1941" (Beaa A., Ezeyer G. T'e Reauiu Etygase: Hsheer, Sciaip apa Mali-Souiei Rasi, 1939 1941. G.opdop. 1988) is rejected as a manifestation of the "survivability of this myth". // The myth of the "Icebreaker". S. 70.

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12 Falsifiers of history. pp. 36-55. The title of the chapter of the pamphlet belongs to Stalin.

3 there. pp. 53 - 55.

MMat1-Souiei Velayop\$, 1939 - 1941: Rosshtepis Notes ye Atshuess oE Sche Segtap Geogeop Oyse. Ea. Bu V. S. Somao, J. \$. Ved fe. Mayynopyp, 1948. It is clear that G. Gorodetsky did not need the documents of this collection.

15 Tov. Malenkov: Information report on the activities of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6). // Meetings of the Cominform. 1947, 1948, 1949. Documents and materials. M., 1998. P. 81. The Diplomatic Dictionary, published in the early 1960s, as an example of the use of contradictions between the imperialists "to neutralize their aggressive plans" contains a reference to the as well as during World War II. // Diplomatic Dictionary. In 3 vols. M., 1960 - 1964; vol. 1, p. 467. For the authors of the official history of Soviet foreign policy, the Second World War was a confirmation of Lenin's prediction of the inevitability of "the most terrible clashes" between socialism and capitalism, i.e. was a natural continuation of the struggle between the two systems. // History of foreign policy of the USSR. 1917 - 1985. In 2 vols. Ed. 5th. M., 1986. T. 1. S. 15.

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"Tre Moa ip Mags 1939. Ea. Bu A. Topee, E. T. AzMup-Suakap. Gop4dop, her. 1952. R. UP.

18 The editorial of the Izvestia newspaper "On the International Position". May 11, 1939 // USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Year of crisis. Documents and materials. In 2 vols. M., 1990. T. 1. S. 452. The editorial was perceived by Soviet diplomats abroad as an indication of Moscow.

19 Chuev F.M. Molotov: Semi-power ruler. M., 1999. S. 82.

20 G. Gorodetsky's answers to the questions of the journal New and Contemporary History. // "New and Recent History". 1995, no. 3. S. 71 (italics mine).

2 P.T. resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) of November 14, 1938

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party propaganda in connection with the release of the "Short Course in the History of the CPSU (6)". // "Is it true". November 15, 1938

22 Truth. September 19, 1938

23 21st anniversary of the October Revolution. Comrade's report V.M. Molotov at the solemn meeting of the Moscow Council on November 6 of this year. // Pravda, November 7, 1938

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(Sakharov A.N. War and Soviet Diplomacy: 1939 - 1945. // Questions of History. 1995. No. 7. P. 32.

27 Simonov K.M. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on I.V. Stalin. M., 1990. S. 86. See also: Vishnevsky Vs. "... We ourselves will go on the attack." From the diaries of 1939-1941. // M., 1995. No. 5. S. 104 - 105, 107 - 109.

28RGASPI. F. 77, op. 1, d. 714, l. 33 — 54. Further references to individual sheets are not given. The document style has been saved. (Italics mine. - Auth.)

2See: Comintern and the idea of world revolution. Documentation. M., 1998.

30 Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. // "Questions of history". 1990, No. 8. S. 60.

31 Transcript of the report of comrade. Manuisky about the international situation. July 14, 1939 // RGASPI. F. 523. Op. 1. D. 92. L. 16.

32Foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Report of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Comrade. V.M. Molotov at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 1, 1940 // Pravda, August 2, 1940.

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34Comrade Stalin's Report... // 18th Congress... P. 11 (italics mine. - Auth.).

35 Comrade Stalin's Report... // 18th Congress... P. 13 (italics mine. - Auth.).

36Ibid. P. 14 (italics mine. - Auth.).

37Comrade Stalin's Report... // 18th Congress... P. 15.

38Note from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov to the German Ambassador to the USSR F. Schulenburg. March 18, 1939 // DVP of the USSR. T. 22. Book. 1. S. 202 - 204.

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58Galyanov V. The international situation of the Second World War. // Bolshevik. 1939, No. 4. S. 65.

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72 German-Soviet communiqué. September 18, 1939 // Ibid. T. 22. Book. 2. S. 98.

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74Speech by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. August 31, 1939 // The year of the crisis. T. 2. S. 350.

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Uri Milstein!

VOLUNTEER ASSISTANTS OF STALIN

WHY HATE VICTOR Suvorov

Having analyzed in my time all the military moves of Adolf Hitler—especially those relating to August/September 1939—I came to the conclusions set out in the book T'e Coparse ap a 1e550p5 (1993)¹, in which parallels were drawn between the Yom Kippur War? 1973 and the crossing of the Meuse River by the Wehrmacht in 1940.

German government in the late 1930s was not interested either in the world war, or even in the war against Poland. He was much more concerned - and with good reason - that the combined forces of Great Britain and France would reach the western borders of the German Reich, while the Soviet Union would simultaneously attack the eastern ones. Hitler believed that he would need years more to arm and fortify himself before he could risk a general European war, and that if he risked war now, he would put at stake everything that had been created by his aggressive policy. Namely: the transformation of a defeated country into a great power in just seven years of successful all-in strategy. On September 1, 1939, Hitler was sure that his entry into Poland would not lead to war, since he still had before his eyes a peaceful annexation without firing a shot.

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Sudetenland, and that Poland would accept his demands without entering the war. Hitler thought so also because Poland was weaker than Czechoslovakia, and because Stalin, by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, gave him a guarantee of non-aggression, and the secret protocol to it meant the unequivocal collapse of the future of Eastern Europe.

Hitler was wrong on all these points.

For Stalin, the strategic significance of the pact was that it created the Moscow-Berlin axis, which allowed the Reich - at first - to take over Western Europe, but then allowed the destruction of the German comrades in the pact and - as a third step - the subordination of the whole world to Bolshevism.

In fact, even then it was clear that this was a pact between enemies, ready at any moment to break it and destroy the enemy even before the ink dries on paper.

Perhaps Stalin signed the pact in the expectation that the Third Reich would develop its armed forces no faster than after 1933; in the middle of 1940, the Nazi army would not have been able to offer serious resistance to the attacking Red Army. Since the time of Peter the Great, Germany has personified for the Russians the pinnacle of progress and the ideal to achieve. Therefore, just at that time, Stalin staked on a war between the capitalist countries of the West, which, according to his plans, were destined sooner or later to be included in the community of communist states.

Even at a time when I knew nothing about Viktor Suvorov and his great work, it seemed clear to me that Stalin had pushed Hitler to attack Poland. If Stalin had attacked Poland at the same time as Hitler—as implied by the supplementary agreement to the non-aggression pact, or a day later, as Hitler demanded of him—then Britain and France would not have dared to declare war on the German-Soviet military alliance. This follows from the German appeal to the Soviet Union on September 3, 1939, to enter Poland in accordance with the agreement, i.e., on the very day when Veli

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Britain and France declared war on Germany. Stalin was extremely interested in declaring war on Germany by Western democracies, since this eliminated the threat of the USSR in the future and weakened all the countries involved in the war; this was to be the first step towards a future Soviet invasion.

The former Soviet secret service officer Viktor Suvorov, who turned his back on collapsing Soviet totalitarianism in 1978 and defected to the liberal West, devoted all his energies to uncovering the Stalinist master plan: the Soviet leader sought the world domination of Bolshevik totalitarianism and wanted to to play in their favor the German military potential. Was the purpose of Stalin's intrigues to unleash a war by superior German forces under the command of a vicious and invincible "watch dog" (to use the expression of Suvorov himself)? — Adolf Hitler.

Since the beginning of 1990, a "world war" has flared up among historians over the question of the main culprit. Today, everything speaks for the fact that there was one main culprit of the Second World War — and the catastrophe that overtook the Jewish people — and it was not the "watch dog" Adolf Hitler, but the one who set him on his neighbors: Joseph Stalin.

Suvorov's book *The Main Culprit*, published in the United States in 2008, aims to finally confirm the thesis that was first stated twenty years earlier in the book *Icebreaker*.

At the same time, Suvorov's concept is so simple and elegant that it seems surprising why only in the mid-1980s. he was the first to build it sequentially. This concept is based, among other things, on the contacts that arose between the Soviets and the NSDAP in 1923; the ban on the German communists in 1933 entering into a coalition with the social democrats, which could have prevented the Nazis from coming to power; on the support that war-losing Germany secretly received from Soviet Russia so that it could develop military products and train army officers on Soviet territory—which

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completely contradicted the prohibitions imposed on the Germans by the Treaty of Versailles.

It should be emphasized that "The Main Culprit" is by no means a reprint of Suvorov's classic work "The Icebreaker", published in 1989. In the new book, Suvorov masterfully uses numerous latest publications published in different countries (some from 2008 to 2008).), while its first-born "Icebreaker" relied only on open sources of the Soviet era. In the new book, Suvorov examines in detail many important events that had previously been beyond his attention, the assassination of Trotsky, the war in Spain, the attack on Japan in August 1945.

With an extremely strange unprofessional hostility for an educated person, the concept of Suvorov was considered by the famous American historian David Glantz in his 1998 book "The Stumbling Colossus"? and no less respectable Israeli historian of diplomacy Gabriel Gorodetsky in his book Fatal Self-Deception (1999).

Both of them do not discuss the results of Suvorov's research at all, but simply declare that their own books of Suvorov have been refuted.

Most trained historians have followed the ostrich tactic, sticking their heads in the sand, hoping that if Suvorov's work is hushed up, everyone will forget about it. Such a tactic only demonstrates the unreasonableness of these historians themselves — it is thanks to this silence that Suvorov's works become even more famous (I myself paid attention to Suvorov's works, because I heard that they were hushed up).

Glantz and Gorodetsky failed to refute Suvorov's arguments, they only made their own, extremely superficial understanding of what was happening in the USSR obvious.

Their criticism, combined with the silence of the rest, speaks more about the nature of the Western "left", which is a product of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, slightly polished by intellectual chatter Frankfurt

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school and its most famous representative in the West, the German-Jewish scholar Herbert Marcuse, than about Hitler and Stalin.

Both Soviet and Western historians justified the conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - by the fact that it was allegedly concluded under the pressure of circumstances and cannot be condemned, because - as they say The USSR was very weak then. First of all, due to the fact that Soviet officers became victims of political purges, such as, for example, Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky. Therefore, Stalin wanted to win a couple of years in order to have time to arm himself for the decisive battle with Hitler.

Before Suvorov, there was a consensus on this issue: Soviet scientists were afraid for their lives, their Western colleagues were fascinated by the Soviet Union. And most importantly: the German Reich attacked the USSR in June 1941, and the Red Army was defeated. For everyone, this meant that the combat capabilities of the Red Army in 1941 were not in the best way. Consequently, in 1939 it must have been much weaker still.

However, Suvorov, in his new book, brilliantly refuted this argument and proved that the purges did not at all significantly weaken the Red Army. Stalin, a master of disguise, perfectly aware of the high combat capability of the Red Army, carefully concealed it from the rest of the world. Suvorov, talking about the Stalinist strategy of secrecy, writes, for example, that just in those days when the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed, the Red Army won a triumphant victory over the Japanese in Mongolia, but this triumph was at the direction of the Soviet higher authorities "rolled under the carpet."

Since the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Anglo-Saxons have been leading the world, although many have tried to challenge their superiority by force.

By the beginning of the 20th century, more than three hundred years later, the Anglo-Saxons created a liberal political civilization, and American liberalism emerged from the First World War

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victorious, in spite of US military weakness, but because of its industrial superiority.

Since then, it was American liberalism, in alliance with the European satellites of the United States, Great Britain and France, that set the tone in the world.

But even before this US victory, the revolutionary Bolshevik Vladimir Lenin wrote in his work *The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution* (1916/1917) that communist totalitarianism would use war as a means of conquering the world, and that if this goal was not achieved, it will take another world war to spread the Marxist utopia to the whole world. And before the messianic victory of this utopia, Lenin intended to build his dominion on the cruel Marxist idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." After the October Revolution of 1917, Lenin tried to prolong the world war by securing the support of the German Empire: in March 1918, the freshly minted Soviet Republic signed a peace treaty with Germany, which after that could continue to fight only on the Western Front. In addition, Germany received from Russia huge territories with industrial enterprises, agricultural production and important military raw materials.

Lenin believed that the capitalist states of the West would mutually exhaust each other, the exploited masses would rise up, and revolutions would break out all over Europe, directly or indirectly benefiting the Bolsheviks. But Germany agreed in November 1918 to a cessation of hostilities, and the revolutions provoked by the Bolsheviks in some European countries quickly died out. It soon became clear that communism in Europe in peacetime had no chance of winning.

Therefore, the Bolsheviks became secret instigators of WAR.

According to Stalin's plan, Hitler—whose work *Mein Kampf* was very quickly translated into Russian and carefully studied by Stalin—was like an "icebreaker" to break through the fairway in the frozen ocean of liberal Western Europe. After that, the Red Army could

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invade Europe without much resistance and bring the joys of communism to its peoples with bayonets.

Hitler, however, was not a very attentive reader of the works of Lenin and Stalin, and this was precisely one of the reasons for his last failure: Stalin surpassed him intellectually.

War is first of all a war of the spirit, even Friedrich II of Prussia in his time taught this to his generals.

In most Western countries - and in Israel too - Suvorov is more than unloved by the academic historical community. However, in the same Israel, he has countless readers, especially among the million immigrants from the former USSR. The hatred of the academic community can be explained by the fact that it is almost entirely formed by the Frankfurt School, which strongly influenced Israeli culture. This is a problem that Dr. Gideon Ariel and I discussed in our book *Dream Oasis*."

However, scholars from the Civil Combat Research Forum found much in common between Suvorov's theses and their own research on the war between Israel, Egypt, and Syria in 1973.

According to Suvorov, Stalin was planning an attack on Germany, but Hitler beat him to it with a preemptive attack on June 22, 1941. When asked why the Soviet armed forces suffered such a crushing defeat immediately after the start of Operation Barbarossa, Glantz and Gorodetsky answer : the intelligence information received by Stalin was interpreted by him in such a way that Hitler would not be able to dare to attack. Therefore, the Soviet dictator turned out to be completely unprepared for the attack.

Suvorov answers the same question differently: the Red Army was defeated because it was preparing for an attack).

Something similar happened during the Yom Kippur War. Israeli forces stationed along the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights were stunned by

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that the Egyptians and Syrians seized the initiative in April 1973. Most researchers, both in Israel and elsewhere, see the reason for this confusion as a misinterpretation of intelligence information. Employees of the Civil Forum group came across an unexpected fact: despite the defensive policy after the six-day war in 1967, the Israeli army received only offensive weapons - aircraft and tanks, developed only offensive strategies and planned only an attacker in a future war. - operations.

After it became clear at 3:30 am on October 6 that war would begin on that day, David Elazar, Chief of the General Staff, and his officers were busy developing exclusively offensive plans, although they knew full well that Israel would be attacked by seven Egyptian and Syrian divisions. They were opposed by only three Israeli regiments, two of which were to be destroyed that day.

Just as exactly as Suvorov's concept, they were either ignored or met with hostility at the opening of the "Civil Forum". This is the reason for the "ruling madness" (Togey de "Kesiegepaen"), exposed by American Jewish historian Barbara Tuchman in a book of the same name in 1984. The intellectual elite clung to false dogma, only not to admit that they were wrong .

Stalin was - and this is provable - not only the main culprit of the Second World War and the catastrophe that befell the Jews, but also - as Suvorov shows - the subsequent spread of Marxist influence in the pseudo-liberal West, a spread that took the form of such a "religion prudence" which Maximilian Robespierre and his accomplices failed to impose on revolutionary France after 1791.

Karl Marx defined religion as "the opiate of the people." He understood that the masses cannot live without religion. But since the traditional, transcendental religion suffered greatly from the skepticism of the eighteenth century, the leaders of the French

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The tsuzsky revolution decided to create an intellectual opium.

Marx succeeded where all his predecessors had failed: he created a religion based on an anti-capitalist utopia.

But Marx was wrong, because he did not understand that modern civilization is based on capital, on surplus value, and without it we will be plunged into an era of hunting and gathering. Marx's theses were melted down by Lenin and later by Stalin into a dogma that has remained unshakable since the end of the First World War. Pseudo-liberal intellectuals have been infected with this dogma for nine decades, and that is why they play the role of inquisitors in relation to people like Viktor Suvorov, the latter who are able to

prove the hopelessness of their religion. Stalin failed to conquer all of Europe, and what he managed to conquer has long since fallen apart again. Today, China, with its mixture of "Nazi" political totalitarianism and economic liberalism, is on the rise and reaching for world domination.

But in one respect Stalin was undeniably successful: he harnessed Western intellectuals to his cart.

Notes

1! Defeat and its lessons, 1993.

2 Doomsday War.

3 "When we commemorate with an unkind word the dog that bit half of Europe, let's not forget Stalin, who raised the dog. And then he let go of the chain. Suvorov Victor. Icebreaker. Moscow: AST, 2001, p. 13.

4 5Imogou GTsaog. Your USA Sshri (2008).

5 Cstapig Frame. On the other hand, Cojoz\$u\$, Oshuerzlu Prgess oGKapas. 1998.

6 Sotodevka date. Stapa Re[azyup, 1999. Russian edition: Fatal self-deception. Moscow: Rosspen, 2001.

7 Tre Oasis oJOgeat. Ziguua| Pross, 2006.

8 / LuPez Geogit Yoag Che Oshegzisvipe wop ZsShasMep.

Yuri Tsurganov

THE IDEA OF THE "GREAT PATRIOTIC"

THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET MYTHOLOGY OF OUR DAYS

In the late 1980s, an extremely difficult situation developed for Soviet patriots. It was akin to the one in which the heroes of their legend, the "Panfilovites", found themselves. The political leader of the "Panfilovites" is credited with the phrase: "Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - behind Moscow." At the end of perestroika, the ideologists of Soviet patriotism also had nowhere to retreat — the history of the "Great Patriotic War" was behind them.

By that time, almost all the dogmas of the outgoing era were reassessed in the public mind: "developed socialism", "peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR", "voluntary entry" of the Baltic countries into the "fraternal family of the peoples of the Soviet Union", "unprecedented flourishing of culture in the USSR" And so on. The cult of Lenin held out the longest, but he, in the end, fell under the onslaught of irrefutable evidence of the mass extermination of people during the Red Terror, that it was Lenin who laid the foundations of totalitarianism in our country.

The idea of the "Great Patriotic War" became the last stronghold of the ideology of the Soviet patriots. In the late 1980s (as, by the way, even now), attempts to refute the theses of Soviet propaganda about the Second World War were perceived by officials with particular intolerance. Not surprising. After all, the collapse of the "last holy

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neither" deprives the Bolsheviks of power of any historical justification.

Despite the opposition of officials, from the beginning of the 1990s to the present time, many works have been written and published, the authors of which are free from ideological clichés.

If the first of these books had come out five years earlier, the last bastion of Soviet propaganda would have collapsed.

Unfortunately, in the 1990s, the minds of many Russian citizens were no longer so receptive to new ideas related to the field of humanitarian knowledge. People were not busy with this - some were creating initial capital, others were looking for means of subsistence, that is, "their own affairs". Therefore, the stereotypes of thinking in relation to the events of 1941-1945 remained basically the same.

The Soviet patriots almost managed to defend the "last bastion" and even use it as a springboard for an ideological counteroffensive.

In the 1990s, many citizens became disillusioned with democratic reforms. The consequence of this was nostalgia for the USSR and the search for "bright sides" in its history. This was immediately noticed by those who dream of restoring the Soviet order. Today, they are gradually turning the idea of the "Great Patriotic War" into a surrogate for the national idea of Russia. There was no national idea, and there is no, but the "Great Patriotic War" is presented as something sacred, not subject to rethinking. Any attempt to revise the history of the war is treated as an apostasy.

Based on the myth of the "Great Patriotic War", modern Soviet patriots are trying to rehabilitate many of the actions of the Bolsheviks since 1917. They are trying to convince us that, despite the harshness and even cruelty of the methods used by the Bolsheviks, it was these methods that ensured ultimately victory over Germany.

In this case, the following judgments are expressed:

- June 22, 1941 Nikolai P would have been aged

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73 years old, his son, Tsarevich Alexei, would have been 37. Neither one nor the other, much less the political heirs of Kerensky, would have been able to organize an adequate rebuff to Hitler.

- Repulse could not be organized because tsarist Russia was a backward country. Nicholas II suffered from paralysis of will, allowed himself to be misled by the court camarilla, unwittingly becoming a hostage to political intrigues. He made decisions that served the interests of those close to the court, and not the interests of the country. All this was quite clearly manifested during the First World War.

— By 1941, the situation could only worsen. Firstly, old age is added to all other bad qualities of Nicholas II; secondly, Hitler was stronger and more dangerous than Kaiser Wilhelm. By the beginning of the new German invasion, Tsarevich Alexei could have already succeeded his father on the Russian throne. But he was a seriously ill person — he suffered from hemophilia. A liberal republican government would have been even more incapable of repulsing the German onslaught.

— Of course, certain positive changes could have taken place in non-Soviet Russia by 1941, including in the economy, but clearly nothing like the industrialization carried out by the Bolsheviks could be carried out.

"Since it would have been impossible for Hitler to give a proper rebuff, Russia was in for destruction: the territory was dismembered, the peoples were partly exterminated, partly enslaved by the "Great German Reich".

- Only the Bolsheviks had the will to fight, were able to prepare the country for defense and thereby save it. During the three pre-war five-year plans, the country has traveled in its industrial development the path that European countries have traveled for 50-100 years. Russia from an agricultural country

turned into an industrial giant. The developed heavy industry made it possible, albeit belatedly, to equip the Red Army with modern weapons and defeat the enemy.

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A high price was paid for industrialization. But without it, there would have been no victory, and, consequently, no Russia itself. It was impossible to carry out industrialization without the transfer of funds from agriculture to industry, and this transfer is impossible without collectivization. Collectivization was impossible without dispossession, because it inevitably led to resistance from the most prosperous peasants.

— All this could not be done without the termination of the New Economic Policy, without the use of the free labor force of prisoners, without selling national wealth abroad. It was impossible not to lower the living standards of citizens, and in order to avoid unrest, strikes and strikes, political repressions had to be carried out in the country according to the principle “not for what”, but “not for what”. It was inevitable to fight the opposition and dissent, and such a fight is impossible in the conditions of the existence of a multi-party system, parliamentarism and its state media.

“Of course, all this could not have been accomplished without the Bolsheviks seizing power in October 1917 and without those methods of fighting the enemies of the revolution that took place during the Civil War.

Yes, the Bolsheviks caused a lot of suffering to people, committed many injustices. But, if not for the Bolsheviks, Hitler would have destroyed us. The Bolsheviks donated a part in order to ultimately save the whole.

- That is, if the Bolsheviks had not taken power in 1917, then the war in 1941 would have ended with the defeat of Russia.

The scheme is based on two postulates:

- Hitler's attack was inevitable;

— Hitler posed a real threat to the biological and cultural existence of the peoples of Russia.

However, these postulates are unsteady, and without them the whole scheme breaks down.

How did Hitler become Hitler?

The answer to the question of how inevitable Hitler's attack was depends on the answer to another question: how inevitable was his rise to power in Germany?

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What happened as a result? Let's figure it out.

None of the leaders of Bolshevism in 1917 considered the seizure of power in Russia to be the final point of the program. Lenin even argued that it would be more correct to speak not about the Russian revolution, but about the world revolution, which, due to historical circumstances, began in Russia!

In 1919, the Bolsheviks created in Moscow a transnational “proletarian” organization of a “new type”—the Communist International (Comintern). The organization set itself the task of establishing the “dictatorship of the proletariat” on a global scale. The Communist International defined itself as the world communist party. The Charter of the Comintern read: “As the leader and organizer of the world revolutionary movement of the proletariat,

bearer of the principles and goals of communism, the Communist International is fighting ... for the creation of the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"? (which, in essence, was a declaration of war on the whole world, at least the cold war). As a springboard for the implementation of this plan, the leaders of the Bolsheviks, who are also the leaders of the Comintern, intended to use the territory of the Russian state they had already destroyed.

In the first years of their stay in power, the Bolsheviks made several unsuccessful attempts to carry out a revolutionary campaign in Europe with the help of the Red Army. The peoples of neighboring countries perceived these measures not as a mission of "liberation from the yoke of the landowners and capitalists", but as aggression. The Red Army was rebuffed. The attempts of the Bolsheviks to organize revolutions in European countries with the help of the Foreign Department of the GPU, that is, to blow them up from the inside, were also unsuccessful.

Then the Bolsheviks began to develop new tactics for the world revolution. It was to contribute to the establishment in one of the European countries of an aggressive regime that would unleash a new world war and enslave the rest of the peoples of Europe. In this version, the forthcoming invasion of the Red Army certainly should have been perceived by these peoples as a mission of "liberation". (The future aggressive regime in the peri

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During its growth, the Bolsheviks were to provide technical assistance.)

Germany seemed to be the ideal state that could unleash a new world war in the future. Here were the most suitable conditions for potential aggressors to come to power, namely, revanchist moods in society.

The fact is that the powers that defeated Germany in the First World War punished her too cruelly. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had to pay multimillion-dollar reparations. This led to disastrous social and economic consequences for the Germans. A characteristic indicator is brand hyperinflation. In 1922, in Germany, prices changed but 5-6 times a day, wages were paid twice a day. The conditions of Versailles were also a blow to the national pride of the Germans. Germany lost 67.3 thousand square kilometers of its territory and all its colonies.

These two factors - poverty and national humiliation - contributed to the emergence and growth of revanchist sentiments in German society.

Under these conditions, Soviet-German military cooperation began - the first phase of the implementation of the new tactics of the world revolution.

According to the Versailles Treaty of 1919, the armed forces of Germany - the Reichswehr - were limited to 100 thousand people in 10 divisions: 3 cavalry and 7 infantry. The German army was forbidden to have a submarine fleet, large armored ships, aircraft, airships, tanks, armored cars, chemical weapons. And in 1922, in Rapallo, Soviet and German representatives signed an agreement on cooperation, which did not have military articles, but its most important result was interaction in the field of armaments. The Reichswehr received the right to create military installations on Soviet territory, secretly from the whole world. They were intended for testing military equipment, accumulating tactical experience, training personnel of those branches of the armed forces that Germany was forbidden to have.

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In 1923, several agreements were signed, in particular with the Junkers firm, on the construction of an aircraft factory on the territory of the USSR. In 1924, Soviet industry accepted an order from the Reichswehr for the production of 400,000 shells. There were three main centers of cooperation between the Red Army and the Germans: the higher pilot school in Lipetsk - "Lipetsk", the tank school in Kazan - "Kama" and the school of chemical warfare in Podosinki - "Tomka". In 1931, the following were trained in Moscow:

V. Model, V. Brauchitsch, V. Keitel, E. Manstein and other future commanders of the Second World War. In 1933, cooperation came to naught, but the power of the German army by this time had already been largely recreated?. In any case, the available facts testify to the quite definite intentions of the Soviet side - intentions to help Germany maintain the military sphere at a modern level.

The next phase of the new tactics of the world revolution was the bringing to power in Germany of the main revanchist force - the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) - Adolf Hitler.

According to the charter of the Comintern, the communist parties of different countries were included in it as sections. The CPSU(b) was also one of the sections, but played a leading role: "The number of decisive votes of each section at the world congress is determined ... according to the number of members of the given party and the political significance of the given country". It is quite obvious that the VKP(b) was the most numerous of all the communist parties, and the political significance of the USSR for the world communist movement was decisive, since only in the Soviet Union was the Communist Party in power, moreover, no other parties in The USSR did not exist.

Thus, the Comintern was an instrument of the foreign policy of the USSR, and foreign communist parties were executors of the will of the leadership of the CPSU (b): "Decisions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International are obligatory for all sections of the Communist International and must be immediately carried out by them in LIFE".

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In 1928, the UT Congress of the Comintern took place. It proclaimed that the main enemy of the international communist movement were the Social Democrats. By that time, three parties had real power in Germany: the National Socialists, the Social Democrats and the Communists. The Comintern (and in practice, the leadership of the USSR, or more precisely, Stalin) forbade the German communists to support the Social Democrats and form pre-election blocs with them. As a result, the Nazis won the 1932 Reichstag elections. A regularity has long been noted: the sum of votes cast for each of the politically close parties going to the polls separately is significantly less than the number of votes that could be cast for their single bloc. Nothing disappoints the voter more than the inability of those for whom he was going to vote to agree with politically close ones on joint coordinated actions. Stalin forbade the German Communist Party to negotiate.

German President Hindenburg appointed Hitler Reich Chancellor (head of government) on January 30, 1933. Soviet books say that this post was literally bought by Hitler by large German industrialists. Their motive is that Hitler will prepare for revenge, therefore, the industry will receive military orders. That is, it was a profitable investment. This is true. But Hitler, in order to bet on him, had to be something of himself. He represented the leader of the party that won the largest number of votes in the elections.

This is a brief history of the participation of the USSR in the creation of the Third Reich.

CONSEQUENCE OF THE OCTOBER COUP

In Germany itself, the votes cast for the NSDAP signified not only the desire for revenge for Versailles, and not only disappointment in the "ability" of the German Social Democrats and the German Communists to find a common language. They also meant fear of Bolshevism.

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This fear was one of the natural consequences of the October Revolution in Russia and the subsequent attempts to spread Bolshevism to other countries: "Give Warsaw!"; "Give Berlin!".

In the 1930s, in Germany, as well as in other European states, it was widely believed that the Bolshevik regime could be successfully opposed only by a similar totalitarian regime, but with the opposite ideological sign: not international, but national.

Hitler fully responded to such sentiments, whose concept of a totalitarian state was borrowed from Lenin, and the edge of Nazi totalitarianism was turned against an international brother-model. Both Lenin and Hitler have one leader, one party, they have powerful secret police in their hands. The country is carrying out a complete "levelling" (Sletsizspa un?) of cultural and social life. Any public associations independent of the ruling party are being liquidated. But Hitler copies Bolshevism in order to repulse him. Even Hitler's anti-Semitism was dressed in the toga of struggle against "Judao-Bolshevism".

So, without the Bolsheviks, Hitler would hardly have succeeded as a dictator. Some "intrigues of Versailles" are not enough, especially since by the beginning of the 1930s, the most painful articles of the Versailles Treaty for Germany were canceled. Much more important is the situation in Russia. If the monarchist or republican system had been preserved in it until 1933 (and beyond), the Reichswehr would not have been able to maintain itself at a modern level, the NSDAP would not have won the elections both because of the creation of a left bloc opposing it, and because the German townsfolk would have no reason to vote for national extremists.

There would have been neither reasons nor models for the creation of the Hitler regime.

TWO SYSTEMS

In fairness, let's say that such complete forms as in the USSR, totalitarianism in Germany never found. The political model created by Hitler has

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there is much in common with the model created by Lenin and Stalin, but there are also significant differences: the Bolsheviks carried out the demolition of the "old state machine" - the Nazis did not begin to break it; the Bolsheviks destroyed the aristocracy and the social elite - the Nazis kept it; the Bolsheviks liquidated private enterprise, private capital, private ownership of the means of production - the Nazis left all this behind.

Accordingly, the way of life of people in the USSR and in the Reich was also different. In the absence of non-state enterprises in the USSR, the possibility of emancipation of a citizen from the state was excluded. Simply put, no matter where a person goes to work, he will still work at a state-owned enterprise. In addition, when leaving a job, a Soviet citizen received a reference, without which he could not get a job in a new place. And in this characteristic they could write something that they would not take in the janitors. This system was crowned by a decree of June 26, 1940, according to which citizens were generally forbidden to arbitrarily move from one enterprise to another. In the Reich, the emancipation of a citizen from the state was possible - through the transition to work in a private company.

In the USSR, there was a significantly lower standard of living than in the Reich, which was also due in the first case to the absence, in the second case, to the presence of a private sector in the economy. There were no communal apartments in Germany, while the vast majority of the citizens of the Soviet Union lived in them. There were no ration cards in Germany before the war. In the USSR, they appeared in April 1929 — for bread, so that by the end of the year they would spread to almost all food products, and then to industrial products. In 1931, additional warrants were introduced, since even with cards it was impossible to get the required ration. The Soviet man was suffocating from the shortage of goods. To disperse thousands of queues for an elementary set of everyday goods, outfits of equestrian militia were used.

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lice. The German countryside did not know hunger; in the USSR, the famine of 1932-1933 claimed the lives of 6.5 million rural residents.

In the USSR, the policy of repression was carried out by the lottery method, the possibility of being repressed did not depend on the degree of loyalty to the regime. A person could be arbitrarily devoted to "the cause of the party and personally to comrade Stalin", but this did not give grounds for asserting with certainty that today he would spend the night at home, and not in a pre-trial detention cell. In the Reich there was selectivity in repression. In order to end up behind bars, a person had to come into conflict with the system — prove himself as a social democrat, communist, trade union activist, Austrian separatist, and so on, or belong to a certain social group, primarily to the Jews.

Hence the comparatively greater scope of political repressions in the USSR, which were carried out mainly on the basis of denunciations, the fertile ground for which was again created by a low standard of living. The scope of repressions in the Reich was relatively smaller, since they were carried out mainly taking into account the citizen's belonging to one or another political or social group, which in themselves are not numerous. Arrest by denunciation is a much rarer phenomenon among the Nazis than among the Bolsheviks.

Hitler allowed dissenters to remain silent, Stalin demanded from everyone an active manifestation of delight. In the USSR, unlike the Reich, active non-freedom was practiced. It was not enough to read and listen to official propaganda — everyone is obliged to conduct it himself in order to show his "consciousness" and LOYALTY.

Finally, the atmosphere of social life in the two compared countries was very different. In the USSR, the cloth-tarpaulin style dominated, the squalor of external forms of life was ubiquitous, hypocrisy and the cult of asceticism were planted. Germany remained a secular country even under Hitler.

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MYTH ABOUT "BACKGROUND RUSSIA"

According to modern Soviet patriots, without the October Revolution, "weak, backward Russia" could not have resisted the enemy. And supposedly only industrialization carried out by the Bolsheviks at any cost could pull the country out of the economic hole.

However, the storm movement of the first five-year plans did not at all make up for the "backwardness" of tsarist Russia, but the lag caused by the collapse of the country as a result of the Bolshevik coup. In the Soviet literature itself, much was written about the fact that during the years of the NEP, the level of production in pre-revolutionary Russia was approximately restored by 1927. That is, the October Revolution, the devastating experience of the immediate building of communism, and the resulting Civil War took away ten years of growth from the country (and this is in addition to irreparable human losses, colossal moral trauma and decimated national culture). It was these ten years that made up for the first five-year plans. And, firstly, the Soviet industry gave a pronounced flux in the direction of heavy industry, and that, in turn, in the direction of arms production. The Russian pre-revolutionary industry was reasonably balanced, worked for the needs of society, since the Russian Empire did not seek to spread by force of arms to the extent of the entire globe. Secondly, the Soviet industry developed by lowering the standard of living of citizens, while the Russian industry developed in order to raise this level.

Before the First World War, during the Duma period (1906-1913), the national product of Russia increased at a rate of 6% per year, that is, it doubled every 12 years. Without the cataclysms of 1917-1921, Russia in 1941 would have been at least 4 times more powerful economically than in 1913. And without the "costs" that accompanied the policy of the Bolsheviks.

I foresee an objection: such a development of the country could be slowed down by unforeseen force majeure circumstances.

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evidence. Yes, they could, and they slowed down. The October Revolution is that very force majeure circumstance.

HOW DANGEROUS WAS HITLER?

Stalin miscalculated with the new scheme of the world revolution - Hitler guessed his plans and attacked the USSR himself. The mere development of this scheme makes Stalin a criminal, and the CPSU(b) a criminal organization. But, if in 1941 a gigantic danger loomed over the country and the same Stalin managed to rectify the situation and achieve the victory of Soviet weapons, can this be considered as a rehabilitating factor?

It depends on the answer to a very important question - to what extent did Hitler pose a danger to the biological and cultural existence of the peoples of Russia?

Soviet propagandists did their best to exaggerate the possibilities of the German economy and the armed forces. Ultimately, the wording was born: "The Red Army saved the world from the fascist plague." Obviously, if Hitler had declared that after the victory he would extinguish the sun, Soviet propagandists would say: the Red Army saved the heavenly body for the world.

Hitler's plans indeed included partial extermination and partial enslavement of the peoples of Russia, depriving them of their cultural identity. You can cite a lot of relevant quotations from the leaders of the Reich.

However, intentions and opportunities do not always coincide. German marshals and generals wrote in their memoirs that they could not win World War II. Moreover, some of these works were published in the USSR in very old years, when the thesis about "saving the world" was formed. One thing contradicts the other, but here we have a collection of memoirs of major German commanders under the general heading "Fatal Decisions". Issued in 1958 by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

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Let's give the floor to Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt: "The war with Russia is a senseless undertaking, which, in my opinion, cannot have a happy ending." General G. Blumentritt: "Even a glance at the world map, it was not difficult to understand that a small area in Central Europe, occupied by Germany, clearly could not put up forces capable of capturing and holding the entire European continent. Because of Hitler's policy, the German people and their armed forces were going step by step into a dead end."

And here is the testimony of Lieutenant General Z. Westphal: "The Germans could not even hope for a long time with weapons in their hands to threaten the whole world. The world was simply too big... The main fatal decision was that based on Hitler's erroneous assumption that the Western powers would allow him to destroy Poland without standing up for his ally. As soon as the decision was made to invade Poland, our fate was also decided. Lessons 1914 - 1918 repeated again a quarter of a century later: Germany cannot win a war by fighting it on more than one front"?

Many memoirs of German generals have been published in modern Russia. Anyone can make a large list of statements of similar content.

Yes, as a rule, these statements are the result of "correcting mistakes". The quoted texts were written after the defeat of Germany. It is likely that in 1939 and 1941 the German

the generals and marshals thought otherwise, but so much the worse for them.

You can leave aside the sources of personal origin and turn to the scientific literature. There is no lack in it. Monographs and collective scientific works are written by both Russian and foreign scientists. The multitude of data presented attests to the inevitable final defeat of Germany, regardless of how the course of individual battles might develop. It is enough to compare the total military and economy

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the economic potential of the "axis" and the United Nations, the size of the territories.

Hitler, who "needed to expand the living space", obviously not out of kindness left the southern part of France out of occupation. The Germans could not fully control the occupied territories of the USSR, they did not have enough strength for everything. At the same time, it was planned to reach the Urals. And what to do with the territory beyond the Urals? Germany's main ally, Japan, instead of opening a second front against Stalin in the Far East, dragged Hitler into the war with the United States.

This picture is written with the broadest strokes. Anyone can add to it and refine it. In any case, the history of the Third Reich would have ended no later than August 1945, when the Americans completed work on the creation of the atomic bomb.

Thus, we can conclude:

— Hitler as the political leader of Germany was a product of Stalin;

- Hitler was not able to destroy and enslave the peoples of Russia, although he really wanted to;

— the concept of the saving mission of Bolshevism for the fate of Russia turns out to be completely unconvincing.

NOTES

1 A lot of serious scientific research is devoted to this topic. For example: Felashtinsky Yu. The collapse of the world revolution. Essay first. Brest peace. October 1917 - November 1918. London: OPI, 1991. 655 p.

2 Communist International in documents. Decisions, theses and appeals of the congresses of the Comintern and plenums of the ECCI. 1919 - 1932 / Ed. Bela Kuna. M.: Party publishing house, 1933. S. 47.

3 The book by Yu.L. Dyakova and T.S. Bushueva "The fascist sword was forged in the USSR: the Red Army and the Reichswehr. Secret cooperation. 1922 - 1933. Unknown Documents. M.: Sov. Russia. 1992. 384 p. The authors introduced into scientific circulation a huge array of documents that reveal in detail the nature of Soviet-German military cooperation in this period.

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4 Communist International in Documents... P. 48.

5 Ibid.

6 Westphal 3., Kreipe W. Blumentritt G., Bayerlein F., Zeituler K., Zimmerman B., Manteuffel H. Fatal Decisions / Ed. P.A. Zhilina. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1958. 317 p.

7 Ibid. S. 76.

8 Ibid. S. 108.

9 Ibid. S. 305 - 306.

Yuri Felshtinsky!

READING THE BOOKS "ICEBREAKER" AND "DAY "M" VICTOR SUVOROV

By the irony of our life, politicized history puts on us such blindness visors that you need to be not a historian in order to know the truth. You have to be not a professional to overturn the familiarity of dogmas. One has to be a solitary hermit in order to get rid of the pressure of the always boringly identical opinions of contemporaries outweighing any scale.

This is not how history is born yet, but a spark of truth, under which footnotes and quotations, documents and memoirs will then be knocked out. And, having finished reading on the list of sources used, we will understand that we have before us not just a book, but a historical work - another step, due to the author's abilities, bringing us closer to that unattainable pinnacle of truth, which seeks to know and which never the historian will not enter, unable to feel, study and describe all the twists and turns of the superhuman design.

Among the bureaucratic and banal ideas and people whose books you will never distinguish from each other if you rip out

1 Felshtinsky Yuri Georgievich - Doctor of Historical Sciences, author of the books: "Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries" (Paris, 1985); "On the history of our closedness" (London, 1988; Moscow, 1991); "The collapse of the World Revolution" (London, 1991; Moscow, 1992); "Leaders in Law" (Moscow, 1999); "FSB blows up Russia" (co-authored with A. Litvinenko, New York, 2002). First published in Vestnik #26 (207), December 22, 1998.

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the title pages of the volumes they wrote, Viktor Suvorov's Icebreaker and M Day are outstanding phenomena. And precisely because the author of these books will never convince a large army of professional historians of anything, I am writing these lines in defense of history, in defense of the truth, in defense of the author of such extraordinary books. I am writing with gratitude and jealousy, because quite a long time ago, even before the articles of V. Suvorov began to appear in Russkaya Mysl, I came to the conclusion that "of course" Stalin himself was going to attack Hitler. This is the only way to explain his behavior in 1939 -

1941 (actually earlier).

Where to start? In 1974 I wrote a term paper on the first weeks of the war. My scientific adviser E.E. Shklyar rated it as "written in the spirit of Nekrich", gave it a B and submitted the corresponding memorandum to the dean's office. I realized that I was going in the right direction and showed the work to my father's friend, children's writer Viktor Vazdaev. He was also dissatisfied with the "biased selection of facts and sources" and told me an anecdote of that time: "Before the start of the war, Soviet and German officers meet on the Soviet-German border. The first asks the second:

— And why is it that so many German troops are concentrated on our border?

The second one answers:

"Yes, they were too tired on the Western Front and were transferred here on vacation. By the way, why is it that so many Soviet troops are concentrated on our border?

"And so that nothing prevents the German soldiers from resting," the Soviet officer replies.

So I learned about the concentration of Soviet troops on the border with Germany. From a joke. Thus began my Icebreaker and M-Day. Ten years later, already in the USA, I realized that June 1941 cannot be explained without the history of German-Bolshevik relations during the First World War. Reading now in The Icebreaker (p. 18): "In meaning and spirit, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is a trial Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Lenin's calculation in 1918 and Stalin's calculation in 1939

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the very same ... "- I was both amazed and touched. The author who sees this relationship will understand everything. rest.

As an author dealing with the Treaty of Brest, I, of course, have some comments on the introductory chapters of the book The Icebreaker. But at least V. Suvorov and I speak the same language. And in different ways - with everyone else. When signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin's calculation was more profound. "The defeat of Germany was already close," writes V. Suvorov, "and Lenin makes peace, according to which Russia renounces its rights to the role of the winner ... without a fight. Lenin gives Germany a million square kilometers of the most fertile lands and the richest industrial regions of the country, and he also pays an indemnity in gold. For what?!" ("Icebreaker", p. 17). V. Suvorov's answer: so that the war continues and Germany exhausts itself and its Western allies as much as possible.

It is difficult to disagree with this, with the only caveat that such a statement contradicts the generally accepted opinion about Lenin's desire to kindle a revolutionary fire in Germany as soon as possible. One of two things: either accelerate the revolution in Germany and for this do not sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but wage an open (the position of Bukharin and other left communists) or undeclared (the position of "neither peace, nor war" of Trotsky) war, or, in essence, liquidate the Eastern Front, sign an armistice with Germany and help the German government—let's not forget the epithets: reactionary, imperialist, militaristic—hold a front in the West against Russia's former allies.

Lenin chose the latter. And it was not he who, with the signature of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, broke the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but the Soviet activist, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, who stood in opposition to Lenin's entire Brest policy, signed by Sverdlov, who had already pushed Lenin aside in the struggle for power in the critical months of the second half of 1918. If it were not for the actual removal of Lenin from party affairs in the summer of 1918 (by the way, precisely because of his extremely unpopular Brest policy), the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk might never have been broken by the Soviet

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skim government. And the Rappala Treaty of 1922 would not be considered by us as a breakthrough, but only as a smooth transition from the Brest-Litovsk Agreement to a new, more equal one.

It is hardly possible to agree with the opinion of Trotsky (1936), with which V. Suvorov agrees, that "without Stalin there would be no Hitler." Without the humiliating and unacceptable terms of the Treaty of Versailles for Germany, without the Bolshevik threat looming over Europe, in Germany - yes! There would be no Hitler. And in this sense, Stalin, apparently, is less responsible for the victory of National Socialism in Germany than the statesmen of France, Belgium and England. Trotsky himself, by constantly preaching about the inevitability of the victory of the communist revolution in Germany, helped Hitler much more than anyone else. The facts about Soviet-German cooperation between 1922 and 1941 are now well known (which has always been denied by both sides). Here is what Trotsky wrote, betraying state secrets, on March 5, 1938, in the article "Secret Alliance with Germany", published in the New York Times:

"Since the overthrow of the Hohenzollerns, the [Soviet] government has been striving for a defensive agreement with Germany - against the Entente and the Treaty of Versailles. However, the Social Democracy, which played first fiddle in Germany at that time, was afraid of an alliance with Moscow, pinning its hopes on London and especially Washington. On the contrary, the officers of the Reichswehr, despite their political hatred of communism, considered it necessary

diplomatic and military cooperation with the Soviet republic. Since the countries of the Entente were in no hurry to meet the hopes of social democracy, the "Moscow" orientation of the Reichswehr began to influence government spheres as well. The high point of this period was the signing of the Rappala Treaty on the establishment of friendly relations between Soviet Russia and Germany (April 17, 1922).

The military department, at the head of which I was, began in 1921 to reorganize and rearm

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the Red Army, which switched from martial law to peaceful. Extremely interested in improving military technology, we could only expect assistance from Germany at that time. On the other hand, the Reichswehr, deprived of development opportunities by the Treaty of Versailles, especially in the field of heavy artillery, aviation and chemistry, naturally sought to use the Soviet military industry as an experimental field for military equipment. The streak of German concessions in Soviet Russia opened up at a time when I was completely absorbed in the Civil War. The most important of them in terms of its capabilities, or rather, in its hopes, was the concession of the Junkers aviation company. A certain number of officers revolved around these concessions. In turn, individual representatives of the Red Army visited Germany, where they got acquainted with the organization of the Reichswehr and with that part of the German military "secrets" that they were shown. All this work was carried out, of course, under the cover of secrecy, since the sword of Damocles of Versailles obligations hung over the head of Germany. Officially, the Berlin government did not take any part in this matter and did not even seem to know about it: the formal responsibility lay with the Reichswehr, on the one hand, and the Red Army, on the other. All negotiations and practical steps were carried out in strict secrecy. But this was a secret mainly from the French government as the most immediate enemy. The mystery, of course, did not last long. The agents of the Entente, primarily of France, easily established that there was an aviation plant "Junker" and some other enterprises near Moscow. In Paris, undoubtedly, exaggerated importance was attached to our cooperation with Germany. It did not receive serious development, since neither the Germans nor we had any capital. In addition, mutual distrust was too great. However, semi-friendly ties with the Reichswehr continued later, after 1923, when Krestinsky became ambassador to Berlin.

On the part of Moscow, this policy was carried out not by me alone, but by the Soviet government as a whole, or rather

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say, its leading center, i.e. Politburo. Stalin was a member of the Politburo all this time, and, as all his subsequent behavior showed. Until 1934, when Hitler rejected the outstretched hand from Moscow, Stalin was the most stubborn supporter of cooperation with the Reichswehr and with Germany in general.

The German military concessions were monitored through Rozengolts as a representative of the head of the military department. In view of the danger of introducing military espionage, Dzerzhinsky, the head of the GPU, in cooperation with the same Rozengolts, monitored the concessions from his own side.

In the secret archives of the military department and the GPU, documents should undoubtedly have been preserved in which cooperation with the Reichswehr is spoken of in very cautious and secret terms ... "

Extremely interesting materials on this issue are contained in foreign archives, in particular, in the collection of B. I. Nikolaevsky at the Hoover Institution. Here is what the Menshevik and economist N. V. Valentinov-Volsky wrote in a letter to R. A. Abramovich, one of the leaders of the Menshevik Party:

"Having arrived in Lipetsk in the summer of 1927, to my greatest surprise, I found it full of Germans and in the sky above it there were as many flying airplanes as I had not seen in Moscow at that time. In Lipetsk, there were German arsenals and aerogars guarded by the GPU. All the townsfolk knew about it, but no one dared to talk about it - the GPU arrested such people. At the cemetery in Lipetsk there was a whole corner with monuments in honor of the dead German aviators. [...] When, having arrived from Lipetsk (I took mud baths there) and visited Rykov, in a conversation with him I touched on the German aviators in Lipetsk, he dryly interrupted me, saying: "Excuse me, I'm talking about this with you I won't" (box 591, p. 14. Letter from N.V. Valentinov-Volsky to R.A. Abramovich dated January 28, 1958, pp. 4-6). Since about 1924, communication between the headquarters of the Red Army and Bendelstrasse was carried out through the commanders of the Red Army of high rank (Tukhachevsky and Berzin), and back through

German

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officers who traveled between Berlin and Moscow "on official assignments" (box 508, p. 44. Erich Wollenberg to B. I. Nikolaevskii. Letter from Hamburg to California dated 20 air 1965. Translated from German.).

Valentinov also told Abramovich that since 1924 Junkers had been building aircraft in the USSR and that a plant for the production of asphyxiating gases had been built in Samara. Abramovich was also aware of Soviet-German military cooperation. Here is what he replied to Valentinov:

"I have an extremely extensive material on this, based on more than 225 books, reports, articles, etc. German and other presses. It began during the Civil War, when Chicherin appeared at night at the German embassy to the "heir" of Mirbach von Gelferich and offered him an unspoken military agreement for a joint struggle [together] with the Germans, Finns and Baltics against the British in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. This was in July-August 1918. This cooperation continued before Hitler and under Hitler. The initial period [was] until about 1926; now there is no dispute [...] and what you are now reporting in your letter about Lipetsk and Trotsk (that was the name of the town near Samara, in which there was a chemical gas factory for the Germans. - Yu.F.). All of Germany thundered about these chemical grenades, when the German Social Democrats persuaded the Hamburg loaders to drop several boxes from the Soviet steamer, and grenades with asphyxiating gases with the RSFSR brand were scattered along the entire embankment in front of many people. Then there was a request in parliament, public debates, and this incident was extinguished with difficulty" (box 591, p. 14. Letter from R. Abramovich to N.V. Valentinov Volsky. Feb. 4, 1958, p. 2) .

Much was said about this after the Second World War, when a large number of former Soviet citizens who were captured or interned by the Germans during the war ended up abroad. One of these emigrants, L. Trenin, wrote: "The beginning of German influence must be considered from 1922, when between the Soviet government and Germany there was

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A secret agreement was concluded on the armament and technical equipment of the Red Army. From an economic point of view, this agreement brought Germany some benefit, because it sold part of the military-chemical and aviation stocks left after the Great War and subject to destruction to the Soviet government. [...] In the second half of 1922, German aviation specialists - officers of the Reichswehr - arrived in Moscow, signed a contract for 5 years and founded an aircraft factory in Fili, near Moscow. All technical equipment was brought from Germany. The working and technical staff at first was also German. In the same year, 1922, the first Russian-German aviation society, Deruluft, was founded, which established the first Moscow-Kenigsberg line. At the beginning of 1923, another group of German chemical officers founded 12 km from Moscow between the mountains. Lyubertsy and mountains. Lublin is a small military chemical plant. At first, only a few dozen people worked here, including management personnel. They were exclusively Germans. This plant did not independently produce any chemical products, and its task was only to

equipping mines, artillery chemical projectiles and poison-smoke bombs with chloropicrin, adamsite and other poisonous substances brought from Germany. The plant also tested these mines, shells, checkers, as well as gas waves. All this took place on the territory of the future scientific and testing chemical test site. [...] Gradually, the Bolsheviks created their own chemical cadres and built two powerful chemical plants. [...] When these plants were ready in 1925, the Bolsheviks decided to liquidate the German chemical plant. Since the contract was valid until 1927, [...] one of the autumn September nights of 1925 they set fire to a factory and a house of German employees in Podosinki (17 km from Moscow along the Kazan railway). Only one shed with chemical products remained from the plant, and the residential building burned to the ground. After that, the Bolsheviks accused the Germans of sabotage. [...] Shortly thereafter there was you

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thrown from the aircraft factory in Fili and another German group of aviation specialists "(Box 295, p. 23. P. Trenin. "The Germans and Russian Aviation Chemistry." Newspaper clipping).

Approximately the same is reported by an untitled note from the Nikolaevsky archive:

"As a result of the very hard and painstaking work of the semi-official representatives of the Reichswehr (since 1922), the USSR currently has decent reserves of German property and entire military-industrial organizations (officially "state enterprises of the Voenned"), created at the expense of German Reichswehr and under its direct technical control. [...] The Reichswehr took care mainly of the artillery and machine-gun armament of the Red Army: improvements in the British type of tanks, setting military chemical and aviation to the proper height. In the maritime area, the Reichswehr worked to improve technical diving "(box 14, item 1. Reichswehr and Comintern. No date and no author, pp. 1, 3). Military cooperation was followed by political and even ideological rapprochement. The fight against the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (Rhineland) at the beginning of 1923 was presented literally as an action of the Comintern. Soviet agents were sent there for illegal work. At the same time, "plans for the battle of the Russian-German forces with French imperialism on the Rhine and the supply of the Reichswehr and German nationalists with Soviet grenades" were discussed (box 629, item 3. Sukhomlin V.V. In the ring of betrayal. Trotsky's betrayal, Stalin, Bukharin, the Chinese, the British, and others - Will of Russia, 1926, p. 131).

Differences on the question of Soviet-German relations were one of the causes of the conflict between Stalin and Bukharin. "Bukharin's position was greatly influenced by questions of foreign policy," Nikolaevskii wrote. - It was on them that he broke with Stalin: Bukharin in 1926 came to the conclusion that Germany had ceased to be a country in a semi-colonial position. Remember Bukharin's articles in Pravda in 1926-27, when he argued that after Locarno Germany would cease

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la be an exploited country? After all, this is against Stalin. Stalin held on to an alliance with Bredov-Schleicher's Reichswehr. Ludwig Reiss, who was killed in Switzerland in 1937, received the Order of Lenin for establishing a secret connection with the leaders of German naval intelligence early in 1928. It is from this moment that the purely Stalinist game of secret agents begins - twice underground. In the conversation between Bukharin and Kamenev, it corresponds to hints of Stalin's refusal to punish the Shakhty people for their ties with the Germans" (box 476, item 34. Letter from Nikolaevsky dated October 6, 1965, p. 1; box 472, item 32. Letter from Nikolaevsky to I.M. Berger dated October 2, 1961, sheet 1).

The conversation between Bukharin and Kamenev mentioned by Nikolaevsky took place in July 1928. Just at this time, in May-July, a trial of "pests in the Donbass" was taking place in Moscow - the so-called Shakhty case. The case was fabricated. Five of the accused were sentenced to death by firing squad, the rest to various terms of imprisonment. defendants

accused, among other things, of spying for Germany. And Stalin's proposal not to give death sentences, which Bukharin and his supporters finally insisted on, was seen as flirting with Germany.

"I am impressed by your arguments that Stalin had pro-German sympathies," wrote Nikolayevsky, a former communist and later a well-known Sovietologist, Louis Fischer. — I understand that he would welcome close cooperation with the Reichswehr. It was in the Leninist tradition and began, as I understand it, in 1919, which means that Trotsky and Chicherin, of course, saw an advantage in this. After Hitler came to power in January 1933, Stalin waited a year. I was in Moscow that year.

[...] Moscow has always been afraid of a foreign invasion. In 1934 Radek told me that Stalin feared a simultaneous Polish-Japanese attack against the USSR. For this reason, mainly the CER was sold to Manchukuo (Japan) in 1935. Of course, Stalin dreamed of directing Hitler's expansion to the West. But German

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His military work in Spain did not harm Hitler. It was a way to train the armed forces. The purpose of Stalin's policy in Spain, in my opinion, was to force France and England to abandon the foreign policy of appeasing Hitler and Mussolini and force them to take the path of active opposition. Munich showed that this attempt ended in failure. Chamberlain, Daladier and Roosevelt did not go against Hitler. But during this time, Stalin, through purges, ensured that he was completely free in his actions in foreign and domestic policy. And of course, he has now returned to his goal: to cooperate with

Nazis.

I think that the date preceding the Soviet-Nazi agreement of August 23, 1939, is April 1, 1939, the day of the British guarantees to Poland. [...] Negotiations with France and England were open. Negotiations with Germany are secret. If Stalin wanted to come to an agreement with England and France, he would have acted in exactly the opposite way: he would have conducted open negotiations with Hitler in order to put pressure on the West for even greater concessions. But the West had nothing to give. They could not give up the Baltic states, and an agreement with the West for the USSR meant war, while an agreement with Hitler meant no war for some time and imperialist expansion - just what Stalin wanted. .

We differ on whether [...] Stalin seriously pursued a policy of collective security. I believe that Litvinov was serious in this matter and that he could not act against the will of Stalin. But this policy failed on the Rhine, in Spain, and elsewhere. And Stalin abandoned it and turned to Hitler" (box 479, p. 13. Letter from Louis Fischer (1005 E1sjer) to Nikolaevsky dated January 26, 1966, translated from English).

Nikolaevsky replied: "Slutsky, head of the foreign department of the NKVD, giving instructions to Krivitsky, back in 1935 said: "Know that we will come to an agreement with Germany one way or another." And the true foreign policy was [...] through Slutsky. This latter then spoke to Cree

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Vitsky: "Remember that your reports are carefully read by Stalin himself." [...] Stalin himself always dreamed of collusion with Germany, and, moreover, a big collusion to fight against the Anglo-Saxons. He was a staunch supporter of Haushofer's version of geopolitics, and Haushofer himself sent secret reports to Stalin for many years. And Molotov knew what he was saying when, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet at the signing of the treaty with Hitler, he spoke of Stalin's brilliant foresight. Of course, when Hitler openly pursued an anti-Soviet policy, Stalin could not help speaking out against him, but he always spoke in such a way so as not to make an agreement [impossible in the future. It was his struggle for the Soviet-Hitler pact" (box 479, p. 13. Letter from Nikolaevsky to Louis Fischer dated February 4, 1966, fol. 1).

"In one of our conversations, I told you that Stalin's decision to come to terms with Hitler dates back to April 1936, when it became clear that France would not go against Hitler on her own. Now I have a number of data in this direction. [...] By the way, did you know that the apartment of Wilhelm P in Doorn was a stronghold for the work of Stalin's agents? That the secret pamphlet against Hitler, written by Matilda Ludendorff, was copied by Krivitsky and distributed by Wilhelm's wife? It was in 1936-1938: the generals visiting Doorn were arrested. Krivitsky was convinced that Stalin had betrayed them to Hitler" (box 479, p. 13. Letter from Nikolaevsky to Fischer dated December 14, 1965, fol. 2).

Here it is appropriate to return to the books of V. Suvorov and ask the question whether Hitler and Stalin were going to abide by the agreement. And when exactly the first and second decided to break up.

The undoubted merit of V. Suvorov is that he named the date of Stalin's decision to start hostilities against Germany: August 19, 1939 - the day the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed. It may seem paradoxical, but this is the only way to explain all the further behavior of Stalin, to which V. Suvorov devotes his books.

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There are no riddles in terms of Hitler's position. It can be argued that he made the fundamental decision to break with Stalin during Molotov's visit to Berlin at the end of 1940. Molotov then demanded from the Germans consent to the Soviet occupation of Romania, Bulgaria, Finland and the Straits. Hitler responded with a decisive refusal and signed a directive to attack the USSR.

Just before the war, in the financial year 1938/39, Germany spent 15% of its national income on armaments, the same amount as England. Hitler did not want to arm himself at the expense of the welfare of the German people. In addition, this could lead to a decline in his popularity.

In the Soviet Union, 26.4% of all budget appropriations were officially spent on defense spending in the first three years of the Third Five-Year Plan, and in 1940 this percentage was 32.6. And in 1941, it was planned to spend 43.4% of budget appropriations on defense.

These dry figures lead us to the conclusion that the Soviet government was preparing for war. However, until August 19, 1939, Germany was not the main foreign policy enemy of the USSR. That enemy was Japan, and Stalin's policy towards the Chinese revolution of 1926-1927 was connected primarily with the age-old Soviet-Japanese conflict.

The refusal of the Soviet government to openly intervene in the Chinese revolution, on which Trotsky's "left opposition" so insisted, was another "Brest-Litovsk agreement". Everything developed according to the scheme of 1918, only in the place of Lenin was Stalin, in the place of Bukharin - Trotsky. Like the left communists of 1918, the left opposition convinced the party activists that the policy of the Soviet government towards the Chinese revolution would certainly lead to its defeat. Like Lenin in 1918, Stalin did not want to take risks, because he understood that active interference in Chinese affairs would lead to a conflict with Japan, and the USSR was not ready for it. Stalin sacrificed the revolution in China, as Lenin sacrificed

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revolution in Germany - for the sake of respite. The Chinese revolution did end in defeat, but time was won, and the first serious conflict with Japan broke out only in 1938, when the Soviet state was much stronger.

Back in 1937, the creation of a powerful industrial base in the Urals, the Far East, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia began. Today, this fact is cited as proof of the far-sightedness of the Soviet government, which almost foresaw not only the war with Germany, but also the evacuation of industry carried out during the war years. Meanwhile, in the late 1930s, Japan was the main foreign policy enemy of the USSR. Just in September 1937

Soviet troops were sent to Mongolia. Somewhat earlier, in the summer of 1937, the Japanese began to seize China. In July, Beijing was occupied by them, in November - Shanghai, in December - Nanjing. By October 1938, they had occupied a significant part of China with the main industrial centers and the most important railway lines.

Historians point out that Japan's foreign policy goals were to capture the Soviet Far East. During 1936-1938, 35 major military clashes with Japanese troops took place on the Soviet-Far Eastern border, the most serious of which was a clash at the end of July 1938 in the area of Lake Khasan. Only as a result of fierce battles that lasted until August 9, 1938, the Soviet territory was cleared of the Japanese. In May 1939 Japan started a war against Mongolia (and indirectly against the USSR). Military operations on the Khalkhin Gol River lasted four months and ended after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in August 1939, thanks also to the mediation of Hitler.

Thus, the creation of the second economic base of the USSR in the east of the country was by no means caused by the expectation of a war with Germany, but only by the desire to move the industrial base closer to the potential front - the Far East.

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The question of the creation by the Soviet Union of a second economic base did not bother Hitler all the more. Directive No. 21 of the High Command ("Plan Barbarossa") provided for victory over the USSR "in the course of a short campaign even before the war against England is over." But it is not worth repeating, following the Soviet historians, that Hitler lost because he did not take into account the "ideological factor" — the courage of the Red Army. It is safe to say that this is the only thing he took into account. The report of the German General Staff "On the political and moral stability of the Soviet Union and on the combat power of the Red Army" dated January 1, 1941, in particular, stated: "The armed forces of the Soviet Union, apparently, should be rebuilt on a new basis, especially with taking into account the experience of the Finnish war. From the Bolshevik megalomania... The Red Army returns to scrupulous individual training of officers and rank and file... Discipline becomes much stricter (abolition of the institution of commissars; introduction of officer and sergeant ranks; general uniform; saluting ..). All these measures should ensure the gradual improvement of the Red Army in all areas of service ... The Russian national character will not change: heaviness, schematism, fear of making independent decisions, of responsibility. Commanders of all levels in the near future will not yet be able to effectively command large modern formations and their elements. Both now and in the near future, they will hardly be able to carry out major offensive operations, use the favorable situation for swift strikes, and show initiative within the framework of the overall task set by the command. The troops... will fight bravely. But the mass of soldiers does not meet the requirements of modern offensive combat, especially in the field of interaction between all branches of the armed forces; a lone fighter will often lack his own initiative. In defense, especially prepared in advance, the Red Army will prove to be enduring and stubborn, and will be able to achieve good results.

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comrade The ability to withstand defeat and to passively resist enemy pressure is especially characteristic of the Russian character. The strength of the Red Army lies in a large number of weapons, unpretentiousness, hardening and courage of a soldier. The natural ally of the army is the open spaces of the country and impassability. The weakness lies in the sluggishness of commanders of all levels, attachment to the scheme, insufficient education for modern conditions, fear of responsibility and a widespread lack of organization.

The first days of the war turned out to be much easier for the Germans than all their plans foresaw. On June 22, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff, General Halder, wrote in his official diary: "The offensive of our troops, apparently, was a complete tactical attack on the entire front.

suddenness. The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers have been everywhere captured by our troops without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks position, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do. . An even greater influence of the element of surprise on the further course of events can be expected as a result of the rapid advance of units, for which at present there is a full opportunity everywhere. The naval command also reports that the enemy seems to have been taken by surprise. In recent days, he has been completely passive in observing all the activities carried out by us and is now concentrating his naval forces in ports, apparently fearing mines ...

The Air Force command reported that our air force had destroyed 800 enemy aircraft. Our aviation managed to mine the approaches to Leningrad from the sea without loss. German losses are still 10 aircraft.

The command of the Army Group "South" reported that on

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our patrols crossed the Prut without resistance... The bridges are in our hands...

The protection of the border itself was, in general, weak... After the initial "tetanus" caused by the suddenness of the attack, the enemy proceeded to active operations... In a number of sectors of the front, there was almost no leadership of the troops from the higher headquarters... It seems that that the Russian command, due to its sluggishness, will not be able to organize an operational countermeasure to our offensive in the near future ... There is no organized resistance ... "

Hitler could be pleased. It was different with Stalin. Khrushchev testifies in his memoirs that Stalin deserted, leaving the reins of government. The remaining members of the government, primarily Molotov and Beria, tried at all costs to resolve the "conflict" that had begun with Hitler. As Halder wrote in his diary, "they asked Japan to represent Russia's interests on political and economic relations between Russia and Germany, and are engaged in lively radio talks with the German Foreign Office."

The negotiations were unsuccessful. Hitler was as sure of his victory as Stalin was of his defeat. In the autumn of 1941, the German government decided to curtail its military industry. On October 3, 1941, Hitler declared: "We have provided everything in advance in such a way that I, in the midst of the battle, can suspend further production of weapons in large industries, because I know that now there is no enemy that we could not crush with the help of the existing stockpile of weapons".

By September 1941, Germany's manpower reserves had not, in fact, been affected by serious mobilizations, although by June 1941 the number of German troops had reached 7,254,000. While the Soviet government on the first day of the war issued an order

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on the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918, the German army did not carry out additional mobilizations after the attack on the USSR.

Nothing changed after the defeat near Moscow, except for the January order of Hitler in 1942 on the redistribution of budgetary appropriations within the military department. Expenditures on the most expensive type of weapons - warships - were reduced, and expenditures on armament of the ground forces increased.

Only after the defeat at Stalingrad did Hitler begin to approach the war with the USSR more seriously. On January 13, 1943, the so-called total mobilization was announced in Germany. But it did not consist in mobilization as such, but in the registration for military work of men aged 16 to 65 and women aged 17 to 45. Nevertheless, despite the serious situation on the fronts of Germany, women's labor in German industry until 1944 was practically not used, as well as children's, as it was believed that this corrupted the family and had a bad effect on the morale of men, who were in the army. Women's and children's labor in Germany was partly compensated by the labor of foreign workers and prisoners of war, of which by the spring of 1943 there were 6,259,900 people in German industry. Thus, if the Soviet industry from the first to the last day of the war worked for wear and tear and all healthy men were mobilized into the army, and the unhealthy, teenagers and old people - into the militia, Germany only in 1943-1944, under the influence of the defeat at Stalingrad and Allied bombing of German cities began to take the war seriously.

The German armaments industry reached its highest productivity in the days when Allied bombing was at its height, in July 1944. Then, in the second half of 1944, the size of the German army, despite numerous losses on the fronts, in general, was easily brought up to 9,400,000 people.

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After the summer of 1944, due to the bombing and loss of territory, there was a decline in the German military industry. And yet, in March 1945, Germany produced more weapons than in June 1941, when Hitler started the war against the USSR.

In one of his speeches, Stalin called the war a competition of systems, in which the socialist system proved its advantages over the national socialist one. The Soviet system was certainly more totalitarian. In terms of mobilizing the population for the front or work in the rear, it was ready to go much further than the National Socialist. Already at the very beginning of the war in the USSR, the peaceful sector of industry, including the food industry, was reduced to nothing. Even Poles under German occupation, mobilized to work in factories, ate better than the Soviet rear.

But even with the unimaginable tension experienced by the Soviet economy and the Soviet people, the war still would not have been won without the economic help of the allies, primarily the United States. The question of this assistance is hushed up by Soviet historiography. Among thousands of books about the Second World War, there is not a single one devoted specifically to this topic. Meanwhile, the help was substantial.

England began deliveries to the USSR in August 1941. In the last quarter alone, it delivered 669 aircraft, 487 tanks, and 330 tankettes. The United States supplied the Soviet Union with arms and strategic raw materials worth \$41 million in the first months of the Soviet-German war. At that time, due to the occupation by Germany of a significant part of the European territory of the USSR and the beginning of the evacuation of industry and its transfer to a military footing, the Soviet Union actually did not produce weapons. In light of this, the importance of initial Allied supplies becomes clear.

On October 30, 1941, that is, even before the Battle of Moscow, when the USSR was in a catastrophic situation, the United States provided the Soviet government with an interest-free loan of 1 billion dollars, then, on November 7,

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extended to the USSR the effect of the law on Lend-Lease, adopted by the US Congress on March 11, 1941. Finally, in February 1942, the US doubled its credit to the Soviet government, bringing it to \$2 billion. (The loan amounts were never repaid by the Soviet government.)

During the war years through Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Vladivo

stock and Iran America and England delivered to the USSR 18,700 aircraft, 10,800 tanks, 9,600 guns, 2,600,000 tons of oil products, 44,600 machine tools, 1,860 steam locomotives, 11,300 platforms, more than 500,000 tons of non-ferrous metals, more than 172,000 tons of cable and wires. The total amount of US aid alone amounted to \$9.5 billion. Even Canada imported into the USSR in 1942-1944. 355 thousand tons of cargo, including tanks (1188), armored personnel carriers (842), trucks (2568), shells (827,000). The pride of the Soviet army, the T-34 tank, was made from English armor. The Soviet army ate American and Canadian bread and the famous American stew. From neutral Sweden, machine tools, presses, cranes, power equipment and rolled steel went to the USSR. During the war years, the USSR exported 700,000 heads of cattle, 4,900,000 heads of small cattle and 400,000 horses from Mongolia during the war years.

12% of all aircraft and 10% of all tanks in the Red Army were delivered by the Allies. But if most of the tanks and aircraft were nevertheless produced in the USSR (albeit from raw materials imported by the Allies), then the Allies supplied one type of equipment completely - motor vehicles. The US delivered 52,000 jeeps and 375,000 trucks to the USSR. There are no indications of the production by the Soviet Union during the war of its own trucks and cars in the historical literature. Without American trucks and Mongolian horses, the Red Army would have been completely paralyzed.

The scale of allied assistance will be even greater if we take into account that approximately 15% of all cargo sent from the USA and Great Britain to the USSR was destroyed by the Germans before reaching their destination. Biggest

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The greatest losses were in March-April 1942, when a quarter of all ships following the northern route were sunk by German aircraft and submarines. As a result, out of 2,505 aircraft sent to the USSR in 1942, only 1,550–1,650 were delivered. Soviet historians only concluded from this that losses during transportation cannot "justify the systematic underperformance by the Allies of deliveries to the USSR" (History of the Socialist Economy USSR, V. 5, Moscow, 1978, p. 545). Even here the allies were to blame!

Knowing this, one can determine not only Hitler's miscalculations, but also Stalin's mistakes. From the point of view of the competition of systems, the Soviet system, of course, proved its complete failure. Despite all the efforts made both in the period 1939-1941 and after the German attack, Soviet industry was unable to recover from the losses suffered in the first months of the Soviet-German war. Obviously, the war with Germany, for which the Soviet government had been preparing, at least since August 19, 1939, would not have been won without the economic assistance of the allies and, most importantly, without the US military intervention. In this sense, one has to draw a conclusion about the economic weakness of the Soviet system in comparison with the German one.

To study the problems of the initial period of the Second World War, V. Suvorov did more than all Soviet and Western historiography. He found answers to many questions that have tormented us for decades. He explained a lot, and he explained, of course, correctly. His contribution is inestimable. And I always catch myself wanting to shower the author with praise. But precisely because V. Suvorov set himself the task of turning historiography on the problem of the initial period of the Second World War, it is necessary to dwell on what hinders any serious reader most of all.

The first and, I think, the most important thing is the lack of references to sources. According to the rules of the genre - and V. Suvorov's books are written in the genre of historical work - these references are necessary. Meanwhile, they are given very selectively.

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And their absence for the bulk of the books makes it impossible to realize the main goal of the author: to convince not only the ordinary reader, but above all historians that the foreign policy of the Soviet government, and in particular the events of 1941, should be assessed differently.

The second obvious disadvantage of V. Suvorov's books is their excessive emotionality or, as we would say, their journalistic style. Precisely because V. Suvorov's books are historical and not journalistic, they should have been written differently. V. Suvorov and his books will form the views of new generations of historians on the topics he touched upon. And for this you need a calm and confident style of the attacker, and not countless shooting in defense from the vast Soviet historiography on the problems of the Second World War.

In conclusion, a few words about another date set by V. Suvorov: July 6, 1941, "M Day". The arguments given by the author in favor of this date are very serious. And yet here we apparently cannot do without additional information, which is not yet available. Maybe the currently inaccessible archives will help us. Perhaps the minutes of the Politburo meeting on June 21, 1941 will become known. As a historian, I am inclined to believe that V. Suvorov is right. If it turns out that "M-Day" was scheduled for July 13 or 20, this, in the end, will not be so important. V. Suvorov opened for us a whole layer of our history. This is his greatest merit. In his footsteps, I am sure, others will now follow - correcting, supplementing and clarifying. They will be second, third... tenth. Viktor Suvorov was the first.

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There are books that are destined not only to become bestsellers, but to literally turn over all previous ideas, blow up public consciousness, rewrite the past once and for all in order to CHANGE THE WORLD no less. So it was with Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. So it was with the "Icebreaker" by Viktor Suvorov. And no matter how much the Kremlin agitprop rages, no matter how the trained historians—"anti-rezunists" curse its books, they will not be able to silence its revelations, nor save the Stalinist mythology of the Second World War, nor shut up the mouths of the numerous followers of Viktor Suvorov who continue it. case and find more and more confirmation of his discoveries. Despite the tacit censorship and persecution of dissidents, the process. rethinking of history can no longer be stopped. Proof of what -

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